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REILLY OF WATFORD

THE
PROSE WORKS
OF
SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART.
VOL. 16.



The Pollerophon, Plymouth Sound.

THE
MISCELLANEOUS PROSE WORKS
OF
SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART.

VOL. XVI.

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LIFE

OF

NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE,

WITH A

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION.

BY

SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART.

VOL. IX.

ROBERT CADELL, EDINBURGH;

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1835.



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LIFE

OF

NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

Strength of the two armies.—Plans of their Generals.—

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO commenced on the forenoon of the 18th June.—French attack directed against the British centre—shifted to their right—charges of the Cuirassiers—and their reception.—Advance of the Prussians.—Ney's charge at the head of the Guards.—His repulse—and Napoleon's orders for retreat.—The victorious Generals meet at La Belle Alliance.—Behaviour of Napoleon during the engagement.—Blucher's pursuit of the French.—Loss of the British—of the French.—Napoleon's subsequent attempts to undervalue the military skill of the Duke of Wellington answered.—His unjust censures of Grouchy.—The notion that the British were on the point of losing the battle when the Prussians came up, shown to be erroneous.

THERE might be a difference of opinion, in a mere military question, whether the English general ought to have hazarded a battle for the defence of Brussels, or whether, falling back on the strong city of Antwerp, it might have been safer to wait

the arrival of the reinforcements which were in expectation. But in a moral and political point of view, the protecting Brussels was of the last importance. Napoleon has declared, that, had he gained the battle of Waterloo, he had the means of revolutionizing Belgium;¹ and although he was doubtless too sanguine in this declaration, yet unquestionably the French had many partisans in a country which they had so long possessed. The gaining of the battle of Ligny had no marked results, still less had the indecisive action at Quatrebras; but had these been followed by the retreat of the English army to Antwerp, and the capture of Brussels, the capital city of the Netherlands, they would then have attained the rank of great and decisive victories.

Napoleon, indeed, pretended to look to still more triumphant results from such a victory, and to expect nothing less than the dissolution of the European Alliance as the reward of a decided defeat of the English in Belgium. So long as it was not mentioned by what means this was to be accomplished, those who had no less confidence in Napoleon's intrigues than his military talents, must have supposed that he had already in preparation among the foreign powers some deep scheme, tending to sap the foundation of their alliance, and ready to be carried into action when he should attain a certain point of success. But when it is explained, that these extensive expectations rested on Napoleon's belief that a single defeat of the Duke of Wellington would occasion a total change

¹ [Montholon, t. ii. p. 283.]

of government in England ; that the statesmen of the Opposition would enter into office as a thing of course, and instantly conclude a peace with him ;¹ and that the coalition, thus deprived of subsidies, must therefore instantly withdraw the armies which were touching the French frontier on its whole northern and eastern line,—Napoleon's extravagant speculations can only serve to show how very little he must have known of the English nation, with which he had been fighting so long. The war with France had been prosecuted more than twenty years, and though many of these were years of bad success and defeat, the nation had persevered in a resistance which terminated at last in complete triumph. The national opinion of the great general who led the British troops, was too strongly rooted to give way upon a single misfortune ; and the event of the campaign of 1814, in which Napoleon, repeatedly victorious, was at length totally defeated and dethroned, would have encouraged a more fickle people than the English to continue the war notwithstanding a single defeat, if such an event had unhappily occurred. The duke had the almost impregnable fortress and seaport of Antwerp in his rear, and might have waited there the reinforcements from America. Blucher had often shown how little he was disheartened by defeat ; at worst, he would have fallen back on a

¹ [“My intentions were, to attack and to destroy the English. This, I knew, would produce an immediate change of ministry. The indignation against them would have excited such a popular commotion, that they would have been turned out ; and peace would have been the result.”—*NAPOLEON, Voice, &c.* v. i. p. 176.]

Russian army of 200,000 men, who were advancing on the Rhine. The hopes, therefore, that the battle of Waterloo, if gained by the French, would have finished the war, must be abandoned as visionary, whether we regard the firm and manly character of the great personage at the head of the British monarchy, the state of parties in the House of Commons, where many distinguished members of the Opposition had joined the Ministry on the question of the war, or the general feeling of the country, who saw with resentment the new irruption of Napoleon. It cannot, however, be denied, that any success gained by Napoleon in this first campaign, would have greatly added to his influence both in France and other countries, and might have endangered the possession of Flanders. The Duke of Wellington resolved, therefore, to protect Brussels, if possible, even by the risk of a general action.

By the march from Quatre-bras to Waterloo, the duke had restored his communication with Blücher, which had been dislocated by the retreat of the Prussians to Wavre. When established there, Blücher was once more upon the same line with the British, the distance between the Prussian right flank, and the British left, being about five leagues, or five leagues and a half. The ground which lay between the two extreme points, called the heights of St Lambert, was exceedingly rugged and wooded; and the cross-roads which traversed it, forming the sole means of communication between the English and Prussians, were dreadfully broken up by the late tempestuous weather.

The duke despatched intelligence of his position in front of Waterloo to Prince Blücher, acquainting him at the same time with his resolution to give Napoleon the battle which he seemed to desire, providing the prince would afford him the support of two divisions of the Prussian army. The answer was worthy of the indefatigable and indomitable old man, who was never so much disconcerted by defeat as to prevent his being willing and ready for combat on the succeeding day. He sent for reply, that he would move to the Duke of Wellington's support, not with two divisions only, but with his whole army; and that he asked no time to prepare for the movement, longer than was necessary to supply food and serve out cartridges to his soldiers.

It was three o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th,¹ when the British came on the field, and took

¹ ["All his arrangements having been effected early in the evening of the 17th, the Duke of Wellington rode across the country to Blücher, to inform him personally that he had thus far effected the plan agreed on at Bry, and express his hope to be supported on the morrow by two Prussian divisions. The veteran replied, that he would leave a single corps to hold Grouchy at bay as well as they could, and march himself with the rest of his army upon Waterloo; and Wellington immediately returned to his post. The fact of the duke and Blücher having met between the battles of Ligny and Waterloo, is well known to many of the superior officers then in the Netherlands; but the writer of this compendium has never happened to see it mentioned in print. The horse that carried the Duke of Wellington through this long night's journey, so important to the decisive battle of the 18th, remained till lately—if it does not still remain—a free pensioner in the best paddock of Strathfieldsaye."—*Hist. of Nap. Buonaparte*, Family Library, v. ii. p. 313.]

up their bivouac for the night in the order of battle in which they were to fight the next day. It was much later before Napoleon reached the heights of Belle Alliance in person, and his army did not come up in full force till the morning of the 18th. Great part of the French had passed the night in the little village of Genappe, and Napoleon's own quarters had been at the farm-house called Caillou, about a mile in the rear of La Belle Alliance.

In the morning, when Napoleon had formed his line of battle, his brother Jerome, to whom he ascribed the possession of very considerable military talents, commanded on the left—Counts Reille and D'Erlon the centre—and Count Lobau on the right. Mareschals Soult and Ney acted as lieutenant-generals to the Emperor. The French force on the field consisted probably of about 75,000 men. The English army did not exceed that number, at the highest computation. Each army was commanded by the chief, under whom they had offered to defy the world. So far the forces were equal. But the French had the very great advantage of being trained and experienced soldiers of the same nation, whereas the English, in the Duke of Wellington's army, did not exceed 35,000; and although the German Legion were veteran troops, the other soldiers under his command were those of the German contingents, lately levied, unaccustomed to act together, and in some instances suspected to be lukewarm to the cause in which they were engaged; so that it would have been imprudent to trust more to their assistance and co-operation than could possibly be avoided.

In Buonaparte's mode of calculating, allowing one Frenchman to stand as equal to one Englishman, and one Englishman or Frenchman against two of any other nation, the inequality of force on the Duke of Wellington's side was very considerable.

The British army thus composed, was divided into two lines. The right of the first line consisted of the second and fourth English divisions, the third and sixth Hanoverians, and the first corps of Belgians, under Lord Hill. The centre was composed of the corps of the Prince of Orange, with the Brunswickers and troops of Nassau, having the guards, under General Cooke, on the right, and the division of General Alten on the left. The left wing consisted of the divisions of Picton, Lambert, and Kempt. The second line was in most instances formed of the troops deemed least worthy of confidence, or which had suffered too severely in the action of the 16th to be again exposed until extremity. It was placed behind the declivity of the heights to the rear, in order to be sheltered from the cannonade, but sustained much loss from shells during the action. The cavalry were stationed in the rear, distributed all along the line, but chiefly posted on the left of the centre, to the east of the Charle-roi causeway. The farm-house of La Haye Sainte, in the front of the centre, was garrisoned, but there was not time to prepare it effectually for defence. The villa, gardens, and farm-yard of Hougomont formed a strong advanced post towards the centre of the right. The whole British position formed a sort of curve, the centre of which was nearest to

the enemy, and the extremities, particularly on their right, drawn considerably backward.

The plans of these two great generals were extremely simple. The object of the Duke of Wellington was to maintain his line of defence, until the Prussians coming up, should give him a decided superiority of force. They were expected about eleven or twelve o'clock; but the extreme badness of the roads, owing to the violence of the storm, detained them several hours later.

Napoleon's scheme was equally plain and decided. He trusted, by his usual rapidity of attack, to break and destroy the British army before the Prussians should arrive in the field; after which, he calculated to have an opportunity of destroying the Prussians, by attacking them on their march through the broken ground interposed betwixt them and the British. In these expectations he was the more confident, that he believed Grouchy's force, detached on the 17th in pursuit of Blucher, was sufficient to retard, if not altogether to check, the march of the Prussians. His grounds for entertaining this latter opinion, were, as we shall afterwards show, too hastily adopted.

Commencing the action according to his usual system, Napoleon kept his guard in reserve, in order to take opportunity of charging with them, when repeated attacks of column after column, and squadron after squadron, should induce his wearied enemy to show some symptoms of irresolution. But Napoleon's movements were not very rapid. His army had suffered by the storm even more than the English, who were in bivouac at three in the after-

noon of the 17th June; while the French were still under march, and could not get into line on the heights of La Belle Alliance until ten or eleven o'clock of the 18th. The English army had thus some leisure to take food, and to prepare their arms before the action; and Napoleon lost several hours ere he could commence the attack. Time was, indeed, inestimably precious for both parties, and hours, nay, minutes, were of importance. But of this Napoleon was less aware than was the Duke of Wellington.

The tempest, which had raged with tropical violence all night, abated in the morning; but the weather continued gusty and stormy during the whole day. Betwixt eleven and twelve, before noon, on the memorable 18th June, this dreadful and decisive action commenced, with a cannonade on the part of the French, instantly followed by an attack, commanded by Jerome, on the advanced post of Hougomont. The troops of Nassau, which occupied the wood around the chateau, were driven out by the French, but the utmost efforts of the assailants were unable to force the house, garden, and farm-offices, which a party of the guards sustained with the most dauntless resolution. The French redoubled their efforts, and precipitated themselves in numbers on the exterior hedge, which screens the garden-wall, not perhaps aware of the internal defence afforded by the latter. They fell in great numbers on this point by the fire of the defenders, to which they were exposed in every direction. The number of their troops, however, enabled them, by possession of the wood, to mask Hougomont for

a time, and to push on with their cavalry and artillery against the British right, which formed in squares to receive them. The fire was incessant, but without apparent advantage on either side. The attack was at length repelled so far, that the British again opened their communication with Hougoumont, and that important garrison was reinforced by Colonel Hepburn and a body of the guards.

Mean time, the fire of artillery having become general along the line, the force of the French attack was transferred to the British centre. It was made with the most desperate fury, and received with the most stubborn resolution. The assault was here made upon the farm-house of Saint Jean by four columns of infantry, and a large mass of cuirassiers, who took the advance. The cuirassiers came with the utmost intrepidity along the Genappe causeway, where they were encountered and charged by the English heavy cavalry; and a combat was maintained at the sword's point, till the French were driven back on their own position, where they were protected by their artillery. The four columns of French infantry, engaged in the same attack, forced their way forward beyond the farm of La Haye Sainte, and dispersing a Belgian regiment, were in the act of establishing themselves in the centre of the British position, when they were attacked by the brigade of General Pack, brought up from the second line by General Picton, while, at the same time, a brigade of British heavy cavalry wheeled round their own infantry, and attacked the French charging columns in flank, at the moment when they were checked by the fire of the mus-

ketry. The results were decisive. The French columns were broken with great slaughter, and two eagles, with more than 2000 men, were made prisoners. The latter were sent instantly off for Brussels.

The British cavalry, however, followed their success too far. They got involved amongst the French infantry and some hostile cavalry which were detached to support them, and were obliged to retire with considerable loss. In this part of the action, the gallant General Picton, so distinguished for enterprise and bravery, met his death, as did General Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry.

About this period the French made themselves masters of the farm of La Haye Sainte, cutting to pieces about two hundred Hanoverian sharpshooters, by whom it was most gallantly defended. The French retained this post for some time, till they were at last driven out of it by shells.

Shortly after this event, the scene of conflict again shifted to the right, where a general attack of French cavalry was made on the squares, chiefly towards the centre of the British right, or between that and the causeway. They came up with the most dauntless resolution, in despite of the continued fire of thirty pieces of artillery, placed in front of the line, and compelled the artillerymen, by whom they were served, to retreat within the squares. The enemy had no means, however, to secure the guns, or even to spike them, and at every favourable moment the British artillerymen sallied from their place of refuge, again manned their pieces, and fired on the assailants—a manœuvre

which seems peculiar to the British service.¹ The cuirassiers, however, continued their dreadful onset, and rode up to the squares in the full confidence, apparently, of sweeping them before the impetuosity of their charge. Their onset and reception was like a furious ocean pouring itself against a chain of insulated rocks. The British squares stood unmoved, and never gave fire until the cavalry were within ten yards, when men rolled one way, horses galloped another, and the cuirassiers were in every instance driven back.

The French authors have pretended, that squares were broken, and colours taken ; but this assertion, upon the united testimony of every British officer present, is a positive untruth. This was not, however, the fault of the cuirassiers, who displayed an almost frantic valour. They rallied again and again, and returned to the onset, till the British could recognise even the faces of individuals among their enemies. Some rode close up to the bayonets, fired their pistols, and cut with their swords with reckless and useless valour. Some stood at gaze, and were destroyed by the musketry and artillery. Some squadrons, passing through the intervals of the first line, charged the squares of Belgians posted there, with as little success. At length the cuirassiers

¹ Baron Muffling, speaking of this peculiarity, says—"The English artillery have a rule not to remove their guns, when attacked by cavalry in a defensive position. The field pieces are worked till the last moment, and the men then throw themselves into the nearest square, bearing off the implements they use for serving the guns. If the attack is repulsed, the artillerymen hurry back to their pieces, to fire on the retreating enemy. This is an extremely laudable practice, if the infantry be properly arranged to correspond with it."

suffered so severely on every hand, that they were compelled to abandon the attempt, which they had made with such intrepid and desperate courage. In this unheard-of struggle, the greater part of the French heavy cavalry were absolutely destroyed. Buonaparte hints at it in his bulletin as an attempt made without orders, and continued only by the desperate courage of the soldiers and their officers.¹ It is certain that, in the destruction of this noble body of cuirassiers, he lost the corps which might have been most effectual in covering his retreat. After the broken remains of this fine cavalry were drawn off, the French confined themselves for a time to a heavy cannonade, from which the British sheltered themselves in part by lying down on the ground, while the enemy prepared for an attack on another quarter, and to be conducted in a different manner.

It was now about six o'clock, and during this long succession of the most furious attacks, the French had gained no success save occupying for a time the wood around Hougomont, from which they had been expelled, and the farm house of La Haye Sainte, which had been also recovered. The British, on the other hand, had suffered very severely, but had not lost one inch of ground, save the

¹ [“By a movement of impatience, which has often been so fatal to us, the cavalry of reserve having perceived a retrograde movement made by the English to shelter themselves from our batteries, crowned the heights of Mount St Jean, and charged the infantry. This movement, which, made in time, and supported by the reserves, must have decided the day, made in an isolated manner, and before affairs on the right were terminated, became fatal.”—*Bulletin, Moniteur*, June 21.]

two posts, now regained. Ten thousand men were, however, killed and wounded; some of the foreign regiments had given way, though others had shown the most desperate valour. And the ranks were thinned both by the actual fugitives, and by the absence of individuals, who left the bloody field for the purpose of carrying off the wounded, and some of whom might naturally be in no hurry to return to so fatal a scene.

But the French, besides losing about 15,000 men, together with a column of prisoners more than 2000 in number, began now to be disturbed by the operations of the Prussians on their right flank; and the secret of the Duke of Wellington was disclosing itself by its consequences. Blucher, faithful to his engagement, had, early in the morning, put in motion Bulow's division, which had not been engaged at Ligny, to communicate with the English army, and operate a diversion on the right flank and rear of the French. But although there were only about twelve or fourteen miles between Wavre and the field of Waterloo, yet the march was, by unavoidable circumstances, much delayed. The rugged face of the country, together with the state of the roads, so often referred to, offered the most serious obstacles to the progress of the Prussians, especially as they moved with an unusually large train of artillery. A fire, also, which broke out in Wavre, on the morning of the 18th, prevented Bulow's corps from marching through that town, and obliged them to pursue a circuitous and inconvenient route. After traversing, with great difficulty, the cross-roads by Chapelle Lambert,

Bulow, with the 4th Prussian corps, who had been expected by the Duke of Wellington about 11 o'clock, announced his arrival by a distant fire, about half-past four. The first Prussian corps, following the same route with Bulow, was yet later in coming up. The second division made a lateral movement in the same direction as the fourth and first, but by the hamlet of Ohain, nearer to the English flank. The Emperor instantly opposed to Bulow, who appeared long before the others, the 6th French corps, which he had kept in reserve for that service ; and, as only the advanced guard was come up, they succeeded in keeping the Prussians in check for the moment. The first and second Prussian corps appeared on the field still later than the fourth. The third corps had put themselves in motion to follow in the same direction, when they were furiously attacked by the French under Mareschal Grouchy, who, as already stated, was detached to engage the attention of Blucher, whose whole force he believed he had before him.

Instead of being surprised, as an ordinary general might have been, with this attack upon his rear, Blucher contented himself with sending back orders to Thielman, who commanded the third corps, to defend himself as well as he could upon the line of the Dyle. In the mean time, without weakening the army under his own command, by detaching any part of it to support Thielman, the veteran rather hastened than suspended his march towards the field of battle, where he was aware that the war was likely to be decided in a manner so complete,

as would leave victory or defeat on every other point a matter of subordinate consideration.

At half-past six, or thereabouts, the second grand division of the Prussian army began to enter into communication with the British left, by the village of Ohain, while Bulow pressed forward from Chappelle Lambert on the French right and rear, by a hollow, or valley, called Frischemont. It became now evident that the Prussians were to enter seriously into the battle, and with great force. Napoleon had still the means of opposing them, and of achieving a retreat, at the certainty, however, of being attacked upon the ensuing day by the combined armies of Britain and Prussia. His celebrated Guard had not yet taken any part in the conflict, and would now have been capable of affording him protection after a battle which, hitherto, he had fought at disadvantage, but without being defeated. But the circumstances by which he was surrounded must have pressed on his mind at once. He had no succours to look for; a reunion with Grouchy was the only resource which could strengthen his forces; the Russians were advancing upon the Rhine with forced marches; the Republicans at Paris were agitating schemes against his authority. It seemed as if all must be decided on that day, and on that field. Surrounded by these ill-omened circumstances, a desperate effort for victory, ere the Prussians could act effectually, might perhaps yet drive the English from their position; and he determined to venture on this daring experiment.

About seven o'clock, Napoleon's Guard were formed in two columns, under his own eye, near the bottom of the declivity of La Belle Alliance. They were put under command of the dauntless Ney. Buonaparte told the soldiers, and, indeed, imposed the same fiction on their commander, that the Prussians whom they saw on the right were retreating before Grouchy. Perhaps he might himself believe that this was true. The Guard answered, for the last time, with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur*, and moved resolutely forward, having, for their support, four battalions of the Old Guard in reserve, who stood prepared to protect the advance of their comrades. A gradual change had taken place in the English line of battle, in consequence of the repeated repulse of the French. Advancing by slow degrees, the right, which at the beginning of the conflict, presented a segment of a convex circle, now resembled one that was concave, the extreme right, which had been thrown back, being now rather brought forward, so that their fire both of artillery and infantry fell upon the flank of the French, who had also to sustain that which was poured on their front from the heights. The British were arranged in a line of four men deep, to meet the advancing columns of the French Guard, and poured upon them a storm of musketry which never ceased an instant. The soldiers fired independently, as it is called; each man loading and discharging his piece as fast as he could. At length the British moved forward, as if to close round the heads of the columns, and at the same time continued to pour their

shot upon the enemy's flanks. The French gallantly attempted to deploy, for the purpose of returning the discharge. But in their effort to do so, under so dreadful a fire, they stopt, staggered, became disordered, were blended into one mass, and at length gave way, retiring, or rather flying, in the utmost confusion. This was the last effort of the enemy, and Napoleon gave orders for the retreat; to protect which, he had now no troops left, save the last four battalions of the Old Guard, which had been stationed in the rear of the attacking columns. These threw themselves into squares, and stood firm. But at this moment the Duke of Wellington commanded the whole British line to advance, so that whatever the bravery and skill of these gallant veterans, they also were thrown into disorder, and swept away in the general rout, in spite of the efforts of Ney, who, having had his horse killed, fought sword in hand, and on foot, in the front of the battle, till the very last.¹ That *mareschal*, whose military virtues at least cannot be challenged, bore personal evidence against two circumstances, industriously circulated by the friends of Napoleon. One of these fictions occurs in his own bulletin, which charges the loss of the battle to a panic fear, brought about by the treachery of some

¹ [“ I had my horse killed and fell under it. The brave men who will return from this terrible battle, will, I hope, do me the justice to say, that they saw me on foot with sword in hand during the whole of the evening; and that I only quitted the scene of carnage among the last, and at the moment when retreat could no longer be prevented.”—*Ney's Letter to the Duke of Ot-ranto.*]

unknown persons, who raised the cry of "*Sauve qui peut.*"¹ Another figment, greedily credited at Paris, bore, that the four battalions of Old Guard, the last who maintained the semblance of order, answered a summons to surrender, by the magnanimous reply, "The Guard can die, but cannot yield." And one edition of the story adds, that thereupon the battalions made a half wheel inwards, and discharged their muskets into each other's bosoms, to save themselves from dying by the hands of the English. Neither the original reply, nor the pretended self-sacrifice of the Guard, have the slightest foundation. Cambrone, in whose mouth the speech was placed, gave up his sword, and remained prisoner; and the military conduct of the French Guard is better eulogized by the undisputed truth, that they fought to extremity, with the most unyielding constancy, than by imputing to them an act of regimental suicide upon the lost field of battle.² Every attribute of brave men they have a just right to claim. It is no compliment to ascribe to them that of madmen. Whether the words were used by

¹ ["Cries of *all is lost, the Guard is driven back*, were heard on every side. The soldiers pretend even that on many points ill-disposed persons cried out *sauve qui peut*. However this may be, a complete panic at once spread itself throughout the whole field. The Old Guard was infected, and was itself hurried along. In an instant, the whole army was nothing but a mass of confusion; all the soldiers of all arms were mixed *pel-mel*, and it was utterly impossible to rally a single corps."—*Bulletin, Moniteur*, June 21. "A retrograde movement was declared, and the army formed nothing but a confused mass. There was not, however, a total rout, nor the cry of *sauve qui peut*, as has been calumniously stated in the official bulletin."—*Ney to the Duke of Otranto*.]

² [Fleury de Chamboullon, t. ii. p. 187.]

Cambrone or no, the Guard well deserved to have them inscribed on their monument.

Whilst this decisive movement took place, Bulow, who had concentrated his troops, and was at length qualified to act in force, carried the village of Planchenois in the French rear, and was now firing so close on their right wing, that the cannonade annoyed the British who were in pursuit, and was suspended in consequence. Moving in oblique lines, the British and Prussian armies came into contact with each other on the heights so lately occupied by the French, and celebrated the victory with loud shouts of mutual congratulation.

The French army was now in total and inextricable confusion and rout; and when the victorious generals met at the farm-house of La Belle Alliance, it was agreed that the Prussians, who were fresh in comparison, should follow up the chase, a duty for which the British, exhausted by the fatigues of a battle of eight hours, were totally inadequate.

During the whole action, Napoleon maintained the utmost serenity. He remained on the heights of La Belle Alliance, keeping pretty near the centre, from which he had a full view of the field, which does not exceed a mile and a half in length. He expressed no solicitude on the fate of the battle for a long time, noticed the behaviour of particular regiments, and praised the English several times, always, however, talking of them as an assured prey. When forming his guard for the last fatal effort, he descended near them, half down the causeway from La Belle Alliance, to bestow upon them what proved his parting exhortation. He

watched intently their progress with a spyglass, and refused to listen to one or two aides-de-camp, who at that moment came from the right to inform him of the appearance of the Prussians. At length, on seeing the attacking columns stagger and become confused, his countenance, said our informer, became pale as that of a corpse, and muttering to himself, "They are mingled together," he said to his attendants, "All is lost for the present," and rode off the field; not stopping or taking refreshment till he reached Charleroi, where he paused for a moment in a meadow, and occupied a tent which had been pitched for his accommodation.¹

Mean time the pursuit of his discomfited army was followed up by Blucher, with the most determined perseverance. He accelerated the march of the Prussian advanced guard, and despatched every man and horse of his cavalry upon the pursuit of the fugitive French. At Genappe they attempted something like defence, by barricading the bridge and streets; but the Prussians forced them in a moment, and although the French were sufficiently numerous for resistance, their disorder was so irremediable, and their moral courage was so absolutely quelled for the moment, that in many cases they were slaughtered like sheep. They were driven from bivouac to bivouac, without exhibiting even the shadow of their usual courage. One hun-

¹ Our informant on these points, was Lacoste, a Flemish peasant, who was compelled to act as Buonaparte's guide, remained with him during the whole action, and accompanied him to Charleroi. He seemed a shrewd sensible man in his way, and told his story with the utmost simplicity. The author saw him, and heard his narrative, very shortly after the action.

dred and fifty guns were left in the hands of the English, and a like number taken by the Prussians in course of the pursuit. The latter obtained possession also of all Napoleon's baggage, and of his carriage, where, amongst many articles of curiosity, was found a proclamation intended to be made public at Brussels the next day.

The loss on the British side during this dreadful battle, was, as the Duke of Wellington, no user of exaggerated expressions, truly termed it, *immense*. One hundred officers slain, five hundred wounded, many of them to death, fifteen thousand men killed and wounded (independent of the Prussian loss at Wavre), threw half Britain into mourning. Many officers of distinction fell. It required all the glory, and all the solid advantages, of this immortal day, to reconcile the mind to the high price at which it was purchased. The commander-in-chief, compelled to be on every point of danger, was repeatedly in the greatest jeopardy. Only the duke himself, and one gentleman of his numerous staff, escaped unwounded in horse and person.

It would be difficult to form a guess at the extent of the French loss. Besides those who fell in the battle and flight, great numbers deserted. We do not believe, that of 75,000 men, the half were ever again collected under arms.¹

Having finished our account of this memorable action, we are led to notice the communications and criticisms of Napoleon himself on the subject, partly

¹[See Captain Pringle's Remarks on the Campaign of 1815, APPENDIX, No. I.]

as illustrative of the narrative, but much more as indicating his own character.

The account of the battle of Waterloo, dictated by Napoleon to Gourgaud, so severely exposed by General Grouchy¹ as a mere military romance, full of gratuitous suppositions, misrepresentations, and absolute falsehoods, accuses the subordinate generals who fought under Buonaparte of having greatly degenerated from their original character. Ney and Grouchy are particularly aimed at; the former by name, the latter by obvious implication. It is said they had lost that energy and enterprising genius by which they had formerly been distinguished, and to which France owed her triumphs. They had become timorous and circumspect in all their operations; and although their personal bravery remains, their greatest object was to compromise themselves as little as possible. This general remark, intended, of course, to pave the way for transferring from the Emperor to his lieutenants the blame of the miscarriage of the campaign, is both unjust and ungrateful. Had they lost energy, who struggled to the very last in the field of Waterloo, long after the Emperor had left the field? Was Grouchy undecided in his operations, who brought his own division safe to Paris, in spite of all the obstacles opposed to him by a victorious army, three times the amount of his own in numbers? Both these officers had given up, for the sake of Napoleon, the rank and appointments which they might have peacefully borne

¹ [“Observations sur ‘Le Campagne de 1815,’ par Le Général Grouchy, 1819.”]

under the Bourbons. Did it indicate the reluctance to commit themselves, with which they are charged, that they ventured on the decided step of joining his desperate career, not only abandoning all regard to their interest and their safety, but compromising their character as men of loyalty in the face of all Europe, and exposing themselves to certain death, if the Bourbons should be successful? Those who fight with the cord around their neck, which was decidedly the case with Grouchy and Ney, must have headed the forlorn hope; and is it consistent with human nature, in such circumstances, to believe that they, whose fortune and safety depended on the victory, personally brave as they are admitted to be, should have loitered in the rear, when their fate was in the balance?

He who was unjust to his own followers, can scarce be expected to be candid towards an enemy. The Duke of Wellington has, upon all occasions, been willing to render the military character or Napoleon that justice which a generous mind is scrupulously accurate in dispensing to an adversary, and has readily admitted that the conduct of Buonaparte and his army on this memorable occasion, was fully adequate to the support of their high reputation. It may be said, that the victor can afford to bestow praise on the vanquished, but that it requires a superior degree of candour in the vanquished to do justice to the conqueror. Napoleon, at any rate, does not seem to have attained, in this particular, to the pitch of a great or exalted mind, since both he and the various persons whom he employed as the means of circulating his state-

ments, concur in a very futile attempt to excuse the defeat at Waterloo, by a set of apologies founded in a great degree upon misrepresentation. The reader will find these scientifically discussed in a valuable article in the Appendix.¹ But it may be necessary, at the risk of some repetition, to take some notice of them here in a popular form. The allegations, which are designed to prove the incapacity of the British general, and to show that the battle of Waterloo was only lost by a combination of extraordinary fatalities, may be considered in their order.

The first, and most frequently repeated, is the charge, that the Duke of Wellington, on the 15th, was surprised in his cantonments, and could not collect his army fast enough at Quatre-bras. In this his Grace would have been doubtless highly censurable, if Napoleon had, by express information, or any distinct movement indicative of his purpose, shown upon which point he meant to advance. But the chivalrous practice of fixing a field of combat has been long out of date; and Napoleon, beyond all generals, possessed the art of masking his own movements, and misleading his enemy concerning the actual point on which he meditated an attack. The Duke and Prince Blücher were, therefore, obliged to provide for the concentration of their forces upon different points, according as Buonaparte's selection should be manifested; and

¹ See an account of the action of Waterloo, equally intelligible and scientific, drawn up by Captain Pringle of the artillery, which will amply supply the deficiencies of our narrative—
APPENDIX, No. I.

in order to be ready to assemble their forces upon any one position, they must, by spreading their cantonments, in some degree delay the movement upon all. The duke could not stir from Brussels, or concentrate his forces, until he had certain information of those of the enemy ; and it is said that a French statesman, who had promised to send him a copy of the plan of Buonaparte's campaign, contrived, by a trick of policy, to evade keeping his word.¹ We do not mean to deny the talent and activity displayed by Buonaparte, who, if he could have brought forward his whole army upon the evening of the 15th of June, might probably have succeeded in preventing the meditated junction of Blucher and Wellington. But the celebrated prayer

¹ This was Fouché, who seems to have been engaged in secret correspondence with all and sundry of the belligerent powers, while he was minister of police under Napoleon. In his Memoirs [vol. ii. p. 279], he is made to boast that he contrived to keep his word to the Duke of Wellington, by sending the plan of Buonaparte's campaign by a female, a Flemish postmistress, whom he laid wait for on the frontier, and caused to be arrested. Thus he

— “ kept the word of promise to the ear,
And broke it to the sense.”

This story, we have some reason to believe, is true. One of the marvels of our times is how Fouché, after having been the main-spring of such a complication of plots and counterplots, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary intrigues, contrived after all *to die in his bed!* [On the second restoration, Louis XVIII. saw himself reduced to the sad necessity of admitting Fouché to his counsels. But the clamours raised against his profligacy and treachery convincing him that it would be dangerous to continue in France, he resigned in September, and was sent ambassador to Dresden. In January 1816, he was denounced as a regicide by both Chambers, and condemned to death, in case he re-entered the French territory. He died at Trieste, December 26, 1820, in his sixty-seventh year, leaving behind him an immense fortune.]

for annihilation of time and space, would be as little reasonable in the mouth of a general as of a lover, and, fettered by the limitations against which that modest petition is directed, Buonaparte failed in bringing forward in due time a sufficient body of forces to carry all before him at Quatre-bras; while, on the other hand, the Duke of Wellington, from the same obstacles of time and space, could not assemble a force sufficient to drive Ney before him, and enable him to advance to the support of Blücher during the action of Ligny.¹

¹ Some people have been silly enough to consider the Duke of Wellington's being surprised as a thing indisputable, because the news of the French advance first reached him in a ball-room. It must be supposed that these good men's idea of war is, that a general should sit sentinel with his truncheon in his hand, like a statue in the midst of a city market-place, until the tidings come which call him to the field.

“Free is his heart who for his country fights;
• He on the eve of battle may resign
Himself to social pleasure—sweetest then,
When danger to the soldier's soul endears
The human joy that never may return.”

HOME'S *Douglas*.

[“The fiction of the Duke of Wellington having been *surprised* on this great occasion, has maintained its place in almost all narratives of the war for fifteen years. The duke's magnanimous silence under such treatment, for so long a period, will be appreciated by posterity. The facts of the case are now given from the most unquestionable authority. At half-past one o'clock, P.M., of Thursday the 15th, a Prussian officer of high rank arrived at Wellington's headquarters in Brussels, with the intelligence of Napoleon's decisive operations. By two o'clock, orders were despatched to all the cantonments of the duke's army, for the divisions to break up and concentrate on the left of Quatre-bras, his grace's design being that his whole force should be assembled there by eleven o'clock on the next night, Friday the 16th. It was at first intended to put off a ball announced for the evening of Thursday, at the Duchess of Richmond's hotel in Brussels;

The choice of the field of Waterloo is also charged against the Duke of Wellington as an act of weak judgment; because, although possessed of all the requisites for maintaining battle or pursuing victory, and above all, of the facilities for communicating with the Prussian army, it had not, according to the imperial critic, the means of affording security in case of a retreat, since there was only one communication to the rear—that by the causeway of Brussels, the rest of the position being screened by the forest of Soignes, in front of which the British army was formed, and through which, it is assumed, retreat was impossible.

Taking the principle of this criticism as accurate, it may be answered that a general would never halt or fight at all, if he were to refuse combat on every other save a field of battle which possessed all the various excellences which may be predicated of one in theory. The commander must consider whether the ground suits his present exigencies, without looking at other circumstances which may be less pressing at the time. Generals have been known to choose by preference the ground from which there could be no retiring; like invaders

but on reflection it seemed highly important that the population of that city should be kept, as far as possible, in ignorance as to the course of events, and the Duke of Wellington desired that the ball should proceed accordingly; nay, the general officers received his commands to appear in the ball-room, each taking care to quit the apartment as quietly as possible at ten o'clock, and proceed to join his respective division *en route*. This arrangement was carried into strict execution. The duke himself retired at twelve o'clock, and left Brussels at six o'clock next morning for Quatre-bras."—*History of Napoleon Buonaparte, Family Library*, vol. ii. p. 309.]

who burn their ships, as a pledge that they will follow their enterprise to the last. And although provision for a safe retreat is certainly in most cases a desirable circumstance, yet it has been dispensed with by good generals, and by none more frequently than by Napoleon himself. Was not the battle of Essling fought without any possible mode of retreat save the frail bridges over the Danube? Was not that of Wagram debated under similar circumstances? And, to complete the whole, did not Napoleon, while censuring the Duke of Wellington for fighting in front of a forest himself, enter upon conflict with a defile in his rear, formed by the narrow streets and narrower bridge of Genappe, by which alone, if defeated, he could cross the Dyle?—It might, therefore, be presumed, that if the Duke of Wellington chose a position from which retreat was difficult, he must have considered the necessity of retreat as unlikely, and reckoned with confidence on being able to make good his stand until the Prussians should come up to join him.

Even this does not exhaust the question; for the English general-officers unite in considering the forest of Soignes as a very advantageous feature in the field; and, far from apprehending the least inconvenience from its existence, the Duke of Wellington regarded it as affording a position, which, if his first and second line had been unhappily forced, he might have nevertheless made good against the whole French army. The hamlet of Mont Saint Jean, in front, affords an excellent key to the position of an army compelled to occupy the

forest. The wood itself is every where passable for men and horses, the trees being tall, and without either low boughs or underwood ; and, singular as the discrepancy between the opinions of distinguished soldiers may seem, we have never met an English officer who did not look on the forest of Soignes as affording an admirable position for making a final stand. In support of their opinion they refer to the defence of the Bois de Bossu, near Quatre-bras, against the reiterated attacks of Mareschal Ney. This impeachment of the Duke of Wellington may therefore be set aside, as inconsistent with the principles of British warfare. All that can be added is, that there are cases in which national habits and manners may render a position advantageous to soldiers of one country, which is perilous or destructive to those of another.

The next subject of invidious criticism, is of a nature so singular, that, did it not originate with a great man, in peculiar circumstances of adversity, it might be almost termed ludicrous. Napoleon expresses himself as dissatisfied, because he was defeated in the common and vulgar proceeding of downright fighting, and by no special manœuvres or peculiar display of military art on the part of the victor. But if it can afford any consolation to those who cherish his fame, it is easy to show that Napoleon fell a victim to a scheme of tactics early conceived, and persevered in under circumstances which, in the case of ordinary men, would have occasioned its being abandoned ; resumed after events which seemed so adverse, that nothing save

dauntless courage and unlimited confidence could have enabled the chiefs to proceed in their purpose ; and carried into execution, without Napoleon's being able to penetrate the purpose of the allied generals, until it was impossible to prevent the annihilation of his army ;—that he fell, in short, by a grand plan of strategie, worthy of being compared to that of any of his own admirable campaigns.

To prove what we have said, it is only necessary to remark, that the natural bases and points of retreat of the Prussian and English armies were different ; the former being directed on Maestricht, the other on Antwerp, where each expected their reinforcements. Regardless of this, and with full confidence in each other, the Prince Mareschal Blucher, and the Duke of Wellington, agreed to act in conjunction against the French army. The union of their forces, for which both were prepared, was destined to have taken place at Ligny, where the duke designed to have supported the Prussians, and where Blucher hazarded an action in expectation of his ally's assistance. The active movements of Napoleon, and the impossibility of the English force being sufficiently concentrated at Quatre-bras to afford the means of overpowering Ney and the force in their front, prevented their making a lateral march to relieve Blucher at that critical period. Otherwise, the parts of the bloody drama, as afterwards acted, would have been reversed, and the British army would have moved to support the Prussians at Ligny, as the Prussians came to the aid of the British at Waterloo.

Napoleon had the merit of disconcerting this plan for the time; but he did not, and could not, discover that the allied generals retained, after the loss of the battle of Ligny, the same purpose which they had adopted on the commencement of the campaign. He imagined, as did all around him, that Blucher must retreat on Namur, or in such a direction as would effectually accomplish a separation betwixt him and the English, as it was natural to think a defeated army should approach towards its own resources, instead of attempting further offensive operations. At all events, Napoleon was in this respect so much mistaken, as to believe that if Blucher did retire on the same line with the English, the means which the Prussian retained for co-operating with his allies were so limited, and (perhaps he might think) the spirit of the general so subdued, that Mareschal Grouchy, with 32,000 men, would be sufficient to keep the whole Prussian force in check. The mareschal was accordingly, as we have seen, despatched much too late, without any other instructions than to follow and engage the attention of the Prussians. Misled by the demonstration of Blucher, he at first took the road to Namur, and thus, without any fault on his part, lost time, which was inconceivably precious.

Buonaparte's subsequent accounts of this action blame Mareschal Grouchy for not discovering Blucher's real direction, which he had no means of ascertaining, and for not obeying orders which were never given to him, and which could not be given, because Napoleon was as ignorant as the mareschal, that Blucher had formed the deter-

mination, at all events, to unite himself with Wellington. This purpose of acting in co-operation, formed and persevered in, was to the French Emperor the riddle of the Sphinx, and he was destroyed because he could not discover it. Indeed, he ridiculed even the idea of such an event. One of his officers, according to Baron Muffling, having hinted at the mere possibility of a junction between the Prussian army and that of Wellington, he smiled contemptuously at the thought. "The Prussian army," he said, "is defeated—It cannot rally for three days—I have 75,000 men, the English only 50,000. The town of Brussels awaits me with open arms. The English Opposition waits but for my success to raise their heads. Then adieu subsidies, and farewell coalition!" In like manner, Napoleon frankly acknowledged, while on board the *Northumberland*, that he had no idea that the Duke of Wellington meant to fight, and therefore omitted to reconnoitre the ground with sufficient accuracy. It is well known, that when he observed them still in their position on the morning of the 18th, he exclaimed, "I have them, then, these English!"

It was half past eleven, just about the time that the battle of Waterloo commenced, that Grouchy, as already hinted, overtook the rear of the Prussians. A strong force, appearing to be the whole of the Prussian army, lay before the French *mareschal*, who, from the character of the ground, had no means of ascertaining their numbers, or of discovering the fact, that three divisions of Blucher's army were already on the march to their right,

through the passes of Saint Lambert ; and that it was only Thielman's division which remained upon the Dyle. Still less could he know, what could only be known to the duke and Blucher, that the English were determined to give battle in the position at Waterloo. He heard, indeed, a heavy cannonade in that direction, but that might have proceeded from an attack on the British rear-guard, the duke being, in the general opinion of the French army, in full retreat upon Antwerp. At any rate, the mareschal's orders were to attack the enemy which he found before him. He could not but remember, that Ney had been reprimanded for detaching a part of his force on the 16th, in consequence of a distant cannonade ; and he was naturally desirous to avoid censure for the self-same cause. Even if Napoleon was seriously engaged with the English, it seemed the business of Grouchy to occupy the large force which he observed at Wavre, and disposed along the Dyle, to prevent their attempting any thing against Napoleon, if, contrary to probability, the Emperor should be engaged in a general battle. Lastly, as Grouchy was to form his resolution under the idea of having the whole Prussian force before him, which was estimated at 80,000 men, it would have been impossible for him to detach from an army of 32,000 any considerable body, to the assistance of Napoleon ; and in attacking with such inadequate numbers, he showed his devotion, at the risk of being totally destroyed.

He engaged, however, in battle without any hesitation, and attacked the line of the Prussians along the Dyle on every accessible point ; to wit,

at Wavre, at the mill of Bielge, and at the village of Limale. The points of attack were desperately defended by the Prussians under Thielman, so that Grouchy could only occupy that part of Wavre which was on his own side of the Dyle. About four o'clock, and consequently when the fate of the battle of Waterloo was nearly decided, Grouchy received from Mareschal Soult the only order which reached him during the day, requiring him to manœuvre so as to unite himself to the right flank of the Emperor, but at the same time acquainting him with the (false) intelligence, that the battle was gained upon the line of Waterloo. A postscript informed Grouchy, that Bulow was appearing upon Napoleon's right flank, and that if he could come up with speed, he would take the Prussian *flagrante delicto*.¹

These orders were quite intelligible. But two things were necessary to their being carried into execution. First, that Grouchy should get clear of Thielman, the enemy with whom he was closely engaged, and who would not fail to pursue the French mareschal if he retreated or moved to his left flank, without having repulsed him. Secondly, it was indispensable he should pass the small river Dyle, defended by Thielman's division, since the road leading through the woods of Chapelle Lambert, was that by which he could best execute his march towards Waterloo. Grouchy redoubled his efforts to force the Dyle, but he could not succeed till night, and then but partially; for the Prussians continued to hold the mill of Bielge, and

¹ [Savary, t. iv. p. 75.]

remained in force within a cannon-shot of Grouchy's position.

In the morning, the mareschal, anxious to learn with certainty the fate of Napoleon, though believing, according to Soult's letter, that he was victorious, sent out reconnoitring parties. When he learned the truth, he commenced a retreat, which he conducted with such talent, that though closely pursued by the Prussians, then in all the animation of triumph, and though sustaining considerable loss, he was enabled to bring his corps unbroken under the walls of Paris. Weighing all these circumstances, it appears that Buonaparte had no right to count upon the assistance of Grouchy, far less to throw censure on that general for not coming to his assistance, since he scrupulously obeyed the orders he received ; and when at four o'clock, that of attacking and pressing the Prussian rear was qualified by the directions of Soult, to close up to Buonaparte's right wing, Grouchy was engaged in an obstinate engagement with Thielman, whom he must necessarily defeat before he could cross the Dyle, to accomplish the junction proposed.

The movement of Blucher, therefore, was a masterpiece of courage and judgment, since the prince mareschal left one division of his army to maintain a doubtful onset against Grouchy, and involved himself with the other three in that flank movement through the woods of Saint Lambert, by which he paid with interest the debt which he owed Napoleon for a similar movement, previous to the affairs of Champ-Aubert and Montmirail, in 1814.

The same system which placed Blucher in motion, required that the Duke of Wellington should maintain his position, by confining himself to a strictly defensive contest. The British, as they were to keep their place at all risks, so on no temptation of partial success were they to be induced to advance. Every step which they might have driven the French backward, before the coming up of the Prussians, would have been a disadvantage as far as it went, since the object was not to beat the enemy by the efforts of the English only, which, in the state of the two armies, might only have amounted to a repulse, but to detain them in the position of La Belle Alliance, until the army of Blucher should come up. When Napoleon, therefore, objects to the conduct of the Duke of Wellington on the 18th, that he did not manœuvre in the time of action, he objects to the very circumstance which rendered the victory of the day so decisive. He was himself decoyed into, and detained in a position, until his destruction was rendered inevitable.

It has been a favourite assertion with almost all the French, and some English writers, that the English were on the point of being defeated, when the Prussian force came up. The contrary is the truth. The French had attacked, and the British had resisted, from past eleven until near seven o'clock; and though the battle was most bloody, the former had gained no advantage save at the wood of Hougomont, and the farm-house of La Haye Sainte; both they gained, but speedily lost. Baron Muffling has given the most explicit testi-

mony, "that the battle could have afforded no favourable result to the enemy, even if the Prussians had never come up." He was an eyewitness, and an unquestionable judge, and willing, doubtless, to carry the immediate glory acquired by his countrymen on this memorable occasion, and in which he had a large personal stake, as high as truth and honour will permit. At the time when Napoleon made the last effort, Bulow's troops were indeed upon the field, but had not made any physical impression by their weapons, or excited any moral dread by their appearance. Napoleon announced to all his Guard, whom he collected and formed for that final exertion, that the Prussians whom they saw were closely pursued by the French of Grouchy's army. He himself, perhaps, had that persuasion; for the fire of Grouchy's artillery, supposed to be a league and a half, but in reality nearly three leagues distant, was distinctly heard; and some one of Napoleon's suite saw the smoke from the heights above Wavre. "The battle," he said, "is won; we must force the English position, and throw them upon the defiles.—*Allons ! La Garde en avant !*"¹ Accordingly, they then made the attack in the evening, when they were totally repulsed, and chased back upon, and beyond, their own position. Thus, before the Prussians came

¹ He gave the same explanation when on board of the Northumberland. General Gourgaud had inaccurately stated that the Emperor had mistaken the corps of Bulow for that of Grouchy. Napoleon explained, that this was not the case, but that he had opposed a sufficient force to those Prussians whom he saw in the field, and concluded that Grouchy was closing up on their flank and rear.

into serious action, Napoleon had done his utmost, and had not a corps remaining in order, excepting four battalions of the Old Guard. It cannot be therefore said, that our allies afforded the British army protection from any enemy that was totally disorganized; but that for which the Prussians do deserve the gratitude of Britain and of Europe, is the generous and courageous confidence with which they marched at so many risks to assist in the action, and the activity and zeal with which they completed the victory. It is universally acknowledged, that the British army, exhausted by so long a conflict, could not have availed themselves of the disorder of their enemy at its conclusion; while, on the contrary, nothing could exceed the dexterity and rapidity with which the Prussians conducted the pursuit. The laurels of Waterloo must be divided,—the British won the battle, the Prussians achieved and rendered available the victory.¹

¹ Baron Muffling's account of the British army must interest our readers:—"There is not, perhaps, in all Europe, an army superior to the English in the actual field of battle. That is to say, an army in which military instruction is entirely directed to that point, as its exclusive object. The English soldier is strongly formed and well-fed, and nature has endowed him with much courage and intrepidity. He is accustomed to severe discipline, and is very well armed. The infantry opposes with confidence the attack of cavalry, and shows more indifference than any other European army when attacked in the flank or rear. These qualities explain why the English have never been defeated in a pitched field since they were commanded by the Duke of Wellington.

"On the other hand, there are no troops in Europe less experienced than the English in the light service and in skirmishes; accordingly, they do not practise that service themselves. The

English army in Spain formed the standing force round which the Spaniards and Portuguese rallied. The Duke of Wellington acted wisely in reserving his English troops for regular battles, and in keeping up that idea in his army.

“ If, on the one hand, a country is worthy of envy which possesses an army consisting entirely of grenadiers, that army might, on the other hand, experience great disadvantage if forced to combat unassisted against an able general, who understands their peculiarities, and can avoid giving them battle excepting on advantageous ground. However, it is to be supposed that the English will seldom make war on the continent without allies, and it appears their system is established on that principle. Besides, such an army as the English is most precious for those they may act with, as the most difficult task of the modern art of war is to form an army for pitched battles.” The baron adds, in a note upon the last sentence,—“ The people who inhabit other quarters of the world, and are not come to the same state of civilisation with us, afford a proof of this. Most of them know better than Europeans how to fight man to man, but can never attain the point of gaining a battle over us. Discipline, in the full extent of the word, is the fruit of moral and religious instruction.”—*Histoire de la Campagne de l'Armée Angloise, &c. sous les ordres du Duc de Wellington, et de l'Armée Prussienne, sous les ordres du Prince Blücher de Wahlstadt, 1815, Par. 6. de 10. Stuttgart et Tubingue. 1817.*

CHAPTER XC.

Buonaparte's arrival at Paris.—The Chambers assemble, and adopt resolutions, indicating a wish for Napoleon's Abdication.—Fouché presents Napoleon's Abdication, which stipulates that his Son shall succeed him.—Carnot's report to the Peers, of the means of defence—contradicted by Ney.—Stormy debate on the Abdication Act.—Both Chambers evade formally recognising Napoleon II.—Provisional Government.—Napoleon at Malmaison.—His offer of his services in the defence of Paris rejected.—Surveillance of General Beker.—Means provided at Rochefort for his departure to the United States.—He arrives at Rochefort on 3d July.—The Provisional Government attempt in vain to treat with the Allies.—The Allies advance to Paris.—Chamber of Peers disperse.—Louis XVIII. re-enters Paris on 8th July.

IMMENSE as the direct and immediate consequences of the battle of Waterloo certainly were, being the total loss of the campaign, and the entire destruction of Napoleon's fine army, the more remote contingencies to which it gave rise were so much more important, that it may be doubted whether there was ever in the civilized world a great battle followed by so many and such extraordinary results.

That part of the French army which escaped from the field of Waterloo, fled in the most terrible disorder towards the frontiers of France.

Napoleon himself continued his flight from Charleroi, in the neighbourhood of which was his first place of halting, and hurried on to Philippeville. From this point, he designed, it was said, to have marched to place himself at the head of Grouchy's army. But no troops of any kind having been rallied, and Charleroi having been almost instantly occupied by the Prussian pursuers, a report became current that the division was destroyed, and Grouchy himself made prisoner. Napoleon, therefore, pursued his own retreat, leaving orders, which were not attended to, that the relics of the army should be rallied at Avesnes. Soult could only succeed in gathering together a few thousands, as far within the French territory as Laon. Meanwhile, Buonaparte, travelling post, had reached Paris, and brought thither the news of his own defeat.

On the 19th of June the public ear of the capital had been stunned by the report of a hundred pieces of cannon, which announced the victory at Ligny, and the public prints had contained the most gasconading accounts of that action; of the forcing the passage of the Sambre, the action at Charleroi, and the battle of Quatre-bras. The Imperialists were in the highest state of exultation, the Republicans doubtful, and the Royalists dejected. On the morning of the 21st, the third day after the fatal action, it was at first whispered, and then openly said, that Napoleon had returned alone from the army on the preceding night, and was now in the palace of Bourbon-Elysée. The fatal truth was not long in transpiring—he had

lost a dreadful and decisive pitched battle, and the French army, which had left the capital so confident, so full of hope, pride, and determination, was totally destroyed.

Many reasons have been given for Napoleon's not remaining with his army on this occasion, and endeavouring at least to bring it into a state of reorganization ; but the secret seems to be explained by his apprehension of the faction of Republicans and Constitutionals in Paris. He must have remembered that Fouché, and others of that party, had advised him to end the distresses of France by his abdication of the crown, even before he placed himself at the head of his army. He was aware, that what they had ventured to suggest in his moment of strength, they would not hesitate to demand and extort from him in the hour of his weakness, and that the Chamber of Representatives would endeavour to obtain peace for themselves by sacrificing him. " He is known," says an author already quoted, friendly to his fame, " to have said, after the disasters of the Russian campaign, that he would confound the Parisians by his presence, and fall among them like a thunderbolt. But there are things which succeed only because they have never been done before, and for that reason ought never to be attempted again. His fifth flight from his army occasioned the entire abandonment of himself and his cause by all who might have forgiven him his misfortune, but required that he should be the first to arise from the blow."¹

¹ Hobhouse's Letters from Paris, written during the Last Reign of Napoleon.

It was a curious indication of public spirit in Paris, that, upon the news of this appalling misfortune, the national funds rose, immediately after the first shock of the tidings was past ; so soon, that is, as men had time to consider the probable consequence of the success of the allies. It seemed as if public credit revived upon any intelligence, however disastrous otherwise, which promised to abridge the reign of Buonaparte.

The anticipations of Napoleon did not deceive him. It was plain, that, whatever deference the Jacobins had for him in his hour of strength, they had no compassion for his period of weakness. They felt the opportunity favourable to get rid of him, and did not disguise their purpose to do so.

The two Chambers hastily assembled. La Fayette addressed that of the Representatives in the character of an old friend of freedom, spoke of the sinister reports that were spread abroad, and invited the members to rally under the three-coloured banner of liberty, equality, and public order, by adopting five resolutions. The first declared, that the independence of the nation was menaced ; the second declared the sittings of the Chambers permanent, and denounced the pains of treason against whomever should attempt to dissolve them ; the third announced, that the troops had deserved well of their country ; the fourth called out the national guard ; the fifth invited the ministers to repair to the Assembly.¹

These propositions intimated the apprehensions

¹ [Moniteur, June 22 ; Montgaillard, t. viii. p. 220.]

of the Chamber of Representatives, that they might be a second time dissolved by an armed force, and, at the same time, announced their purpose to place themselves at the head of affairs, without farther respect to the Emperor. They were adopted, all but the fourth concerning the national guard, which was considered as premature. Regnault de St Jean d'Angely attempted to read a bulletin, giving an imperfect and inconsistent account of what had passed on the frontiers ; but the representatives became clamorous, and demanded the attendance of the ministers. At length, after a delay of three or four hours, Carnot, Caulaincourt, Davoust, and Fouché, entered the hall with Lucien Buonaparte.

The Chamber formed itself into a secret committee, before which the ministers laid the full extent of the disaster, and announced that the Emperor had named Caulaincourt, Fouché, and Carnot, as commissioners to treat of peace with the allies. The ministers were bluntly reminded by the Republican members, and particularly by Henry Lacoste, that they had no basis for any negotiations which could be proposed in the Emperor's name, since the allied powers had declared war against Napoleon, who was now in plain terms pronounced, by more than one member, the sole obstacle betwixt the nation and peace. Universal applause followed from all parts of the hall, and left Lucien no longer in doubt, that the representatives intended to separate their cause from that of his brother. He omitted no art of conciliation or entreaty, and,—more eloquent probably in prose than in poetry,—appealed to their love of glory,

their generosity, their fidelity, and the oaths which they had so lately sworn. “We *have* been faithful,” replied Fayette; “we have followed your brother to the sands of Egypt—to the snows of Russia. The bones of Frenchmen, scattered in every region, attest our fidelity.”¹ All seemed to unite in one sentiment, that the abdication of Buonaparte was a measure absolutely necessary. Davoust, the minister at war, arose, and disclaimed, with protestations, any intention of acting against the freedom or independence of the Chamber. This was, in fact, to espouse their cause. A committee of five members was appointed to concert measures with Ministers. Even the latter official persons, though named by the Emperor, were not supposed to be warmly attached to him. Carnot and Fouché were the natural leaders of the popular party, and Caulaincourt was supposed to be on indifferent terms with Napoleon, whose Ministers, therefore, seemed to adopt the interest of the Chamber in preference to his. Lucien saw that his brother’s authority was ended, unless it could be maintained by violence. The Chamber of Peers might have been more friendly to the Imperial cause, but their constitution gave them as little confidence in themselves as weight with the public. They adopted the three first resolutions of the Lower Chamber, and named a committee of public safety.

The line of conduct which the Representatives meant to pursue was now obvious; they had spoken

¹ [Montgaillard, t. viii. p. 222.]

out, and named the sacrifice which they exacted from Buonaparte, being nothing less than abdication. It remained to be known whether the Emperor would adopt measures of resistance, or submit to this encroachment. If there could be a point of right, where both were so far wrong, it certainly lay with Napoleon. These very Representatives were, by voluntary consent, as far as oaths and engagements can bind men, his subjects, convoked in his name, and having no political existence excepting as a part of his new constitutional government. However great his faults to the people of France, he had committed none towards these accomplices of his usurpation, nor were they legislators otherwise than as he was their Emperor. Their right to discard and trample upon him in his adversity, consisted only in their having the power to do so; and the readiness which they showed to exercise that power, spoke as little for their faith as for their generosity. At the same time, our commiseration for fallen greatness is lost in our sense of that justice, which makes the associates and tools of a usurper the readiest implements of his ruin.

When Buonaparte returned to Paris, his first interview was with Carnot, of whom he demanded, in his usual tone of authority, an instant supply of treasure, and a levy of 300,000 men. The minister replied, that he could have neither the one nor the other. Napoleon then summoned Maret, Duke of Bassano, and other confidential persons of his court. But when his civil counsellors talked of defence, the word wrung from him the bitter ejacu-

lation, "Ah, my old guard, could they but defend themselves like you!" A sad confession that the military truncheon, his best emblem of command, was broken in his gripe. Lucien urged his brother to maintain his authority, and dissolve the Chambers by force; but Napoleon, aware that the national guard might take the part of the representatives, declined an action so full of hazard. Davoust, was, however, sounded concerning his willingness to act against the Chambers, but he positively refused to do so. Some idea was held out by Fouché to Napoleon, of his being admitted to the powers of a dictator; but this could be only thrown out as a proposal for the purpose of amusing him. In the mean time arrived the news of the result of the meeting of the Representatives in secret committee.

The gauntlet was now thrown down, and it was necessary that Napoleon should resist or yield; declare himself absolute, and dissolve the Chambers by violence; or abdicate the authority he had so lately resumed. Lucien finding him still undetermined, hesitated not to say, that the smoke of the battle of Mont Saint Jean had turned his brain.¹ In fact his conduct at this crisis was not that of a great man. He dared neither venture on the desperate measures which might, for a short time, have preserved his power, nor could he bring himself to the dignified step of an apparently voluntary resignation. He clung to what could no longer avail

¹ [Fleury de Chamboullon, t. ii. p. 296; Miss Williams' Narrative.]

him, like the distracted criminal, who, wanting resolution to meet his fate by a voluntary effort, must be pushed from the scaffold by the hand of the executioner.

Buonaparte held, upon the night of the 21st, a sort of general council, comprehending the ministers of every description ; the president and four members of the Chamber of Peers, the president, and four vice-presidents, of the Representatives, with other official persons and counsellors of state. The Emperor laid before this assembly the state of the nation and required their advice. Regnault (who was the Imperial orator in ordinary) seconded the statement with a proposal, that measures be taken to recruit with heroes the heroic army, and bring succours to what, by a happily selected phrase, he termed the "astonished eagle." He opined, therefore, that the Chambers should make an appeal to French valour, while the Emperor was treating of peace "in the most steady and dignified manner." Fayette stated, that resistance would but aggravate the calamities of France. The allies stood pledged to demand a particular sacrifice when they first engaged in the war ; they were not likely to recede from it after this decisive victory. One measure alone he saw betwixt the country and a bloody and ruinous conflict, and he referred to the great and generous spirit of the Emperor to discover its nature. Maret, Duke of Bassano, long Buonaparte's most confidential friend, and fatally so, because (more a courtier than a statesman) he attended rather to soothe his humour than to guide

his councils, took fire at this suggestion. He called for severe measures against the Royalists and the disaffected; a revolutionary police, and revolutionary punishments. "Had such," he said, "been earlier resorted to, a person" (meaning probably Fouché) "who now hears me, would not be now smiling at the misfortunes of his country, and Wellington would not be marching upon Paris." This speech was received with a burst of disapprobation, which even the presence of the Emperor, in whose cause Maret was thus vehement, proved unable to restrain; hisses and clamour drowned the voice of the speaker. Carnot, who had juster views of the military strength, or rather weakness of France at the moment, was desirous, democrat as he was, to retain the advantage of Napoleon's talents. He is said to have wept when the abdication was insisted upon. Lanjuinais and Constant supported the sentiments of Fayette. But the Emperor appeared gloomy, dissatisfied, and uncertain, and the council broke up without coming to any determination.¹

For another anxious night the decision of Buonaparte was suspended. Had the nation, or even the ministers, been unanimous in a resolution to defend themselves, unquestionably France might have been exposed to the final chance of war, with some prospect of a struggle on Napoleon's part; though, when it is considered within how short a time the allies introduced, within the limits of

¹ [Montgaillard, t. viii. p. 223; Fouché, t. ii. p. 282; Las Cases, t. i. p. 10; Savary, t. iv. p. 98.]

France, an armed force amounting to 800,000 effective men, it does not appear how his resistance could have eventually proved successful. It would be injustice to deny Napoleon a natural feeling of the evils which must have been endured by the nation in such a protracted contest, and we readily suppose him unwilling to have effected a brief continuation of his reign, by becoming the cause of so much misery to the fine country which he had so long ruled. Like most men in difficulties, he received much more advice than offers of assistance. The best counsel was, perhaps, that of an American gentleman, who advised him instantly to retreat to the North American States, where he could not indeed enjoy the royal privileges and ceremonial, to which he was more attached than philosophy warrants, but where that general respect would have been paid to him, which his splendid talents, and wonderful career of adventure, were so well calculated to enforce. But now, as at Moscow, he lingered too long in forming a decided opinion; for, though the importunity of friends and opponents wrung from him the resignation which was demanded at all hands, yet it was clogged by conditions which could only be made in the hope of retaining a predominant interest in the government by which his own was to be succeeded.

On the morning of the 22d June, only four days after the defeat at Waterloo, the Chamber of Representatives assembled at nine in the morning, and expressed the utmost impatience to receive the Act of Abdication. A motion was made by Duchesne,

that it should be peremptorily demanded from the Emperor, when this degree of violence was rendered unnecessary by his compliance.¹ It was presented by Fouché, whose intrigues were thus far crowned with success, and was couched in the following terms :—

“ Frenchmen !—In commencing war for maintaining the national independence, I relied on the union of all efforts, of all wills, and the concurrence of all the national authorities. I had reason to hope for success, and I braved all the declarations of the powers against me.

“ Circumstances appear to me changed. I offer myself as a sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they prove sincere in their declarations, and have really directed them only against my power ! My political life is terminated, and I proclaim my son, under the title of Napoleon II., Emperor of the French.

“ The present ministers will provisionally form the council of the government. The interest which I take in my son induces me to invite the Chambers to form, without delay, the regency by a law.

“ Unite all for the public safety, in order to remain an independent nation. (Signed) NAPOLEON.”²

The Republican party having thus obtained a victory, proposed instantly several new models for

¹ [“ We all manœuvred to extort his abdication. There was a multitude of messages backwards and forwards, parleys, objections, replies,—in a word, evolutions of every description ; ground was taken, abandoned, and again retaken. At length, after a warm battle, Napoleon surrendered, in full council, under the conviction that longer resistance was useless ; then turning to me, he said, with a sardonic smile, ‘ Write to those gentlemen to make themselves easy ; they shall be satisfied.’ Lucien took up the pen, and drew, under Napoleon’s dictation, the act of abdication.”—FOUCHÉ, t. ii. p. 283.]

² [Moniteur, June 23.]

settling the form of a constitution, in the room of that, which, exactly three weeks before, they had sworn to in the Champ de Mai. This was judged somewhat premature; and they resolved for the present to content themselves with nominating a Provisional Government, vesting the executive powers of the state in five persons—two to be chosen from Buonaparte's House of Peers, and three from that of the Representatives.

In the mean while, to preserve the decency due to the late Emperor, the Chamber named a committee to wait on him with an address of thanks, in which they carefully avoided all mention and recognition of his son. Napoleon, for the last time, received the committee delegated to present the address, in the imperial habit, and surrounded by his state-officers and guards. He seemed pale and pensive, but firm and collected, and heard with a steady indifference the praises which they bestowed on his patriotic sacrifice. His answer recommended unanimity, and the speedy preparation of means of defence; but at the conclusion he reminded them, that his abdication was conditional, and comprehended the interests of his son.

Lanjuinais, President of the Chamber, replied, with profound respect, that the Chamber had given him no directions respecting the subject which Napoleon pressed upon. "I told you," said he, turning to his brother Lucien, "they would not, could not do it.—Tell the Assembly," he said, again addressing the President, "that I recom-

mend my son to their protection. It is in his favour I have abdicated."

Thus the succession of Napoleon II. came to be now the point of debate between the abdicated Emperor and the Legislative Bodies. It is certain the appointment could not have been rendered acceptable to the allies; and the influence which Buonaparte and his friends were likely to have in a regency, were strong arguments for all in France who had opposed him in the struggle, uniting to set aside his family and dynasty.

Upon the same 22d June, a strange scene took place in the Chamber of Peers. The government had received intelligence that Mareschal Grouchy, whom we left on the banks of the Dyle, near Wavre, and who continued his action with Thielman, to whom he was opposed, till deep in the night, had, on hearing the loss of the battle at Waterloo, effected a most able retreat through Namur, defended himself against several attacks, and finally made his way to Laon. This good news encouraged Carnot to render a brilliant account to the Chamber, of Grouchy being at the head of an untouched army of upwards of 60,000 men (Grouchy's whole force at Wavre having been only 32,000); of Soult collecting 20,000 of the old guard at Mezières; of 10,000 new levies despatched from the interior to join the rallied forces, with 200 pieces of cannon. Ney, half frantic at hearing these exaggerated statements, and his mind galled with the sense of Napoleon's injustice towards him, as expressed in the bulletins, started up, and spoke like a possessed person under the power of the exorcist. There

was a reckless desperation in the manner of his contradicting the minister. It seemed as if he wished the state of the world undone in his own undoing. "The report," he said, "was false—false in every respect. Dare they tell eyewitnesses of the disastrous day of the 18th, that we have yet 60,000 soldiers embodied? Grouchy cannot have under him 20,000, or 25,000 soldiers, at the utmost. Had he possessed a greater force, he might have covered the retreat, and the Emperor would have been still in command of an army on the frontiers. Not a man of the guard," he said, "will ever rally more. I myself commanded them—I myself witnessed their total extermination, ere I left the field of battle. They are annihilated.—The enemy are at Nivelles with 80,000 men; they may, if they please, be at Paris in six days. There is no safety for France but in instant propositions of peace." On being contradicted by General Flahault, Ney resumed his sinister statement with even more vehemence; and at length striking at once into the topic which all felt, but none had ventured yet to name, he said in a low, but distinct voice—"Yes! I repeat it—your only course is by negotiation—you must recall the Bourbons;—and, for me, I will retire to the United States."

The most bitter reproaches were heaped on Ney for this last expression. Lavalette and Carnot especially appeared incensed against him. Ney replied with sullen contempt to those who blamed his conduct, "I am not one of those to whom their interest is every thing; what should I gain by the

restoration of Louis, except being shot for desertion? but I must speak the truth, for the sake of the country." This strange scene sunk deep into the minds of thinking men, who were thenceforward induced to view the subsequent sounding resolutions, and bustling debates of the Chambers, as empty noise, unsupported by the state of the national resources.

After this debate on the state of the means of defence, there followed one scarce less stormy, in the House of Peers, upon the reading of the Act of Abdication. Lucien Buonaparte took up the question of the succession, and insisted upon the instant recognition of his nephew, according to the rules of the constitution. The Count de Pontecoulant interrupted the orator, demanding by what right Lucien, an Italian prince, and an alien, presumed to name a sovereign to the French empire, where he himself had not even the privileges of a denizen? To this objection,—a strange one, certainly, coming from lips which had sworn faith but twenty-two days before to a constitution, recognising Lucien not only as a denizen, but as one of the blood-royal of France, the prince answered, that he was a Frenchman by his sentiments, and by virtue of the laws. Pontecoulant then objected to accept as sovereign a child residing in a different kingdom; and Labédoyère, observing the hesitation of the assembly, started up, and demeaning himself with unrestrained fury, exhibited the same blind and devoted attachment to Napoleon, which had prompted him to show the example of defection at Grenoble.

“ The Emperor,” he said, “ had abdicated solely in behalf of his son. His resignation was null, if his son was not instantly proclaimed. And who were they who opposed this generous resolution ? Those whose voices had been always at the sovereign’s devotion while in prosperity ; who had fled from him in adversity, and who were already hastening to receive the yoke of foreigners. Yes,” continued this impetuous young man, aiding his speech with the most violent gestures, and overpowering, by the loudness of his tone, the murmurs of the assembly, “ if you refuse to acknowledge the Imperial prince, I declare that Napoleon must again draw his sword—again shed blood. At the head of the brave Frenchmen who have bled in his cause, we will rally around him ; and wo to the base generals who are perhaps even now meditating new treasons ! I demand that they be impeached, and punished as deserters of the national standard—that their names be given to infamy, their houses razed, their families proscribed and exiled. We will endure no traitors amongst us. Napoleon, in resigning his power to save the nation, has done his duty to himself, but the nation is not worthy of him, since she has a second time compelled him to abdicate ; she who vowed to abide by him in prosperity and reverses.” The ravings of this daring enthusiast, who was, in fact, giving language to the feelings of a great part of the French army, were at length drowned in a general cry of order. “ You forget yourself,” exclaimed Massena. “ You believe yourself still in the *corps de garde*,” said Lameth. Labédoyère strove to go on, but was

silenced by the general clamour, which at length put an end to this scandalous scene.¹

The peers, like the deputies of the Lower Chamber, having eluded the express recognition of Napoleon II., the two Chambers proceeded to name the members of the provisional government. These were Carnot, Fouché, Caulaincourt, Grenier, and Quinette.² In their proclamation they stated that Napoleon had resigned, and that his son had been *proclaimed* (which, by the way, was not true); calling on the nation for exertions, sacrifices, and unanimity, and promising, if not an actually new constitution, as had been usual on such occasions, yet such a complete revision and repair of that which was now three weeks old, as should make it in every respect as good as new.³

This address had little effect either on the troops or the Federates, who, like Labédoyère, were of opinion that Napoleon's abdication could only be received on his own terms. These men assembled in armed parties, and paraded under Buonaparte's windows, at the palace of Bourbon-Elysée. Money

¹ [Moniteur, June 23.]

² [Carnot, Fouché, Grenier, and Quinette had all voted for the death of Louis XVI.]

³ ["I was present at the moment of abdication; and, when the question of Napoleon's removal was agitated, I requested permission to participate in his fate. Such had been till then the disinterestedness and simplicity, some will say folly, of my conduct, that, notwithstanding my daily intercourse as an officer of the household, and member of his council, the Emperor scarcely knew me. 'Do you know whither your offer may lead you?' said he, in his astonishment, 'I have made no calculation about it,' I replied. He accepted me, and here I am at St Helena." —LAS CASES, t. i. p. i. p. 9.]

and liquor were delivered to them, which increased their cries of *Vive Napoleon ! Vive l'Empereur !* They insulted the national guards, and seemed disposed to attack the residence of Fouché. On the other hand, the national guards were 30,000 men in number, disposed in general to support order, and many of them leaning to the side of Louis XVIII. A moment of internal convulsion seemed inevitable ; for it was said, that if Napoleon II. was not instantly acknowledged, Buonaparte would come down and dissolve the Chamber with an armed force.

On the meeting of the 24th June, the important question of succession was decided, or rather evaded, as follows :—Manuel, generally understood to be the organ of Fouché in the House of Representatives, made a long speech to show that there was no occasion for a formal recognition of the succession of Napoleon II., since he was, by the terms of the constitution, already in possession of the throne. When the orator had given this deep reason that their sovereign should neither be acknowledged nor proclaimed, purely because he *was* their sovereign, all arose and shouted, *Vive Napoleon II. !* But when there was a proposal to swear allegiance to the new Emperor, there was a general cry of “ No oaths ! No oaths ! ” as if there existed a consciousness in the Chamber of having been too lavish of these ill-redeemed pledges, and a general disgust at commencing a new course of perjury.

The Chamber of Representatives thus silenced, if they did not satisfy, the Imperialist party, by a sort of incidental and ostensible acknowledgment of

the young Napoleon's right to the crown ; while at the same time, by declaring the Provisional Government to be a necessary guarantee for the liberties of the subject, they prevented the interference either of Napoleon himself, or any of his friends, in the administration of the country. Yet, notwithstanding the simulated nature of their compliance with the especial condition of Napoleon's resignation, the Chambers and Provisional Government were as strict in exacting from the abdicated sovereign the terms of his bargain, as if they had paid him the stipulated value in sterling, instead of counterfeit coin. Thus they exacted from him a proclamation, addressed in his own name to the soldiers, in order to confirm the fact of his abdication, which the troops were unwilling to believe on any authority inferior to his own. In this address, there are, however, expressions, which show his sense of the compulsion under which he acted. After an exhortation to the soldiers to continue in their career of honour, and an assurance of the interest which he should always take in their exploits, follows this passage :—" Both you and I have been calumniated. Men, very unfit to appreciate our labours, have seen in the marks of attachment which you have given me, a zeal of which I was the sole object. Let your future successes tell them, that it was the country, above all things, which you served in obeying me ; and that, if I had any share in your affections, I owed it to my ardent love for France, our common mother."¹

¹ [Dated Malmaison, June 25, See Fleury de Chamboullon, t. ii. p. 294.]

These expressions were highly disagreeable to the Chamber of Representatives, who at the same time regarded the presence of Napoleon in the capital as dangerous to their own power, and to the public tranquillity. The suburbs, with their fierce inmates, continued to be agitated, and soldiers, the straggling relics of the field of Waterloo, were daily gathering under the walls of Paris, furious at their recent defeat, and calling on their Emperor to lead them to vengeance. There seems to have been little to prevent Napoleon from still placing himself at the head of a small but formidable army. To remove him from this temptation, the Provisional Government required him to retire to the palace of Malmaison, near St Germain, so long the favourite abode of the discarded Josephine. Napoleon had not been within its walls a single day, before, surrounded by Fouché's police, he found that he, who, not a month since, had disposed of the fate of myriads, was no longer the free master of his own actions. He was watched and controlled, though without the use of actual force, and now, for the first time, felt what it was to lose that free agency, of which his despotism had for so many years deprived so large a portion of mankind. Yet he seemed to submit to his fate with indifference, or only expressed impatience when beset by his personal creditors, who, understanding that he was not likely to remain long in France, attempted to extort from him a settlement of their claims. This petty persecution was given way to by the government, as one of several expedients to abridge his residence

in France ; and they had the means of using force, if all should fail.

Short as was the time he lingered at Malmaison, incredible as it may be thought, Napoleon was almost forgotten in Paris. " No one," says a well-informed author, living in that city during the crisis, " except the immediate friends of government, pretends to know whether he is still at Malmaison, or seems to think it a question of importance to ask. On Saturday last, Count M—— saw him there ; he was tranquil, but quite lost. His friends now pretend, that, since his return from Elba, he has never been quite the man he was."¹ There was, however, a reason for his protracting his residence at Malmaison, more honourable than mere human reluctance to submit to inevitable calamity.

The English and Prussian forces were now approaching Paris by rapid marches ; every town falling before them which could have been reckoned upon as a bar to their progress. When Paris was again to be girt round with hostile armies, honourable as well as political feelings might lead Napoleon to hope that the Representatives might be inclined to wave all personal animosity, and, having recourse to his extraordinary talents and his influence over the minds of the army and federates, by which alone the capital could be defended, might permit him once more to assume the sword for protection of Paris. He offered to command the army as general in chief, in behalf of his son. He offered to take share in the defence, as an ordinary

¹ [Hobhouse's Letters from Paris, vol. ii. ; Fleury de Chamboillon, t. ii. p. 298.]

citizen. But the internal discord had gone too far. The popular party which then prevailed, saw more danger in the success of Napoleon, than in the superiority of the allies. The latter they hoped to conciliate by treaty. They doubted, with good reason, the power of resisting them by force ; and if such resistance was or could be maintained by Napoleon, they feared his supremacy, in a military command, at least as much as the predominance of the allies. His services were therefore declined by them.

Like skilful anglers, the Provisional Government had been gradually drawing their nets around Napoleon, and it was now time, as they thought, to drag him upon the shallows. They proceeded to place him under a sort of arrest, by directing General Beker, an officer with whom Napoleon had been on indifferent terms, to watch over, and, if necessary, to restrain his movements in such a manner, that it should be impossible for him to make his escape, and to use measures to induce him to leave Malmaison for Rochefort, where the means were provided for his departure out of France. Orders were at the same time given for two frigates to transport him to the United States of America ; and the *surveillance* of General Beker and the police was to continue until the late Emperor was on board the vessels. This order was qualified by directions that all possible care should be taken to ensure the safety of Napoleon's person. A corresponding order was transmitted by Davoust, who, giving way to one of those equivocal bursts of feeling, by which men compromise a conflict

between their sentiments and their duty or their interest, refused to sign it himself, but ordered his secretary to do so, which, as he observed, would be quite the same.¹

Napoleon submitted to his destiny with resignation and dignity. He received General Beker with ease, and even cheerfulness; and the latter, with feelings which did him honour, felt the task committed to him the more painful, that he had experienced the personal enmity of the individual who was now intrusted to his custody.² About forty persons, of different ranks and degrees, honourably dedicated their services to the adversity of the Emperor, whom they had served in prosperity.

Yet, amid all these preparations for departure, a longing hope remained, that his exile might be dispensed with. He heard the distant cannonade as the war-horse hears the trumpet. Again he offered his services to march against Blucher as a simple volunteer, undertaking that, when he had repulsed the invaders, he would then proceed on his journey of expatriation.³ He had such hopes of his request being granted, as to have his horses brought out

¹ [“The secretary found himself equally incapable of putting his name to such a communication. Was it sent or not?—this is a point which I cannot decide.”—LAS CASES, t. i. p. i. pp. 17–20.]

² [“Fouché knew that General Beker had a private pique against the Emperor; and therefore did not doubt of finding in the former a man disposed to vengeance; but he was grossly deceived in his expectations, for Beker constantly showed a degree of respect and attachment to the Emperor highly honourable to his character.”—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 17.]

³ [Ibid. t. i. p. 20.]

and in readiness to enable him to join the army. But the Provisional Government anew declined an offer, the acceptance of which would indeed have ruined all hopes of treating with the allies. Fouché, on hearing Napoleon's proposal, is said to have exclaimed, "Is he laughing at us!" Indeed, his joining the troops would have soon made him master of the destiny of the Provisional Government, whatever might have been the final result.

On the 29th of June, Napoleon departed from Malmaison; on the 3d of July he arrived at Rochefort. General Beker accompanied him, nor does his journey seem to have been marked by any circumstances worthy of remark. Wherever he came, the troops received him with acclamation; the citizens respected the misfortunes of one who had been wellnigh master of the world, and were silent where they could not applaud.

Thus, the reign of the Emperor Napoleon was completely ended. But, before adverting to his future fate, we must complete, in a few words, the consequences of his abdication, and offer some remarks on the circumstances by which it was extorted and enforced.

The Provisional Government had sent commissioners to the Duke of Wellington, to request passports for Napoleon to the States of America. The duke had no instructions from his government to grant them. The Prussian and English generals alike declined all overtures made for the establishment, or acknowledgment, either of the present Provisional Administration, or any plan which they endeavoured to suggest, short of the

restoration of the Bourbons to the seat of government. The Provisional Commissioners endeavoured, with as little success, to awaken the spirit of national defence. They had lost the road to the soldiers' hearts. The thoughts of patriotism had in the army become indissolubly united with the person and the qualities of Napoleon. It was in vain that deputies, with scarfs, and proclamations of public right, and invocation of the ancient watchwords of the Revolution, endeavoured to awaken the spirit of 1794. The soldiers and federates answered sullenly, "Why should we fight any more? we have no longer an Emperor."

Mean while the Royalist party assumed courage, and showed themselves in arms in several of the departments, directed the public opinion in many others, and gained great accessions from the Constitutionalists. Indeed, if any of the latter still continued to dread the restoration of the Bourbons, it was partly from the fear of reaction and retaliation on the side of the successful Royalists, and partly because it was apprehended that the late events might have made on the mind of Louis an impression unfavourable to constitutional limitations, a disgust to those by whom they were recommended and supported, and a propensity to resume the arbitrary measures by which his ancestors had governed their kingdom. Those who nourished those apprehensions could not but allow, that they were founded on the fickleness and ingratitude of the people, who had shown themselves unworthy of, and easily induced to conspire against, the mild and easy rule of a limited monarchy. But

they involved, nevertheless, tremendous consequences, if the King should be disposed to act upon rigorous and vindictive principles ; and it was such an apprehension on the part of some, joined to the fears of others for personal consequences, the sullen shame of a third party, and the hatred of the army to the princes whom they had betrayed, which procured for the Provisional Government a show of obedience.

It was thus that the Chambers continued their resistance to receiving their legitimate monarch, though unable to excite any enthusiasm save that expressed in the momentary explosions discharged within their own place of meeting, which gratified no ears, and heated no brains but their own. In the mean while, the armies of Soult and Grouchy were driven under the walls of Paris, where they were speedily followed by the English and the Prussians. The natural gallantry of the French then dictated a resistance, which was honourable to their arms, though totally unsuccessful. The allies, instead of renewing the doubtful attack on Montmartre, crossed the Seine, and attacked Paris on the undefended side. There was not, as in 1814, a hostile army to endanger the communications on their rear. The French, however, showed great bravery, both by an attempt to defend Versailles, and in a *coup-de-main* of General Excelmans, by which he attempted to recover that town. But at length, in consequence of the result of a council of war held in Paris, on the night betwixt the 2d and 3d of July, an armistice was concluded, by which the

capital was surrendered to the allies, and the French army was drawn off behind the Loire.

The allies suspended their operations until the French troops should be brought to submit to their destined movement in retreat, against which they struggled with vain enthusiasm. Permitting their violence to subside, they delayed their own occupation of Paris until the 7th of July, when it had been completely evacuated. The British and Prussians then took military possession, in a manner strictly regular, but arguing a different state of feelings on both parts, from those exhibited in the joyous procession of the allies along the Boulevards in 1814. The Provisional Government continued their sittings, though Fouché, the chief among them, had been long intriguing (and ever since the battle of Waterloo, with apparent sincerity) for the second restoration of the Bourbon family, on such terms as should secure the liberties of France. They received, on the 6th of July, the final resolution of the allied sovereigns, that they considered all authority emanating from the usurped power of Napoleon Buonaparte as null, and of no effect; and that Louis XVIII., who was presently at Saint Denis, would on the next day, or day after at farthest, enter his capital, and resume his regal authority.

On the 7th of July, the Provisional Commission dissolved itself. The Chamber of Peers, when they heard the act of surrender, dispersed in silence; but that of the Representatives continued to sit, vote, and debate, for several hours. The president then prorogued the meeting till eight the next morning, in defiance of the cries of several

members, who called on him to maintain the literal permanence of the sitting. The next morning, the members who attended found the hall sentinelled by the national guard, who refused them admittance, and heard the exclamations and complaints of the deputies with great disregard. Nay, the disappointed and indignant legislators were subjected to the ridicule of the idle spectators, who accompanied the arrival and retreat of each individual with laughter and acclamation, loud in proportion to the apparent excess of his mortification.

On the 8th of July, Louis re-entered his capital, attended by a very large body of the national guards and royal volunteers, as well as by his household troops. In the rear of these soldiers came a numerous *etat-major*, among whom were distinguished the Mareschals Victor, Marmont, Macdonald, Oudinot, Gouvion St Cyr, Moncey, and Lefebvre. An immense concourse of citizens received, with acclamations, the legitimate monarch; and the females were observed to be particularly eager in their expressions of joy. Thus was Louis again installed in the palace of his ancestors, over which the white banner once more floated. Here, therefore, ended that short space, filled with so much that is wonderful, that period of an Hundred Days, in which the events of a century seemed to be contained. Before we proceed with the narrative, which must in future be the history of an individual, it may not be improper to cast a look back upon the events comprised within that extraordinary period, and offer a few remarks on their political nature and tendency.

It is unnecessary to remind the reader, that Napoleon's restoration to the throne was the combined work of two factions. One comprehended the army, who desired the recovery of their own honour, sullied by recent defeats, and the recalling of the Emperor to their head, that he might save them from being disbanded, and lead them to new victories. The other party was that which not only desired that the kingdom should possess a large share of practical freedom, but felt interested that the doctrines of the Revolution should be recognised, and particularly that which was held to entitle the people, or those who might contrive to assume the right of representing them, to alter the constitution of the government at pleasure, and to be, as was said of the great Earl of Warwick, the setters up and pullers down of kings. This party, availing themselves of some real errors of the reigning family, imagining more, and exciting a cloud of dark suspicions, had instigated a general feeling of dissatisfaction against the Bourbons. But though they probably might have had recourse to violence, nothing appears less probable than their success in totally overturning royalty, had they been unsupported by the soldiers. The army, which rose so readily at Buonaparte's summons, had no community of feeling with the Jacobins, as they were called; and but for his arrival upon the scene, would have acted, there can be little doubt, at the command of the *mareschals*, who were almost all attached to the royal family. It was, therefore, the attachment of the army to their ancient com-

mander which gave success to the joint enterprise, which the Jacobinical party alone would have attempted in vain.

The Republican, or Jacobin party, closed with their powerful ally ; their leaders accepted titles at his hands ; undertook offices, and became members of a Chamber of Peers and of Representatives, summoned by his authority. They acknowledged him as their Emperor ; received as his boon a new constitution ; and swore in the face of all France the oath of fealty to it, and to him as their sovereign. On such terms the Emperor and his Legislative Body parted on the 7th of June. Suspicion there existed between them certainly, but, in all outward appearance, he departed a contented prince from a contented people. Eleven days brought the battle of Waterloo, with all its consequences. Policy of a sound and rational sort should have induced the Chambers to stand by the Emperor whom they had made, to arm him with the power which the occasion required, and avail themselves of his extraordinary military talent, to try some chance of arresting the invaders in their progress. Even shame might have prevented them from lending their shoulders to overthrow the tottering throne before which they had so lately kneeled. They determined otherwise. The instant he became unfortunate, Napoleon ceased to be their Emperor, the source of their power and authority. They could see nothing in him but the hurt deer, who is to be butted from the herd ; the Jonas in the vessel, who is to be flung overboard. When Napoleon, therefore, talked to them of men and

arms, they answered him, with "equality and the rights of man;" every chance of redeeming the consequences of Waterloo was lost, and the Emperor of their choice, if not ostensibly, was in effect at least arrested, and sent to the sea-coast, like a felon for deportation. Their conduct, however, went clearly to show, that Napoleon was not the free choice of the French people, and especially that he was not the choice of those who termed themselves exclusively the friends of freedom.

Having thus shown how easily they could get rid of the monarch who had called them into political existence, the Chambers applied to the allies, inviting them to give their concurrence to the election of another sovereign, and assist them to build another throne on the quicksand which had just swallowed that of Napoleon. In one respect they were not unreasonably tenacious. They cared little who the sovereign should be, whether Orleans or Orange, the Englishman Wellington or the Cossack Platoff, providing only he should derive no right from any one but themselves; and that they should be at liberty to recall that right when it might please them to do so. And there can be little doubt, that any new sovereign and constitution which could have been made by the assistance of such men, would have again occasioned the commencement of the wild dance of revolution, till, like so many mad Dervises, dizzy with the whirl, the French nation would once more have sunk to rest under the iron sway of despotism.

The allied sovereigns viewed these proposals with an evil eye, both in respect to their nature,

and to those by whom they were proposed. Of the authorities, the most prudent was the Duke of Otranto, and he had been Fouché of Nantes. Carnot's name was to be found at all the bloody rescripts of Robespierre, in which the conscience of the old decemvir and young count had never found any thing to boggle at. There were many others, distinguished in the Revolutionary days. The language which they held was already assuming the cant of democracy, and though there was among them a large proportion of good and able men, it was not to be forgotten how many of such existed in the first Assembly, for no purpose but to seal the moderation and rationality of their political opinions with their blood. It was a matter of imperious necessity to avoid whatever might give occasion to renew those scenes of shameful recollections, and the sovereigns saw a guarantee against their return, in insisting that Louis XVIII. should remount the throne as its legitimate owner.

The right of legitimacy, or the right of succession, a regulation adopted into the common law of most monarchical constitutions, is borrowed from the analogy of private life, where the eldest son becomes naturally the head and protector of the family upon the decease of the father. While states, indeed, are small,—before laws are settled,—and when much depends on the personal ability and talents of the monarch,—the power, which, for aught we know, may exist among the abstract rights of man, of choosing each chief magistrate after the death of his predecessor, or perhaps more frequently, may be exercised without much incon-

venience. But as states become extended, and their constitutions circumscribed and bounded by laws, which leaves less scope and less necessity for the exercise of the sovereign's magisterial functions, men become glad to exchange the licentious privilege of a Tartarian *couroultai*, or a Polish diet, for the principle of legitimacy; because the chance of a hereditary successor's proving adequate to the duties of his situation, is at least equal to that of a popular election lighting upon a worthy candidate; and because, in the former case, the nation is spared the convulsions occasioned by previous competition and solicitation, and succeeding heart-burnings, factions, civil war, and ruin, uniformly found at last to attend elective monarchies.

The doctrine of legitimacy is peculiarly valuable in a limited monarchy, because it affords a degree of stability otherwise unattainable. The principle of hereditary monarchy, joined to that which declares that the king can do no wrong, provides for the permanence of the executive government, and represses that ambition which would animate so many bosoms, were there a prospect of the supreme sway becoming vacant, or subject to election from time to time. The king's ministers, on the other hand, being responsible for his actions, remain a check, for their own sakes, upon the exercise of his power; and thus provision is made for the correction of all ordinary evils of administration, since, to use an expressive though vulgar simile, it is better to rectify any occasional deviation from the regular course by changing the driver, than by overturning the carriage.

Such is the principle of legitimacy which was invoked by Louis XVIII., and recognised by the allied sovereigns. But it must not be confounded with the slavish doctrine, that the right thus vested is by divine origin indefeasible. The heir-at-law in private life may dissipate by his folly, or forfeit by his crimes, the patrimony which the law conveys to him; and the legitimate monarch may most unquestionably, by departing from the principles of the constitution under which he is called to reign, forfeit for himself, and for his heirs if the legislature shall judge it proper, that crown, which the principle of legitimacy bestowed on him as his birth-right. The penalty of forfeiture is an extreme case, provided, not in virtue of the constitution, which recognises no possible delinquency in the sovereign, but because the constitution has been attacked and infringed upon by the monarch, and therefore can no longer be permitted to afford him shelter. The crimes by which this high punishment is justly incurred, must therefore be of an extraordinary nature, and beyond the reach of those correctives for which the constitution provides, by the punishment of ministers and counsellors. The constitutional buckler of impeccability covers the monarch (personally) for all blameworthy use of his power, providing it is exercised within the limits of the constitution; it is when he stirs beyond it, and not sooner, that it affords no defence for the bosom of a tyrant. A King of Britain, for example, may wage a rash war, or make a disgraceful peace, in the lawful, though injudicious and blameworthy exercise of the power

vested in him by the constitution. His advisers, not he himself, shall be called in such a case, to their responsibility. But if, like James II., the sovereign infringes upon, or endeavours to destroy, the constitution itself, it is then that resistance becomes lawful and honourable; and the king is justly held to have forfeited the right which descended to him from his forefathers, by his attempt to encroach on the rights of the subjects.

The principles of hereditary monarchy, of the inviolability of the person of the king, and of the responsibility of ministers, were recognised by the constitutional charter of France. Louis XVIII. was, therefore, during the year previous to Buonaparte's return, the lawful sovereign of France, and it remains to be shown by what act of treason to the constitution he had forfeited his right of legitimacy. If the reader will turn back to vol. xv. p. 268 (and we are not conscious of having spared the conduct of the Bourbons), he will probably be of opinion with us, that the errors of the restored King's government were not only fewer than might have been expected in circumstances so new and difficult, but were of such a nature as an honest, well-meaning, and upright Opposition would soon have checked; he will find that not one of them could be personally attributed to Louis XVIII., and that, far from having incurred the forfeiture of his legitimate rights, he had, during these few months, laid a strong claim to the love, veneration, and gratitude of his subjects. He had fallen a sacrifice, in some degree, to the humours and rashness of persons connected with his family and household

—still more to causeless jealousies and unproved doubts, the water-colours which insurrection never lacks to paint her cause with; to the fickleness of the French people, who became tired of his simple, orderly, and peaceful government; but, above all, to the dissatisfaction of a licentious and licensed soldiery, and of clubs of moody banditti, panting for a time of pell-mell havoc and confusion. The forcible expulsion of Louis XVIII., arising from such motives, could not break the solemn compact entered into by France with all Europe, when she received her legitimate monarch from the hand of her clement conquerors, and with him, and for his sake, obtained such conditions of peace as she was in no condition to demand, and would never otherwise have been granted. The King's misfortune, as it arose from no fault of his own, could infer no forfeiture of his vested right. Europe, the virtual guarantee of the treaty of Paris, had also a title, leading back the lawful King in her armed and victorious hand, to require of France his reinstatement in his rights; and the termination which she thus offered to the war was as just and equitable, as the conduct of the sovereigns during this brief campaign had been honourable and successful.

To these arguments, an unprejudiced eye could scarcely see any answer; yet the popular party endeavoured to found a pleading against the second restoration of Louis, upon the declaration of the allies. This manifesto had announced, they said, that the purpose of the war was directed against Buonaparte personally, and that it was the intention of the allied sovereigns, when he should be

dethroned, to leave the French the free exercise of choice respecting their own internal government.¹ The Prince Regent's declaration, in particular, was referred to, as announcing that the treaty of Vienna, which resolved on the dethronement of Napoleon, should not bind the British Government to insist upon the restoration of the Bourbon family as an indispensable condition of peace.² Those who urged this objection did not, or would not consider the nature of the treaty which this explanatory clause referred to. That treaty of Vienna had for its express object, the restoration of Louis XVIII., and the Prince Regent adhered to it with the same purpose of making every exertion for bringing about that event. The restrictive clause was only introduced, because his royal highness did not intend to bind himself to make that restoration *alone* the cause of continuing the war to extremity. Many things might have happened to render an absolute engagement of this nature highly inexpedient; but since none of these did happen, and since the re-establishment of the throne of the Bourbons was, in consequence of the victory of Waterloo, a measure which could be easily accomplished, it necessarily followed, that it *was* to be accomplished according to the tenor of the treaty of Vienna.

But, even had the sovereigns positively announced in their manifestoes, that the will of the French people should be consulted exclusively, what right

¹ [Parl. Debates, vol. xxx. p. 373.]

² ["It is not to be understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to prosecute the war with a view of imposing upon France any particular government."—*Parl. Deb.* vol. xxx. p. 798.]

had the Legislative Body, assembled by Buonaparte, to assume the character of the French people? They had neither weight nor influence with any party in the state, except by the momentary possession of an authority, which was hardly acknowledged on any side. The fact, that Napoleon's power had ceased to exist, did not legitimate them. On the contrary, flowing from his commission, it must be held as having fallen with his authority. They were either the Chambers summoned by Napoleon, and bound to him as far as oaths and professions could bind them, or they were a body without any pretension whatever to a political character.

La Fayette, indeed, contended that the present representatives of France stood in the same situation as the convention parliaments of England, and the army encamped in Hounslow-heath, at the time of the English Revolution. To have rendered this parallel apt, it required all the peculiar circumstances of justice which attended the great event of 1688. The French should have been able to vindicate the reason of their proceedings by the aggressions of their exiled monarch, and by the will of the nation generally, nay, almost unanimously, expressed in consequence thereof. This, we need not say, they were wholly unable to do. But the English history *did* afford one example of an assembly, exactly resembling their own, in absence of right, and exuberance of pretension; and that precedent existed when the Rump Parliament contrived to shuffle the cards out of the hands of Richard Cromwell, as the Provisional Commissioners at Paris were endeavouring by legerdemain to con-

vey the authority from Napoleon II. This Rump Parliament also sat for a little time as a government, and endeavoured to settle the constitution upon their own plan, in despite of the whole people of England, who were longing for the restoration of their lawful monarch, as speedily was shown to be the case, when Monk, with an armed force, appeared to protect them in the declaration of their real sentiments. This was the most exact parallel afforded by English history to the situation of the Provisional Commissioners of France; and both they and the Rump Parliament being equally intrusive occupants of the supreme authority, were alike justly deprived of it by the return of the legitimate monarch.

While the allied powers were thus desirous that the King of France should obtain possession of a throne which he had never forfeited, they, and England in particular, saw at once the justice and the policy of securing to France every accession of well-regulated freedom, which she had obtained by and through the Revolution, as well as such additional improvements upon her constitution as experience had shown to be desirable. These were pointed out and stipulated for by the celebrated Fouché, who, on this occasion, did much service to his country. Yet he struggled hard, that while the King acknowledged, which he was ready to do, the several benefits, both in point of public feeling and public advantage, which France had derived from the Revolution, the sovereign should make some steps to acknowledge the Revolution itself.¹

¹[Memoirs, t. ii. p. 292.]

He contended for the three-coloured banners being adopted, as a matter of the last importance ;—in that, somewhat resembling the archfiend in the legends of necromancy, who, when the unhappy persons with whom he deals decline to make over their souls and bodies according to his first request, is humble enough to ask and accept the most petty sacrifices—the paring of the nails, or a single lock of hair, providing it is offered in symbol of homage and devotion. But Louis XVIII. was not thus to be drawn into an incidental and equivocal homologation, as civilians term it, of all the wild work of a period so horrible, which must have been by implication a species of ratification even of the death of his innocent and murdered brother. To preserve and cherish the good which had flowed from the Revolution, was a very different thing from a ratification of the Revolution itself. A tempest may cast rich treasures upon the beach, a tornado may clear the air ; but while these benefits are suitably prized and enjoyed, it is surely not requisite that, like ignorant Indians, we should worship the wild surge, and erect altars to the howling of the wind.

The King of France having steadily refused all proposals which went to assign to the government an authority founded on the Revolution, the constitution of France is to be recognised as that of a hereditary monarchy, limited by the Royal Charter, and by the principles of freedom. It thus affords to the other existing monarchies of Europe a guarantee against sudden and dangerous commotion ; while in favour of the subject, it extends all

the necessary checks against arbitrary sway, and all the suitable provisions for ameliorating and extending the advantages of liberal institutions, as opportunity shall offer, and the expanding light of information shall recommend.

The allies, though their treaty with France was not made in the same humour of romantic generosity which dictated that of 1814, insisted upon no articles which could be considered as dishonourable to that nation. The disjoining from her empire three or four border fortresses was stipulated, in order to render a rapid and successful invasion of Germany or the Netherlands more difficult in future. Large sums of money were also exacted in recompense of the heavy expenses of the allies; but they were not beyond what the wealth of France could readily discharge. A part of her fortresses were also detained by the allies as a species of pledge for the peaceable behaviour of the kingdom; but these were to be restored after a season, and the armies of Europe, which for a time remained within the French territories, were at the same time to be withdrawn. Finally, that splendid Museum, which the right of conquest had collected by the stripping of so many states, was transferred by the same right of conquest, not to those of the allies who had great armies in the field, but to the poor and small states, who had resigned their property to the French under the influence of terror, and received it back from the confederates with wonder and gratitude.

These circumstances were indeed galling to France for the moment; but they were the neces-

sary consequence of the position in which, perhaps rather passively than actively, she had been placed by the Revolution of the Hundred Days. All the prophecies which had been circulated to animate the people against the allies, of their seeking selfish and vindictive objects, or endeavouring to destroy the high national rank which that fair kingdom ought to hold in Europe, were proved to be utterly fallacious. The conquered provinces, as they are called, the acquisitions of Louis XIV., were not rent from the French empire—their colonies were left as at the peace of Paris. The English did not impose on them an unfavourable treaty of commerce, which Napoleon affirmed was their design, and the omission to insist on which he afterwards considered as a culpable neglect of British interests by the English ministers. France was left, as she ought to be, altogether independent, and splendidly powerful.

Neither were the predictions concerning the stability of the new royal government less false than had been the vaticinations respecting the purposes of the allies. Numbers prophesied the downfall of the Bourbon dynasty. It was with difficulty that the political augurs would allow that it might last as long as the life of Louis XVIII. He now sleeps with his fathers ; and his successor, generally beloved for his courteous manners, and respected for his integrity and honour, reigns over a free and flourishing people. Time, that grand pacificator, is daily abating the rancour of party, and removing from the scene those of all sides, who, unaccustomed to the general and impartial

exercise of the laws, were ready to improve every advantage, and debate every political question, sword in hand, or, as they themselves express it, *par voie du fait*. The guarantee for the permanence of their freedom, is the only subject on which reasonable Frenchmen of the present day are anxious. We trust there is no occasion for their solicitude. Fatal indeed would be the advice which should induce the French Government to give the slightest subject for just complaints. The ultra Royalist, the Jacobin *enragé*, are gradually cooled by age, or fate has removed them from the scene. Those who succeed, having never seen the sword drawn, will be less apt to hurry into civil strife; and the able and well-intentioned on either side, while they find room in the Chambers for expressing their difference of opinion, will acquire the habit of enduring contradiction with candour and good-humour, and be led to entertain the wholesome doubt, whether, in the imperfect state of the human intellect, it is possible for one class of statesmen to be absolutely and uniformly right, and their opponents, in all instances, decidedly wrong. The French will learn, that it is from freedom of debate—from an appeal, not to the arms, but to the understandings of the people—by the collision of intellect, not the strife of brutal violence, that the political institutions of this ingenious people are in future to be improved.

The aspirations of France after glory in the field, had been indulged, during the period of which we have treated, dreadfully for other countries, and the requital to herself was sufficiently fearful. A

sentiment friendly to peace and good order has of late years distinguished even those two nations, which, by a rash and wicked expression, have been sometimes termed natural enemies. The enlarged ideas of commerce, as they spread wider, and become better understood, will afford, perhaps, the strongest and most irresistible motive for amicable intercourse,—that, namely, which arises from mutual advantage; for commerce keeps pace with civilisation, and a nation, as it becomes wealthy from its own industry, acquires more and more a taste for the conveniences and luxuries, which are the produce of the soil, or of the industry, of other countries. Britain, of whom all that was selfish was expected and predicated by Napoleon and his friends—Britain, who was said to meditate enchain-
ing France by a commercial treaty (which would have ruined her own manufactures), has, by opening her ports to the manufactures of her neighbour, had the honour to lead the way in a new and more honourable species of traffic, which has in some degree the property ascribed by the poet to Mercy,—

“ It blesseth him who gives, and him who takes.”

To the eye of a stranger, the number of new buildings established in Paris, and indeed throughout France, are indications of capital and enterprise, of a nature much more satisfactory than the splendid but half-finished public edifices, which Napoleon so hastily undertook, and so often left in an incomplete state. The general improvement of ideas may be also distinctly remarked, on comparing the

French people of 1815 and 1826, and observing the gradual extinction of long-cherished prejudices, and the no less gradual improvement and enlargement of ideas. This state of advancement cannot, indeed, be regular—it must have its ebbs and flows. But on the whole, there seems more reason than at any former period of the world, for hoping that there will be a general peace of some lengthened endurance; and that Britain and France, in particular, will satisfy themselves with enjoying in recollection the laurels each country has won in the field, and be contented to struggle for the palm of national superiority by the arts of peaceful and civilized industry.

CHAPTER XCI.

Disposition of the British Fleet along the Western Coast of France, in order to prevent Buonaparte's Escape.—The Bellerophon off Rochefort.—Orders under which Captain Maitland acted.—Plans agitated for Napoleon's Escape.—Savary and Las Cases open a Negotiation with Captain Maitland—Captain Maitland's Account of what passed at their Interviews—Las Cases' Account—The Statements compared.—Napoleon's Letter to the Prince Regent.—He surrenders himself on board the Bellerophon, on 15th July—His arrival off Plymouth.—All approach to the Ship prohibited.—Final determination of the English Government that Buonaparte shall be sent to St Helena.—His Protest.

OUR history returns to its principal object. Buonaparte arrived at Rochefort upon the 3d July; so short had been the space between the bloody cast of the die at Waterloo, and his finding himself an exile. Yet even this brief space of fifteen days had made his retreat difficult, if not impracticable. Means, indeed, were provided for his transportation. The two French frigates, the Saale and the Medusa, together with the Balladière, a corvette, and the Epervier, a large brig, waited Buonaparte's presence, and orders to sail for America from their station under the isle d'Aix. But, as Napoleon himself said shortly afterwards,

wherever there was water to swim a ship, there he was sure to find the British flag.

The news of the defeat at Waterloo had been the signal to the Admiralty to cover the western coast of France with cruisers, in order to prevent the possibility of Napoleon's escaping by sea from any of the ports in that direction. Admiral Lord Keith, an officer of great experience and activity, then commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, had made a most judicious disposition of the fleet under his command, by stationing an inner line of cruisers, of various descriptions, off the principal ports between Brest and Bayonne, with an exterior line, necessarily more widely extended, betwixt Ushant and Cape Finisterre. The commanders of these vessels had the strictest orders to suffer no vessel to pass unexamined. No less than thirty ships of different descriptions maintained this blockade. According to this arrangement, the British line-of-battle ship, the *Bellerophon*, cruised off Rochefort, with the occasional assistance of the *Slaney*, the *Phœbe*, and other small vessels, sometimes present, and sometimes detached, as the service might require. Captain Maitland, who commanded the *Bellerophon*, is a man of high character in his profession, of birth, of firmness of mind, and of the most indisputable honour. It is necessary to mention these circumstances, because the national character of England herself is deeply concerned and identified with that of Captain Maitland, in the narrative which follows.

The several orders under which this officer acted, expressed the utmost anxiety about intercepting

Buonaparte's flight, and canvassed the different probabilities concerning its direction. His attention was at a later date particularly directed to the frigates in Aix roads, and the report concerning their destination. Admiral Hotham writes to Captain Maitland, 8th July, 1815. the following order :—

“ The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having every reason to believe that Napoleon Buonaparte meditates his escape, with his family, from France to America, you are hereby required and directed, in pursuance of orders from their Lordships, signified to me by Admiral the Right Honourable Viscount Keith, to keep the most vigilant look-out, for the purpose of intercepting him ; and to make the strictest search of any vessel you may fall in with ; and if you should be so fortunate as to intercept him, you are to transfer him and his family to the ship you command, and, there keeping him in careful custody, return to the nearest port in England (going into Torbay in preference to Plymouth), with all possible expedition ; and, on your arrival, you are not to permit any communication whatever with the shore, except as herein after directed ; and you will be held responsible for keeping the whole transaction a profound secret, until you receive their Lordships' further orders.

“ In case you should arrive at a port where there is a flag-officer, you are to send to acquaint him with the circumstances, strictly charging the officer, sent on shore with your letter, not to divulge its contents ; and if there should be no flag-officer at the port where you arrive, you are to send one letter express to the Secretary of the Admiralty, and another to Admiral Lord Keith, with strict injunctions of secrecy to each officer who may be the bearer of them.”

We give these orders at full length, to show that they left Captain Maitland no authority to make conditions or stipulations of surrender, or to treat Napoleon otherwise than as an ordinary prisoner of war.

Captain Maitland proceeded to exercise all the vigilance which an occasion so interesting demand-

ed ; and it was soon evident, that the presence of the *Bellerophon* was an absolute bar to Napoleon's escape by means of the frigates, unless it should be attempted by open force. In this latter case, the British officer had formed his plan of bearing down upon and disabling the one vessel, and throwing on board of her a hundred men selected for the purpose, while the *Bellerophon* set sail with all speed in pursuit of her consort, and thus made sure of both. He had also two small vessels, the *Slaney* and *Phœbe*, which he could attach to the pursuit of the frigate, so as at least to keep her in view. This plan might have failed by accident, but it was so judiciously laid as to have every chance of being successful ; and it seems that Napoleon received no encouragement from the commanders of the frigates to try the event of a forcible escape.

The scheme of a secret flight was next meditated. A *chasse-marée*, a peculiar species of vessel, used only in the coasting trade, was to be fitted up and manned with young probationers of the navy, equivalent to our midshipmen. This, it was thought, might elude the vigilance of such British cruisers as were in shore ; but then it must have been a suspicious object at sea, and the possibility of its being able to make the voyage to America, was considered as precarious. A Danish corvette was next purchased, and as, in leaving the harbour, it was certain she would be brought to and examined by the English, a place of concealment was contrived, being a cask supplied with air-tubes, to be stowed in the hold of the vessel, in which it was intended Napoleon should lie concealed. But the

extreme rigour with which the search was likely to be prosecuted, and the corpulence of Buonaparte, which would not permit him to remain long in a close or constrained position, made this as well as other hopeless contrivances be laid aside.¹

There were undoubtedly at this time many proposals made to the Ex-Emperor by the army, who, compelled to retreat behind the Loire, were still animated by a thirst of revenge, and a sense of injured honour. There is no doubt that they would have received Napoleon with acclamation; but if he could not, or would not, pursue a course so desperate in 1814, when he had still a considerable army, and a respectable extent of territory remaining, it must have seemed much more ineligible in 1815, when his numbers were so much more disproportioned than they had formerly been, and when his best generals had embraced the cause of the Bourbons, or fled out of France. Napoleon's condition, had he embraced this alternative, would have been that of the chief of a roving tribe of warriors, struggling for existence, with equal misery to themselves and the countries through which they wandered, until at length broken down and destroyed by superior force.

Rejecting this expedient, and all others having been found equally objectionable, the only alternative which remained was to surrender his person, either to the allied powers as a body, or to any one of them in particular. The former course would have been difficult, unless Napoleon had

¹ [Savary, t. iv. p. 149; Las Cases, t. i. p. 24-27.]

adopted the idea of resorting to it earlier, which, in the view of his escape by sea, he had omitted to do. Neither had he time to negotiate with any of the allied sovereigns, or of travelling back to Paris for the purpose, with any chance of personal safety, for the Royalists were now every where holding the ascendancy, and more than one of his generals had been attacked and killed by them.

He was cooped up, therefore, in Rochefort,¹ although the white flag was already about to be hoisted there, and the commandant respectfully hinted the necessity of his departure. It must have been anticipated by Napoleon, that he might be soon deprived of the cover of the batteries of the isle of Aix. The fact is (though we believe not generally known), that on the 13th July, Lord Castlereagh wrote to Admiral Sir Henry Hotham, commanding off cape Finisterre, suggesting to him the propriety of attacking, with a part of his force, the two frigates in the roads of the isle d'Aix, having first informed the commandant that they did so in the capacity of allies of the King of France, and placing it upon his responsibility if he fired on them from the batteries. Napoleon could not, indeed, know for certain that such a plan was actually in existence, and about to be attempted, but yet must have been aware of its probability,

¹ [“ At Rochefort, the Emperor lived at the prefecture : numbers were constantly grouped round the house ; and acclamations continued to be frequently repeated. He leads the same sort of life as if at the Tuileries : we do not approach his person more frequently ; he scarcely receives any persons but Bertrand and Savary.”—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 24.]

when the Royalist party were becoming every where superior, and their emblems were assumed in the neighbouring town of Rochelle. It is, therefore, in vain to state Buonaparte's subsequent conduct, as a voluntary confidence reposed by him in the honour of England. He was precisely in the condition of the commandant of a besieged town, who has the choice of surrendering, or encountering the risks of a storm. Neither was it open for him to contend, that he selected the British, out of all the other allied powers, with whom to treat upon this occasion. Like the commandant in the case above supposed, he was under the necessity of surrendering to those who were the immediate besiegers, and therefore he was compelled to apply for terms of safety to him who alone possessed the direct power of granting it, that is, to Captain Frederick Maitland, of the *Bellerophon*.

Napoleon opened a communication with this officer on the 10th July, by two of his attendants, General Savary and Count Las Cases, under pretence of enquiring about a safe-conduct,—a passport which Napoleon pretended to expect from England, and which, he said, had been promised to him, without stating by whom. Under this round assertion, for which there was not the slightest ground, Messrs Savary and Las Cases desired to know, whether Captain Maitland would permit the frigates to sail with him uninterrupted, or at least give him leave to proceed in a neutral vessel. Captain Maitland, without hesitation, declared that he would not permit any armed vessel to put to sea from the port of Rochefort. “It was equally out of his power,” he

stated, "to allow the Emperor to proceed in a neutral vessel, without the sanction of Admiral Hotham, his commanding officer." He offered to write to that officer, however, and the French gentlemen having assented, he wrote, in their presence, to the admiral, announcing the communication he had received, and requesting orders for his guidance. This was all but a prelude to the real subject of negotiation. The Duke of Rovigo (Savary) and Count Las Cases remained two or three hours on board, and said all they could to impress Captain Maitland with the idea, that Napoleon's retirement was a matter of choice, not of compulsion, and that it was the interest of Britain to consent to his going to America; a measure, they said, which was solely dictated to him by humanity, and a desire to save human blood. Captain Maitland asked the natural question, which we give in his own words:—

"Supposing the British Government should be induced to grant a passport for Buonaparte's going to America, what pledge could he give that he would not return, and put England, as well as all Europe, to the same expense of blood and treasure that has just been incurred?"

"General Savary made the following reply:—'When the Emperor first abdicated the throne of France, his removal was brought about by a faction, at the head of which was Talleyrand, and the sense of the nation was not consulted: but in the present instance he has voluntarily resigned the power. The influence he once had over the French people is past; a very considerable change has taken place in their sentiments towards him, since he went to Elba; and he could never regain the power he had over their minds; therefore, he would prefer retiring into obscurity, where he might end his days in peace and tranquillity; and were he solicited to ascend the throne again, he would decline it.'

"If that is the case," said Captain Maitland, "why not ask an asylum in England?" Savary answered, "There are many reasons for his not wishing to reside in England; the climate is

too damp and cold; it is too near France; he would be, as it were, in the centre of every change and revolution that might take place there, and would be subject to suspicion; he has been accustomed to consider the English as his most inveterate enemies, and they have been induced to look upon him as a monster, without one of the virtues of a human being.' ”

Captain Knight of the Falmouth was present during the whole of this conversation, from which Captain Maitland, like an able diplomatist, drew a conclusion respecting the affairs of Napoleon, exactly opposite from that which they endeavoured to impress upon him, and concluded that he must be in extremity.

On the 14th July, Count Las Cases again came on board the Bellerophon, now attended by General Count Lallemand. The pretext of the visit was, to learn whether Captain Maitland had received any answer from the admiral. Captain Maitland observed, the visit on that account was unnecessary, as he would have forwarded the answer so soon as received; and added, he did not approve of frequent communication by flags of truce; thus repelling rather than inviting them. The conference was resumed after breakfast, Captain Maitland having, in the mean time, sent for Captain Sartorius of the Slaney, to be witness of what passed. In this most important conference, we hold it unjust to Captain Maitland to use any other words than his own, copied from his Journal, the original of which we have ourselves had the advantage of seeing:—

“ When breakfast was over, we retired to the after-cabin. Count Las Cases then said, ‘ The Emperor is so anxious to spare the further effusion of human blood, that he will proceed to America in any way the British Government chooses to sanction, either in a French ship of war, a vessel armed *en flute*, a merchant vessel,

or even in a British ship of war.' To this I answered, 'I have no authority to agree to any arrangement of that sort, nor do I believe my Government would consent to it, but I think I may venture to receive him into this ship, and convey him to England : *if, however.*' I added, '*he adopts that plan, I cannot enter into any promise, as to the reception he may meet with, as, even in the case I have mentioned, I shall be acting on my own responsibility, and cannot be sure that it would meet with the approbation of the British Government.*'

"There was a great deal of conversation on this subject, in the course of which Lucien Buonaparte's name was mentioned, and the manner in which he had lived in England alluded to ; but I invariably assured Las Cases most explicitly, that I had no authority to make conditions of any sort, as to Napoleon's reception in England. In fact, I could not have done otherwise, since, with the exception of the order [inserted at page 89], I had no instructions for my guidance, and was, of course, in total ignorance of the intention of his Majesty's ministers as to his future disposal. One of the last observations Las Cases made, before quitting the ship, was, 'Under all circumstances, I have little doubt that you will see the Emperor on board the Bellerophon ;' and, in fact, Buonaparte must have determined on that step before Las Cases came on board, as his letter to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent is dated the 13th of July, the day before this conversation."

The Count Las Cases gives nearly a similar detail of circumstances, with a colouring which is exaggerated, and an arrangement of dates which is certainly inaccurate. It must be also noticed that Count Las Cases dissembled his acquaintance with the English language ; and therefore, if any mistake had occurred betwixt him and Captain Maitland, who spoke French with difficulty, he had himself so far to blame for it.¹ Of the visit on board the Bellerophon on the 10th, after giving the same statement as Captain Maitland, concerning the ap-

¹ ["Our situation was quite sufficient to remove any scruples I might otherwise have entertained, and rendered this little deception pardonable."—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 26.]

plication for the passports, the count states, "It was suggested to us to go to England, and we were assured we had no room to fear any bad treatment."¹

On the 14th, being the date of his second visit, he states, that there was a repetition of the invitation to England, and the terms on which it was recommended. "Captain Maitland," he says, "told him, that if the Emperor chose immediately to embark, he had authority to receive him on board, and conduct him to England." This is so expressed as to lead the reader to believe that Captain Maitland spoke to the count of some new directions or orders which he had received, or pretended to have received, concerning Buonaparte. Such an inference would be entirely erroneous; no new or extended authority was received by Captain Maitland, nor was he capable of insinuating the existence of such. His sole instructions were contained in the orders of Admiral Hotham, quoted at p. 89, directing him, should he be so fortunate as to intercept Buonaparte, to transfer him to the ship he commanded, to make sail for a British port, and, when arrived there, to communicate instantly with the port-admiral, or with the Admiralty.

Count Las Cases makes Captain Maitland proceed to assure him and Savary, that, "in his own private opinion, Napoleon would find in England all the respect and good treatment to which he could make any pretension; that there, the princes and ministers did not exercise the absolute authority

¹ "Il nous fut suggéré de nous rendre en Angleterre, et affirmé qu'on ne pouvait y craindre aucun mauvais traitement."—*Journal de Las Cases*, t. i. p. i. p. 28.

used on the continent, and that the English people had a liberality of opinion, and generosity of sentiment, superior to that entertained by sovereigns." Count Las Cases states himself to have replied to the panegyric on England, by an oration in praise of Buonaparte, in which he described him as retiring from a contest which he had yet the means of supporting, in order that his name and rights might not serve as a pretext to prolong civil war. The count, according to his own narrative, concluded by saying, that, "under all the circumstances, he thought the Emperor might come on board the *Bellerophon*, and go to England with Captain Maitland, for the purpose of receiving passports for America." Captain Maitland desired it should be understood, that he by no means warranted that such would be granted.

"At the bottom of my heart," says Las Cases, "I never supposed the passports would be granted to us; but as the Emperor had resolved to remain in future a personal stranger to political events, we saw, without alarm, the probability that we might be prevented from leaving England; but to that point all our fears and suppositions were limited. Such, too, was doubtless the belief of Maitland. I do him, as well as the other officers, the justice to believe, that he was sincere, and of good faith, in the painting they drew us of the sentiments of the English nation."¹

The envoys returned to Napoleon, who held, according to Las Cases, a sort of council, in which

¹ [Las Cases, t. i. p. 29.]

they considered all the chances. The plan of the Danish vessel, and that of the *classe-marée*, were given up as too perilous; the British cruiser was pronounced too strong to be attacked; there remained only the alternative of Napoleon's joining the troops, and renewing the war, or accepting Captain Maitland's offer by going on board the *Bellerophon*. The former was rejected; the latter plan adopted, and "then," says M. Las Cases, "*Napoleon wrote to the Prince Regent.*"¹ The letter follows, but it is remarkable that the date is omitted. This is probably the reason why Count Las Cases did not discover that his memory was betraying him, since that date must have reminded him that the letter was written *before*, not *after*, the conference of the 14th July.

From this narrative two things are plain; I. That no terms of capitulation were made with Captain Maitland. II. That it is the object of Count Las Cases to insinuate the belief, that it was in consequence of the arguments used by Captain Maitland, supported by the British officers present, that Las Cases was induced to recommend, and Napoleon to adopt, the step of surrendering himself on board the *Bellerophon*. But this whole inference is disproved by two small ciphers; the date, namely, of *13th of July* on the letter addressed to the Prince Regent, which, therefore, could not, in the nature of things, have been written in consequence of a conference betwixt Las Cases and

¹ "*Alors Napoléon écrivit au Prince Régent.*"—*Journal*, t. i. p. 33.

Captain Maitland, and a consultation betwixt Napoleon and his followers; which conference and consultation did not take place till the 14th of July. The resolution was taken, and the letter written, the day before all those glowing descriptions of the English people put into the mouth of Captain Maitland; and the faith of Napoleon was grounded upon the impersonal suggestion to go to England,¹ made to Las Cases and Savary on their first visit to the Bellerophon. The visit of the 14th, doubtless, confirmed the resolution which had been adopted the preceding day.

No delay now intervened. On the same 14th of July, General Baron Gourgaud was sent off with the letter, so often mentioned, addressed to the Prince Regent, which was in these well-known terms:

“Rochefort, July 13th, 1815.

“ROYAL HIGHNESS,

“A victim to the factions which distract my country, and to the enmity of the greatest powers of Europe, I have terminated my political career, and I come, like Themistocles, to throw myself upon the hospitality of the British people. I put myself under the protection of their laws; which I claim from your Royal Highness, as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies.

“NAPOLEON.”

Captain Maitland informed Count Las Cases, that he would despatch General Gourgaud to England, by the *Slaney*, and himself prepare to receive Napoleon and his suite. General Gourgaud proposed to write to Count Bertrand instantly, when,

¹ See p. 97, where Las Cases says, “*It was suggested to us to go to England.*”

in presence and hearing of his brother officers, Captains Sartorius and Gambier, Captain Maitland gave another instance of his anxiety not to be misunderstood on this important occasion.

“ When General Gourgaud was about to write the letter, to prevent any future misunderstanding, I said, ‘ M. Las Cases, you will recollect that I am not authorized to stipulate as to the reception of Buonaparte in England, but that he must consider himself entirely at the disposal of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.’ He answered, ‘ I am perfectly aware of that, and have already acquainted the Emperor with what you said on the subject.’ ”

Captain Maitland subjoins the following natural and just remark :—

“ It might, perhaps, have been better if this declaration had been given in an official written form ; and could I have foreseen the discussions which afterwards took place, and which will appear in the sequel, I undoubtedly should have done so ; but as I repeatedly made it in the presence of witnesses, it did not occur to me as being necessary ; and how could a stronger proof be adduced, that no stipulations were agreed to respecting the reception of Buonaparte in England, than the fact of their not being reduced to writing ? which certainly would have been the case had any favourable terms been demanded on the part of M. Las Cases, and agreed to by me.”

To conclude the evidence on this subject, we add Captain Maitland’s letter, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty on 14th July :—

“ For the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I have to acquaint you that the Count Las Cases and General Lallemand this day came on board his Majesty’s ship under my command, with a proposal from Count Bertrand for me to receive on board Napoleon Buonaparte, for the purpose of throwing himself on the generosity of the Prince Regent. Conceiving myself authorized by their lordships’ secret order, I have acceded to the proposal, and he is to embark on board this ship to-morrow morning. That no misunderstanding might arise, I have explicitly and clearly explained to Count Las Cases, that I have no authority whatever for granting terms of any sort, but that all I can do is to carry him and his suite to England, to be

received in such manner as his Royal Highness may deem expedient."

Is it in human nature to suppose, that a British officer, with two others of the same rank as witnesses of the whole negotiation, would have expressed himself otherwise than as truth warranted, in a case which was sure to be so strictly enquired into?

On the 15th July, 1815, Napoleon finally left France, to the history of which he had added so much of victory, and so much of defeat; the country which his rise had saved from civil discord and foreign invasion, and which his fall consigned to both; in a word, that fair land to which he had been so long as a Deity, and was in future to be of less import than the meanest peasant on the soil. He was accompanied by four of his generals—Bertrand, Savary, Lallemand, and Montholon, and by Count Las Cases, repeatedly mentioned as counsellor of state. Of these, Bertrand and Montholon had their ladies on board, with three children belonging to Count Bertrand, and one of Count Montholon's. The son of Las Cases accompanied the Emperor as a page. There were nine officers of inferior rank, and thirty-nine domestics. The principal persons were received on board the *Bellerophon*, the others in the corvette.

Buonaparte came out of Aix roads on board of the *Epervier*. Wind and tide being against the brig, Captain Maitland sent the barge of the *Bellerophon* to transport him to that ship. Most of the officers and crew of the *Epervier* had tears in their eyes, and they continued to cheer the Emperor while their voices could be heard. He was

received on board the Bellerophon respectfully, but without any salute or distinguished honours.¹ As Captain Maitland advanced to meet him on the quarterdeck, Napoleon pulled off his hat, and, addressing him in a firm tone of voice, said, "I come to place myself under the protection of your prince and laws." His manner was uncommonly pleasing, and he displayed much address in seizing upon opportunities of saying things flattering to the hearers whom he wished to conciliate.²

¹["Buonaparte's dress was an olive-coloured great coat over a green uniform, with scarlet cape and cuffs, green lapels turned back and edged with scarlet, skirts hooked back with bugle horns embroidered in gold, plain sugar-loaf huttons and gold epaulettes; being the uniform of *chasseur à cheval* of the imperial guard. He wore the star, or grand cross of the legion of honour, and the small cross of that order; the iron crown; and the union, appended to the hutton-hole of his left lapel. He had a small cocked hat, with a tri-coloured cockade, plain gold-hilted sword, military boots, and white waistcoat and breeches. The following day he appeared in shoes, with gold buckles, and silk stockings—the dress he always wore afterwards, while with me."—MAITLAND, p. 66.]

²["Rear-Admiral Hotham came to visit the Emperor, and remained to dinner. From the questions asked by Napoleon relative to his ship, he expressed a wish to know whether his Majesty would condescend to go on board the following day; upon which the Emperor said he would breakfast with the admiral, accompanied by all his attendants. On the 16th, I attended him on board the Superb: all the honours, except those of firing cannon, were liberally done; we went round the ship, and examined the most trifling objects: every thing seemed to be in admirable order. Admiral Hotham evinced, throughout, all the refinement and grace of a man of rank and education. On our leaving the Bellerophon in the morning to visit the Superb, Napoleon stopped short in front of the guard drawn up on the quarterdeck to salute him. He made them perform several movements, giving them the word of command himself; having desired them to charge bayonets, and perceiving this motion was

As when formerly on board Captain Usher's vessel, Buonaparte showed great curiosity concerning the discipline of the ship, and expressed considerable surprise that the British vessels should so easily defeat the French ships, which were heavier, larger, and better manned than they. Captain Maitland accounted for this by the greater experience of the men and officers. The Ex-Emperor examined the marines also, and, pleased with their appearance, said to Bertrand, "How much might be done with an hundred thousand such men!" In the management of the vessel, he particularly admired the silence and good order of the crew while going through their manœuvres, in comparison to a French vessel, "where every one," he said, "talks and gives orders at once." When about to quit the *Bellerophon*, he adverted to the same subject, saying, there had been less noise on board that vessel, with six hundred men, in the whole passage from Rochefort, than the crew of the *Epervier*, with only one hundred, had contrived to make between the isle d'Aix and Basque roads.

He spoke, too, of the British army in an equal style of praise, and was joined by his officers in doing so. One of the French officers observing that the English cavalry were superb, Captain Maitland observed, that in England, they had a higher opinion of the infantry. "You are right,"

not performed altogether in the French manner, he advanced into the midst of the soldiers, put the weapons aside with his hands, and seized a musket from one of the rear rank, with which he went through the exercise himself, according to our method." —LAS CASES, t. i. p. 35.]

said the French gentleman; "there is none such in the world; there is no making an impression on them; you might as well attempt to charge through a wall; and their fire is tremendous." Bertrand reported to Captain Maitland that Napoleon had communicated to him his opinion of the Duke of Wellington in the following words:—"The Duke of Wellington, in the management of an army, is fully equal to myself, with the advantage of possessing more prudence." This we conceive to be the genuine unbiassed opinion of one great soldier concerning another. It is a pity that Napoleon could on other occasions express himself in a strain of depreciation, which could only lower him who used it, towards a rival in the art of war.

During the whole passage, notwithstanding his situation, and the painful uncertainty under which he laboured, Napoleon seemed always tranquil, and in good temper;¹ at times, he even approached to cheerfulness. He spoke with tenderness of his wife and family, complained of being separated from them, and had tears in his eyes when he showed their portraits to Captain Maitland. His health seemed perfectly good; but he was occasionally subject to somnolency, proceeding, perhaps, from

¹ [Some of the London newspapers having represented Napoleon "as taking possession of the chief cabin in a most brutal way, saying '*Tout ou rien pour moi*'"—Captain Maitland makes this declaration—"I here, once for all, beg to state most distinctly, that from the time of his coming on board my ship, to the period of his quitting her, his conduct was invariably that of a gentleman; and in no instance do I recollect him to have made use of a rude expression, or to have been guilty of any kind of ill-breeding."—*Narrative*, p. 72.]

the exhaustion of a constitution which had gone through such severe service.

On 23d July, they passed Ushant. Napoleon remained long on deck, and cast many a melancholy look to the coast of France, but made no observations. At daybreak on 24th, the *Bellerophon* was off Dartmouth; and Buonaparte was struck, first with the boldness of the coast, and then, as he entered Torbay,¹ with the well-known beauty of the scenery. "It reminded him," he said, "of Porto Ferrajo, in Elba;" an association which must at the moment have awakened strange remembrances in the mind of the deposed Emperor.

The *Bellerophon* had hardly anchored, when orders came from the admiral, Lord Keith, which were soon after seconded by others from the Admiralty, enjoining that no one, of whatever rank or station, should be permitted to come on board the *Bellerophon*, excepting the officers and men belonging to the ship. On the 26th, the vessel received orders to move round to Plymouth Sound.

In the mean time, the newspapers which were brought on board tended to impress anxiety and consternation among the unhappy fugitives. The report was generally circulated by these periodical publications, that Buonaparte would not be permitted to land, but would be presently sent off to St Helena, as the safest place for detaining him as a prisoner of war. Napoleon himself became alarmed,

¹ ["July 24. we anchored at Torbay about eight in the morning: Napoleon had risen at six, and went on the poop, whence he surveyed the coast and anchorage. I remained by his side to give the explanations he required."—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 41.]

and anxiously desirous of seeing Lord Keith, who had expressed himself sensible of some kindness which his nephew, Captain Elphinstone of the 7th Hussars, had received from the Emperor, when wounded and made prisoner at Waterloo. Such an interview accordingly took place betwixt the noble admiral and the late Emperor, upon the 28th July, but without any results of importance, as Lord Keith was not then possessed of the decision of the British Government.

That frenzy of popular curiosity, which, predominating in all free states, seems to be carried to the utmost excess by the English nation, caused such numbers of boats to surround the *Bellerophon*, that, notwithstanding the peremptory orders of the Admiralty, and in spite of the efforts of the man-of-war's boats, which maintained constant guard round the vessel, it was almost impossible to keep them at the prescribed distance of a cable's length from the ship. They incurred the risk of being run down,—of being, as they might apprehend, shot (for muskets were discharged for the purpose of intimidation), of all the dangers of a naval combat, rather than lose the opportunity of seeing the Emperor whom they had heard so much of. When he appeared he was greeted with huzzas, which he returned with bows, but could not help expressing his wonder at the eagerness of popular curiosity, which he was not accustomed to see in such a pitch of excitation.

On the evening of the 30th of July, Major-General Sir Henry Bunbury, one of the Under Secretaries of State, arrived, bringing with him

the final intentions of the British Government, for the disposal of Buonaparte and his suite. Upon the 31st, Lord Keith and Sir Henry waited upon the Ex-Emperor, on board of the *Bellerophon*, to communicate to him the unpleasing tidings. They were accompanied by Mr Meike, the secretary of Lord Keith, whose presence was deemed necessary as a witness to what passed. Napoleon received the admiral and under secretary of state with becoming dignity and calmness. The letter of Lord Melville (First Lord of the Admiralty) was read to the Ex-Emperor, announcing his future destination. It stated, that "it would be inconsistent with the duty of the British ministers to their sovereign and his allies, to leave *General Buonaparte* the means or opportunity of again disturbing the peace of Europe—announced that the island of St Helena was selected for his future residence, and selected as such, because its local situation would permit his enjoying more freedom than could be compatible with adequate security elsewhere—that, with the exception of Generals Savary and Lallemand, the general might select three officers, together with his surgeon, to attend him to St Helena—that twelve domestics would also be allowed." The same document stated, that "the persons who might attend upon him would be liable to a certain degree of restraint, and could not be permitted to leave the island without the sanction of the British Government." Lastly, it was announced that "Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn, appointed to the chief command of the Cape of Good Hope, would be presently ready to

sail, for the purpose of conveying General Buonaparte to St Helena, and therefore it was desirable that he should without delay make choice of the persons who were to form his suite.”¹

The letter was read in French to Buonaparte by Sir Henry Bunbury. He listened without impatience, interruption, or emotion of any kind. When he was requested to state if he had any reply, he began, with great calmness of manner and mildness of countenance, to declare that he solemnly protested against the orders which had been read—that the British Ministry had no right to dispose of him in the way proposed—that he appealed to the British people and the laws—and asked what was the tribunal which he ought to appeal to. “I am come,” he continued, “voluntarily to throw myself on the hospitality of your nation—I am not a prisoner of war, and if I was, have a right to be treated according to the law of nations. But I am come to this country a passenger on board one of your vessels, after a previous negotiation with the commander. If he had told me I was to be a prisoner, I would not have come. I asked him if he was willing to receive me on board, and convey me to England. *Admiral Maitland* said he was, having received, or telling me he had received, special orders of government concerning me. It was a snare, then, that had been spread for me; I came on board a British vessel as I would have entered one of their towns—a vessel, a village, it is the same thing. As for

¹ [Las Cases, t. i. p. 50.]

the island of St Helena, it would be my sentence of death. I demand to be received as an English citizen. How many years entitle me to be domiciliated?"

Sir Henry Bunbury answered, that he believed four were necessary. "Well, then," continued Napoleon, "let the Prince Regent during that time place me under any superintendence he thinks proper—let me be placed in a country-house in the centre of the island, thirty leagues from every seaport—place a commissioned officer about me, to examine my correspondence and superintend my actions; or, if the Prince Regent should require my word of honour, perhaps I might give it. I might then enjoy a certain degree of personal liberty, and I should have the freedom of literature. In St Helena I could not live three months; to my habits and constitution it would be death. I am used to ride twenty miles a-day,—what am I to do on that little rock at the end of the world? No! Botany bay is better than St Helena—I prefer death to St Helena—And what good is my death to do you? I am no longer a sovereign. What danger could result from my living as a private person in the heart of England, and restricted in any way which the Government should think proper?"

He referred repeatedly to the manner of his coming on board the *Bellerophon*, insisting upon his being perfectly free in his choice, and that he had preferred confiding to the hospitality and generosity of the British nation.

"Otherwise," he said, "why should I not have

gone to my father-in-law, or to the Emperor Alexander, who is my personal friend? We have become enemies, because he wanted to annex Poland to his dominions, and my popularity among the Poles was in his way. But otherwise he was my friend, and he would not have treated me in this way. If your Government act thus, it will disgrace you in the eyes of Europe. Even your own people will blame it. Besides, you do not know the feeling that my death will create both in France and Italy. There is, at present, a high opinion of England in these countries. If you kill me, it will be lost, and the lives of many English will be sacrificed. What was there to force me to the step I took? The tri-coloured flag was still flying at Bourdeaux, Nantes, and Rochefort.¹ The army has not even yet submitted. Or, if I had chosen to remain in France, what was there to prevent me from remaining concealed for years amongst a people so much attached to me?"

He then returned to his negotiation with Captain Maitland, and dwelt on the honours and attentions shown to him personally by that officer and Admiral Hotham. "And, after all, it was only a snare for me!"² He again enlarged on the

¹ The white flag was flying at Rochelle and the isle of Oleron. It was hoisted on the 12th, and hauled down afterwards; again hoisted on the 13th July, to the final exclusion of the three-coloured ensign.

² Admiral Hotham and Captain Maitland had no particular orders how this uncommon person was to be treated, and were naturally desirous of showing respect under misfortunes to one who had been so great. Their civilities went no farther than manning the yards when he entered the *Superb* on a breakfast visit, and

disgrace to England which was impending. "I hold out to the Prince Regent," he said, "the brightest page in his history, in placing myself at his discretion. I have made war upon you for twenty years, and I give you the highest proof of confidence by voluntarily giving myself into the hands of my most inveterate and constant enemies. Remember," he continued, "what I have been, and how I stood among the sovereigns of Europe. *This* courted my protection—*that* gave me his daughter—all sought for my friendship. I was Emperor acknowledged by all the powers in Europe, except Great Britain, and she had acknowledged me as Chief Consul. Your Government has no right to term me *General Buonaparte*," he added, pointing with his finger to the offensive epithet in Lord Melville's letter. "I am Prince, or Consul, and ought to be treated as such, if treated with at all. When I was at Elba, I was at least as much a sovereign in that island as Louis on the throne of France. We had both our re-

when he returned to the Bellerophon on the same occasion. Captain Maitland also permitted Napoleon to lead the way into the dining cabin, and seat himself in the centre of the table; an honour which it would have been both ungracious and uncalled for to have disputed. Even these civilities could not have been a portion of the snare of which Napoleon complains, or have had the least effect in inducing him to take his resolution of surrendering to the English, as the argument in the text infers; for that resolution had been taken, and the surrender made, before the attentions Napoleon founds upon could have been offered and received. This tends to confirm the opinion of Nelson, that the French, when treated with ceremonial politeness, are apt to form pretensions upon the concessions made to them in ordinary courtesy.

spective flags, our ships, our troops—Mine, to be sure,” he said with a smile, “were rather on a small scale—I had six hundred soldiers, and he had two hundred thousand. At length, I made war upon him, defeated him, and dethroned him. But there was nothing in this to deprive me of my rank as one of the sovereigns of Europe.”

During this interesting scene, Napoleon spoke with little interruption from Lord Keith and Sir Henry Bunbury, who declined replying to his remonstrances, stating themselves to be unauthorized to enter into discussions, as their only duty was to convey the intentions of Government to Napoleon, and transmit his answer, if he charged them with any. He repeated again and again his determination not to go to St Helena, and his desire to be suffered to remain in Great Britain.

Sir Henry Bunbury then said, he was certain that St Helena had been selected as the place of his residence, because its local situation allowed freer scope for exercise and indulgence than could have been permitted in any part of Great Britain.

“No, no,” repeated Buonaparte, with animation “I will not go there—You would not go there, sir, were it your own case—nor, my lord, would you.” Lord Keith bowed and answered,—“He had been already at St Helena four times.” Napoleon went on reiterating his protestations against being imprisoned, or sent to St Helena. “*I will not go thither,*” he repeated; “I am not a Hercules” (with a smile), “but you shall not conduct me to St Helena. I prefer death in this place. You found me free, send me back again; replace me in

the condition in which I was, or permit me to go to America."

He dwelt much on his resolution to die rather than to go to St Helena ; he had no great reason, he said, to wish for life. He urged the admiral to take no farther steps to remove him into the Northumberland, before Government should have been informed of what he had said, and have signified their final decision. He conjured Sir Henry Bunbury to use no delay in communicating his answer to Government, and referred himself to Sir Henry to put it into form. After some cursory questions and pances, he again returned to the pressing subject, and urged the same arguments as before. " He had expected," he said, " to have had liberty to land, and settle himself in the country, some commissioner being named to attend him, who would be of great use for a year or two to teach him what he had to do. You could choose," he said, " some respectable man, for the English service must have officers distinguished for probity and honour ; and do not put about me an intriguing person, who would only play the spy, and make cabals." He declared again his determination not to go to St Helena ; and this interesting interview was concluded.

After the admiral and Sir Henry Bunbury had left the cabin, Napoleon recalled Lord Keith, whom, in respect of his former attention to his lordship's relative, Captain Elphinstone, he might consider as more favourable to his person.

Napoleon opened the conversation, by asking Lord Keith's advice how to conduct himself. Lord

Keith replied, that he was an officer, and had discharged his duty, and left with him the heads of his instructions. If he considered it necessary to renew the discussion, Sir Henry Bunbury must be called in. Buonaparte said that was unnecessary. "Can you," said he, "after what is passed, detain me until I hear from London?" Lord Keith replied, that must depend on the instructions brought by the other admiral, with which he was unacquainted. "Was there any tribunal," he asked, "to which he could apply?" Lord Keith answered, that he was no civilian, but believed that there was none whatever. He added, that he was satisfied there was every disposition on the part of the British Government to render his situation as comfortable as prudence would permit. "How so?" said Napoleon, lifting the paper from the table, and speaking with animation. Upon Lord Keith's observing, that it was surely preferable to being confined to a smaller space in England, or being sent to France, or perhaps to Russia. "Russia!" exclaimed Buonaparte, "God preserve me from it!"¹

During this remarkable scene, Napoleon's manner was perfectly calm and collected, his voice equal and firm, his tones very pleasing. Once or twice only he spoke more rapidly, and in a harsher key. He used little gesticulation, and his attitudes were ungraceful; but the action of the head was dignified, and the countenance remarkably soft and placid, without any marks of severity. He seemed to have made up his mind, anticipating what was to

¹ Russie !—Dieu m'en garde.

be announced, and perfectly prepared to reply. In expressing his positive determination not to go to St Helena, he left it to his hearers to infer, whether he meant to prevent his removal by suicide, or to resist it by force.¹

¹ Having had the inestimable advantage of comparing Sir Henry Bunbury's Minutes of this striking transaction with those of Mr Meike, who accompanied Lord Keith in the capacity of secretary, the Author has been enabled to lay before the public the most ample and exact account of the interview of 31st July which has yet appeared.

CHAPTER XCII.

Napoleon's real view of the measure of sending him to St Helena.—Allegation that Captain Maitland made terms with him—disproved—Probability that the insinuation arose with Las Cases.—Scheme of removing Napoleon from the Bellerophon, by citing him as a witness in a case of libel.—Threats of self-destruction.—Napoleon goes on board the Northumberland, which sails for St Helena.—His behaviour on the voyage.—He arrives at St Helena, 16th October.

THE interest attaching to the foregoing interview betwixt Napoleon and the gentlemen sent to announce his doom, loses much, when we regard it in a great measure as an empty personification of feeling, a well-painted passion which was not in reality felt. Napoleon, as will presently appear, was not serious in averring that he had any encouragement from Captain Maitland to come on board his ship, save in the character of a prisoner, to be placed at the Prince Regent's discretion. Neither had he the most distant idea of preventing his removal to the Northumberland, either by violence to himself or any one else. Both topics of declamation were only used for show,—the one to alarm the sense of honour entertained by the Prince Regent and the people of England, and the other to work upon their humanity.

There is little doubt that Napoleon saw the probability of the St Helena voyage, so soon as he surrendered himself to the captain of the *Bellerophon*.¹ He had affirmed, that there was a purpose of transferring him to St Helena or St Lucie, even before he left Elba; and if he thought the English capable of sending him to such banishment while he was under the protection of the treaty of Fontainebleau, he could hardly suppose that they would scruple to execute such a purpose, after his own conduct had deprived him of all the immunities with which that treaty had invested him.

Nevertheless, while aware that his experiment might possibly thus terminate, Napoleon may have hoped a better issue, and conceived himself capable of cajoling the Prince Regent² and his administration into hazarding the safety and the peace of Europe, in order to display a Quixotic generosity towards an individual, whose only plea for deserving it was, that he had been for twenty years their mortal enemy. Such hopes he may have entertained; for it cannot be thought that he would

¹ [“ Aug. 3. The Emperor said to me, ‘ after all, it is quite certain that I shall go to St Helena; but what can we do in that desolate place?’—‘ Sire,’ I replied, ‘ we will live on the past; there is enough in it to satisfy us. Do we not enjoy the life of Cæsar and that of Alexander? We shall possess still more; you will reperuse yourself, Sire!’—‘ Be it so,’ rejoined Napoleon, ‘ we will write our memoirs. Yes, we must be employed; for occupation is the scythe of time.’ ”—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 57.]

² [“ Speaking of Napoleon’s wish for an interview with the Prince Regent, Lord Keith said, ‘ D—n the fellow, if he had obtained an interview with his Royal Highness, in half an hour they would have been the best friends in England.’ ”—MAITLAND, p. 211.]

acknowledge even to himself the personal disqualifications which rendered him, in the eyes of all Europe, unworthy of trust or confidence. His expectation of a favourable reception did not go so far, in all likelihood, as those of the individual among his followers, who believed that Napoleon would receive the Order of the Garter from the Prince Regent ; but he might hope to be permitted to reside in Britain on the same terms as his brother Lucien had done.

Doubtless he calculated upon, and perhaps over-rated, all these more favourable chances. Yet, if the worst should arrive, he saw even in that *worst*, that island of St Helena itself, the certainty of personal safety, which he could not be assured of in any despotic country, where, as he himself must have known pretty well, an obnoxious prisoner, or *détenu*, may lose his life *par négligence*, without any bustle or alarm being excited upon the occasion. Upon the 16th August, while on his passage to St Helena, he frankly acknowledged, that though he had been deceived in the reception he had expected from the English, still, harshly, and unfairly as he thought himself treated, he found comfort from knowing that he was under the protection of British laws, which he could not have enjoyed had he gone to another country, where his fate would have depended upon the caprice of an individual. This we believe to be the real secret of his rendition to England, in preference to his father-in-law of Austria, or his friend in Russia. He might, in the first-named country, be kept in custody, more or less severe ; but he would be at

least secure from perishing of some political disease. Even while at St Helena, he allowed, in an interval of good-tempered candour, that comparing one place of exile to another, St Helena was entitled to the preference. In higher latitudes, he observed, they would have suffered from cold, and in any other tropical island they would have been burned to death. At St Helena the country was wild and savage, the climate monotonous, and unfavourable to health, but the temperature was mild and pleasing.¹

The allegation on which Napoleon had insisted so much, namely, that Captain Maitland had pledged himself for his good reception in England, and received him on board his vessel, not as a prisoner, but as a guest, became now an important subject of investigation. All the while Napoleon had been on board the *Bellerophon*, he had expressed the greatest respect for Captain Maitland, and a sense of his civilities totally inconsistent with the idea that he conceived himself betrayed by him. He had even sounded that officer, by the means of Madame Bertrand, to know whether he would accept a present of his portrait set with diamonds, which Captain Maitland requested might not be offered, as he was determined to decline it.

On the 6th of August, Count Las Cases, for the first time, hinted to Captain Maitland, that he had understood him to have given an assurance, that Napoleon should be well received in England.

¹ [Las Cases, t. i. pt. ii. p. 229.]

Captain Maitland replied, it was impossible the count could mistake him so far, since he had expressly stated he could make no promises; but that he thought his orders would bear him out in receiving Napoleon on board, and conveying him to England. He reminded the count, that he had questioned him (Captain Maitland) repeatedly, as to his private opinion, to which he could only answer, that he had no reason to think Napoleon would be ill received. Las Cases had nothing to offer in reply. Upon the same 6th August, Napoleon himself spoke upon the subject, and it will be observed how very different his language was to Captain Maitland, from that which he held in his absence. "They say," he remarked, "that I made no conditions. *Certainly I made no conditions.* How could an individual enter into terms with a nation? I wanted nothing of them but hospitality, or, as the ancients would express it, air and water. As for you, captain, I have no cause of complaint; your conduct has been that of a man of honour."

The investigation of this matter did not end here, for the ungrounded assertion that Captain Maitland had granted some conditions, expressed or implied, was no sooner repelled than it was again revived.

On the 7th, Count Las Cases having a parting interview with Lord Keith, for the purpose of delivering to him a protest on the part of Buonaparte, "I was in the act of telling him," said the count, "that Captain Maitland had said he was authorized to carry us to London, without letting

us suspect that we were to be regarded as prisoners of war ; and that the captain could not deny that we came freely and in good faith ; that the letter from the Emperor to the Prince of Wales, of the existence of which I had given Captain Maitland information, must necessarily have created tacit conditions, since he had made no observation on it." Here the admiral's impatience, nay, anger, broke forth. He said to him sharply, that in that case Captain Maitland was a fool, since his instructions contained not a word to such a purpose ; and this he should surely know, since it was he, Lord Keith, who issued them. Count Las Cases still persevered, stating that his lordship spoke with a hasty severity, for which he might be himself responsible ; since the other officers, as well as Rear-Admiral Hotham, had expressed themselves to the same effect, which could not have been the case had the letter of instructions been so clearly expressed, and so positive, as his lordship seemed to think.¹

Lord Keith, upon this statement of Count Las Cases, called upon Captain Maitland for the most ample account he could give of the communications which he had had with the count, previous to Napoleon's coming on board the *Bellerophon*. Captain Maitland of course obeyed, and stated at full length the manner in which the French frigates lay blockaded, the great improbability of their effecting an escape, and the considerable risk they would

¹ [Las Cases, t. i. p. 69.] The reader may judge for himself, by turning to p. 89, where the instructions are printed, acting under which no man but a fool, as the admiral truly said, could have entered into such a treaty, as Count Las Cases pretends Captain Maitland to have engaged in.

have run in attempting it; the application to him, first by Savary and Las Cases, afterwards by Las Cases and Gourgaud; his objecting to the frequent flags of truce; his refusal to allow Buonaparte to pass to sea, either in French ships of war, or in a neutral vessel; his consenting to carry to England the late Emperor and his suite, to be at the disposal of the Prince Regent, with his cautions to them, again and again renewed, in the presence of Captain Sartorius and Captain Gambier, that he could grant no stipulations or conditions whatever. These officers gave full evidence to the same effect, by their written attestations. If, therefore, the insinuation of Count Las Cases, for it amounts to no more, is to be placed against the express and explicit averment of Captain Maitland, the latter must preponderate, were it but by aid of the direct testimony of two other British officers. Finally, Captain Maitland mentioned Napoleon's acknowledgment, and that of his suite, that though their expectations had been disappointed, they imputed no blame to him, which he could not have escaped, had he used any unwarranted and fallacious proposals to entice them on board his vessel. As the last piece of evidence, he mentioned his taking farewell of Montholon, who again reverted to Napoleon's wish to make him a present, and expressed the Emperor's sense of his civilities, and his high and honourable deportment through the whole transaction.

Captain Maitland, to use his own words, then said, " ' I feel much hurt that Count Las Cases should have stated to Lord Keith, that I had promised Buonaparte should be well received in Eng-

land, or indeed made promises of any sort. I have endeavoured to conduct myself with integrity and honour throughout the whole of this transaction, and therefore cannot allow such an assertion to go uncontradicted.'—'Oh!' said Count Montholon, 'Las Cases negotiated this business; it has turned out very differently from what he and all of us expected. He attributes the Emperor's situation to himself, and is therefore desirous of giving it the best countenance he can; but I assure you, the Emperor is convinced your conduct has been most honourable;' then taking my hand, he pressed it, and added, 'and that is my opinion also.'

Lord Keith was of course perfectly convinced that the charge against Captain Maitland was not only totally unsupported by testimony, but that it was disproved by the evidence of impartial witnesses, as well as by the conduct and public expression of sentiments of those who had the best right to complain of that officer's conduct, had it been really deserving of censure. The reason why Count Las Cases should persist in grounding hopes and wishes of his own framing, upon supposed expressions of encouragement from Captain Maitland, has been probably rightly treated by Count Montholon. Napoleon's conduct, in loading Captain Maitland with the charge of "laying snares for him," while his own conscience so far acquitted that brave officer, that he pressed upon him thanks, and yet more substantial evidence of his favourable opinion, can, we are afraid, only be imputed to a predominant sense of his own interest, to which he was not unwilling to have sacrificed the professional character

and honourable name of an officer, to whom, on other occasions, he acknowledged himself obliged. As Captain Maitland's modest and manly Narrative¹ is now published, the figment, that Napoleon came on board the *Bellerophon* in any other character than as a prisoner of war, must be considered as silenced for ever.

Having prosecuted this interesting subject to a conclusion, we return to the train of circumstances attending Napoleon's departure from England, so far as they seem to contain historical interest.

The inconvenient resort of immense numbers, sometimes not less than a thousand boats, scarce to be kept off by absolute force by those who rowed guard within the prescribed distance of 300 yards from the *Bellerophon*, was rendered a greater annoyance, when Napoleon's repeated expressions, that he would never go to St Helena, occasioned some suspicions that he meant to attempt his escape. Two frigates were therefore appointed to lie as guards on the *Bellerophon*, and sentinels were doubled and trebled, both by night and day.

An odd incident, of a kind which could only have happened in England (for though as many bizarre whims may arise in the minds of foreigners, they are much more seldom ripened into action), added to the cares of those who were to watch this important prisoner. Some newspaper, which was not possessed of a legal adviser to keep it right in point of form, had suggested (in tenderness, we suppose,

¹ [“ Narrative of the surrender of Buonaparte, and of his residence on Board H.M.S. *Bellerophon*. By Captain F. L. Maitland, C. B. 1826.”]

to public curiosity), that the person of Napoleon Buonaparte should be removed to shore by agency of a writ of Habeas Corpus. This magical rescript of the Old Bailey, as Smollett terms it, loses its influence over an alien and prisoner of war, and therefore such an absurd proposal was not acted upon. But an individual, prosecuted for a libel upon a naval officer, conceived the idea of citing Napoleon as an evidence in a court of justice, to prove, as he pretended, the state of the French navy, which was necessary to his defence. The writ was to have been served on Lord Keith; but he disappointed the litigant, by keeping his boat off the ship while he was on board, and afterwards by the speed of his twelve-oared barge, which the attorney's panting rowers toiled after in vain. Although this was a mere absurdity, and only worthy of the laughter with which the anecdote of the attorney's pursuit and the admiral's flight was generally received, yet it might have given rise to inconvenience, by suggesting to Napoleon, that he was, by some process or other, entitled to redress by the common law of England, and might have encouraged him in resisting attempts to remove him from the *Bellerophon*. On the 4th of August, to end such inconvenient occurrences, the *Bellerophon* was appointed to put to sea and remain cruising off the Start, where she was to be joined by the squadron destined for St Helena, when Napoleon was with his immediate attendants to be removed on board the *Northumberland*.

His spirit for some time seemed wound up to some desperate resolve, and though he gave no

hint of suicide before Captain Maitland, otherwise than by expressing a dogged resolution not to go to St Helena, yet to Las Cases he spoke in undisguised terms of a Roman death.¹ We own we are not afraid of such resolutions being executed by sane persons, when they take the precaution of consulting an intelligent friend. It is quite astonishing how slight a backing will support the natural love of life, in minds the most courageous, and circumstances the most desperate. We are not, therefore, surprised to find that the philosophic arguments of Las Cases determined Napoleon to survive and write his history. Had he consulted his military attendants, he would have received other counsels, and assistance to execute them if necessary. Lallemand, Montholon, and Gourgaud assured Captain Maitland, that the Emperor would sooner kill himself than go to St Helena, and that even were he to consent, they three were determined themselves to put him to death, rather than he should so far degrade himself. Captain Maitland, in reply, gave some hints indicative of the gallows, in case such a scheme were prosecuted.

Savary and Lallemand were, it must be owned, under circumstances peculiarly painful. They had been among the list of persons excluded from the

¹ [“ ‘ My friend,’ said the Emperor to me, ‘ I have sometimes an idea of quitting you, and this would not be very difficult ; it is only necessary to create a little mental excitement, and I shall soon have escaped. All will be over, and you can then quietly rejoin your families.’ I remonstrated warmly against such notions. Poets and philosophers had said, that it was a spectacle worthy of the Divinity to see men struggling with fortune ; reverses and constancy had their glory.”—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 56.]

amnesty by the royal government of France, and now they were prohibited by the British Ministry from accompanying Napoleon to St Helena. They entertained, not unnaturally, the greatest anxiety about their fate, apprehensive, though entirely without reason, that they might be delivered up to the French Government. They resolved upon personal resistance to prevent their being separated from their Emperor, but fortunately were so considerate amid their wrath, as to take the opinion of the late distinguished lawyer and statesman, Sir Samuel Romilly.¹ As the most effectual mode of serving these unfortunate gentlemen, Sir Samuel, by personal application to the Lord Chancellor, learned that there were no thoughts of delivering up his clients to the French government, and thus became able to put their hearts at ease upon that score. On the subject of the resistance, as to the legality of which they questioned him, Sir Samuel Romilly acquainted them, that life taken in an affray of the kind, would be construed into murder by the law of England. No greater danger, indeed, was to be expected from an assault, legalized upon the opinion of an eminent lawyer, than from a suicide adjusted with the advice of a counsellor of state; and we suppose neither Napoleon nor his followers were more serious in the violent projects which they announced, than they might think necessary to shake the purpose of the English Ministry. In this they were totally unsuccessful; and their intemperate threats only occasioned their being de-

¹ [Savary, t. iv. p. 189.]

prived of arms, excepting Napoleon, who was left in possession of his sword. Napoleon and his followers were greatly hurt at this marked expression of want of confidence, which must also have been painful to the English officers who executed the order, though it was explained to the French gentlemen, that the measure was only one of precaution, and that their weapons were to be carefully preserved and restored to them. During his last day on board the *Bellerophon*, Napoleon was employed in composing a Protest, which, as it contains nothing more than his address to Lord Keith and Sir Henry Bunbury, we have thrown into the Appendix.¹ He also wrote a second letter to the Prince Regent.

On the 4th of August, the *Bellerophon* set sail, and next morning fell in with the *Northumberland*, and the squadron destined for St Helena, as also with the *Tonnant*, on board of which Lord Keith's flag was hoisted.

It was now that Napoleon gave Captain Maitland the first intimation of his purpose to submit to his exile, by requesting that Mr O'Meara, surgeon of the *Bellerophon*, might be permitted to attend him to St Helena, instead of his own surgeon, whose health could not stand the voyage. This made it clear that no resistance was designed; and,

¹ See APPENDIX, No. II. ["It occurred to me, that, in such a decisive moment, the Emperor was bound to show a formal opposition to this violence. I ventured, therefore, to read to him a paper which I had prepared, with the general sense of which he seemed pleased. After suppressing a few phrases, and correcting others, it was signed, and sent to Lord Keith."—LAS CASES. t. i. p. 59.]

indeed, so soon as Napoleon observed that his threats had produced no effect, he submitted with his usual equanimity. He also gave orders to deliver up his arms. His baggage was likewise subjected to a form of search, but without unpacking or disturbing any article. The treasure of Buonaparte, amounting only to 4000 gold Napoleons, was taken into custody, to abridge him of that powerful means of effecting his escape. Full receipts, of course, were given, rendering the British Government accountable for the same; and Marchand, the favourite valet-de-chambre of the Emperor, was permitted to take whatever money he thought might be immediately necessary.

About eleven o'clock on the morning of the 7th August, Lord Keith came in his barge to transfer Napoleon from the *Bellerophon* to the *Northumberland*. About one o'clock, when Buonaparte had announced that he was in full readiness, a captain's guard was turned out; Lord Keith's barge was prepared; and as Napoleon crossed the quarterdeck, the soldiers presented arms under three ruffles of the drum, being the salute paid to a general officer. His step was firm and steady; his farewell to Captain Maitland polite and friendly.¹

] [" Taking off his hat, he said, ' Captain Maitland, I take this last opportunity of once more returning you my thanks for the manner in which you have treated me while on board the *Bellerophon*, and also to request you will convey them to the officers and ship's company you command;' then turning to the officers, who were standing by me, he added, ' Gentlemen, I have requested your captain to express my gratitude to you for your attention to me, and to those who have followed my fortunes.' He then went forward to the gangway; and before he went down the ship's side, bowed two or three times to the ship's company.

That officer had no doubt something to forgive to Napoleon, who had endeavoured to fix on him the stigma of having laid a snare for him ; yet the candid and manly avowal of the feelings which remained on his mind at parting with him, ought not to be suppressed. They add credit, were that required, to his plain, honest, and unvarnished narrative.

“ It may appear surprising, that a possibility could exist of a British officer being prejudiced in favour of one who had caused so many calamities to his country ; but to such an extent did he possess the power of pleasing, that there are few people who could have sat at the same table with him for nearly a month, as I did, without feeling a sensation of pity, allied perhaps to regret, that a man possessed of so many fascinating qualities, and who had held so high a station in life, should be reduced to the situation in which I saw him.”¹

Napoleon was received on board of the Northumberland with the same honours paid at leaving the Bellerophon. Sir George Cockburn, the Bri-

After the boat had shoved off, and got the distance of about thirty yards from the ship, he stood up, pulled his hat off, and bowed, first to the officers, and then to the men ; and immediately sat down, and entered into conversation with Lord Keith.”—MAITLAND, p. 202.]

¹ [“ After Napoleon had quitted the ship, being desirous to know what were the feelings of the ship’s company towards him, I asked my servant what the people said of him. ‘ Why, sir,’ he answered, ‘ I heard several of them conversing together about him this morning ; when one of them observed, “ Well ! they may abuse that man as much as they please, but if the people of England knew him as well as we do, they would not hurt a hair of his head ;” in which the others agreed.’”—*Ibid.* p. 223.]

tish admiral, to whose charge the late Emperor was now committed, was in every respect a person highly qualified to discharge the task with delicacy towards Napoleon, yet with fidelity to the instructions he had received. Of good birth, accustomed to the first society, a handsome person, and an agreeable address, he had yet so much of the firmness of his profession as to be able to do unpleasing things when necessary. In every particular within the circle of his orders, he was kind, gentle, and accommodating; beyond them, he was inflexible. This mixture of courtesy and firmness was particularly necessary, since Napoleon, and still more his attendants on his behalf, were desirous upon several occasions to arrogate a degree of royal rank for the prisoner, which Sir George Cockburn's instructions, for reasons to be hereafter noticed, positively forbade him to concede. All that he could give, he gave with a readiness which showed kindness as well as courtesy; but aware that, beyond the fixed limit, each admitted claim would only form the foundation for another, he made his French guests sensible that ill-humour or anger could have no effect upon his conduct.

The consequence was, that though Napoleon, when transferred to the Northumberland, was, by the orders of the Admiralty, deprived of certain marks of deference which he received on board of the *Bellerophon* (where Captain Maitland had no precise orders on the subject, and the withholding of which in him would have been a gratuitous infliction of humiliation), yet no positive quarrel, far less any rooted ill-will, took place betwixt Napoleon

and the admiral. The latter remained at the principal place of his own table, was covered when on the quarterdeck, after the first salutations had passed, and disregarded other particulars of etiquette observed towards crowned heads ; yet such circumstances only occasioned a little temporary coldness, which, as the admiral paid no attention to his guests' displeasure, soon gave way to a Frenchman's natural love of society ; and Sir George Cockburn (ceasing to be the *Réquin*, as Las Cases says the French termed him when they were in the pet), became that mixture of the obliging gentleman and strict officer, for which Napoleon held him whenever he spoke candidly on the subject.

It may be mentioned as no bad instance of this line of conduct, and its effects, that upon the Northumberland crossing the line, the Emperor desiring to exhibit his munificence to the seamen, by presenting them with a hundred louis-d'or, under pretext of paying the ordinary fine, Sir George Cockburn, considering this tribute to Neptune as too excessive in amount, would not permit the donative to exceed a tenth part of the sum ; and Napoleon, offended by the restriction, paid nothing at all. Upon another occasion, early in the voyage, a difference in national manners gave rise to one of those slight misunderstandings which we have noticed. Napoleon was accustomed, like all Frenchmen, to leave the table immediately after dinner, and Sir George Cockburn, with the English officers, remained after him at table ; for, in permitting his French guests their liberty, the admiral did not choose to admit the right of Napoleon to break up

the party at his, Sir George's, own table. This gave some discontent.¹ Notwithstanding these trifling subjects of dissatisfaction, Las Cases informs us that the admiral, whom he took to be prepossessed against them at first, became every day more amicable. The Emperor used to take his arm every evening on the quarterdeck, and hold long conversations with him upon maritime subjects, as well as past events in general.²

While on board the *Northumberland*, the late Emperor spent his mornings in reading or writing ;³

¹ Las Cases [t. i. p. 101], gives somewhat a different account of this trifling matter, which appears to have been a misunderstanding. Las Cases supposes the admiral to have been offended at Napoleon's rising, whereas Sir George Cockburn was only desirous to show that he did not conceive himself obliged to break up the party because his French guests withdrew. It seems, however, to have dwelt on Napoleon's mind, and was always quoted when he desired to express dissatisfaction with the admiral.

² Las Cases, t. i. p. 138.—[“ After dinner the grand marshal and I always followed the Emperor to the quarterdeck. After the preliminary remarks on the weather, &c., Napoleon used to start a subject of conversation, and when he had taken eight or nine turns the whole length of the deck, he would seat himself on the second gun from the gangway, on the larboard side. The midshipmen soon observed this habitual predilection, so that the cannon was thenceforth called the *Emperor's gun*. It was there that Napoleon often conversed hours together, and that I learned, for the first time, a part of what I am about to relate.”—*Ibid.* p. 95.]

³ [“ Sept. 1–6. The Emperor expressed a wish to learn English, I endeavoured to form a very simple plan for his instruction. This did very well for two or three days ; but the *ennui* occasioned by the study was at least equal to that which it was intended to counteract, and the English was laid aside.”—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 137. “ Sept. 7. The Emperor observed that I was very much occupied, and he even suspected the subject on which I was engaged. He determined to ascertain the fact, and obtained sight of a few pages of my Journal ; he was not

his evenings in his exercise upon deck, and at cards. The game was generally *vingt un*. But when the play became rather deep, he discouraged that amusement, and substituted chess. Great tactician as he was, Napoleon did not play well at that military game, and it was with difficulty that his antagonist, Montholon, could avoid the solecism of beating the Emperor.

During this voyage, Napoleon's *jour de fête* occurred, which was also his birth-day. It was the 15th August; a day for which the pope had expressly canonized a St Napoleon to be the Emperor's patron. And now, strange revolution, it was celebrated by him on board of an English man-of-war, which was conducting him to his place of imprisonment, and, as it proved, his tomb. Yet Napoleon seemed cheerful and contented during the whole day, and was even pleased with being fortunate at play, which he received as a good omen.¹

displeased with it. He observed that such a work would be interesting rather than useful. The military events, for example, thus detailed, in the ordinary course of conversation, would be meagre, incomplete, and devoid of end or object. I eagerly seized the favourable opportunity, and ventured to suggest the idea of his dictating to me the campaigns in Italy. On the 9th, the Emperor called me into his cabin, and dictated to me, for the first time, some details respecting the siege of Toulon," &c.—*Ibid.* p. 171. "Sept. 19–22. The Emperor now began regularly to dictate to me his campaigns of Italy. For the first few days, he viewed this occupation with indifference; but the regularity and promptitude with which I presented to him my daily task, together with the progress we made, soon excited his interest; and at length the pleasure he derived from this dictation, rendered it absolutely necessary to him. He was sure to send for me about eleven o'clock every morning, and he seemed himself to wait the hour with impatience."—LAS CASES, p. 187.]

¹ [*Ibid.* t. i. p. 92.]

Upon the 15th October, 1815, the Northumberland reached St Helena, which presents but an unpromising aspect to those who design it for a residence, though it may be a welcome sight to the sea-worn mariner. Its destined inhabitant, from the deck of the Northumberland, surveyed it with his spy-glass. St James' Town, an inconsiderable village, was before him, enchased as it were in a valley, amid arid and scarped rocks of immense height; every platform, every opening, every gorge, was bristled with cannon. Las Cases, who stood by him, could not perceive the slightest alteration of his countenance.¹ The orders of Government had been that Napoleon should remain on board till a residence could be prepared suitable for the line of life he was to lead in future. But as this was likely to be a work of time, Sir George Cockburn readily undertook, on his own responsibility, to put his passengers on shore, and provide in some way for the security of Napoleon's person, until the necessary habitation should be fitted up. He was accordingly transferred to land upon the 16th October;² and thus the Emperor of France, nay well-nigh of Europe, sunk into the Recluse of St Helena.

¹ [Las Cases, t. i. p. 241.]

² ["Before Napoleon stepped into the boat, he sent for the captain of the Northumberland and took leave of him, desiring him, at the same time, to convey his thanks to the officers and crew." —*Ibid.* t. i. p. 243.]

CHAPTER XCIII.

Causes which justify the English Government in the measure of Napoleon's Banishment.—Napoleon's wish to retire to England, in order that, being near France, he might again interfere in her affairs.—Reasons for withholding from him the title of Emperor.—Sir George Cockburn's Instructions.—Temporary Accommodation at Briars.—Napoleon removes to Longwood.—Precautions taken for the safe custody of the Prisoner.

WE are now to touch upon the arguments which seem to justify the Administration of England in the strict course which they adopted towards Napoleon Buonaparte, in restraining his person, and abating the privileges of rank which he tenaciously claimed. And here we are led to observe the change produced in men's feelings within the space of only twelve years. In 1816, when the present author, however inadequate to the task, attempted to treat of the same subject,¹ there existed a considerable party in Britain who were of opinion that the British Government would best have discharged their duty to France and Europe, by delivering up Napoleon to Louis XVIII.'s government, to be treated as he himself had treated the Duke d'Eng-hien. It would be at this time of day needless to

¹ [See the Edinburgh Annual Register for 1815.]

throw away argument upon this subject, or to show that Napoleon was at least entitled to security of life, by his surrender to the British flag.

As needless would it be to go over the frequently repeated ground, which proves so clearly that in other respects the transaction with Captain Maitland amounted to an unconditional surrender. Napoleon had considered every plan of escape by force or address, and none had seemed to him to present such chance of a favourable result, as that which upon full consideration he adopted. A surrender to England ensured his life, and gave him the hope of taking further advantages from the generosity of the British nation; for an unconditional surrender, as it secures nothing, so it excludes nothing. General Bertrand, when on board the *Northumberland*, said that Napoleon had been much influenced in taking the step he had done by the Abbé Siéyes, who had strongly advised him to proceed at once to England, in preference to taking any other course, which proves that his resolution must of course have been formed long before he ever saw Captain Maitland. Even *M. Las Cases*, when closely examined, comes to the same result; for he admits that he never hoped that Napoleon would be considered as a free man, or receive passports for America; but only that he would be kept in custody under milder restrictions than were inflicted upon him. But as he made no stipulation of any kind concerning the nature of these restrictions, they must of course have been left to the option of the conquering party. The question, therefore, betwixt Napoleon and the Bri-

tish nation, was not one of *justice*, which has a right to its due, though the consequence should be destruction to the party by which it is to be rendered, but one of generosity and clemency, feelings which can only be wisely indulged with reference to the safety of those who act upon them.

Napoleon being thus a prisoner surrendered at discretion, became subjected to the common laws of war, which authorize belligerent powers to shut up prisoners of war in places of confinement, from which it is only usual to except such whose honour may be accounted as a sufficient guarantee for their good faith, or whose power of doing injury is so small that it might be accounted contemptible. But Buonaparte was neither in the one situation nor the other. His power was great; the temptation to use it strong; and the confidence to be placed in his resolution or promise to resist such temptation, very slight indeed.

There is an unauthorized report, that Lord Castlereagh, at the time of the treaty of Fontainebleau, asked Caulaincourt, why Napoleon did not choose to ask refuge in England, rather than accept the almost ridiculous title of Emperor of Elba. We doubt much if Lord Castlereagh did this. But if, either upon such a hint, or upon his own free motion, Napoleon had chosen in 1814, to repose his confidence in the British nation; or even had he fallen into our hands by chance of war, England ought certainly, on so extraordinary an occasion, to have behaved with magnanimity; and perhaps ought either to have permitted Napoleon to reside as an individual within her dominions, or suffered

him to have departed to America. It might then have been urged (though cautious persons might even then hesitate), that the pledged word of a soldier, who had been so lately a sovereign, ought to be received as a guarantee for his observance of treaty. Nay, it might then have been held, that the talents and activity of a single individual, supposing them as great as human powers can be carried, would not have enabled him, however desirous, to have again disturbed the peace of Europe. There would have been a natural desire, therefore, to grant so remarkable a person that liberty, which a generous nation might have been willing to conceive would not, and could not, be abused. But the experiment of Elba gave too ample proof at once how little reliance was to be placed in Napoleon's engagement, and how much danger was to be apprehended from him, even when his fortunes were apparently at the lowest ebb. His breach of the treaty of Fontainbleau altered entirely his relations with England and with Europe; and placed him in the condition of one whose word could not be trusted, and whose personal freedom was inconsistent with the liberties of Europe. The experiment of trusting to his parole had been tried and failed. The wise may be deceived once; only fools are twice cheated in the same manner.

It may be pleaded and admitted for Napoleon, that he had, to instigate his returning from Elba, as strong a temptation as earth could hold out to an ambitious spirit like his own,—the prospect of an extraordinary enterprise, with the imperial

throne for its reward. It may be also allowed, that the Bourbons, delaying to pay his stipulated revenue, afforded him, so far as they were concerned, a certain degree of provocation. But all this would only argue against his being again trusted within the reach of such temptation. While France was in a state of such turmoil and vexation, with the remains of a disaffected army fermenting amid a fickle population,—while the king (in order to make good his stipulated payments to the allies) was obliged to impose heavy taxes, and to raise them with some severity, many opportunities might arise, in which Napoleon, either complaining of some petty injuries of his own, or invited by the discontented state of the French nation, might renew his memorable attempt of 28th February. It was the business of the British Ministry to prevent all hazard of this. It was but on the 20th April before, that they were called upon by the Opposition to account to the House of Commons for not taking proper precautions to prevent Buonaparte's escape from Elba.¹ For what then would they have rendered themselves responsible, had they placed him in circumstances which admitted of a second escape?—at least for the full extent of all the confusion and bloodshed to which such an event must necessarily have given rise. The justice, as well as the necessity of the case, warranted the abridgement of Buonaparte's liberty, the extent of which had been made, by his surrender, dependent upon the will of Britain.

¹ [Mr Abercrombie's motion respecting the escape of Buonaparte from Elba.—*Parl. Deb.* v. xxx. p. 716.]

In deducing this conclusion, we have avoided having any recourse to the argument *ad hominem*. We have not mentioned the dungeon of Toussaint, on the frontier of the Alps, or the detention of Ferdinand, a confiding and circumvented ally, in the chateau of Valençay. We have not adverted to the instances of honours and appointments bestowed on officers who had broken their parole of honour, by escaping from England, yet were received in the Tuileries with favour and preferments. Neither have we alluded to the great state maxim, which erected political necessity, or expediency, into a power superior to moral law. Were Britain to vindicate her actions by such instances as the above, it would be reversing the blessed rule, acting towards our enemy, not according as we would have *desired* he should have done, but as he actually *had* done in regard to us, and observing a crooked and criminal line of policy, because our adversary had set us the example.

But Buonaparte's former actions must necessarily have been considered, so far as to ascertain what confidence was to be reposed in his personal character; and if that was found marked by gross instances of breach of faith to others, Ministers would surely have been inexcusable had they placed him in a situation where his fidelity was what the nation had principally to depend on for tranquillity. The fact seems to be admitted by Las Cases, that while he proposed to retire to England, it was with the hope of again meddling in French affairs.¹

¹ This, to be sure, according to Las Cases, was only in order to carry through those great schemes of establishing the peace, the

The example of Sir Niel Campbell had shown how little restraint the mere presence of a commissioner would have had over this extraordinary man ; and his resurrection after leaving Elba, had distinctly demonstrated that nothing was to be trusted to the second political death which he proposed to submit to as a recluse in England

It has, however, been urged, that if the character of the times and his own rendered it an act of stern necessity to take from Napoleon his personal freedom, his captivity ought to have been at least accompanied with all marks of honourable distinction ; and that it was unnecessarily cruel to hurt the feelings of his followers and his own, by refusing him the Imperial title and personal observances, which he had enjoyed in his prosperity, and of which he was tenacious in adversity.

honour, and the union of the country. He had hoped to the last, it seems, in the critical moment, " That, at the sight of the public danger, the eyes of the people of France would be opened ; that they would return to him, and enable him to save the country of France. It was this which made him prolong the time at Malmaison ; it was this which induced him to tarry yet longer at Rochefort. If he is now at St Helena, he owes it to that sentiment. It is a train of thought from which he could never be separated. Yet more lately, when there was no other resource than to accept the hospitality of the Bellerophon, perhaps it was not without a species of satisfaction, that he found himself irresistibly drawn on by the course of events towards England, since being there was being near France. He knew well that he would not be free, but he hoped to make his opinion heard ; and then how many chances would open themselves to the new direction which he wished to inspire."—*Journal*, t. i. p. 334. We cannot understand the meaning of this, unless it implies that Napoleon, while retiring into England, on condition of abstaining from politics, entertained hopes of regaining his ascendancy in French affairs, by and through the influence which he expected to exercise over those of Britain.

It will be agreed on all hands, that if any thing could have been done consistent with the main exigencies of the case, to save Napoleon a single pang, in his unfortunate situation, that measure should have been resorted to. But there could be no reason why Britain, in compassionate courtesy, should give to her prisoner a title which she had refused to him *de jure*, even while he wielded the empire of France *de facto*; and there were arguments, to be hereafter stated, which weighed powerfully against granting such an indulgence.

The place of Napoleon's confinement, also, has been the subject of severe censure; but the question is entirely dependent upon the right of confining him at all. If that is denied, there needs no further argument; for a place of confinement, to be effectual, must connect several circumstances of safety and seclusion, each in its degree aggravating the sufferings of the person confined, and inflicting pain which ought only to be the portion of a legal prisoner. But if it be granted, that a person so formidable as Napoleon should be debarred from the power of making a second avatar on the earth, there is perhaps no place in the world where so ample a degree of security could have been reconciled with the same degree of personal freedom to the captive, as St Helena.

The healthfulness of the climate of that island will be best proved by the contents of a report annexed to a return made on 20th March, 1821, by Dr Thomas Shortt, physician to the forces; from which it appears, that among the troops then stationed in St Helena, constantly employed in ordi-

nary or on fatigue duty, and always exposed to the atmosphere, the proportion of sick was only as one man to forty-two, even including casualties, and those sent to the hospital after punishment. This extraordinary degree of health, superior to that of most places in the world, Dr Shortt imputes to the circumstance of the island being placed in the way of the trade-winds, where the continued steady breeze carries off the superfluous heat, and with it such effluvia noxious to the human constitution, as it may have generated. The same cause, bringing with it a succession of vapours from the ocean, affords a cloudy curtain to intercept the sun's rays, and prevents the occurrence of those violent and rapid forms of disease, which present themselves throughout the tropics in general. Checked perspiration is noticed as an occasional cause of disease, but which, if properly treated, is only fatal to those whose constitutions have been previously exhausted by long residence in a hot climate. It should also be observed, that the climate of the island is remarkably steady, not varying upon an average more than twenty degrees in the course of the year; which equality of temperature is another great cause of the general healthfulness.¹ The atmosphere is warm indeed; but, as Napoleon was himself born in a hot climate, and was stated to be afraid of the cold even of Britain, that could hardly in his case be considered as a disadvantageous circumstance.

In respect to Napoleon's personal treatment, Sir George Cockburn proceeded on his arrival to ar-

¹ See APPENDIX. No III.

range this upon the system recommended by his final instructions, which run thus :

“ In committing so important a trust to British officers, the Prince Regent is sensible that it is not necessary to impress upon them his anxious desire that no greater measure of severity with respect to confinement or restriction be imposed, than what is deemed necessary for the faithful discharge of that duty, which the admiral, as well as the Governor of St Helena, must ever keep in mind,—the perfect security of General Buonaparte’s person. Whatever, consistent with this great object, can be allowed in the shape of indulgence, his royal highness is confident will be willingly shown to the General; and he relies on Sir George Cockburn’s known zeal and energy of character, that he will not allow himself to be betrayed into any improvident relaxation of his duty.”¹

It was in the spirit of these instructions that Sir George Cockburn acted, in selecting a place of residence for his important prisoner, while, at the same time, he consulted Napoleon’s wishes as much as the case could possibly admit.

The accommodation upon the island was by no means such as could be desired in the circumstances. There were only three houses of a public character, which were in any degree adapted for such a guest. Two, the town residences of the governor and lieutenant-governor of the island, were unfit for the habitation of Napoleon, because they were within James’ Town, a situation which, for obvious reasons, was not advisable. The third was Plantation-house, a villa in the country, belonging to the governor, which was the best dwelling in the island. The British Administration had prohibited the selection of this house for the residence of the late Imperial captive. We differ from their

¹ Extract of a despatch from Earl Bathurst, addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated 30th July, 1815.

opinion in this particular, because the very best accommodation was due to fallen greatness; and, in his circumstances, Napoleon, with every respect to the authority of the governor, ought to have been the last person on the island subjected to inconvenience. We have little doubt that it would have been so arranged, but for the disposition of the late French Emperor and his followers to use every point of deference, or complaisance, exercised towards them, as an argument for pushing their pretensions farther. Thus, the civility showed by Admiral Hotham and Captain Maitland, in manning the yards as Napoleon passed from one vessel to the other, was pleaded upon as a proof that his free and regal condition was acknowledged by these officers; and, no doubt, the assigning for his use the best house in the island, might, according to the same mode of logic, have been assumed to imply that Napoleon had no superior in St Helena. Still there were means of repelling this spirit of encroachment, if it had shown itself; and we think it would have been better to risk the consequences indicated, and to have assigned Plantation-house for his residence, as that which was at least the best accommodation which the island afforded. Some circumstances about the locality, it is believed, had excited doubts whether the house could be completely guarded. But this, at any rate, was a question which had been considered at home, where, perhaps, the actual state of the island was less perfectly understood; and Sir George Cockburn, fettered by his instructions, had no choice in the matter.

Besides Plantation-house, there was another residence situated in the country, and occupied by the lieutenant-governor, called Longwood, which, after all the different estates and residences in the island had been examined, was chosen by Sir George Cockburn as the future residence of Napoleon. It lies detached from the generally inhabited places of the island, consequently none were likely to frequent its neighbourhood, unless those who came there on business. It was also distant from those points which were most accessible to boats, which, until they should be sufficiently defended, it was not desirable to expose to the observation of Napoleon or his military companions. At Longwood, too, there was an extent of level ground, capable of being observed and secured by sentinels, presenting a space adapted for exercise, whether on horseback or in a carriage; and the situation, being high, was more cool than the confined valleys of the neighbourhood. The house itself was equal in accommodation (though that is not saying much) to any on the island, Plantation-house excepted.

To conclude, it was approved of by Napoleon, who visited it personally, and expressed himself so much satisfied, that it was difficult to prevail on him to leave the place. Immediate preparations were therefore made, for making such additions as should render the residence, if not such a one as could be wished, at least as commodious as the circumstances admitted. Indeed it was hoped, by assistance of artificers, and frames to be sent from England, to improve it to any extent required. In the meanwhile, until the repairs immediately necessary could

be made at Longwood, General Bertrand, and the rest of Napoleon's suite, were quartered in a furnished house in James' Town, while he himself, at his own request, took up his abode at Briars, a small house, or cottage, romantically situated, a little way from the town, in which he could only have one spare room for his own accommodation. Sir George Cockburn would have persuaded him rather to take up his temporary abode in the town, where the best house in the place was provided for him. Napoleon declined this proposal, pleading his natural aversion to expose himself to the public gaze. Besides the solitude, the pleasing landscape, agreeable especially to those whose persons have been lately confined to a ship, and whose eyes have long wandered over the waste of ocean, determined the Ex-Emperor in favour of Briars.

Whilst dwelling at Briars, Napoleon limited himself more than was necessary ; for, taking exception at the sentinels, who were visible from the windows of the house, and objecting more reasonably to the resort of visitors, he sequestered himself in a small pavilion, consisting of one good room, and two small attic apartments, which stood about twenty yards from the house. Of course his freedom, unless when accompanied by a British field-officer, was limited to the small garden of the cottage, the rest of the precincts being watched by sentinels. Sir George Cockburn felt for the situation of his prisoner, and endeavoured to hurry forward the improvements at Longwood, in order that Napoleon might remove thither. He employed for this purpose the ship-carpenters of the squadron,

and all the artificers the island could afford ; “ and Longwood,” says Dr O’Meara, “ for nearly two months, exhibited as busy a scene as had ever been witnessed, during the war, in any of his Majesty’s dock-yards, whilst a fleet was fitting out under the personal direction of some of our best naval commanders. The admiral, indefatigable in his exertions, was frequently seen to arrive at Longwood shortly after sunrise, stimulating by his presence the St Helena workmen, who, in general lazy and indolent, beheld with astonishment the despatch and activity of a man-of-war succeed to the characteristic idleness, which until then they had been accustomed both to witness and to practise.”¹

During the Ex-Emperor’s residence at Briars, he remained much secluded from society, spent his mornings in the garden, and in the evening played at whist for sugar-plums, with Mr Balcombe, the proprietor, and the members of his family. The Count Las Cases, who seems, among those of his retinue, to have possessed the most various and extensive information, was naturally selected as the chief, if not the only companion of his studies and recreations in the morning.² On such occasions he

¹ [Voice, &c. vol. i. p. 14.]

² [“ *Briars*, Oct. 28–31. We had nearly arrived at the end of the campaign of Italy. The Emperor, however, did not yet find that he had sufficient occupation. Employment was his only resource, and the interest which his first dictations had assumed furnished an additional motive for proceeding with them. The campaign of Egypt was now about to be commenced. The Emperor had frequently talked of employing the grand mareschal on this subject. I suggested, that he should set us all to work at the same time, and proceed at once with the campaigns of Italy and Egypt—the history of the Consulate—the return from Elba, &c.

was usually gentle, accessible, and captivating in his manners.

The exertions of Sir George Cockburn, struggling with every difficulty which want of building materials, means of transport, and every thing which facilitates such operations, could possibly interpose, at length enabled him to accomplish the transmutation of Longwood into such a dwelling-house, as, though it was far below the former dignity of its possessor, might sufficiently accommodate a captive of the rank at which Napoleon was rated by the British Government.¹

On the 9th December, Longwood received Napoleon and part of his household; the Count and Countess of Montholon and their children; the Count Las Cases and his son. General Gourgaud, Doctor O'Meara, who had been received as his medical attendant, and such other of Napoleon's attendants as could not be lodged within the house, were, for the time, accommodated with tents; and the Count and Countess Bertrand were lodged in a small cottage at a place called Hut's-gate, just on the verge of what might be called the privileged grounds of Longwood, whilst a new house was building for their reception. Upon the whole, as

The idea pleased the Emperor; and, from that time, one or two of his suite came regularly every day to write by his dictations, the transcript of which they brought to him next morning."—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 286.]

¹ The suite of apartments, destined for his own peculiar use, consisted of a saloon, an eating-room, a library, a small study, and a sleeping-apartment. This was a strange contrast with the palaces which Napoleon had lately inhabited; but it was preferable, in the same proportion, to the Tower of the Temple, and the dungeons of Vincennes.

it is scarcely denied, on the one hand, that every effort was made to render Longwood-house as commodious for the prisoner as time and means could possibly permit, so, on the other, it must in fairness be considered, that the delay, however inevitable, must have been painfully felt by the Ex-Emperor, confined to his hut at Briars; and that the house at Longwood, when finished as well as it could be in the circumstances, was far inferior in accommodation to that which every Englishman would have desired that the distinguished prisoner should have enjoyed whilst in English custody.

It had been proposed to remedy the deficiencies of Longwood by constructing a habitation of wood upon a suitable scale, and sending it out in pieces from England, to be put together on the spot; the only mode, as the island can scarce be said to afford any building-materials, by which the desired object of Napoleon's fitting accommodation could, it was thought, be duly attained. Circumstances, however, prevented this plan from being attempted to be carried into execution for several months; and a series of unhappy disputes betwixt the governor and his prisoner added years of delay; which leads us again to express our regret that Plantation-house had not been at once assigned to Napoleon for his residence.

We have already said, that around the house of Longwood lay the largest extent of open ground in the neighbourhood, fit for exercise either on foot or upon horseback. A space of twelve miles in circumference was traced off, within which Napoleon might take exercise without being attended by

any one. A chain of sentinels surrounded this domain to prevent his passing, unless accompanied by a British officer. If he inclined to extend his excursions, he might go to any part of the island, providing the officer was in attendance, and near enough to observe his motions. Such an orderly officer was always in readiness to attend him when required. Within the limited space already mentioned, there were two camps, that of the 53d regiment at Deadwood, about a mile from Longwood; another at Hut's-gate, where an officer's guard was mounted, that being the principal access to Longwood.

We are now to consider the means resorted to for the safe custody of this important prisoner. The old poet has said, that "every island is a prison;"¹ but, in point of difficulty of escape, there is none which can compare with St Helena; which was no doubt the chief reason for its being selected as the place of Napoleon's detention.

Dr O'Meara, no friendly witness, informs us that the guards, with attention at once to Napoleon's feelings, and the security of his person, were posted in the following manner:—

"A subaltern's guard was posted at the entrance of Longwood, about six hundred paces from the houses, and a cordon of sentinels and picquets was placed round the limits. At nine o'clock the sentinels were drawn in and stationed in communication with each other, surrounding the house in such positions, that no person could come in or go out without being seen and scrutinized by

¹ ["Every island is a prison,
Strongly guarded by the sea;
Kings and princes, for that reason,
Prisoners are, as well as we."

Ritson's *Songs*, vol. ii. p. 105.]

them. At the entrance of the house double sentinels were placed, and patrols were continually passing backward and forward. After nine, Napoleon was not at liberty to leave the house, unless in company with a field officer ; and no person whatever was allowed to pass without the counter-sign. This state of affairs continued until daylight in the morning. Every landing-place in the island, and, indeed, every place which presented the semblance of one, was furnished with a picquet, and sentinels were even placed upon every goat-path leading to the sea ; though in truth the obstacles presented by nature, in almost all the paths in that direction, would, of themselves, have proved insurmountable to so unwieldy a person as Napoleon.”¹

The precautions taken by Sir George Cockburn, to avail himself of the natural character and peculiarities of the island, and to prevent the possibility of its new inhabitant making his escape by sea, were so strict, as, even without the assistance of a more immediate guard upon his person, seemed to exclude the possibility, not only of an escape, but even an attempt to communicate with the prisoners from the sea-coast.

“ From the various signal-posts on the island,” continues the account of Dr O’Meara, “ ships are frequently discovered at twenty-four leagues’ distance, and always long before they can approach the shore. Two ships of war continually cruised, one to windward, and the other to leeward, to whom signals were made as soon as a vessel was discovered from the posts on shore. Every ship, except a British man-of-war, was accompanied down to the road by one of the cruisers, who remained with her until she was either permitted to anchor, or was sent away. No foreign vessels were allowed to anchor, unless under circumstances of great distress ; in which case, no person from them was permitted to land, and an officer and party from one of the ships of war was sent on board to take charge of them as long as they remained, as well as in order to prevent any improper communication. Every fishing-boat belonging to the island was numbered, and anchored every evening at sunset, under the superintendence of a lieutenant

¹ [Voice from St Helena, v. i. p. 21.]

in the navy. No boats, excepting guard-boats from the ships of war, which pulled about the island all night, were allowed to be down after sunset. The orderly officer was also instructed to ascertain the actual presence of Napoleon, twice in the twenty-four hours, which was done with as much delicacy as possible. In fact, every human precaution to prevent escape, short of actually incarcerating or enchaining him, was adopted by Sir George Cockburn."¹

¹ [Voice from St Helena, v. i. p. 22.]

CHAPTER XCIV.

Buonaparte's alleged grievances considered.—Right to restrict his Liberty.—Limits allowed Napoleon.—Complaints urged by Las Cases against Sir George Cockburn.—Sir Hudson Lowe appointed Governor of St Helena.—Information given by General Gourgaud to Government.—Agitation of various Plans for Buonaparte's Escape.—Writers on the subject of Napoleon's Residence at St Helena.—Napoleon's irritating Treatment of Sir Hudson Lowe.—Interviews between them.

HITHERTO, as we have prosecuted our task, each year has been a history which we have found it difficult to contain within the limits of half a volume ; remaining besides conscious, that, in the necessary compression, we have been obliged to do injustice to the importance of our theme. But the years of imprisonment which pass so much more slowly to the captive, occupy, with their melancholy monotony, only a small portion of the page of history ; and the tale of five years of St Helena, might, so far as events are concerned, be sooner told than the history of a single campaign, the shortest which was fought under Buonaparte's auspices. Yet these years were painfully marked, and indeed embittered, by a train of irritating disputes betwixt the prisoner and the officer to whom was committed the important, and yet most deli-

cate, task of restraining his liberty, and cutting off all prospect of escape ; and whose duty it was, at the same time, to mix the necessary degree of vigilance with as much courtesy, and we will add kindness, as Napoleon could be prevailed on to accept.

We have had considerable opportunity to collect information on this subject, the correspondence of Sir Hudson Lowe with his Majesty's Government having been opened to our researches by the liberality of Lord Bathurst, late secretary of state for the colonial department. This communication has enabled us to speak with confidence respecting the general principles by which the British Government were guided in their instructions to Sir Hudson Lowe, and the tenor of these instructions themselves. We therefore propose to discuss, in the first place, the alleged grievances of Napoleon, as they arose out of the instructions of the British Government ; reserving as a second subject of discussion, the farther complaints of the aggravated mode in which these instructions are alleged to have been executed by the Governor of St Helena. On the latter subject our information is less perfect, from the distance of Sir Hudson Lowe from Europe precluding personal enquiry, and the impossibility of producing impartial evidence on the subject of a long train of minute and petty incidents, each of which necessarily demands investigation, and is the subject of inculcation and defence. We have, however, the means of saying something upon this subject also.

We have already discussed the circumstances of

Napoleon's surrender to the British, without reserve, qualification, or condition of any kind ; and we have seen, that if he sustained any disappointment in being detained a prisoner, instead of being considered as a guest, or free inmate of Britain, it arose from the failure of hopes which he had adopted on his own calculation, without the slightest encouragement from Captain Maitland. We doubt greatly, indeed, if his most sanguine expectations ever seriously anticipated a reception very different from what he experienced ; at least he testified little or no surprise when informed of his destiny. But, at any rate, he was a prisoner of war, having acquired by his surrender no right save to claim safety of life and limb. If the English nation had inveigled Napoleon into a capitulation, under conditions which they had subsequently broken, he would have been in the condition of Toussaint, whom, nevertheless, he immured in a dungeon. Or, if he had been invited to visit the Prince Regent of England in the character of an ally, had been at first received with courteous hospitality, and then committed to confinement as a prisoner, his case would have approached that of Prince Ferdinand of Spain, trepanned to Bayonne. But we should be ashamed to vindicate our country by quoting the evil example of our enemy. Truth and falsehood remain immutable and irreconcilable ; and the worst criminal ought not to be proceeded against according to his own example, but according to the general rules of justice. Nevertheless, it greatly diminishes our interest in a complaint, if he who prefers it has himself been in

the habit of meting to others with the same unfair weight and measure, which he complains of when used towards himself.

Napoleon, therefore, being a prisoner of war, and to be disposed of as such (a point which admits of no dispute), we have, we conceive, further proved, that his residence within the territories of Great Britain was what could hardly take place consistently with the safety of Europe. To have delivered him up to any of the other allied powers, whose government was of a character similar to his own, would certainly have been highly objectionable; since in doing so Britain would have so far broken faith with him, as to part with the power of protecting his personal safety, to which extent the country to which he surrendered himself stood undeniably pledged. It only remained to keep this important prisoner in such a state of restraint, as to ensure his not having the means of making a second escape, and again involving France and Europe in a bloody and doubtful war. St Helena was selected as the place of his detention, and, we think, with much propriety; since the nature of that sequestered island afforded the means for the greatest certainty of security, with the least restriction on the personal liberty of the distinguished prisoner. Waves and rocks around its shores afforded the security of walls, ditches, bars, and bolts, in a citadel; and his hours of exercise might be safely extended over a space of many miles, instead of being restrained within the narrow and guarded limits of a fortress.

The right of imprisoning Napoleon being con-

ceded, or at least proved, and the selection of St Helena, as his place of residence, being vindicated, we have no hesitation in avowing the principle, that every thing possible ought to have been done to alleviate the painful feelings, to which, in every point of view, a person so distinguished as Napoleon must have been subjected by so heavy a change of fortune. We would not, at that moment, have remembered the lives lost, fortunes destroyed, and hopes blighted, of so many hundreds of our countrymen, civilians travelling in France, and detained there against every rule of civilized war; nor have thought ourselves entitled to avenge upon Napoleon, in his misfortunes, the cruel inflictions, which his policy, if not his inclination, prompted him to award against others. We would not have made his dungeon so wretched, as that of the unhappy Negro chief, starved to death amidst the Alpine snows. We would not have surrounded him, while a prisoner, with spies, as in the case of the Earl of Elgin; or, as in that of Prince Ferdinand, have spread a trap for him by means of an emissary like the false Baron Koli, who, in proffering to assist his escape, should have had it for an object to obtain a pretence for treating him more harshly. These things we would not then have remembered; or, if we could not banish them from our recollection, in considering how far fraud and ignoble violence can debase genius, and render power odious, we would have remembered them as examples, not to be followed, but shunned. To prevent the prisoner from resuming a power which he had used so fatally, we would have regarded as

a duty not to Britain alone, but to Europe and to the world. To accompany his detention with every alleviation which attention to his safe custody would permit, was a debt due, if not to his personal deserts, at least to our own nobleness. With such feelings upon the subject in general, we proceed to consider the most prominent subjects of complaint, which Buonaparte and his advocates have brought against the Administration of Great Britain, for their treatment of the distinguished exile.

The first loud subject of complaint has been already touched upon, that the imperial title was not given to Napoleon, and that he was only addressed and treated with the respect due to a general officer of the highest rank. On this subject Napoleon was particularly tenacious. He was not of the number of those persons mentioned by the Latin poet, who, in poverty and exile, suited their titles and their language to their condition.¹ On the contrary, he contended with great obstinacy, from the time he came to Portsmouth, on his right to be treated as a crowned head; nor was there, as we have noticed, a more fertile source of discord betwixt him and the gentlemen of his suite on one side, and the Governor of St Helena on the other, than the pertinacious claim, on Napoleon's part, for honours and

¹ Et tragicus plerumque dolet sermone pedestri.
Telephus et Peleus, cum pauper et exul uterque,
Projicit ampullas et sesquipedalia verba.

HOR. *Ars Poetica*.

"Princes will sometimes mourn their lot in prose.
Peleus and Telephus, broke down by woes
In indigence and exile forced to roam,
Leave sounding phrase, and long-tail'd words, at home."

forms of address, which the orders of the British Ministry had prohibited the governor from granting, and which, therefore, Napoleon's knowledge of a soldier's duty should have prevented his exacting. But, independently of the governor's instructions, Buonaparte's claim to the peculiar distinction of a sovereign prince was liable to question, both in respect of the party by whom it was insisted on, and in relation to the government from whom it was claimed.

Napoleon, it cannot be denied, had been not only an Emperor, but perhaps the most powerful that has ever existed; and he had been acknowledged as such by all the continental sovereigns. But he had been compelled, in 1814, to lay aside and abdicate the empire of France, and to receive in exchange the title of Emperor of Elba. His breach of the treaty of Paris was in essence a renunciation of the empire of Elba; and the reassumption of that of France was so far from being admitted by the allies, that he was declared an outlaw by the Congress at Vienna. Indeed, if this second occupation of the French throne were even to be admitted as in any respect re-establishing his forfeited claim to the Imperial dignity, it must be remembered that he himself a second time abdicated, and formally renounced a second time the dignity he had in an unhappy hour reassumed. But if Napoleon had no just pretension to the Imperial title or honours after his second abdication, even from those who had before acknowledged him as Emperor of France, still less had he any right to a title which he had laid down, from a nation who had never acquiesced

in his taking it up. At no time had Great Britain recognised him as Emperor of France; and Lord Castlereagh had expressly declined to accede to the treaty of Paris, by which he was acknowledged as Emperor of Elba.¹ Napoleon, indeed, founded, or attempted to found, an argument upon the treaty of Amiens having been concluded with him, when he held the capacity of First Consul of France. But he had himself destroyed the Consular government, of which he then constituted the head; and his having been once First Consul gave him no more title to the dignity of Emperor, than the Directorship of Barras invested *him* with the same title. On no occasion whatever, whether directly or by implication, had Great Britain recognised the title of her prisoner to be considered as a sovereign prince; and it was surely too late to expect acquiescence in claims in his present situation, which had not been allowed when he was actually master of half the world.

But it may be urged that, admitting that Napoleon's claim to be treated with royal ceremonial was in itself groundless, yet since he had actually enjoyed the throne for so many years, the British ministers ought to have allowed to him that rank which he had certainly possessed *de facto*, though not *de jure*. The trifling points of rank and ceremonial ought, it may be thought, according to the principles which we have endeavoured to express, to have been conceded to eclipsed sovereignty and downfallen greatness.

To this it may be replied, that if the concession

¹ [Parl. Debates, v. xxx. p. 377.]

recommended could have had no further consequences than to mitigate the repinings of Napoleon—if he could have found comfort in the empty sound of titles, or if the observance of formal etiquette could have reconciled his feelings to his melancholy and dethroned condition, without altering the relative state of the question in other respects—such concession ought not to have been refused to him.

But the real cause of his desiring to have, and of the British Government's persisting in refusing to him, the name and honours of a sovereign, lay a great deal deeper. It is true, that it was a foible of Buonaparte, incident, perhaps, to his situation as a *parvenu* amongst the crowned heads of Europe, to be at all times peculiarly and anxiously solicitous that the most strict etiquette and form should be observed about his person and court. But granting that his vanity, as well as his policy, was concerned in insisting upon such rigid ceremonial as is frequently dispensed with by sovereigns of ancient descent, and whose title is unquestionable, it will not follow that a person of his sense and capacity could have been gratified, even if indulged in all the marks of external influence paid to the Great Mogul, on condition that, like the later descendants of Timur, he was still to remain a close prisoner. His purpose in tenaciously claiming the name of a sovereign, was to establish his claim to the immunities belonging to that title. He had already experienced at Elba the use to be derived from erecting a barrier of etiquette betwixt his person and any inconvenient visitor. Once acknowledged as

Emperor, it followed, of course, that he was to be treated as such in every particular; and thus it would have become impossible to enforce such regulations as were absolutely demanded for his safe custody. Such a *status*, once granted, would have furnished Napoleon with a general argument against every precaution which might be taken to prevent his escape. Who ever heard of an emperor restricted in his promenades, or subjected, in certain cases, to the surveillance of an officer, and the restraint of sentinels? Or how could these precautions against escape have been taken, without irreverence to the person of a crowned head, which, in the circumstances of Napoleon Buonaparte, were indispensably necessary? Those readers, therefore, who may be of opinion that it was necessary that Napoleon should be restrained of his liberty, must also allow that the British Government would have acted imprudently if they had gratuitously invested him with a character which they had hitherto refused him, and that at the very moment when their doing so was to add to the difficulties attending his safe custody.

The question, however, does not terminate even here; for not only was Great Britain at full liberty to refuse to Buonaparte a title which she had never recognised as his due—not only would her granting it have been attended with great practical inconvenience, but, farther, she could not have complied with his wishes, without affording the most serious cause of complaint to her ally the King of France. If Napoleon was called emperor, his title could apply to France alone; and if he was ac-

known as Emperor of France, of what country was Louis XVIII. King? Many wars have arisen from no other cause than that the government of one country has given the title and ceremonial due to a sovereign, to a person pretending to the throne of the other, and it is a ground of quarrel recognised by the law of nations. It is true, circumstances might have prevented Louis from resenting the supposed recognition of a royal character in his rival, as severely as Britain did the acknowledgment of the exiled Stuarts by Louis XIV., yet it must have been the subject of serious complaint; the rather that a conduct tending to indicate England's acquiescence in the imperial title claimed by Napoleon, could not but keep alive dangerous recollections, and encourage a dangerous faction in the bosom of France.

Yet, notwithstanding all we have said, we feel there was an awkwardness in approaching the individual who had been so pre-eminently powerful, with the familiarity applicable to one who had never stood more high above others than he would have done merely as General Buonaparte. A compromise was accordingly offered by Sir Hudson Lowe, in proposing to make use of the word Napoleon, as a more dignified style of addressing his prisoner. But an easy and respectable alternative was in the prisoner's own power. Napoleon had but to imitate other sovereigns, who, either when upon foreign travel, or when other circumstances require it, usually adopt a conventional appellative, which, while their doing so waves no part of their own claim of right to royal honours, is equally far from

a concession of that right on the part of those who may have occasion to transact with them. Louis XVIII. was not the less the legitimate King of France, that he was for many years, and in various countries, only known by the name of the Comte de Lille. The conveniency of the idea had struck Napoleon himself; for at one time, when talking of the conditions of his residence in England, he said he would have no objection to assume the name of Meuron, an aide-de-camp who had died by his side at the battle of Arcola.¹ But it seems that Napoleon, more tenacious of form than a prince who had been cradled in it, considered this vailing of his dignity as too great a concession on his part to be granted to the Governor of St Helena. Sir Hudson Lowe, at one time, desirous to compromise this silly subject of dispute, would have been contented to render Napoleon the title of Excellency, as due to a field-mareschal, but neither did this meet with acceptance. Napoleon was determined either to be acknowledged by the governor as Emperor, or to retain his grievance in its full extent. No modifications could be devised by which it could be rendered palatable.

Whether this pertinacity in claiming a title which was rendered ridiculous by his situation, was the result of some feelings which led him to doubt his own title to greatness, when his ears were no longer flattered by the language of humility; or whether

¹ [“ In default of America, I prefer England to any other country. I shall take the name of Colonel Meuron, or of Duroc.”—*Instructions to Gourgaud*, July 13, 1815; Savary, t. iv. p. 162.]

the political considerations just alluded to, rendered him obstinate to refuse all epithets, except one which might found him in claims to those indemnities and privileges with which so high a title is intimate, and from which it may be said to be inseparable, it is impossible for us to say ; vanity and policy might combine in recommending to him perseverance in his claim. But the strife should certainly, for his own sake, have been abandoned, when the point remained at issue between the governor and him only, since even if the former had wished to comply with the prisoner's desires, his instructions forbade him to do so. To continue an unavailing struggle, was only to invite the mortification of defeat and repulse. Yet Napoleon and his followers retained so much sensibility on this subject, that though they must have been aware that Sir Hudson Lowe only used the language prescribed by his government, and indeed dared use no other, this unfortunate phrase of *General Buonaparte* occurring so often in their correspondence, seemed to render every attempt at conciliation a species of derogation and insult, and made such overtures resemble a coarse cloth tied over a raw wound, which it frets and injures more than it protects.

Whatever might be the merits of the case, as between Napoleon and the British Ministry, it was clear that Sir George Cockburn and Sir Hudson Lowe were left by their instructions no option in the matter at issue. These instructions bore that Napoleon, their prisoner, was to receive the style and treatment due to General Buonaparte, a pri-

soner of war ; and it was at their peril if they gave him a higher title, or a different style of attention from what that title implied. No one could know better than Napoleon how strictly a soldier is bound by his *consigne* ; and to upbraid Sir Hudson Lowe as ungenerous, unmanly, and so forth, because he did not disobey the instructions of his government, was as unreasonable as to hope that his remonstrances could have any effect save those of irritation and annoyance. He ought to have been aware that persisting to resent, in rough and insulting terms, the deprivation of his title on the part of an officer who was prohibited from using it, might indeed fret and provoke one with whom it would have been best to keep upon civil terms, but could not bring him one inch nearer to the point which he so anxiously desired to attain.

In fact, this trivial but unhappy subject of dispute was of a character so subtle, that it penetrated into the whole correspondence between the Emperor and the governor, and tended to mix with gall and vinegar all attempts made by the latter to cultivate something like civil intercourse. This unlucky barrier of etiquette started up and poisoned the whole effect of any intended politeness. While Sir George Cockburn remained on the island, for example, he gave more than one ball, to which *General Buonaparte* and his suite were regularly invited. In similar circumstances, Henry IV. or Charles II. would have attended the ball, and to a certainty would have danced with the prettiest young woman present, without dreaming that, by so doing, they derogated from pretensions derived

from a long line of royal ancestors. Buonaparte and Las Cases, on the contrary, took offence at the familiarity, and wrote it down as a wilful and flagrant affront on the part of the admiral. These were not the feelings of a man of conscious dignity of mind, but of an upstart, who conceives the honour of preferment not to consist in having enjoyed, or in still possessing, a high situation, gained by superiority of talent, so much as in wearing the robes, or listening to the sounding titles, which are attached to it.

A subject, upon which we are called upon to express much more sympathy with the condition of Napoleon, than moves us upon the consideration of his abrogated title, is, the screen which was drawn betwixt him, and, it may be said, the living world, through which he was not permitted to penetrate, by letter, even to his dearest friends and relatives, unless such had been previously communicated to, and read by, the governor of the island.

It is no doubt true, that this is an inconvenience to which prisoners of war are, in all cases, subjected; nor do we know any country in which their parole is held so sacred as to induce the government to dispense with the right of inspecting their letters. Yet the high place so lately occupied by the fallen monarch might, we think, have claimed for him some dispensation from a restriction so humiliating. If a third person, cold-blooded at best, perhaps inclined to hold up to scorn the expressions of our grief or our affection, is permitted to have the review of the effusions of our heart towards a wife, a sister, a brother, or a bosom-friend, the corre-

spondence loses half its value ; and, forced as we are to keep it within the bounds of the most discreet caution, it becomes to us rather a new source of mortification, than the opening of a communion with those absent persons, whose friendship and attachment we hold to be the dearest possession of our lives. We the rather think that some exercise of this privilege might have been left to Napoleon, without any risk of endangering the safe custody of his person ; because we are pretty well convinced that all efforts strictly to enforce this regulation did, and must have proved, ineffectual, and that in some cases by means of money, and at other times by the mere influence of compassion, he and his followers would always acquire the means of transmitting private letters from the island without regard to the restriction. Whatever, therefore, was to be apprehended of danger in this species of intercourse by letter, was much more likely to occur in a clandestine correspondence, than in one carried on even by sealed letters, openly and by permission of the government. We cannot help expressing our opinion, that, considering the accurate attention of the police, which would naturally have turned in foreign countries towards letters from St Helena, there was little danger of the public post being made use of for any dangerous machinations. Supposing, therefore, that the Exile had been permitted to use it, it would have been too dangerous to have risked any proposal for his escape through that medium. A secret correspondence must have been resorted to for that purpose, and that under circumstances which would have

put every well-meaning person, at least, upon his guard against being aiding in it ; since, if the ordinary channels of communication were open to the prisoner, there could have been no justifiable reason for his resorting to private means of forwarding letters from the island. At the same time, while such is our opinion, it is founded upon reasoning totally unconnected with the claim of right urged by Napoleon ; as his situation, considering him as a prisoner of war, and a most important one, unquestionably entitled the government of Britain to lay him under all the restrictions incident to persons in that situation.

Another especial subject of complaint pleaded upon by Napoleon and his advocates, arose from a regulation, which, we apprehend, was so essential to his safe custody, that we are rather surprised to find it was dispensed with upon any occasion, or to any extent ; as, if fully and regularly complied with, it would have afforded the means of relaxing a considerable proportion of other restrictions of a harassing and irritating character, liable to be changed from time to time, and to be removed and replaced in some cases, without any very adequate or intelligible motive. The regulation which we allude to is that which required that Buonaparte should be visible twice, or at least once, in the day, to the British orderly officer. If this regulation had been submitted to with equanimity by the Ex-Emperor, it would have given the strongest possible guarantee against the possibility of his attempting an escape. From the hour at which he had been seen by the officer, until that at which

he should again become visible, no vessel would have been permitted to leave the island ; and supposing that he was missed by the officer at the regular hour, the alarm would have been general, and, whether concealed in the town, or on board any of the vessels in the roadstead, he must necessarily have been discovered. Indeed, the risk was too great to induce him to have tried an effort so dangerous. It might easily have been arranged, that the orderly officer should have the opportunity to execute his duty with every possible respect to Napoleon's privacy and convenience, and the latter might himself have chosen the time and manner of exhibiting himself for an instant. In this case, and considering how many other precautions were taken to prevent escape—that every accessible path to the beach was closely guarded—and that the island was very much in the situation of a citadel, of which soldiers are the principal inhabitants—the chance of Napoleon's attempting to fly, even if permitted the unlimited range of St Helena, was highly improbable, and the chance of his effecting his purpose next to an impossibility. But this security depended upon his submitting to see a British officer at a fixed hour ; and, resolute in his plan of yielding nothing to circumstances, Napoleon resisted, in every possible manner, the necessity of complying with this very important regulation. Indeed Sir Hudson Lowe, on his part, was on many occasions contented to wink at its being altogether neglected, when the orderly officer could not find the means of seeing Napoleon by stealth while engaged in a walk, or in a ride, or as it

sometimes happened, through the casement. This was not the way in which this important regulation ought to have been acted upon and enforced, and the governor did not reap a great harvest of gratitude from his conduct in dispensing with this act of superintendence upon his own responsibility.

We have seen that a circuit of twelve miles and upwards was laid off for Buonaparte's private exercise. No strangers entered these precincts without a pass from Bertrand, and the Emperor had uninterrupted freedom to walk or ride within them, unaccompanied by any one save those in his own family. Beyond these privileged bounds, he was not permitted to move, without the attendance of a British officer; but under the escort of such a person he was at liberty to visit every part of the island. To this arrangement Napoleon was more averse, if possible, than to that which appointed that a British officer should see him once a-day.

Other subjects of complaint there were; but as they chiefly arose out of private discussions with Sir Hudson Lowe—out of by-laws enacted by that officer—and restrictions of a more petty description, we limit ourselves for the present to those of a general character, which, however inconvenient and distressing, were, it is to be observed, such as naturally attached to the condition of a prisoner; and which, like the fetters of a person actually in chains, are less annoying when submitted to with fortitude and equanimity, than when the captive struggles in vain to wrench himself out of their gripe. We are far, nevertheless, from saying, that the weight of the fetters in the one case, and the hardship of the

personal restrictions in the other, are in themselves evils which can be easily endured by those who sustain them. We feel especially how painful the loss of liberty must have been to one who had not only enjoyed the freedom of his own actions, but the uncontrolled right of directing those of others. Impatience, however, in this, as in other instances, has only the prerogative of injuring its master. In the many hours of meditation which were afforded to Buonaparte by his residence in St Helena, we can never perceive any traces of the reflection, that he owed his present unhappy situation less to the immediate influence of those who were agents in his defeat and imprisonment, than to that course of ambition, which, sparing neither the liberties of France, nor the independence of Europe, had at length rendered his personal freedom inconsistent with the rights of the world in general. He felt the distresses of his situation, but he did not, or could not, reason on their origin. It is impossible to reflect upon him without the idea being excited, of a noble lion imprisoned within a narrow and gloomy den, and venting the wrath which once made the forest tremble, upon the petty bolts and bars, which, insignificant as they are, defy his lordly strength, and detain him captive.

The situation was in every respect a painful one ; nor is it possible to refuse our sympathy, not only to the prisoner, but to the person whose painful duty it became to be his superintendent. His duty of detaining Napoleon's person was to be done most strictly, and required a man of that extraordinary firmness of mind, who should never yield for one

instant his judgment to his feelings, and should be able at once to detect and reply to all such false arguments, as might be used to deter him from the downright and manful discharge of his office. But, then, there ought to have been combined with those rare qualities a calmness of temper almost equally rare, and a generosity of mind, which, confident in its own honour and integrity, could look with serenity and compassion upon the daily and hourly effects of the maddening causes, which tortured into a state of constant and unendurable irritability the extraordinary being subjected to their influence. Buonaparte, indeed, and the followers who reflected his passions, were to be regarded on all occasions as men acting and speaking under the feverish and delirious influence of things long past, and altogether destitute of the power of cool or clear reasoning, on any grounds that exclusively referred to things present. The emperor could not forget his empire, the husband could not forget his wife, the father his child, the hero his triumphs, the legislator his power. It was scarce in nature, that a brain agitated by such recollections should remain composed under a change so fearful, or be able to reflect calmly on what he now was, when agitated by the extraordinary contrast of his present situation with what he had been. To have soothed him would have been a vain attempt; but the honour of England required that he should have no cause of irritation, beyond those which severely enough attached to his condition as a captive.

From the character we have given of Sir George Cockburn, it may be supposed that he was attentive,

as far as his power extended, and his duty permitted, to do all that could render Napoleon's situation more easy. The various authors, Dr O'Meara, Las Cases, Santini, and others, who have written with much violence concerning Sir Hudson Lowe's conduct, have mentioned that of Sir George as fair, honourable, and conciliatory. No doubt there were many occasions, as the actual inconveniences of the place were experienced, and as the rays of undefined hope vanished from their eyes, when Napoleon and his followers became unreasonably captious in their discussions with the admiral. On such occasions he pursued with professional bluntness the straightforward path of duty, leaving it to the French gentlemen to be sullen as long as they would, and entering into communication again with them whenever they appeared to desire it. It was probably this equanimity, which, notwithstanding various acknowledgments of his good and honourable conduct towards them, seemed to have drawn upon Sir George Cockburn the censure of M. Las Cases, and something that was meant as a species of insult from Napoleon himself. As Sir George Cockburn is acknowledged on the whole to have discharged his duty towards them with mildness and temper, we are the rather tempted to enter into their grounds of complaint against him, because they tend to show the exasperated and ulcerated state of mind with which these unfortunate gentlemen regarded those, who, in their present office, had no alternative but to discharge the duty which their sovereign and country had imposed upon them.

At the risk of being thought trifling with our

readers' patience, we shall recapitulate the grievances complained of by Las Cases, who frankly admits, that the bad humour, arising out of his situation, may have in some degree influenced his mind in judging of Sir George Cockburn's conduct, and shall subjoin to each charge the answer which seems to correspond to it.

1st, The admiral is accused of having called the Emperor Napoleon, *General Buonaparte*; and to have pronounced the words with an air of self-satisfaction, which showed that the expression gratified him. It is replied, that Sir George Cockburn's instructions were to address Napoleon by that epithet; and the commentary on the looks or tone with which he did so, is hypercritical.—2d, Napoleon was quartered in Briars for two months, while the admiral himself resided in Plantation-house. Answered, that the instructions of Government were, that Napoleon should remain on board till his abode was prepared; but finding that would occupy so much more time than was expected, Sir George Cockburn, on his own responsibility, placed him on shore, and at Briars, as being the residence which he himself preferred.—3d, The admiral placed sentinels under Napoleon's windows. Replied, it is the usual practice when prisoners of importance are to be secured, especially if they do not even offer their parole that they will make no attempt to escape.—4th, Sir George did not permit any one to visit Napoleon without his permission. Replied, it seemed a necessary consequence of his situation, until Sir George should be able to distinguish those visitors, who might be with propriety admitted to

an unlimited privilege of visiting the important prisoner.—5th, He invited Napoleon to a ball, by the title of General Buonaparte. The subject of the title has been already discussed; and it does not appear how its being used in sending an invitation to a convivial party, could render the name by which the admiral was instructed to address his prisoner more offensive than on other occasions.—6th, Sir George Cockburn, pressed by Bertrand's notes, in which he qualified the prisoner as an emperor, replied sarcastically, that he knew of no emperor at St Helena, nor had heard that any European emperor was at present travelling abroad. Replied, by referring to the admiral's instructions, and by the fact, that if an emperor can abdicate his quality, certainly Napoleon was no longer one.—7th, Sir George Cockburn is said to have influenced the opinions of others upon this subject, and punished with arrest some subordinate persons, who used the phrase of emperor. Answered as before, he had orders from his government not to suffer Buonaparte to be addressed as emperor, and it was his duty to cause them to be obeyed. He could not, however, have been very rigorous, since Monsieur Las Cases informs us that the officers of the 53d used the *mezzotermino* Napoleon, apparently without censure from the governor.—Lastly, There remains only to be added the complaint, that there was an orderly officer appointed to attend Napoleon when he went beyond certain limits, a point of precaution which must be very useful, if not indispensable, where vigilant custody is required.

From this summary of offences, it must be plain

to the reader, that the resentment of Las Cases and his master was not so much against Sir George Cockburn personally, as against his office ; and that the admiral would have been very acceptable, if he could have reconciled it to his duty to treat Napoleon as an emperor and a free man ; suffered himself, like Sir Niel Campbell, to be admitted or excluded from his presence, as the etiquette of an imperial court might dictate ; and run the risk of being rewarded for his complaisance by learning, when he least looked for it, that Napoleon had sailed for America, or perhaps for France. The question, how far Britain, or rather Europe, had a right to keep Napoleon prisoner, has already been discussed. If they had no such right, and if a second insurrection in France, a second field of Waterloo, should be hazarded, rather than that Napoleon Buonaparte should suffer diminution of dignity, or restraint of freedom, then Napoleon had a right to complain of the ministry, but not of the officer, to whom his instructions were to be at once the guide and vindication of his conduct.

While these things passed at St Helena, the ministry of Great Britain were employed in placing the detention of the Ex-Emperor under the regulation of an act of Parliament, which interdicted all intercourse and commerce with St Helena, excepting by the East India Company's regular chartered vessels. Ships not so chartered, attempting to trade or touch at St Helena, or hovering within eight leagues of the island, were declared subject to seizure and confiscation. The crews of the vessels who came on shore, or other persons

visiting the island, were liable to be sent on board, at the governor's pleasure; and those who might attempt to conceal themselves on shore, were declared subject to punishment. Ships were permitted to approach upon stress of weather, but it was incumbent on them to prove the indispensable necessity, and while they remained at St Helena, they were watched in the closest manner. A clause of indemnity protected the governor and commissioners from any act transgressing the letter of the law, which they might already have committed, while detaining Napoleon in custody. Such was the act 56 George III. ch. 23, which legalized the confinement of Napoleon at St Helena.¹

Another convention betwixt the principal powers of Europe, at Paris, 2d August, 1815, had been also entered into upon the subject of Napoleon, and the custody of his person. It set forth, I. That, in order to render impossible any further attempt on the part of Napoleon Buonaparte against the repose of the world, he should be considered as prisoner to the high contracting powers, the King of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia. II. That the custody of his person was committed to the British Government, and it was remitted to them to choose the most secure place and mode of detaining him in security. III. That the courts of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, were to name commissioners who were to inhabit the same place which should be assigned for Napoleon Buonaparte's residence, and who, without being respon-

¹ [Parl. Debates, vol. xxxiii. p. 213.]

sible for his detention, should certiorate themselves that he was actually present. IV. His Most Christian Majesty was also invited to send a commissioner. V. The King of Great Britain engaged faithfully to comply with the conditions assigned to him by this convention.¹

Of these powers, only three availed themselves of the power, or privilege, of sending commissioners to St Helena. These were, Count Balmain, on the part of Russia, Baron Sturmer for Austria, and an old emigrant nobleman, the Marquis de Montchenu, for France. Prussia seems to have thought the expense of a resident commissioner at St Helena unnecessary. Indeed, it does not appear that any of these gentlemen had an important part to play while at St Helena, but yet their presence was necessary to place what should pass there under the vigilance of accredited representatives of the high powers who had engaged in the Convention of Paris. The imprisonment of Napoleon was now not the work of England alone, but of Europe, adopted by her most powerful states, as a measure indispensable for public tranquillity.

Several months before the arrival of the commissioners, Sir George Cockburn was superseded in his anxious and painful office by Sir Hudson Lowe, who remained Governor of St Helena, and had the charge of Napoleon's person, until the death of that remarkable person. The conduct of this officer has been censured, in several of the writings which have treated of Napoleon's confinement, with such extremity of bitterness as in some

¹ [Parl. Debates, vol. xxxiii. p. 235.]

measure defeats its own end, and leads us to doubt the truth of charges which are evidently brought forward under deep feelings of personal animosity to the late Governor of St Helena. On the other hand, it would require a strong defence on the part of Sir Hudson Lowe himself, refuting or explaining many things which as yet have neither received contradiction nor commentary, to induce us to consider him as the very rare and highly exalted species of character, to whom, as we have already stated, this important charge ought to have been intrusted.

Sir Hudson Lowe had risen to rank in the army while serving chiefly in the Mediterranean, in a foreign corps, in the pay of England. In this situation he became master of the French and Italian languages, circumstances which highly qualified him for the situation to which he was appointed. In the campaign of 1814, he had been attached to the army of the allies, and carried on a correspondence with the English Government, describing the events of the campaign, part of which was published, and intimates spirit and talent in the writer. Sir Hudson Lowe received from several of the allied sovereigns and generals the most honourable testimonies of his services that could be rendered. He had thus the opportunity and habit of mixing with persons of distinction in the discussion of affairs of importance ; and his character as a gentleman and a man of honour was carefully enquired into, and highly vouched, ere his nomination was made out. These were points on which precise enquiries could be made, and distinct answers re-

ceived, and they were all in favour of Sir Hudson Lowe.

But there were other qualifications, and those not less important, his possession of which could only be known by putting him upon trial. The indispensable attribute, for example, of an imperturbable temper, was scarce to be ascertained, until his proceedings in the office intrusted to him should show whether he possessed or wanted it. The same must be said of that firmness and decision, which dictate to an official person the exact line of his duty—prevent all hesitation or wavering in the exercise of his purpose—render him, when it is discharged, boldly and firmly confident that he has done exactly that which he ought—and enable him fearlessly to resist all importunity which can be used to induce him to change his conduct, and to condemn all misrepresentations and obloquy which may arise from his adhering to it.

Knowing nothing of Sir Hudson Lowe personally, and allowing him to possess the qualities of an honourable, and the accomplishments of a well-informed man, we are inclined, from a review of his conduct, divesting it so far as we can of the exaggerations of his personal enemies, to think there remain traces of a warm and irritable temper, which seems sometimes to have overborne his discretion, and induced him to forget that his prisoner was in a situation where he ought not, even when his conduct seemed most unreasonable and most provoking, to be considered as an object of resentment, or as being subject, like other men, to retort and retaliation. Napoleon's situation precluded the pos-

sibility of his inflicting an insult, and therefore the temper of the person to whom such was offered, ought, if possible, to have remained cool and unruffled. It does not seem to us that this was uniformly the case.

In like manner, Sir Hudson Lowe appears to have been agitated by an oppressive sense of the importance and the difficulties of his situation, to a nervous and irritating degree. This over-anxiety led to frequent changes of his regulations, and to the adoption of measures which were afterwards abandoned, and perhaps again resumed. All this uncertainty occasioned just subject of complaint to his prisoner; for, though a captive may become gradually accustomed to the fetters which he wears daily in the same manner, he must be driven to impatience if the mode of adjusting them be altered from day to day.

It is probable that the warm temper of Sir Hudson Lowe was in some degree convenient to Napoleon, as it afforded him the means of reprisals upon the immediate instrument of his confinement, by making the governor feel a part of the annoyance which he himself experienced. Sir George Cockburn had been *in seipso totus, teres, atque rotundus*. He did what his duty directed, and cared little what Napoleon thought or said upon the subject. The new governor was vulnerable; he could be rendered angry, and might therefore be taken at advantage. Thus Napoleon might enjoy the vindictive pleasure, too natural to the human bosom, of giving pain to the person who was the agent, though not the author, in the restrictions to

which he himself was subjected. But Napoleon's interest in provoking the governor did not rest upon the mere gratification of spleen. His views went far deeper, and were connected with the prospect of obtaining his liberty, and with the mode by which he hoped to accomplish it. And this leads us to enquire upon what these hopes were rested, and to place before our readers evidence of the most indisputable credit, concerning the line of policy adopted in the councils of Longwood.

It must be premised that the military gentlemen, who, so much to the honour of their own fidelity, had attended on Buonaparte, to soften his calamity by their society and sympathy, were connected by no other link than their mutual respect for the same unhappy master. Being unattached to each other by any ties of friendship, or community of feelings or pursuits, it is no wonder that these officers, given up to ennui, and feeling the acidity of temper which such a situation is sure to cause, should have had misunderstandings, nay, positive quarrels, not with the governor only, but with each other. In these circumstances, the conduct of General Gourgaud distinguished him from the rest. After the peace of Paris, this officer had been aide-de-camp to the Duke of Berri, a situation which he abandoned on Napoleon's return at the period of the Hundred Days. As he was in attendance upon the Ex-Emperor at the moment of his fall, he felt it his duty to accompany him to St Helena. While upon that island, he took less share in Napoleon's complaints and quarrels with the governor, than either Generals Bertrand and Montholon, or Count

Las Cases, avoided all appearance of intrigue with the inhabitants, and was regarded by Sir Hudson Lowe as a brave and loyal soldier, who followed his emperor in adversity, without taking any part in those proceedings which the governor considered as prejudicial to his own authority. As such, he is characterised uniformly in Sir Hudson's despatches to his Government.

This officer had left in France a mother and sister, to whom he was tenderly devoted, and who loved him with the fondest affection. From attachment to these beloved relatives, and their affecting desire that he should rejoin them, General Gourgaud became desirous of revisiting his native country ; and his resolution was the stronger, that considerable jealousies and misunderstandings arose betwixt him and Count Bertrand. In these circumstances, he applied for and obtained permission from the governor, to return to London direct. Before leaving St Helena, he was very communicative both to Sir Hudson Lowe and Baron Sturmer, the Austrian commissioner, respecting the secret hopes and plans which were carrying on at Longwood. When he arrived in Britain in the spring 1818, he was no less frank and open with the British Government ; informing them of the various proposals for escape which had been laid before Napoleon ; the facilities and difficulties which attended them, and the reasons why he preferred remaining on the island, to making the attempt. At this period it was supposed that General Gourgaud was desirous of making his peace with the King of France ; but whatever might

be his private views, the minutes of the information which he afforded to Sir Hudson Lowe and Baron Sturmer at St Helena, and afterwards at London to the Under Secretary at War, are still preserved in the records of the Foreign Office. They agree entirely with each other, and their authenticity cannot be questioned. The communications are studiously made, with considerable reserve as to proper names, in order that no individual should be called in question for any thing which is there stated ; and in general they bear, as was to be expected, an air of the utmost simplicity and veracity. We shall often have occasion to allude to these documents, that the reader may be enabled to place the real purposes of Napoleon in opposition to the language which he made use of for accomplishing them ; but we have not thought it proper to quote the minutes at length, unless as far as Napoleon is concerned. We understand that General Gourgaud, on his return to the continent, has resumed that tenderness to Napoleon's memory, which may induce him to regret having communicated the secrets of his prison-house to less friendly ears. But this change of sentiments can neither diminish the truth of his evidence, nor affect our right to bring forward what we find recorded as communicated by him.

Having thus given an account of the evidence we mean to use, we resume the subject of Napoleon's quarrels with Sir Hudson Lowe.

It was not, according to General Gourgaud, for want of means of escape, that Napoleon continued to remain at St Helena. There was one plan for

carrying him out in a trunk with dirty linen ; and so general was the opinion of the extreme stupidity of the English sentinels, that there was another by which it was proposed he should slip through the camp in disguise of a servant carrying a dish. When the Baron Sturmer represented the impossibility of such wild plans being in agitation, Gourgaud answered, " There was no impossibility to those who had millions at their command. Yes, I repeat it," he continued, " he can escape from hence, and go to America whenever he has a mind."¹—" Why, then, should he remain here ? " said Baron Sturmer. Gourgaud replied, " That all his followers had urged him to make the experiment of escape ; but he preferred continuing on the island. He has a secret pride in the consequence attached to the custody of his person, and the interest generally taken in his fate. He has said repeatedly, ' I can no longer live as a private person. I would rather be a prisoner on this rock, than a free but undistinguished individual in the United States.' "²

General Gourgaud said, therefore, that the event to which Napoleon trusted for liberty, was some change of politics in the court of Great Britain, which should bring into administration the party who were now in opposition, and who, he rather

¹ "*Je le répète, il peut s'évader seul, et aller en Amérique quand il le voudra.*" Taken from a report of Baron Sturmer to Prince Metternich, giving an account of General Gourgaud's communications, dated 14th March, 1818.

² "*Je ne puis plus vivre en particulier. J'aime mieux être prisonnier ici, que libre aux États Unis.*"

too rashly perhaps conceived, would at once restore to him his liberty. The British ministers received the same assurances from General Gourgaud with those given at St Helena. These last are thus expressed in the original :—

“ Upon the subject of General Buonaparte’s escape, M. Gourgaud stated confidently, that although Longwood was, from its situation, capable of being well protected by sentries, yet he was certain that there would be no difficulty in eluding at any time the vigilance of the sentries posted round the house and grounds ; and, in short, that escape from the island appeared to him in no degree impracticable. The subject, he confessed, had been discussed at Longwood amongst the individuals of the establishment, who were separately desired to give their plans for effecting it. But he expressed his belief to be, that General Buonaparte was so fully impressed with the opinion, that he would be permitted to leave St Helena, either upon a change of ministry in England, or by the unwillingness of the English to bear the expense of detaining him, that he would not at present run the hazard to which an attempt to escape might expose him. It appeared, however, from the statement of General Gourgaud, and from other circumstances stated by him, that Buonaparte had always looked to the period of the removal of the allied armies from France, as that most favourable for his return ; and the probability of such an event, and the consequences which would flow from it, were urged by him as an argument to dissuade General Gourgaud from quitting him until after that period.”

General Gourgaud’s communications further bear, what, indeed, can be collected from many other circumstances, that as Napoleon hoped to obtain his liberty from the impression to be made on the minds of the English nation, he was careful not to suffer his condition to be forgotten, and most anxious that the public mind should be carefully kept alive to it, by a succession of publications coming out one after another, modified according to the different temper and information of the various authors, but bearing all of them the stamp of having issued in

whole or in part from the interior of Longwood. Accordingly, the various works of Warden,¹ O'Meara,² Santini,³ the Letter of Montholon,⁴ and other publications upon St Helena,⁵ appeared one after another, to keep the subject awake ; which, although seemingly discharged by various hands, bear the strong peculiarity of being directed at identically the same mark, and of being arrows from the same quiver. Gourgaud mentioned this species of file-firing, and its purpose. Even the *Manuscrit de St Hélène*, a tract, in which dates and facts were misplaced and confounded, was also, according to General Gourgaud, the work of Buonaparte, and composed to puzzle and *mystify* the British public. He told Sir Hudson Lowe that he was not to consider the abuse in these various pamphlets as levelled against him personally, but as written upon political calculation, with the view of extorting some relaxation of vigilance by the reiteration of complaints. The celebrated Letter of Montholon was, according to the same authority, written in a great measure by Napoleon ; and the same was the case with Santini's, though so grossly over-coloured that he himself afterwards disowned it.⁶

¹ [Warden's Letters from St Helena.]

² [Voice from St. Helena, &c.]

³ [Appeal to the British Nation, &c. By M. Santini, Porter of the Emperor's closet.]

⁴ [Official Memoir, dictated by Napoleon ; being a Letter from Count de Montholon to Sir Hudson Lowe.]

⁵ [Manuscrit venu de St Hélène d'une manière inconnue, &c.]

⁶ [“ Santini has published a brochure full of trash. There are some truths in it ; but every thing is exaggerated.”—NAPOLEON, *Voice*, &c. v. ii. p. 76.]

Other papers, he said, would appear under the names of captains of merchantmen and the like, for Napoleon was possessed by a mania for scribbling, which had no interruption. It becomes the historian, therefore, to receive with caution the narratives of those who have thus taken a determinedly partial part in the controversy, and concocted their statements from the details afforded by the party principally concerned. If what General Gourgaud has said be accurate, it is Napoleon who is pleading his own cause under a borrowed name, in the pages of O'Meara, Santini, Montholon, &c. Even when the facts mentioned in these works, therefore, are undeniable, still it is necessary to strip them of exaggeration, and place them in a fair and just light before pronouncing on them.

The evidence of O'Meara, as contained in a *Voice from St Helena*, is that of a disappointed man, bitterly incensed against Sir Hudson Lowe, as the cause of his disappointment. He had no need to kindle the flame of his own resentment, at that of Buonaparte. But it may be granted that their vindictive feelings must have strengthened each other. The quarrel was the more irreconcilable, as it appears that Dr O'Meara was originally in great habits of intimacy with Sir Hudson Lowe, and in the custom of repeating at Plantation-house the gossip which he had heard at Longwood. Some proofs of this were laid before the public, in the *Quarterly Review* ;¹ and Sir Hudson Lowe's cor-

¹ [Vol. xxviii. p. 227]

respondence with government contains various allusions to Mr O'Meara's authority,¹ down to the period when their mutual confidence was terminated by a violent quarrel.²

Count Las Cases is not, in point of impartiality, to be ranked much above Dr O'Meara. He was originally a French emigrant, a worshipper by profession of royalty, and therefore only changed his idol, not his religion, when he substituted the idol Napoleon for the idol Bourbon. He embraces with passive obedience the interests of his chief, real or

¹ Sir Hudson Lowe writes, for example, to Lord Bathurst, 13th May, 1816 :—" Having found Dr O'Meara, who was attached to Buonaparte's family on the removal of his French physician, very useful in giving information in many instances, and as, if removed, it might be difficult to find another person who might be equally agreeable to General Buonaparte, I have deemed it advisable to suffer him to remain in the family on the same footing as before my arrival." On the 29th of March, 1817, Sir Hudson writes :—" Dr O'Meara had informed me of the conversations that had occurred, and, with that readiness which he always manifests upon such occasions, immediately wrote them down for me."

² ["A catastrophe seemed inevitable. Napoleon indeed concluded that there was a determination to bring it about. On the 6th of May, he sent for O'Meara, in order that he might learn his personal position. He desired me to express to him in English, that he had hitherto no cause of complaint against him. It was necessary, he said, to come to an understanding. Was he to consider him as his own physician personally, or merely as a prison doctor, appointed by the English Government? Was he his confessor or his inspector? *Had he made reports respecting him*, or was it his intention to do so if called upon. The doctor replied with great firmness, and in a tone of feeling. He said he had made *no report* respecting the Emperor, and that he could not imagine any instance in which he might be induced to make a report, except in case of serious illness."—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 211.]

supposed, and can see nothing wrong which Napoleon is disposed to think right. He was also the personal enemy of Sir Hudson Lowe. We have no idea that he would falsify the truth; but we cannot but suspect the accuracy of his recollection, when we find he inserts many expressions and incidents in his Journal, long after the period at which it was originally written, and it is to be presumed from memory. Sir Hudson Lowe had the original manuscript for some time in his possession, and we have at present before us a printed copy, in which Sir Hudson has, with his own hand, marked those additions which had been made to the Journal since he saw it in its primitive state. It is remarkable that all, or almost all, the additions which are made to the Journal, consist of passages highly injurious to Sir Hudson Lowe, which had no existence in the original manuscript. These additions must therefore have been made under the influence of recollection, sharpened by angry passions, since they did not at first seem important enough to be preserved. When memory is put on the rack by passion and prejudice, she will recollect strange things; and, like witnesses under the actual torture, sometimes avow what never took place.

Of Dr Antommarchi it is not necessary to say much; he was a legatee of Buonaparte, and an annuitant of his widow, besides being anxious to preserve the countenance of his very wealthy family. He never speaks of Sir Hudson Lowe without rancour. Sir Hudson's first offence against

him was enquiring for clandestine correspondence;¹ his last was, preventing the crowd at Napoleon's funeral from pulling to pieces the willow-trees by which the grave was sheltered, besides placing a guard over the place of sepulture.² What truth is there, then, to be reposed in an author, who can thus misrepresent two circumstances,—the one imposed on Sir Hudson Lowe by his instructions; the other being what decency and propriety, and respect to the deceased, imperatively demanded?

The mass of evidence shows, that to have remained upon good, or even on decent terms with the governor, would not have squared with the politics of one who desired to have grievances to complain of; and who, far from having the usual motives which may lead a captive and his keeper to a tolerable understanding, by a system of mutual accommodation, wished to provoke the governor, if possible, beyond the extent of human patience, even at the risk of subjecting himself to some new infliction, which might swell the list of wrongs which he was accumulating to lay before the public.

What we have stated above is exemplified by Napoleon's reception of Sir Hudson Lowe, against whom he appears to have adopted the most violent prejudices at the very first interview, and before the governor could have afforded him the slightest disrespect. We quote it, because it shows that the mind of the prisoner was made up to provoke

¹ [Last Days of the Emperor Napoleon, v. i. p. 60.]

² [Ibid. v. ii. p. 185.]

and insult Sir Hudson, without waiting for any provocation on his part.

The governor's first aggression (so represented), was his requiring permission of *General Buonaparte* to call together his domestics, with a view to their taking the declaration required by the British Government, binding themselves to abide by the rules laid down for the custody of Buonaparte's person. This permission was refused in very haughty terms. If Napoleon had been at the Tuileries, such a request could not have been more highly resented. The servants, however, appeared, and took the necessary declaration. But the affront was not cancelled; "Sir Hudson Lowe had put his finger betwixt Napoleon and his valet-de-chambre." This was on the 27th April, 1816.¹

Upon the 30th, the governor again paid his respects at Longwood, and was received with one of those calculated bursts of furious passion with which Napoleon was wont to try the courage and shake the nerves of those over whom he desired to acquire influence. He spoke of protesting against the Convention of Paris, and demanded what right the sovereigns therein allied had to dispose of one, their equal always, and often their superior. He called upon the governor for death or liberty,—as if it had been in Sir Hudson Lowe's power to give him either the one or the other. Sir Hudson enlarged on the conveniences of the building which was to be sent from England, to supply the present want of accommodation. Buonaparte repelled the proposed consolation with fury. It was not a house

¹ [Las Cases, t. ii. p. 89.]

that he wanted, it was an executioner and a line. These he would esteem a favour ; all the rest was but irony and insult. Sir Hudson Lowe could in reply only hope that he had given no personal offence, and was reminded of his review of the domestics ; which reproach he listened to in silence.¹

Presently afterwards, Napoleon fell on a new and cutting method of exercising Sir Hudson's patience. A book on the campaign of 1814,² lay on the table. Napoleon turned up some of the English bulletins, and asked, with a tone which was perfectly intelligible, whether the governor had not been the writer of these letters. Being answered in the affirmative, Napoleon, according to Dr O'Meara, told Sir Hudson they were full of folly and falsehood ; to which the governor, with more patience than most men could have commanded on such an occasion, replied, " I believe I saw what I have stated ;"³ an answer certainly as temperate as could be returned to so gratuitous an insult. After Sir Hudson left the room in which he had been received with so much unprovoked incivility, Napoleon is described as having harangued upon the sinister expression of his countenance, abused him in the coarsest manner, and even caused his valet-

¹ [Las Cases, t. ii. p. 115-120.]

² [Hist. de la Campagne de 1814, par Alphonse de Beauchamp.]

³ [“ It appears that this governor was with Blucher, and is the writer of some official letters to your government, descriptive of part of the operations of 1814. I pointed them out to him, and asked him, ‘ *Est-ce vous, Monsieur ?* ’ He replied, ‘ Yes.’ I told him that they were *pleines de faussetés et de sottises*. He shrugged up his shoulders, and replied, ‘ *J’ai cru voir cela.* ’”—Voice, &c. v. i. p. 49.]

de-chambre throw a cup of coffee out of the window, because it had stood a moment on the table beside the governor.¹

Every attempt at conciliation on the part of the governor, seemed always to furnish new subjects of irritation. He sent fowling-pieces to Longwood, and Napoleon returned for answer, it was an insult to give fowling-pieces where there is no game; though Santini, by the way, pretended to support the family in a great measure by his gun. Sir Hudson sent a variety of clothes and other articles from England, which it might be supposed the exiles were in want of. The thanks returned were, that the governor treated them like paupers, and that the articles ought, in due respect, to have been left at the store, or governor's house, while a list was sent to the Emperor's household, that such things were at their command if they had any occasion for them. On a third occasion, Sir Hudson resolved to be cautious. He had determined to give a ball; but he consulted Dr O'Meara whether Napoleon would take it well to be invited. The doctor foresaw that the fatal address, *General Buonaparte*, would make shipwreck of the invitation. The governor proposed to avoid this stumblingblock, by asking Napoleon verbally and in person. But with no name which his civility could devise for the invitation, could it be rendered acceptable. A governor of St Helena, as Napoleon himself observed, had need to be a person of great politeness, and at the same time of great firmness.

At length, on 18th August, a decisive quarrel

¹[Las Cases, t. i. p. 121.]

took place. Sir Hudson Lowe was admitted to an audience, at which was present Sir Pulteney Malcolm, the admiral who now commanded on the station. Dr O'Meara has preserved the following account of the interview, as it was detailed by Napoleon to his suite, the day after it took place.

“ ‘ That governor,’ said Napoleon, ‘ came here yesterday to annoy me. He saw me walking in the garden, and in consequence, I could not refuse to see him. He wanted to enter into some details with me about reducing the expenses of the establishment. He had the audacity to tell me that things were as he found them, and that he came up to justify himself; that he had come up two or three times before to do so, but that I was in a bath.’ I replied, ‘ No, sir, I was not in a bath; but I ordered one on purpose not to see you. In endeavouring to justify yourself you make matters worse.’ He said, that I did not know him; that, if I knew him, I should change my opinion. ‘ Know you, sir!’ I answered; ‘ how could I know you? People make themselves known by their actions—by commanding in battles. You have never commanded in battle. You have never commanded any but vagabond Corsican deserters, Piedmontese and Neapolitan brigands. I know the name of every English general who has distinguished himself; but I never heard of you, except as a *scrivano* [clerk] to Blucher, or as a commandant of brigands. You have never commanded, or been accustomed to men of honour.’ He said, that he had not sought for his present situation. I told him that such employments were not asked for; that they were given by governments to people who had disbonoured themselves. He said, that he only did his duty, and that I ought not to blame him, as he only acted according to his orders. I replied, ‘ So does the hangman; he acts according to his orders. But when he puts a rope about my neck to finish me, is that a reason that I should like that hangman, because he acts according to his orders? Besides, I do not believe that any government could be so mean as to give such orders as you cause to be executed.’ I told him that, if he pleased, he need not send up any thing to eat; that I would go over and dine at the table of the brave officers of the 53d; that I was sure there was not one of them who would not be happy to give a plate at the table to an old soldier; that there was not a soldier in the regiment who had not more heart than he had; that in the iniquitous bill of Parliament, they had decreed

that I was to be treated as a prisoner ; but that he treated me worse than a condemned criminal or a galley slave, as they were permitted to receive newspapers and printed books, of which he deprived me.' I said, ' You have power over my body, but none over my soul. That soul is as proud, fierce, and determined at the present moment, as when it commanded Europe.' I told him that he was a *sbirro Siciliano* (Sicilian thief-taker), and not an Englishman ; and desired him not to let me see him again until he came with orders to despatch me, when he would find all the doors thrown open to admit him.' " 1

It is not surprising that this extreme violence met with some return on Sir Hudson's part. He told Napoleon that his language was uncivil and ungentlemanlike, and that he would not remain to listen to it. Accordingly, he left Longwood without even the usual salutation.

Upon these occasions, we think it is evident that Napoleon was the wilful and intentional aggressor, and that his conduct proceeded either from the stings of injured pride, or a calculated scheme, which made him prefer being on bad rather than good terms with Sir Hudson Lowe. On the other hand, we could wish that the governor had avoided entering upon the subject of the expenses of his detention with Napoleon in person. The subject was ill-chosen, and could produce no favourable result.

¹ [*Voice*, §c., vol. i. p. 93.—“ The Emperor admitted that he had, during this conversation, seriously and repeatedly offended Sir Hudson Lowe ; and he also did him the justice to acknowledge, that Sir Hudson had not precisely shown, in a single instance, any want of respect ; he had contented himself with muttering, between his teeth, sentences which were not audible. The only failure, perhaps, on the part of the governor, and which was trifling, compared with the treatment he had received, was the abrupt way in which he retired, while the admiral withdrew slowly, and with numerous salutes.”—*LAS CASES*, t. iii. p. 222.]

They never afterwards met in friendship, or even on terms of decent civility; and having given this account of their final quarrel, it only remains for us to classify, in a general manner, the various subjects of angry discussion which took place betwixt them, placed in such uncomfortable relative circumstances, and each determined not to give way to the other's arguments, or accommodate himself to the other's wishes or convenience.

CHAPTER XCV.

Instructions to Sir Hudson Lowe.—Sum allowed for the Ex-Emperor's expenses.—Napoleon's proposal to defray his own Expenses.—Sale of his Plate—made in order to produce a false impression: he had at that time a large sum of Money in his strong-box.—Wooden House constructed in London, and transported to St Helena.—Interview between Sir H. Lowe and Napoleon.—Delays in the erection of the House.—The Regulation that a British Officer should attend Napoleon in his rides.—Communication with Europe carried on by the Inmates of Longwood.—Regulation respecting Napoleon's Intercourse with the Inhabitants of St Helena.—General Reflections on the Disputes between him and Sir H. Lowe.

BEFORE entering upon such brief enquiry as our bounds will permit, into the conduct of the new governor towards Napoleon, it may be necessary to show what were his, Sir Hudson Lowe's, instructions from the English Government on the subject of the custody of the Ex-Emperor:—

“ Downing Street, 12th September, 1816.

“ You will observe, that the desire of his Majesty's Government is, to allow every indulgence to General Buonaparte which may be compatible with the entire security of his person. That he should not by any means escape, or hold communication with any person whatsoever, excepting through your agency, must be your unremitted care; and those points being made sure, every resource and amusement, which may serve to reconcile Buonaparte to his confinement, may be permitted.”

A few weeks later, the Secretary of State wrote

to Sir Hudson Lowe a letter to the same purpose with the former, 26th October, 1816:—

“With respect to General Buonaparte himself, I deem it unnecessary to give you any farther instructions. I am confident that your own disposition will prompt you to anticipate the wishes of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and make every allowance for the effect which so sudden a change of situation cannot fail to produce on a person of his irritable temper. You will, however, not permit your forbearance or generosity towards him to interfere with any regulations which may have been established for preventing his escape, or which you may hereafter consider necessary for the better security of his person.”

The just and honourable principle avowed by Government is obvious. But it was an extraordinary and most delicate tax upon Sir Hudson Lowe, which enjoined him to keep fast prisoner an individual, who, of all others, was likely to be most impatient of restraint, and, at the same time, to treat him with such delicacy as might disguise his situation from himself, if it could not reconcile him to it. If Sir Hudson failed in doing so, he may be allowed to plead, that it was in a case in which few could have succeeded. Accordingly, Napoleon's complaints against the governor were bitter and clamorous.

The first point of complaint on the part of the family at Longwood, respected the allowance assigned by the British Government for their support, which they alleged to be insufficient to their wants. This was not a point on which Napoleon thought it proper to express his feelings in his own person. *His* attention was apparently fixed upon obtaining concessions in certain points of etiquette, which might take him from under the condition in which he was most unwilling to allow himself to be placed,

in the rank, namely, of a prisoner of war. The theme, of the inadequacy of the allowance, was not, however, left untouched, as those concerned were well aware that there was no subject of grievance which would come more home to the people of England than one which turned upon a deficiency either in the quantity or quality of the food supplied to the exiles. Montholon's letter was clamant on the subject ; and Santini intimated, that the Emperor must sometimes have gone without a meal altogether, had he (Santini) not been successful with his gun.

The true state of the case was this :—The British Government had determined that Napoleon's table should be provided for at the rate of a general of the first rank, together with his military family. The expense of such an establishment was, by the regulations furnished to Sir Hudson Lowe, dated 15th April, and 22d November, 1816, supposed to reach to L.8000 a-year, with permission, however, to extend it as far as L.12,000, should he think it necessary. The expense could not, in Sir Hudson Lowe's opinion, be kept within L.8000 ; and indeed it was instantly extended by him to L.12,000, paid in monthly instalments to the purveyor, Mr Balcombe, by whom it was expended in support of the establishment at Longwood. If, however, even L.12,000, the sum fixed as a probable ultimatum, should, in the governor's opinion, be found, from dearth, high price of provisions, or otherwise, practically insufficient to meet and answer the expense of a general's family, calculated on a liberal scale, Sir Hudson Lowe had liberty

from Government to extend the purveyor's allowance without limitation. But if, on the other hand, the French should desire to add to their house-keeping any thing which the governor should think superfluous, in reference to the rank assigned to the principal person, they were themselves to be at the charge of such extraordinary expenditure.

It is apprehended that the British Government could not be expected to do more for Napoleon's liberal maintenance, than to give the governor an unlimited order to provide for it, upon the scale applicable to the rank of a general officer of the first rate. But yet the result, as the matter was managed, was not so honourable to Great Britain, as the intentions of the Government really designed. The fact is, that virtues as well as vices have their day of fashion in England ; and at the conclusion of the peace, when the nation were cloyed with victory, men began, like epicures after a feast, to wrangle about the reckoning. Every one felt the influence of the *Quart d'heure de Rabelais*. It ascended into the Houses of Parliament, and economy was the general theme of the day. There can be no doubt that a judicious restriction upon expenditure is the only permanent source of national wealth ; but, like all other virtues, parsimony may be carried to an extreme, and there are situations in which it has all the meanness of avarice. The waste of a few pounds of meat, of a hundred billets of wood, of a few bottles of wine, ought not to have been made the shadow of a question between Britain and Napoleon ; and it would have been better to have winked at and given way to the prodigality of a

family, which had no motives of economy on their own part, than to be called upon to discuss such petty domestic details in the great council of the nation, sitting as judges betwixt England and her prisoner. A brief answer to those who might in that case have charged the government with prodigality, might have been found in referring the censors to the immense sums saved by the detention of Napoleon in St Helena. It is something of a different scale of expense, which is requisite to maintain a score of persons even in the most extravagant manner, and to support an army of three hundred thousand men.

But although such disputes arose, we think, from the governor mistaking the meaning of the British ministers, and descending, if he really did so, to details about the quality of salt or sugar to be used in the kitchen at Longwood, there is no reason to entertain the belief that the prisoners had any actual restriction to complain of, though it might not always happen that articles of the first quality could be procured at St Helena so easily as at Paris. The East India Company sent out the supplies to the purveyor, and they consisted of every luxury which could be imagined; so that delicacies very unusual in St Helena could, during Napoleon's residence, be obtained there for any one who chose to be at the expense. The wine was (generally speaking) excellent in quality, and of the first price;¹

¹ The claret, for example, was that of Carbonel, at L.6 per dozen without duty. Each domestic of superior rank was allowed a bottle of this wine, which is as choice, as dear certainly, as could be brought to the table of sovereigns. The labourers

and although there was rather too much said and thought about the quantity consumed, yet it was furnished, as we shall hereafter see, in a quantity far beyond the limits of ordinary conviviality. Indeed, although the French officers, while hunting for grievances, made complaints of their treatment at table, and circulated, in such books as that of Santini, the grossest scandal on that subject, yet when called on as men of honour to give their opinion, they did justice to the governor in this respect.

In a letter of General Bertrand to the governor, he expresses himself thus:—"Be assured that we are well persuaded of the good intentions of the governor, to supply us with every thing necessary, and that as to provisions there will never be any complaints, or if there are, they will be made against the government, not against the governor, upon whom the matter does not depend." He adds, "that such were the sentiments of the Emperor. That indeed they had been under some difficulties when the plate was broken up, but that ever since then they had been well supplied, and had no complaint whatever to make." Such is the evidence of Count Bertrand, when deliberately writing to the governor through his military secretary.

But we have also the opinion of the Ex-Emperor himself, transmitted by Dr O'Meara, who was at that time, as already noticed, in the habit

and soldiers had each, daily, a bottle of Teneriffe wine of excellent quality.

of sending to the governor such scraps of information as he heard in conversation at Longwood :

“ 5th June, 1817.

“ He (Buonaparte) observed that Santini's was a foolish production, exaggerated, full of *coglionerie*, and some lies : Truths there were in it, but exaggerated. That there never had existed that actual want described by him ; that there had been enough to eat supplied, but not enough to keep a proper table ; that there had been enough of wine for them ; that there certainly had been sometimes a deficiency of necessary articles, but that this might be accounted for by accidents ; that he believed frequent purchases had been made, at the camp, of bread and other provisions, which might also have occasionally arisen from the same cause. He added, he was convinced some Englishman had written it, and not Santini.”

There is something to the same purpose in Dr O'Meara's printed book,¹ but not so particular. What makes Napoleon's confutation of Santini's work the more amusing, is, that according to General Gourgaud's communication to the British Government, Napoleon was himself the author of the whole, or greater part, of the work in question. The difference between the prisoner and governor, so far as it really existed, may have had its rise in the original dispute ; for a table, which suited the rank of a general, must have been considerably inferior to one kept for an emperor ; and while the former was what the governor was directed to maintain, the latter was what Napoleon conceived himself entitled to expect.

The permission given to Buonaparte, and which indeed could not be well refused, to purchase from his own funds what additional articles he desired

¹ [Voice, &c. vol. ii. p. 76.]

beyond those supplied by the British Government, afforded peculiar facilities to the French, which they did not fail to make use of. Napoleon's money had been temporarily taken into custody when he left the Bellerophon, with a view to prevent his having the means of facilitating his escape by bribery. The permitting him to draw upon the continent for money, would have been in a great measure restoring to him the golden key before which prison-gates give way, and also tending to afford him the means of secret correspondence with those friends abroad, who might aid him to arrange a scheme of flight.

Indeed, the advantages of this species of correspondence were of such evident importance, that Napoleon, through General Montholon, made the following proposal, which was sent to Lord Bathurst by the governor, 8th September, 1816:—

“ The Emperor,” he said, “ was desirous to enter into arrangements for paying the *whole* of his expenses, providing any house here, or in England, or on the continent of Europe, to be fixed on with the governor's consent, or even at his own choice, were appointed to transact his money-matters; under assurance from him, General Buonaparte, that all letters sent through his hands would be solely on pecuniary affairs. But provided always, that such letters should pass *sealed and unopened* to their direction.”

It is probable that Napoleon concluded, from the ferment which was at that time taking place in Parliament on the subject of economy, that the English nation was on the point of bankruptcy, and did not doubt that an offer, which promised to relieve them of L.12,000 a-year, would be eagerly caught at by Sir Hudson Lowe, or the British Ministry. But the governor saw the peril of a measure, which, in its immediate and direct tendency,

went to place funds to any amount at the command of the Ex-Emperor, and might, more indirectly, lead the way to private correspondence of every kind. Napoleon, indeed, had offered to plight his word, that the communication should not be used for any other than pecuniary purposes; but Sir Hudson liked not the security. On his part, the governor tendered a proposal, that the letters to the bankers should be visible only to himself, and to Lord Bathurst, the secretary for the colonial department, and pledged his word that they would observe the most inviolable secrecy on the subject of the contents; but this arrangement did not answer Napoleon's purposes, and the arrangement was altogether dropped.

It was about the same time that Sir Hudson Lowe was desirous to keep the expense of the establishment within L.12,000. A conference on this subject was held betwixt General Montholon, who took charge of the department of the household, and Major Gorreqner, belonging to Sir Hudson's staff, who acted on the part of the governor. It appears that Sir Hudson had either misapprehended the instructions of the government, and deemed himself rigidly bound to limit the expenses of Longwood within L.12,000 yearly, not adverting that he had an option to extend it beyond that sum; or else that he considered the surplus above L.1000 per month, to consist of such articles of extra expenditure as the French might, in a free interpretation of his instructions, be required to pay for themselves, as being beyond the limits of a general-officer's table, provided upon the most liberal plan.

General Montholon stated, that the family could not be provided, even after many reductions, at a cheaper rate than L.15,194, and that this was the *minimum of minimums*, the least possible sum. He offered, that the Emperor would draw for the sum wanted, providing he was permitted to send a sealed letter to the banking-house. This, Major Gorrequer said, could not be allowed. Count Montholon then declared, that as the Emperor was not permitted by the British Government to have access to his funds in Europe, he had no other means left than to dispose of his property here; and that if the Emperor was obliged to defray those expenses of the establishment, which went beyond the allowance made by Britain, he must dispose of his plate.

This proposal was too rashly assented to by Sir Hudson Lowe, whose instructions of 22d November empowered him to have prevented a circumstance so glaringly calculated to accredit all that had ever been said or written respecting the mean and sordid manner in which the late Emperor of France was treated. Napoleon had an opportunity, at the sacrifice of a parcel of old silver plate, to amuse his own moments of languor, by laughing at and turning into ridicule the inconsistent qualities of the English nation—at one time sending him a house and furniture to the value of L.60,000 or L.70,000; at another, obliging him to sell his plate, and discharge his servants; and all for the sake of a few bottles of wine, or pounds of meat. Sir Hudson Lowe ought not to have exposed his country to such a charge; and, even if his instructions seemed

inexplicit on the subject, he ought, on his own interpretation of them, to have paid the extra expense, without giving room to such general scandal as was sure to arise from Napoleon's disposing of his plate.

But if the governor took too narrow a view of his duty upon this occasion, what are we to say of the poor conduct of Napoleon, who, while he had specie in his strong-box to have defrayed three times the sum wanted to defray the alleged balance, yet preferred making the paltry sale alluded to, that he might appear before Europe *in formâ pauperis*, and set up a claim to compassion, as a man driven to such extremity as to be obliged to part with the plate from his table, in order to be enabled to cover it with the necessary food ! He was well aware that little compassion would have been paid to him, had he been possessed of ready money sufficient to supply any deficiencies in the tolerably ample allowance paid by England ; and that it was only the idea of his poverty, proved, as it seemed, by a step, which even private individuals only take in a case of necessity, which made his case appear strong and clamant. The feeling of compassion must have given place to one of a very different kind, had the actual circumstances of the case been fully and fairly known.

The communications of General Gourgaud, upon parting with Sir Hudson Lowe, put the governor in possession of the curious fact, that the breaking up of the plate¹ was a mere trick, resorted to on

¹ [“ Sept. 19.—The Emperor examined a large basket-full of broken plate, which was to be sent next day to the town. This

account of the impression it was calculated to produce in England and Europe; for that at the time they had at Longwood plenty of money. Sir Hudson Lowe conjectured, that General Gourgaud alluded to the sale of some stock belonging to Las Cases, the value of which that devoted adherent had placed at Napoleon's disposal; but General Gourgaud replied, "No, no; before that transaction they had received 240,000 francs, chiefly in Spanish doubloons." He further said, that it was Prince Eugene who lodged the money in the hands of the bankers. In London, General Gourgaud made the same communication. We copy the words in which it is reported by Sir Hudson Lowe to Lord Bathurst:—

"General Gourgaud stated himself to have been aware of General Buonaparte having received a considerable sum of money in Spanish doubloons, viz. L.10,000, at the very time he disposed of his plate; but, on being pressed by me as to the persons privy to that transaction, he contented himself with assuring me, that the mode of its transmission was one purely accidental; that it could never again occur; and that, such being the case, he trusted that I should not press a discovery, which, while it betrayed its author, could have no effect, either as it regarded the punishment of the offenders, or the prevention of a similar act in future. The actual possession of money was, moreover, not likely, in his view of the subject, to afford any additional means of corrupting the fidelity of those whom it might be advisable to

was to be for the future the indispensable complement for our monthly subsistence, in consequence of the late reductions of the governor. When the moment had come for breaking up this plate, the servants could not, without the greatest reluctance, bring themselves to apply the hammer to these objects of their veneration. This act upset all their ideas; it was to them a sacrilege, a desolation! Some of them shed tears on the occasion!!"—LAS CASES, t. iii. p. 184.]

seduce ; as it was well known, that any draught, whatever might be its amount, drawn by General Buonaparte on Prince Eugene, or on certain other members of his family, would be scrupulously honoured."

He further stated, that it was Napoleon's policy to make a *moyen*, a fund for execution of his plans, by placing sums of money at his, General Gourgaud's command, and that he had sustained ill-treatment on the part of Napoleon, and much impotency on that of Bertrand, because he declined lending himself to facilitate secret correspondence.

Whatever sympathy Buonaparte may claim for his other distresses at St Helena, it was made plain from this important disclosure, that want of funds could be none of them ; and it is no less so, that the trick of selling the plate can now prove nothing, excepting that Napoleon's system was a deceptive one ; and that evidence of any sort, arising either from his word or actions, is to be received with caution, when there is an apparent point to be carried by it.

When Sir Hudson Lowe's report reached England, that the excess of the expenditure at Longwood, about twelve thousand pounds, had been defrayed by Napoleon himself, it did not meet the approbation of the Ministry ; who again laid before the governor the distinction which he was to draw betwixt expenses necessary to maintain the table and household of a general officer, and such as might be of a nature different from, and exceeding those attendant on the household of a person of that rank ; which last, and those alone, the French might be

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called on to defray. The order is dated 24th Oct.
1817.

“ As I observe from the statement contained in your despatch, No. 84, that the expense of General Buonaparte's establishment exceeds L.12,000 per annum, and that the excess beyond that sum has, up to the date of that despatch, been defrayed from his own funds, I deem it necessary again to call your attention to that part of my despatch, No. 15, of the 22d November last, in which, in limiting the expense to L.12,000 a-year, I still left you at liberty to incur a farther expenditure, should you consider it to be necessary for the comfort of General Buonaparte; and to repeat, that, *if you should consider the sum of L.12,000 a-year not to be adequate to maintain such an establishment as would be requisite for a general officer of distinction, you will have no difficulty in making what you deem to be a requisite addition.* But, on the other hand, if the expenses which General Buonaparte has himself defrayed are beyond what, on a liberal construction, might be proper for a general officer of distinction, you will permit them, as heretofore, to be defrayed from his own funds.”

These positive and reiterated instructions serve to show that there was never a wish on the part of Britain to deal harshly, or even closely, with Napoleon; as the avowals of General Gourgaud prove on the other hand, that if the governor was too rigid on the subject of expense, the prisoner possessed means sufficient to have saved him from any possible consequences of self-denial, which might have accrued from being compelled to live at so low a rate as twelve thousand pounds a-year.

The subject of the RESIDENCE of Napoleon continued to furnish great subjects of complaint and commotion. We have recorded our opinion, that, from the beginning, Plantation-house, as the best residence in the island, ought to have been set

apart for his use. If, however, this was objected to, the building a new house from the foundation, even with the indifferent means which the island affords, would have been far more respectable, and perhaps as economical, as constructing a great wooden frame in London, and transporting it to St Helena, where it arrived, with the furniture destined for it, in May, 1816. It was not, however, a complete *parapluie* house, as such structures have been called, but only the materials for constructing such a one; capable of being erected separately, or, at Napoleon's choice, of being employed for making large and commodious additions to the mansion which he already occupied. It became a matter of courtesy to inquire whether it would best answer Napoleon's idea of convenience that an entirely new edifice should be constructed, or whether that end would be better attained by suffering the former building to remain, and constructing the new one in the form of an addition to it. We have recounted an interview betwixt Napoleon and the governor, in the words of the former, as delivered to O'Meara. The present we give as furnished by Sir Hudson, in a despatch to Lord Bathurst, dated 17th May, 1816:—

“ It becoming necessary to come to some decision in respect to the house and furniture which had been sent from England for the accommodation of General Buonaparte and his followers, I resolved on waiting upon him, communicating to him the arrival of the various materials, and asking his sentiments with respect to their appropriation, before I made any disposition of them. I previously called on General Bertrand, to ask if he thought General Buonaparte would be at leisure to receive me; and on his reply, which was in the affirmative, I proceeded to Longwood-house, where, having met Count Las Cases, I begged he would

be the bearer of my message to the general, acquainting him with my being there, if his convenience admitted of being visited by me. I received a reply, saying, 'the Emperor would see me.'

"I passed through his outer dining-room into his drawing-room. He was alone, standing with his hat under his arm, in the manner in which he usually presents himself when he assumes his imperial dignity. He remained silent, expecting I would address him. Finding him not disposed to commence, I began in the following words:—'Sir, you will probably have seen by our English newspapers, as well, perhaps, as heard through other channels, of the intention of the British Government to send out hither for your accommodation the materials for the construction of a house, with every necessary furniture. These articles have now for the first time arrived. In the mean time, Government has received information of the building prepared for your reception at this place, and I have instructions for appropriating the articles as may seem best, whether for making a new building, or adding to the conveniences of your present one. Before making any disposition on the subject, I waited to know whether you had any desires to communicate to me regarding it.' He stood as before, and made no reply.

"Observing his silence continue, I again commenced by saying, 'I have conceived, sir, that possibly the addition of two or three good rooms (*deux ou trois salons*) to your present house, with other improvements to it, might add to your convenience in less time than by constructing a new building.' He then commenced, but spoke with such rapidity, such intemperance, and so much warmth, that it is difficult to repeat every word he used. Without apparently having lent an ear to what I said, he began—'I do not at all understand the conduct of your government towards me. Do they desire to kill me? And do you come here to be my executioner, as well as my gaoler?—Posterity will judge of the manner in which I have been treated. The misfortunes which I suffer will recoil upon your nation. No, sir; never will I suffer any person to enter into the interior of my house, or penetrate into my bed-chamber, as you have given orders. When I heard of your arrival in this island, I believed that, as being an officer of the army, you would be possessed of a more polite character than an admiral, who is a navy-officer, and might have more harsh manners. I have no reason to complain of his heart. But you, sir,—in what manner do you treat me? It is an insult to invite me to dinner by the name of General Buonaparte. I am not General Buonaparte—I am the Emperor

Napoleon. I ask you again,—have you come hither to be my gaoler—my hangman?’ Whilst speaking in this manner, his right arm moved backward and forward; his person stood fixed: his eyes and countenance exhibiting every thing which could be supposed in a person who meant to intimidate or irritate.

“ I suffered him to proceed throughout, not without a strong feeling of restraint on myself, until he was really out of breath, when, on his stopping, I said, ‘ Sir, I am not come here to be insulted, but to treat of an affair which regards you more than me. If you are not disposed to talk upon the subject’——

“ ‘ I have no intention to insult you, sir,’ he replied; ‘ but in what sort of manner have you treated me? is it in a soldierlike fashion?’

“ ‘ I answered, ‘ Sir, I am a soldier according to the fashion of my own country, to do my duty to her accordingly, and not according to the fashion of foreigners. Besides, if you conceive you have any reason to complain of me, you have only to put your accusation upon paper, and I will send it to England by the first opportunity.’

“ ‘ To what good purpose?’ he said; ‘ my complaints will not be more public there than here.’

“ ‘ I will cause them be published,’ I answered, ‘ in all the gazettes of the continent, if you desire it. I do my duty, and every thing else is indifferent to me.’

“ ‘ Then, adverting for the first time to the matter which had brought me to him, he said, ‘ Your government has made me no official communication of the arrival of this house. Is it to be constructed where I please, or where you may fix it to be?’

“ ‘ I am now come, sir, for the express purpose of announcing it to you. I have no difficulty in replying to the other point: If there is any particular spot, which you might have thought of to erect it upon, I will examine it, and have it erected there, if I see no objection to it. If I see any objection to it, I will acquaint you with it. It was to combine this matter in some degree of concert with you that I am now come.’

“ ‘ Then you had better speak to the grand mareschal about it, and settle it with him.’

“ ‘ I prefer, sir, addressing you upon it. I find so many *més-intelligences* happen, when I adopt the medium of other persons (particularly as in the instance of the orders which you mention I had given for forcing an entrance into your private apartments), that I find it more satisfactory to address yourself.’

“ He made no particular reply to this, walked about for a moment, and then, working himself up apparently to say something which he thought would appal me with extraordinary surprise or dread, he said,—‘ Do you wish me, sir, to tell you the truth? Yes, sir, I ask you if you desire me to tell you the truth? I believe that you have received orders to kill me—yes, to kill me—yes, sir, I believe that you have received orders to stick at nothing—nothing.’ He then looked at me, as if expecting a reply. My answer was—‘ You were pleased to remark, sir, in our last interview, that you had miscalculated the spirit of the English people. Give me leave to say, you at present calculate as erroneously the spirit of an English soldier.’

“ Our interview here terminated; and, as if neither of us had any thing more to say, we mutually separated.”

Sir Hudson received a letter in reply to his account of this strange and violent scene, in which his forbearance and firmness are approved of. But we quote it, chiefly because it marks the intention of the British Government with respect to Buonaparte, and shows the consideration which they had for his peculiar condition, and the extent of forbearance which it was their desire should be extended towards him by the governor of St Helena :

“ There is a wide distinction between the conduct which you ought to hold towards General Buonaparte, and towards those who have chosen to follow his fortunes, by accompanying him to St Helena.

“ It would be a want of generosity not to make great allowance for the intemperate language into which the former may at times be betrayed. The height from whence he has been precipitated, and all the circumstances which have attended his fall, are sufficient to upset a mind less irritable than his; and it is to be apprehended that he can find little consolation in his reflections, either in the means by which he obtained his power, or his manner of exercising it. So long, therefore, as his violence is confined to words, it must be borne with—always understanding, and giving him to understand, that any wilful transgression, on his part, of the rules which you may think it necessary to prescribe for the

security of his person, will place you under the necessity of adopting a system of restraint, which it will be most painful to you to inflict.

“ With respect to his followers, they stand in a very different situation ; they cannot be too frequently reminded, that their continuance in the island is an act of indulgence on the part of the British Government ; and you will inform them that you have received strict instructions to remove them from the person of General Buouaparte, and to transport them out of the island, if they shall not conduct themselves with that respect which your situation demands, and with that strict attention to your regulations which is the indispensable condition on which their residence in the island is permitted.”

The stormy dispute, which took place on the 16th May, 1816,¹ left every thing unsettled with respect to the house ; and indeed it may be conjectured, without injustice, that Napoleon preferred the old and inconvenient mansion, with the right to complain of it as a grievance, to the new and commodious one, the possession of which must have shut his lips upon one fertile subject of misrepresentation. Repeated and equally nugatory discussions on the subject took place during the course of two or three years, all which time Napo-

¹ [“ As I was waiting in the antechamber with the military secretary, I could hear, from the Emperor's tone of voice, that he was irritated. The audience was a very long, and a very clamorous one. On the governor's departure, I went to the garden, whither the Emperor had sent for me. ‘ Well, Las Cases,’ said he, ‘ we have had a violent scene. I have been thrown quite out of temper ! They have now sent me worse than a gaoler ! Sir Hudson Lowe is a downright executioner ; I received him to-day with my stormy countenance, my head inclined, and my ears pricked up. We looked most furiously at each other. My anger must have been powerfully excited, for I felt a vibration in the calf of my left leg. This is always a sure sign with me ; and I have not felt it for a long time before.’ ”—LAS CASES, t. ii. p. 286.]

leon complained of the want of the promised house, and the governor, on his side, alleged, there was no getting Napoleon to express a fixed opinion on the situation or the plan, or to say whether he would prefer a thorough repair of the old house, occupying M. Bertrand's apartments in the mean while, until the work should be accomplished. Sometimes Napoleon spoke of changing the situation of the house, but he never, according to Sir Hudson Lowe's averment, intimated any specific wish upon that subject, nor would condescend to say distinctly in what place it should be erected. Napoleon on his part maintained, that he was confined for three years in an unhealthy barn, during which time the governor was perpetually talking about a house which had never been commenced. While the blame is thus reciprocally retorted, the impartial historian can only say, that had Sir Hudson Lowe delayed willingly the building of the house, he must have exposed himself to severe censure from his government in consequence, since his despatches were daily urging the task. There was nothing which the governor could place against this serious risk, except the malicious purpose of distressing Napoleon. On the other hand, in submitting to indifferent accommodation, rather than communicate with a man whom he seemed to hold in abhorrence, Napoleon only acted upon his general system, of which this was a part, and sacrificed his convenience, as he afterwards did his health, rather than bend his mind to comply with the regulations of his place of captivity. Mr Ellis, an unprejudiced witness, declares that the original

house seemed to him commodious and well furnished.

The fate of the new house was singular enough. It was at last erected, and is said to be a large and comfortable edifice. But it happened, that the plan directed the building to be surrounded, as is common in England, with something like a sunk ditch, surrounded by cast-iron railing of an ornamental character. No sooner had Napoleon seen these preparations, than the idea of a fortification and a dungeon entered into his head; nor was it possible to convince him that the rails and sunk fence were not intended as additional means of securing his person. When Sir Hudson Lowe learned the objection which had been started, he ordered the ground to be levelled, and the palisade removed. But before this was accomplished, Napoleon's health was too much broken to permit of his being removed, so that he died under the same roof which received him after his temporary residence at Briars.

Another subject of complaint, which Napoleon greatly insisted upon, was, that the governor of St Helena had not been placed there merely as a ministerial person, to see duly executed the instructions which he should receive from Britain, but as a legislator, himself possessing and exercising the power to alter the regulations under which his prisoner was to be confined, to recall them, to suspend them, and finally, to replace them. To this it must be answered, that in such a situation, where the governor, holding so important a charge, was at so great a distance from the original source

of his power, some discretionary authority must necessarily be lodged in him, since cases must occur where he was to act on the event as it arose, and it was indispensable that he should possess the power to do so. It must also be remembered, that different constructions might possibly be given to the instructions from the Secretary of State; and it would, in that case, have been equally anomalous and inconvenient should the governor not have had it in his power to adopt that explanation which circumstances demanded, and not less so if he had been obliged to litigate the point with his prisoner, and, as a mere ministerial person must have done, wait till a commentary on the disputed article should arrive from England.

It is a different question, and on which we are far from having so clear an opinion, whether Sir Hudson Lowe, in every case, exercised this high privilege with sound discretion. It would be unjust to condemn him unheard, who has never fairly been put upon his defence, and the evidence against whom is, we must again say, of a very suspicious nature. Still it appears, that alterations of the existing regulations were, as far as we have information, more frequent than necessity, the best if not the only apology for varying the manner of such proceedings, seems to have authorized.

For example, one of the heaviest of Napoleon's complaints is made against the restriction of the limits within which he might take exercise without the company of a British officer, which, instead of extending to twelve miles in circumference, were

contracted to two-thirds of that space. Every thing in this world is relative, and we can conceive the loss of one-third of his exercising ground to have been, at this moment, a more sincere subject of distress to Napoleon, than the loss of a kingdom while he yet governed Europe. The apology alleged for this was the disposition which Napoleon seemed to show to cultivate the acquaintance of the inhabitants of St Helena, more than it was advisable that he should have the opportunity of doing. We can easily conceive this to be true ; for not only might Napoleon be disposed, from policy, to make friends among the better classes by his irresistible conciliation of manners, and of the lower class by familiarity and largesses ; but he must also be supposed, with the feelings natural to humanity in distress, to seek some little variety from the monotony of existence, some little resumption of connexion with the human race, from which, his few followers excepted, he was in a manner excluded. But this aptitude to mingle with such society as chance threw within his reach, in his very limited range, might perhaps have been indulged without the possibility of his making any bad use of it, especially since no one could enter these grounds without passes and orders. The limits were shortly after restored by Sir Hudson Lowe to their original extent, Napoleon having declared that unless this were the case, he would not consent to take exercise, or observe the usual means of keeping himself in health.

The injunction requiring that Buonaparte should daily be seen by an orderly officer, was, under Sir

Hudson Lowe's authority, as it had been under that of Sir George Cockburn, the subject of Buonaparte's most violent opposition. He affected to apprehend that it was to be enforced by positive violence, and carried this so far as to load fire-arms, with the idea of resisting by force any attempt of an orderly officer to insist upon performing this part of his duty. He alludes resentfully to the circumstance in his angry interview with Sir Hudson Lowe upon the 16th May, 1816. Yet, of all unpleasant regulations to which a prisoner is subjected by his captivity, that appears the least objectionable, which, assuring us from space to space that the person of the prisoner is secure, enables us, in the interval, to leave him a much greater share of personal freedom than otherwise could be permitted, because the shortness of each interval does not allow him time to use it in escape. Nevertheless, Sir Hudson Lowe, as already hinted, was content in this case to yield to the violent threats of Napoleon, and rather suffer the duty to be exercised imperfectly and by chance, than run the risk of his prisoner perishing in the affray which his obstinacy threatened. Perhaps the governor may be in this case rather censured as having given up a point impressed upon him by his original instructions, than blamed for executing them too strictly against the remarkable person who was his prisoner. We cannot but repeat the opinion we have been led to form, that, could Buonaparte's bodily presence have been exactly ascertained from time to time, his rambles through the whole of the island might

have been permitted, even without the presence of a military officer.

This regulation was another circumstance, of which Napoleon most heavily complained. He regarded the company of such attendant as a mark of his defeat and imprisonment, and resolved, therefore, rather to submit to remain within the limits of the grounds of Longwood, narrow as they were, than, by stirring without them, to expose himself to the necessity of admitting the company of this odious guardian. It may be thought, that in thus judging, Napoleon did not adopt the most philosophical or even the wisest opinion. Misfortune in war is no disgrace; and to be prisoner, has been the lot before now both of kings and emperors. The orderly officers, also, who were ready to accompany Napoleon in his ride, might be often men of information and accomplishment; and their society and conversation could not but have added some variety to days so little diversified as those spent by Napoleon.

The prisoner, however, was incapable of deriving amusement from any such source. It might be as well expected that the occupant of a dungeon should amuse himself with botanizing in the ditches which moat it round. Napoleon could not forget what he had been and what he was, and plainly confessed by his conduct that he was contented rather to die, than to appear in public wearing the badge of his fate, like one who was sitting down resigned to it.

While so averse to this regulation, Napoleon had not taken the proper mode of escaping from its influence. Sir George Cockburn, upon his remon-

strance after his first arrival, had granted to him a dispensation from the attendance of an orderly officer, at least in his immediate company or vicinity. This privilege was suddenly withdrawn while the admiral was yet upon the island, and both Napoleon and the various St Helena authors, Las Cases in particular, make the most bitter complaints on the tantalizing conduct of Sir George Cockburn, who gave an indulgence, as it would seem, only with the cruel view of recalling it the next morning. The truth is here told, but not the whole truth. Napoleon had engaged to the admiral, that, in consideration of this indulgence, he would not enter into any intercourse with any of the inhabitants whom he might meet during the time of his excursion. He chose to break through his promise the very first time that he rode out alone, or only with his suite; and hence Sir George Cockburn, considering faith as broken with him, recalled the permission altogether. It was not, therefore, with a good grace, that Napoleon complained of the want of inclination on the part of the governor, to restore an indulgence to him, which he had almost instantly made a use of that was contrary to his express engagement. The truth is, that the Ex-Emperor had his own peculiar manner of viewing his own case. He considered every degree of leniency, which was at any time exercised, as a restoration of some small portion of that liberty, of which he conceived himself to be deprived illegally and tyrannically; and scrupled no more to employ what he got in endeavouring to attain a farther degree of freedom, than the prisoner whose hand

is extricated from fetters would hesitate to employ it in freeing his feet. There can be no doubt, that if by means of such a privilege as riding without the attendance of an officer, he could have arranged or facilitated any mode of final escape, he would not have hesitated to use it to that effect.

But, on the other hand, such being his way of thinking, and hardly disguised, it put the governor strongly on his guard against granting any relaxation of the vigilance necessary for effectually confining him. Indulgences of this nature are, so far as they go, a species of confidence reposed in the captive by the humanity of his keeper, and cannot, in perfect good faith, be used to purposes, which must lead to the disgrace, or perhaps the ruin, of the party who grants them. If, therefore, Napoleon showed himself determined to hold a closer and more frequent intercourse with the natives of St Helena, and the strangers who visited the island, than Sir Hudson Lowe approved, it only remained for the latter to take care that such interviews should not occur without a witness, by adhering to the restrictions, which required that a British officer should attend upon the more distant excursions of the hard-ruled captive.

It is to be remarked, that this intercourse with the inhabitants, and others who visited St Helena, was no imaginary danger, but actually existed to a considerable extent, and for purposes calculated to alarm Sir Hudson Lowe's watchfulness, and to transgress in a most material respect his instructions from government. The disclosures of General Gourgaud are on these points decisive.

That officer "had no difficulty in avowing, that there has always existed a free and uninterrupted communication betwixt the inhabitants of Longwood and the country, without the knowledge or intervention of the governor; and that this has been made use of, not only for the purpose of receiving and transmitting letters, but for that of transmitting pamphlets, money, and other articles, of which the party in Longwood might from time to time have been in want; and that the correspondence was for the most part carried on direct with Great Britain. That the persons employed in it were those Englishmen who from time to time visit St Helena, to all of whom the attendants and servants of Buonaparte have free access, and who, generally speaking, are willing, many of them without reward, and others for very small pecuniary considerations, to convey to Europe any letter or packet intrusted to their charge. It would appear also, that the captains and others on board the merchant ships touching at the island, whether belonging to the East India Company, or to other persons, are considered at Longwood as being peculiarly open to the seduction of Buonaparte's talents; so much so, that the inhabitants of Longwood have regarded it as a matter of small difficulty to procure a passage on board one of these ships for General Buonaparte, if escape should be at any time his object."

In corroboration of what is above stated, of the free communication betwixt St Helena and Europe, occurs the whimsical story told by Dr Antommarchi, of a number of copies of Dr O'Meara's book being smuggled ashore at St Helena, under the disguise of tracts distributed by a religious society. Another instance is mentioned by Count Las Cases, who, when removed from Longwood, and debarred from personally communicating with his master, felt considerable difficulty in discovering a mode of conveying to him a diamond necklace of great value, which had been intrusted to his keeping, and which Napoleon might want after his departure. He addressed at hazard the first decent-looking person he saw going to Longwood, and conjured him in the most pathetic manner, to take charge of

the packet. The stranger slackened his pace without speaking, and pointed to his coat-pocket. Las Cases dropt in the packet; and the jewels, thus consigned to the faith of an unknown person, reached their owner in safety.¹

It is honourable to humanity, that distress of almost any kind, but especially that which affects the imagination by exciting the memory of fallen greatness, should find assistants even among those who were enemies to that greatness when in prosperity. But it was the duty of the governor to take heed, that neither overstrained notions of romantic compassion and generosity, nor the temptation of worse motives, should lead to any combination which might frustrate his diligence; and Napoleon having at once avarice and the excess of generosity to solicit in his favour, the governor naturally secluded him as much as he could from those individuals, who might be liable to be gained over to his interest by such powerful seductions.

Upon the 7th January, 1818, the Government of Britain intimated their approbation of the enlargement of Napoleon's bounds of exercise to the ordinary limits which had been for a time restricted; and, in order to preserve for him the opportunity of keeping up society with such of the people of the island as he might desire to receive on business, or as visitors, the following regulation was adopted:—

“Respecting the intercourse with the inhabitants, I see no material objection to the placing it upon the footing recently suggested by Count Bertrand, as it is one which he represents would

¹ [Las Cases, t. i. p. 61.]

be more consonant to General Buonaparte's wishes. The count's proposition is, that a list of a given number of persons, resident in the island, should be made out. who shall be at once admitted to Longwood on the general's own invitation, without a previous application being made to your excellency on each invitation. You will, therefore, consider yourself at liberty to accede to the suggestions of Count Bertrand; and you will for this purpose direct him to present to you, for your approbation, a list of persons, not exceeding fifty in number, resident in the island, who may be admitted to Longwood at reasonable hours, without any other pass than the invitation of General Buonaparte, it being understood that they are on each occasion to deliver in the invitation as a voucher, with their names, at the barrier. In giving your approbation to the list, you will, as far as is consistent with your duty, consult the wishes of General Buonaparte; but you will let it be clearly understood, that you reserve to yourself a discretionary power of erasing from the list, at any time, any of those individuals, to whom you may have found it inexpedient to continue such extraordinary facility of access; and you will take special care, that a report be always made to you by the orderly officer, of the several persons admitted to Longwood upon General Buonaparte's invitation."

We have touched upon these various subjects of grievance, not as being the only causes of dispute, or rather of violent discord, which existed betwixt the Ex-Emperor of France and the governor of St Helena, for there were many others. It is not in our purpose, however, nor even in our power, to give a detailed or exact history of these particular quarrels, but merely to mark,—as our duty, in this a very painful one, demands,—what was the character and general scope of the debate which was so violently conducted on both sides. Of course it follows, that a species of open war having been declared betwixt the parties, every one of the various points of discussion which must necessarily have arisen betwixt Sir Hudson Lowe and Napoleon, or through their respective attendants and

followers, was turned into matter of offence on the one side or the other, and as such warmly contested. It is thus, that, when two armies approach each other, the most peaceful situations and positions lose their ordinary character, and become the subjects of attack and defence. Every circumstance, whether of business or of etiquette, which occurred at St Helena, was certain to occasion some dispute betwixt Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe, the progress and termination of which seldom passed without an aggravation of mutual hostilities. It is beneath the dignity of history to trace these *tracasseries*; and beyond possibility, unless for one present on the spot, and possessed of all the minute information attending each subject of quarrel, to judge which had the right or the wrong.

It would be, indeed, easy for us, standing aloof and remote from these agitating struggles, to pass a sweeping condemnation on the one party or the other, or perhaps upon each of them; and to show that reason and temper on either side would have led to a very different course of proceeding on both, had it been permitted by those human infirmities to which, unhappily, those who have power or pretensions are more liable than the common class, who never possessed the one, and make no claim to the other.

Neither would it be difficult for us to conceive a governor of St Helena, in the abstract, who, treating the reviling and reproaches with which he was on all occasions loaded by Buonaparte, as the idle chidings of a storm, which must howl around

whatever it meets in its course, would, with patience and equanimity, have suffered the tempest to expend its rage, and die away in weakness, the sooner that it found itself unresisted. We can conceive such a person wrapping himself up in his own virtue, and, while he discharged to his country the duty she had intrusted to him, striving, at the same time, by such acts of indulgence as might be the more gratifying because the less expected, or perhaps merited, to melt down the sullenness which the hardship of his situation naturally imposed on the prisoner. We can even conceive that a man of such rare temper might have found means, in some happy moment, of re-establishing a tolerable and ostensible good understanding, if not a heart-felt cordiality, which, could it have existed, would so much have lessened the vexations and troubles, both of the captive and of the governor. All this is very easily conceived. But in order to form the idea of such a man, we must suppose him, in the case in question, stoically impassive to insults of the grossest kind, insults poured on him before he had done any thing which could deserve them, and expressed in a manner which plainly intimated the determination of Napoleon to place himself at once on the most hostile terms with him. This must have required the most uncommon share of calmness and candour. It is more natural that such a functionary as the governor of St Helena—feeling the impulse of ill usage from a quarter where no regular satisfaction could be had,—if he did not use the power which he held for the time, to the actual annoyance and vexation of the party

by whom he had been deliberately insulted, should be apt at least to become indifferent how much, or how little, his prisoner was affected by the measures which he adopted, and to go forward with the necessary means of confining the person, without being so solicitous as he might otherwise have been, to spare the feelings. An officer, termed to his face, a liar, a brigand, an assassin, a robber, a hangman, has few terms to keep with him by whom he has been loaded with such unworthy epithets; and who, in using them, may be considered as having declared mortal war, and disclaimed the courtesy, while he defied the power, of the person to whom he addressed them.

In the same manner, judging with the coolness of a third party, we should be inclined to say, that the immediate attendants and followers of Napoleon might have here served their master more effectually, by endeavouring to accommodate the subjects of dispute with Sir Hudson Lowe, than by aggravating and carrying them still farther by their own subordinate discussions with the governor and his aides-de-camp, and thus heating their master's passions by their own. But while that was the line of conduct to be desired, it is impossible to deny that another was more naturally to be expected. Generals Bertrand, Montholon, and Gourgaud, were all soldiers of high reputation, who, rising to fame under Napoleon's eye, had seen their own laurels flourish along with his. In the hour of adversity, they had most laudably and honourably followed him, and were now sharing with him the years of solitude and exile. It was not, there-

fore, to be wondered at, that they, wearied of their own restrained and solitary condition, enraged, too, at every thing which appeared to add to the calamitous condition of their fallen master, should be more disposed to increase the angry spirit which manifested itself on both sides, than, by interposing their mediation, to endeavour to compose jars which might well render Napoleon's state more irritable and uncomfortable, but could not, in any point of view, tend to his comfort, peace, or even respectability.

But perhaps we might have been best entitled to hope, from the high part which Napoleon had played in the world, from the extent of his genius, and the natural pride arising from the consciousness of talent, some indifference towards objects of mere form and ceremony, some confidence in the genuine character of his own natural elevation, and a noble contempt of the change which fortune could make on circumstances around him. We might have hoped that one whose mental superiority over the rest of his species was so undeniable, would have been the last to seek with eagerness to retain the frippery and feathers of which the wind of adverse fortune had stripped him, or to be tenacious of that etiquette, which now, if yielded to him at all, could only have been given by compassion. We might have thought the conqueror in so many bloody conflicts would, even upon provocation, have thought it beneath him to enter on a war of words with the governor of an islet in the Atlantic, where foul language could be the only weapon on either side, and held it a yet greater derogation, so far to

lay aside his high character, as to be the first to engage in so ignoble a conflict. It might, we should have supposed, have been anticipated by such a person, not only that calm and patient endurance of inevitable misfortunes is the noblest means of surmounting them, but that, even with a view to his liberty, such conduct would have been most advisable, because most politic. The people of Europe, and especially of Britain, would have been much sooner apt to unite in the wish to see him removed from confinement, had he borne himself with philosophical calmness, than seeing him, as they did, still evincing within his narrow sphere the restless and intriguing temper which had so long disturbed the world, and which now showed itself so engrained in his constitution, as to lead him on to the unworthy species of warfare which we have just described. But the loftiest and proudest beings of mere humanity are like the image which the Assyrian monarch beheld in his dream—blended of various metals, uniting that which is vile with those which are most precious ; that which is frail, weak, and unsubstantial, with what is most perdurable and strong. Napoleon, like many an emperor and hero before him, sunk under his own passions after having vanquished nations ; and became, in his exile, the prey of petty spleen, which racked him almost to frenzy, and induced him to hazard his health, or perhaps even to throw away his life, rather than submit with dignified patience to that which his misfortunes had rendered unavoidable.

CHAPTER XCVI.

Napoleon's domestic habits—Manner in which he spent the day—his Dress.—Nature of the Fragments of Memoirs he dictated to Gourgaud and Montholon.—His admiration of Ossian.—He prefers Racine and Corneille to Voltaire.—Dislike of Tacitus.—His vindication of the Character of Cæsar.—His behaviour towards the Persons of his Household—Amusements and exercises.—His Character of Sir Pulteney Malcolm.—Degree of his Intercourse with the Islanders, and with Visitors to the Island.—Interview with Captain Basil Hall—with Lord Amherst and the Gentlemen attached to the Chinese Embassy.

THE unpleasant and discreditable disputes, of which we have given some account in the last chapter, form, unhappily, the most marked events of Napoleon's latter life. For the five years and seven months that he remained in the island of St Helena, few circumstances occurred to vary the melancholy tenor of his existence, excepting those which affected his temper or his health. Of the general causes influencing the former, we have given some account; the latter we shall hereafter allude to. Our present object is a short and general view of his personal and domestic habits, while in this melancholy and secluded habitation.

Napoleon's life, until his health began to give way, was of the most regular and monotonous cha-

racter. Having become a very indifferent sleeper, perhaps from his custom of assigning during the active part of his life no precise time for repose, his hours of rising were uncertain, depending upon the rest which he had enjoyed during the earlier part of the night. It followed from this irregularity, that during the day time he occasionally fell asleep, for a few minutes, upon his couch, or arm-chair. At times his favourite valet-de-chambre, Marchand, read to him while in bed until he was composed to rest, the best remedy, perhaps, for that course of "thick-coming fancies," which must so oft have disturbed the repose of one in circumstances so singular and so melancholy. So soon as Napoleon arose from bed, he either began to dictate to one of his generals (Montholon or Gourgaud generally), and placed upon record such passages of his remarkable life as he desired to preserve ; or, if the weather and his inclination suited, he went out for an hour or two on horseback. He sometimes breakfasted in his own apartment, sometimes with his suite, generally about ten o'clock, and almost always *à la fourchette*. The fore part of the day he usually devoted to reading, or dictating to one or other of his suite, and about two or three o'clock received such visitors as had permission to wait upon him. An airing in the carriage or on horseback generally succeeded to this species of levee, on which occasions he was attended by all his suite. Their horses, supplied from the Cape of Good Hope, were of a good race and handsome appearance. On returning from his airings, he again resumed the book, or caused his amanuensis

take up the pen until dinner time, which was about eight o'clock at night. He preferred plain food, and eat plentifully, and with an apparent appetite. A very few glasses of claret, scarce amounting to an English pint in all, and chiefly drank during the time of dinner, completed his meal. Sometimes he drank champagne; but his constitutional sobriety was such, that a large glass of that more generous wine immediately brought a degree of colour to his cheek. No man appears to have been in a less degree than Napoleon, subject to the influence of those appetites which man has in common with the lower range of nature. He never took more than two meals a-day, and concluded each with a small cup of coffee. After dinner, chess, cards, a volume of light literature, read aloud for the benefit of his suite, or general conversation, in which the ladies of his suite occasionally joined, served to consume the evening till ten or eleven, about which time he retired to his apartment, and went immediately to bed.

We may add to this brief account of Napoleon's domestic habits, that he was very attentive to the duties of the toilet. He usually appeared in the morning in a white night-gown, with loose trowsers and stockings joined in one, a chequered red Madras handkerchief round his head, and his shirt collar open. When dressed, he wore a green uniform, very plainly made, and without ornament, similar to that which, by its simplicity, used to mark the sovereign among the splendid dresses of the Tuileries, white waistcoat, and white or nankeen breeches, with silk stockings, and shoes with

gold buckles, a black stock, a triangular cocked hat, of the kind to be seen in all the caricatures, with a very small tri-coloured cockade. He usually wore, when in full dress, the riband and grand cross of the Legion of Honour.¹

Such were the personal habits of Napoleon, on which there is little for the imagination to dwell, after it has once received the general idea. The circumstance of the large portion of his time employed in dictation, alone interests our curiosity, and makes us anxious to know with what he could have found means to occupy so many pages, and so many hours. The fragments upon military subjects, dictated from time to time to Generals Gourgaud and Montholon, are not voluminous enough to account for the leisure expended in this manner; and even when we add to them the number of pamphlets and works issuing from St Helena, we shall still find room to suppose either that manuscripts remain which have not yet seen the light, or that Napoleon was a slow composer, and fastidious in the choice of his language. The last conjecture seems most probable, as the French are particularly scrupulous in the punctilios of composition, and Napoleon, emperor as he had been, must have known that he would receive no mercy from the critics upon that particular.

The avowed works themselves, fragments as they are, are extremely interesting in a military point of view; and those in which the campaigns of Italy are described, contain many most inval-

¹ [Las Cases, t. ii. pp. 1-7.]

able lessons on the art of war. Their political value is by no means so considerable. Gourgaud seems to have formed a true estimation of them, when, in answer to Baron Sturmer's enquiries, whether Napoleon was writing his history, he expressed himself thus :—" He writes disjointed fragments, which he will never finish. When asked why he will not put history in possession of the exact fact, he answers, it is better to leave something to be guessed at than to tell too much. It would also seem, that not considering his extraordinary destinies as entirely accomplished, he is unwilling to detail plans which have not been executed, and which he may one day resume with more success." To these reasons for leaving blanks and imperfections in his proposed history, should be added the danger which a faithful and unreserved narrative must have entailed upon many of the actors in the scenes from which he was lifting the veil. It is no doubt true, that Napoleon seems systematically to have painted his enemies, more especially such as had been once his adherents, in the most odious colours, and particularly in such as seemed likely to render them most obnoxious to the ruling powers ; but the same principle induced him to spare his friends, and to afford no handle against them for their past efforts in his favour, and no motive for taking from them the power of rendering him farther service, if they should be in a capacity to do so.

These considerations operated as a check upon the pen of the historian ; and it may be truly said, that no man who has written so much of his own life, and that consisting of such singular and impor-

tant events, has told so little of himself which was not known before from other sources. But the present is not the less valuable ; for there is sometimes as much information derived from the silence as from the assertions of him who aspires to be his own biographer ; and an apology for, or vindication of, the course of a remarkable life, however partially written, perhaps conveys the most information to the reader, next to that candid confession of faults and errors, which is so very seldom to be obtained in autobiography.

Napoleon's Memoirs, together with the labour apparently bestowed upon his controversial pamphlets written against Sir Hudson Lowe, seem to have furnished the most important part of his occupation whilst at St Helena, and probably also of his amusement. It was not to be expected that in sickness and calamity he could apply himself to study, even if his youth had furnished him with more stores to work upon. It must be remembered that his whole education had been received at the military school of Brienne, where indeed he displayed a strong taste for the sciences. But the studies of mathematics and algebra were so early connected and carried on with a view to the military purposes in which he employed them, that it may be questioned whether he retained any relish for prosecuting his scientific pursuits in the character of an enquirer into abstract truths. The practical results had been so long his motive, so long his object, that he ceased to enjoy the use of the theoretical means, when there was no siege to be formed, no complicated manœuvres to be arranged, no great military purpose

to be gained by the display of his skill—but when all was to begin and end with the discussion of a problem.

That Napoleon had a natural turn for belles lettres is unquestionable; but his leisure never permitted him to cultivate it, or to refine his taste or judgment on such subjects. The recommendation which, in 1784, described him as fit to be sent to the Military School at Paris, observes, that he is tolerably acquainted with history and geography, but rather deficient in the ornamented branches, and in the Latin language.¹ At seventeen years of age he joined the regiment of La Fère, and thus ended all the opportunities afforded him of regular education. He read, however, very extensively; but, like all young persons, with little discrimination, and more to amuse himself than for the purpose of instruction. Before he had arrived at that more advanced period when youths of such talent as his, and especially when gifted with such a powerful memory, usually think of arranging and classifying the information which they have collected during their earlier course of miscellaneous reading, the tumults of Corsica, and subsequently the siege of Toulon, carried him into those scenes of war and business which were his element during the rest of his life, and down to the period we now speak of.

The want of information which we have noticed, he supplied, as most able men do, by the assistance derived from conversing with persons possessing knowledge, and capable of communicating it. No one was ever more dexterous than Napoleon at ex-

¹ [See *ante*, vol. ix. p. 330.]

tracting from individuals the kind of information which each was best qualified to impart; and in many cases, while in the act of doing so, he contrived to conceal his own ignorance, even of that which he was anxiously wishing to know. But although in this manner he might acquire facts and results, it was impossible to make himself master, on such easy terms, of general principles, and the connexion betwixt them and the conclusions which they lead to.

It was no less certain, that though in this manner Napoleon could obtain by discoursing with others the insulated portions of information which he was desirous of acquiring, and though the knowledge so acquired served his immediate purpose in public life, these were not habits which could induce him to resume those lighter subjects of study so interesting and delightful in youth, but which an advanced age is unwilling to undertake, and slow to profit by. He had, therefore, never corrected his taste in the belles lettres, but retained his admiration for Ossian, and other books which had fascinated his early attention. The declamatory tone, redundancy of expression, and exaggerated character of the poetry ascribed to the Celtic bard, suit the taste of very young persons; but Napoleon continued to retain his relish for them to the end of his life; and, in some of his proclamations and bulletins, we can trace the hyperbolical and bombastic expressions which pass upon us in youth for the sublime, but are rejected as taste and reason become refined and improved. There was indeed this apology for Napoleon's lingering fondness for

Ossian, that the Italian translation, by Cesarotti, is said to be one of the most beautiful specimens of the Tuscan language. The work was almost constantly beside him.

Historical, philosophical, or moral works, seem more rarely to have been resorted to for the amusement of Longwood. We have, indeed, been informed, that the only books of this description for which Napoleon showed a decided partiality, were those of Machiavel and Montesquieu, which he did not perhaps consider as fit themes of public recitation ; Tacitus, who holds the mirror so close to the features of sovereigns, he is said always to have held in aversion, and seldom to have mentioned without terms of censure or dislike. Thus will the patient sometimes loathe the sight of the most wholesome medicine. The French novels of the day were sometimes tried as a resource ; but the habits of order and decency which Napoleon observed, rendered their levities and indelicacies unfitted for such society.

There remained another department of literature, from which the party at Longwood derived frequent resources. The drama occupied a considerable part of those readings with which Napoleon used to while away the tedious hours of his imprisonment. This was an indication that he still retained the national taste of France, where few neglect to attend the spectacle, in one form or another, during the space betwixt dinner and the reunion of society in the evening. Next to seeing his ancient favourite Talma, was to Napoleon the reading some of those *chef-d'œuvres* to which he had

seen and heard him give life and personification. He is himself said to have read with taste and effect, which agrees with the traditions that represent him as having been early attached to theatrical representations.¹ It was in the discussions following these readings, which Las Cases has preserved with so much zeal, that Buonaparte displayed his powers of conversation, and expressed his peculiar habits and opinions.

Corneille² and Racine³ stood much higher in his estimation than Voltaire. There seems a good reason for this. They wrote their immortal works for the meridian of a court, and at the command of the most monarchical of monarchs, Louis XIV. The productions, therefore, contain nothing that can wound the ear of the most sensitive sovereign. In the King of Denmark's phrase, they "have no offence in them."

With Voltaire it is different. The strong and

¹ ["Plays occupied our attention for the future; tragedies in particular. Napoleon is uncommonly fond of analyzing them, which he does in a singular mode of reasoning, and with a great deal of taste. He remembers an immense quantity of poetry, which he learned when he was eighteen years old, at which time, he says, he knew more than he does at present."—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 249.]

² ["Tragedy fires the soul, elevates the heart, and is calculated to generate heroes. Considered under this point of view, perhaps, France owes to Corneille a part of her great actions; and, had he lived in my time, I would have made him a prince."—NAPOLEON, t. i. p. 250.]

³ ["Napoleon is delighted with Racine, in whom he finds an abundance of beauties. He thinks but little of Voltaire, who, he says, is full of bombast and tinsel; always incorrect, unacquainted either with men or things, with truth or the sublimity of the passions of mankind."—LAS CASES, t. i. p. 249.]

searching spirit, which afterwards caused the French Revolution, was abroad at this time, and though unaware of the extent to which it might lead, the philosopher of Ferney was not the less its proselyte. There were many passages, therefore, in his works, which could not but be instantly applied to the changes and convulsions of the period during which Napoleon had lived, to the despotic character of his government, and to the plans of freedom which had sunk under the influence of his sword. On this account Voltaire, whose compositions recalled painful comparisons and recollections, was no favourite with Napoleon. The *Mahomet*¹ of that author he particularly disliked, avowing, at the same time, his respect for the Oriental impostor, whom he accused the poet of traducing and misrepresenting. Perhaps he secretly acknowledged a certain degree of resemblance between his own career and that of the youthful camel-driver, who, rising from a mean origin in his native tribe, became at once the conqueror and the legislator of so many nations.

¹ [“ Voltaire, in the character and conduct of his hero, has departed both from nature and history. He has degraded Mahomet, by making him descend to the lowest intrigues. He has represented a great man who changed the face of the world, acting like a scoundrel, worthy of the gallows. He has no less absurdly travestied the character of Omar, which he has drawn like that of a cut-throat in a melo-drama. Voltaire committed a fundamental error in attributing to intrigue that which was solely the result of opinion. Those who have wrought great changes in the world, never succeeded by gaining over chiefs; but always by exciting the multitude. The first is the resource of intrigue, and produces only secondary results; the second is the resort of genius, and transforms the face of the universe.”—*NAPOLÉON, Las Cases, t. ii. p. 80.*]

Perhaps, too, he remembered his own proclamations while in Egypt, in the assumed character of a Moslem, which he was wont to term by the true phrase of *Charlatanerie*, but adding, that it was charlatanerie of a high and elevated character.

The character of Cæsar was another which Napoleon always strove to vindicate. The French general could not be indifferent to the Roman leader, who, like himself, having at first risen into notice by his victories over the enemies of the republic, had, also like himself, ended the struggles between the patricians and plebeians of ancient Rome, by reducing both parties equally under his own absolute dominion; who would have proclaimed himself their sovereign, even by the proscribed title of king, had he not been prevented by conspiracy; and who, when he had conquered his country, thought of nothing so much as extending an empire, already much too large, over the distant regions of Scythia and Parthia. The points of personal difference, indeed, were considerable; for neither did Napoleon indulge in the gross debauchery and sensuality imputed to Cæsar, nor can we attribute to him the Roman's powers as an author, or the gentle and forgiving character which distinguished him as a man.

Yet, although Napoleon had something vindictive in his temper, which he sometimes indulged when Cæsar would have scorned to do so, his intercourse with his familiar friends was of a character the most amiable. It is true, indeed, that, determined, as he expressed himself, to be Emperor within Longwood and its little demesne, he exacted from his

followers the same marks of severe etiquette which distinguished the Court of the Tuileries ; yet, in other respects, he permitted them to carry their freedom in disputing his sentiments, or replying to his arguments, almost beyond the bounds of ordinary decorum. He seemed to make a distinction between their duty towards him as subjects, and their privileges as friends. All remained uncovered and standing in his presence, and even the person who played at chess with him sometimes continued for hours without sitting down. But their verbal intercourse of language and sentiments was that of free men, conversing with a superior, indeed, but not with a despot. Captain Maitland mentions a dispute betwixt Napoleon and General Bertrand. The latter had adopted a ridiculous idea that L.30,000 a-year, or some such extravagant sum, was spent in maintaining the grounds and establishment at Blenheim. Napoleon's turn for calculation easily detected the improbability. Bertrand insisted upon his assertion, on which Buonaparte said with quickness, "*Bah ! c'est impossible.*"—"Oh !" said Bertrand, much offended, "if you are to reply in that manner, there is an end of all argument ;" and for some time would not converse with him. Buonaparte, so far from taking umbrage, did all he could to soothe him and restore him to good-humour, which was not very difficult to effect.¹

But although Napoleon tolerated freedoms of this kind to a considerable extent, yet he still kept

¹ [Narrative, p. 234.]

in his own hands the royal privilege of starting the topic of conversation, and conducting it as he should think proper ; so that, in some respects, it seemed that, having lost all the substantial enjoyment of power, he had become more attached than ever to the observance of its monotonous, wearisome, unprofitable ceremonial. Yet there might be a reason for this, besides the gratification of his own pertinacious temper. The gentlemen who inhabited Longwood had followed him from the purest motives, and there was no reason to suppose that their purpose would waver, or their respect diminish. Still their mutual situation compelled the deposed sovereign, and his late subjects, into such close familiarity, as might perhaps beget, if not contempt, at least an inconvenient degree of freedom betwixt the parties, the very possibility of which he might conceive it as well to exclude by a strict barrier of etiquette.

We return to Napoleon's habits of amusement. Music was not one of the number. Though born an Italian, and possessing something of a musical ear, so far, at least, as was necessary to enable him to hum a song, it was probably entirely without cultivation.¹ He appears to have had none of the

¹ [“The sound of bells produced upon Napoleon a singular effect. When we were at Malmaison, and while walking in the avenue leading to Ruel, how often has the booming of the village bell broken off the most interesting conversations. He stopped, lest the moving of our feet might cause the loss of a tone in the sounds which charmed him. The influence, indeed, was so powerful, that his voice trembled with emotion while he said— ‘That recalls to me the first years I passed at Brienne.’”—*BOURRIENNE*, t. iii. p. 222.]

fanaticism for music which characterises the Italians ; and it is well known that in Italy he put a stop to the cruel methods which had been used in that country to complete their concerts.

Neither was Napoleon, as we have heard Denon reluctantly admit, a judge or an admirer of painting. He had some pretence to understand sculpture ; and there was one painting in the Museum, before which he used to pause, terming it his own ; nor would he permit it to be ransomed for a very large sum by its proprietor the Duke of Modena.¹ But he valued it, not on account of its merits, though a masterpiece of art, but because he had himself been the means of securing it to the Museum at a great sacrifice. The other paintings in that immense collection, however great their excellence, he seldom paid much attention to. He also shocked admirers of painting by the contempt he showed for the durability of the art. Being informed that a first-rate picture would not last above five or six hundred years, he exclaimed, " Bah ! a fine immortality ! " Yet by using Denon's advice, and that of other sc̃avans, Napoleon sustained a high reputation as an encourager of the arts. His medals have been particularly and deservedly admired.

In respect of personal exercise at St Helena, he walked occasionally, and while strong, did not shun steep, rough, and dangerous paths. But although there is some game on the island, he did not avail himself of the pleasure of shooting. It does not indeed appear that he was ever much attached to field sports, although, when Emperor, he replaced

¹ See *ante*, vol. x. p. 63.

the hunting establishment upon a scale still more magnificent, as well as better regulated, than formerly. It is supposed he partook of this princely pastime, as it has been called, rather out of a love of magnificent display than any real attachment to the sport. We may here mention, in his own words, the danger in which he was once placed at a boar hunt. The picture will remind the amateur of the pieces of Rubens and Schneider.

“ Upon one occasion at Marli,” said the Emperor, “ at a boar-hunt, I kept my ground with Soult and Berthier against three enormous wild-boars, who charged us up to the bayonet’s point. All the hunting party fled : ’twas a complete military rout. We killed the three animals dead ; but I had a scratch from mine, and had nigh lost my finger” (on which a deep scar was still visible). “ But the jest was to see the number of men, surrounded with their dogs, concealing themselves behind the three heroes, and crying at top of their throats—‘ to the Emperor’s assistance ! save the Emperor ! help the Emperor !’—and so forth ; but not one coming forward.”¹

While on the subject of Napoleon’s exercises, we may mention another danger which he incurred by following an amusement more common in England than in France. He chose at one time to undertake the task of driving a calash, six in hand, which he overturned, and had a severe and dangerous fall. Josephine and others were in the vehicle.² The English reader cannot fail to recollect that a similar accident happened to Cromwell, who, because, as

¹ [Las Cases, t. ii. p. 325.]

² [Ibid, p. 324.]

the historian says, he could manage three nations, took upon him to suppose that he could drive six fiery horses, of which he had just received a present; and, being as unsuccessful as Napoleon in later days, overturned the carriage, to the great damage of the Secretary Thurlow, whom he had placed inside, and to his own double risk, both from the fall, and from the explosion of a pistol, which he carried privately about his person. Buonaparte's sole observation, after his own accident, was, "I believe every man should confine himself to his own trade."

The chief resource of Napoleon at St Helena, as we have already said, was society and conversation, and those held chiefly with the gentlemen of his own suite. This need not have been the case, had he been able in the present instance to command that temper which had not failed him under great misfortunes, but seemed now to give way under a series of petty quarrels and mortifications.

The governor and the staff belonging to him were of course excluded from the society of Longwood, by the terms on which Napoleon stood with Sir Hudson Lowe. The officers of the regiments which lay in the island might most probably have afforded some well-informed men, who, having been engaged in the recent war, would have occasionally supplied amusing society to the Emperor and his suite. But they did not in general frequent Longwood. Dr O'Meara observes, that the governor had exerted his influence to prevent the officers from cultivating the acquaintance of the French; which Sir Hudson Lowe repels as a ca-

lunny, confuted by the declarations of the officers of the 53d themselves. But admitting that no intimations were used of set purpose to keep asunder the British officers from the French prisoners, such estrangement naturally followed from the unwillingness of military men to go where they were sure to hear not only their commanding officer for the time, but also their country and its ministers, treated with the grossest expressions of disrespect, while there was no mode of calling the person who used them either to account or to explanation.

The rank and character of Sir Pulteney Malcolm, who commanded the squadron upon the station, set him above the feelings which might influence inferior officers, whether of the army or navy. He visited Napoleon frequently, and was eulogized by him in a description, which (though we, who have the advantage of seeing in the features of Sir Pulteney those of an honoured friend, can vouch for its being just) may have been painted the more willingly, because it gave the artist an opportunity of discharging his spleen, while contrasting the appearance of the admiral with that of the governor, in a manner most unfavourable to the latter. Nevertheless we transcribe it, to prove that Buonaparte could occasionally do justice, and see desert even in a Briton.

“ He said he had seen the new admiral. ‘ Ah ! there is a man with a countenance really pleasing, open, frank, and sincere. There is the face of an Englishman. His countenance bespeaks his heart, and I am sure he is a good man : I never yet beheld a man of whom I so immediately formed a

good opinion, as of that fine soldier-like old man. He carries his head erect, and speaks out openly and boldly what he thinks, without being afraid to look you in the face at the time. His physiognomy would make every person desirous of a further acquaintance, and render the most suspicious confident in him.'"¹

Sir Pulteney Malcolm was also much recommended to Napoleon's favourable judgment by the circumstance of having nothing to do with the restraints imposed upon his person, and possessing the power neither of altering or abating any of the restrictions he complained of. He was fortunate, too, in being able, by the calmness of his temper, to turn aside the violent language of Buonaparte, without either granting the justice of his complaints, or giving him displeasure by direct contradiction. "Does your Government mean," said Napoleon one day to the English admiral, "to detain me upon this rock until my death's day?"—"I am sorry to say, sir," answered Sir Pulteney, "that such I apprehend is their purpose."—"Then the term of my life will soon arrive," said Napoleon. "I hope not, sir," answered the admiral; "I hope you will survive to record your great actions, which are so numerous that the task will ensure you a term of long life." Napoleon bowed, and was gratified, probably both as a hero and as an author. Nevertheless, before Sir Pulteney Malcolm left the island, and while he was endeavouring to justify the governor against some of the harsh and extravagant

¹ [O'Meara, vol. i. p. 65.]

charges in which Napoleon was wont to indulge, the latter began to appeal from his judgment as being too much of an Englishman to be an impartial judge. They parted, however, on the best terms, and Napoleon often afterwards expressed the pleasure which he had received from the society of Sir Pulteney Malcolm.

The colonists of St Helena did not, it may be well supposed, furnish many individuals, sufficiently qualified, by rank and education, to be admitted into the society of the exile. They, too, lay under the same awkward circumstances, which prevented the British officers from holding intercourse with Longwood and its inhabitants. The governor, should he be displeased at the too frequent attentions of any individual, or should he conceive any suspicion arising out of such an intercourse, had the power, and, in the opinion of the colonists, might not want the inclination, to make his resentment severely felt. Mr Balcomb, however, who held the situation of purveyor, with one or two other inhabitants of the island, sometimes visited at Longwood. The general intercourse between the French prisoners and the colonists was carried on by means of the French domestics, who had the privilege of visiting James' Town as often as they pleased, and whose doing so could infer no disadvantageous suspicions. But the society of Longwood gained no advantage by the intercourse with James' Town, although unquestionably the facility of foreign communication was considerably increased to the exiles. Their correspondence was chiefly maintained by the way of Bahia; and it is certain they succeeded in sending

many letters to Europe, although they are believed to have been less fortunate in receiving answers.

It was to be expected, that some accession to the society of Longwood might have accrued, from the residence of three gentlemen of rank (two of them, we believe, having ladies and a family), the commissioners of Austria, Russia, and France. But here also ceremonial interposed one of those bars, which are effectual, or otherwise, according to the opinion of those betwixt whom they are erected. The commissioners of the allied powers had requested to be presented to Napoleon. On their wish being announced, he peremptorily declined to receive them in their official capacity, disclaiming the right which the princes of Europe had to interfere with and countenance the custody of his person. On the other hand, the commissioners, finding their public function disowned, refused to hold any communication with Longwood in their private capacity; and thus there were excluded from this solitary spot three persons, whose manners and habits, as foreigners, might have assorted tolerably with those of the exile and his attendants.

The society of St Helena receives a great temporary increase at the seasons when vessels touch there on their way to India, or on their return to Europe. Of course, every officer and every passenger on such occasions was desirous to see a person so celebrated as Napoleon; and there might sometimes occur individuals among them whom he too might have pleasure in receiving. The regulation of these visits to Longwood seems to have been one of the few parts of the general

system of which Napoleon made no complaints. He had a natural reluctance to gratify the idle curiosity of strangers, and the regulations protected him effectually against their intrusion. Such persons as desired to wait upon Napoleon were obliged to apply, in the first place, to the governor, by whom their names were transmitted to General Bertrand, as grand mareschal of the household, who communicated Napoleon's reply, if favourable, and assigned an hour at which he was to receive their visit.

Upon such occasions, Napoleon was particularly anxious that the etiquette of an imperial court should be observed, while the visitors, on the contrary, were strictly enjoined by the governor not to go beyond the civilities due to a general of rank. If, therefore, as sometimes happened, the introduction took place in the open air, the French part of the company attendant on Buonaparte remained uncovered, while the English replaced their hats after the first salutation. Napoleon saw the incongruity of this, and laid his orders on his attendants to imitate the English in this particular point. It is said, that they did not obey without scruples and murmurs.

Those visitors who were permitted to pay their respects at Longwood, were chiefly either persons of distinguished birth, officers of rank in the army and navy, persons of philosophical enquiry (to whom he was very partial), or travellers from foreign regions, who could repay, by some information, the pleasure which they received from being admitted to the presence of a man so remark-

able. Of these interviews, some who enjoyed the benefit of them have published an account; and the memoranda of others we have seen in manuscript. All agree in extolling the extreme good grace, propriety, and appearance of benevolence, with which Napoleon clothed himself whilst holding these levees; and which scarce left the spectators permission to believe that, when surprised by a fit of passion, or when choosing to assume one for the purpose of effect, he could appear the rude, abrupt, and savage despot, which other accounts described him. His questions were uniformly introduced with great tact, so as to put the person interrogated at his ease, by leading to some subject with which he was acquainted, while, at the same time, they induced him to produce any stock of new or curious information which he possessed.

The Journal of Captain Basil Hall of the Royal Navy, well-known by his character both in his profession and in literature, affords a pleasing example of what we have been endeavouring to express, and displays at the same time the powerful extent of Buonaparte's memory. He recognised the name of Captain Hall instantly, from having seen his father, Sir James Hall, Bart. when he was at the Military Academy of Brienne, to which visit Sir James had been led by the love of science, by which he was always distinguished. Buonaparte explained the cause of his recollecting a private individual, after the intervention of such momentous events as he had himself been concerned in. "It is not," he said, "surprising. Your father was the first Englishman that I ever saw; and I have recol-

lected him all my life on that account." He was afterwards minute in his enquiries respecting the Royal Society of Edinburgh, of which Sir James Hall was long President. He then came to the very interesting subject of the newly-discovered island of Loo-Choo; and Captain Hall gives an account of the nature of the interrogations which he underwent, which we will not risk spoiling by an attempt at condensing it.

"Having settled where the island lay, he cross-questioned me about the inhabitants with a closeness—I may call it a severity of investigation—which far exceeds every thing I have met with in any other instance. His questions were not by any means put at random, but each one had some definite reference to that which preceded it, or was about to follow. I felt in a short time so completely exposed to his view, that it would have been impossible to have concealed or qualified the smallest particular. Such, indeed, was the rapidity of his apprehension of the subjects which interested him, and the astonishing ease with which he arranged and generalized the few points of information I gave him, that he sometimes outstripped my narrative, saw the conclusion I was coming to before I spoke it, and fairly robbed me of my story.

"Several circumstances, however, respecting the Loo-Choo people, surprised even him a good deal; and I had the satisfaction of seeing him more than once completely perplexed, and unable to account for the phenomena which I related. Nothing struck him so much as their having no arms. '*Point d'armes!*' he exclaimed, '*c'est à dire point de canons—ils ont des fusils?*' Not even muskets, I replied. '*Eh bien donc—des lances, ou, au moins, des arcs et des flèches?*' I told him they had neither one nor other. '*Ni poignards?*' cried he, with increasing vehemence.—'No, none.'—'*Mais!*' said Buonaparte, clenching his fist, and raising his voice to a loud pitch, '*Mais! sans armes, comment se bat-on?*'

"I could only reply, that as far as we had been able to discover, they had never had any wars, but remained in a state of internal and external peace. 'No wars!' cried he, with a scornful and incredulous expression, as if the existence of any people under the sun without wars was a monstrous anomaly.

"In like manner, but without being so much moved, he

seemed to discredit the account I gave him of their having no money, and of their setting no value upon our silver or gold coins. After hearing these facts stated, he mused for some time, muttering to himself, in a low tone, 'Not know the use of money—are careless about gold and silver.' Then looking up, he asked, sharply, 'How then did you contrive to pay these strangest of all people for the bullocks and other good things which they seem to have sent on board in such quantities?' When I informed him that we could not prevail upon the people of Loo-Choo to receive payment of any kind, he expressed great surprise at their liberality, and made me repeat to him twice, the list of things with which we were supplied by these hospitable islanders."

The conversation proceeded with equal spirit, in which it is singular to remark the acuteness of Napoleon, in seizing upon the most remarkable and interesting facts, notwithstanding the hurry of a casual conversation. The low state of the priesthood in Loo-Choo was a subject which he dwelt on without coming to any satisfactory explanation. Captain Hall illustrated the ignorance of the people of Loo-Choo with respect to all the world, save Japan and China, by saying they knew nothing of Europe at all—knew nothing of France and England—and never had even heard of his Majesty; at which last proof of their absolute seclusion from the world, Napoleon laughed heartily. During the whole interview, Napoleon waited with the utmost patience until his questions were replied to, enquired with earnestness into every subject of interest, and made naturally a most favourable impression on his visitor.

"Buonaparte," says the acute traveller, "struck me as differing considerably from the pictures and busts I had seen of him. His face and figure looked much broader and more square, larger, indeed, in every way, than any representation I had met with. His corpulency, at this time universally reported to be excessive,

was by no means remarkable. His flesh looked, on the contrary, firm and muscular. There was not the least trace of colour in his cheeks ; in fact, his skin was more like marble than ordinary flesh. Not the smallest trace of a wrinkle was discernible on his brow, nor an approach to a furrow on any part of his countenance. His health and spirits, judging from appearances, were excellent ; though at this period it was generally believed in England, that he was fast sinking under a complication of diseases, and that his spirits were entirely gone. His manner of speaking was rather slow than otherwise, and perfectly distinct : he waited with great patience and kindness for my answers to his questions, and a reference to Count Bertrand was necessary only once during the whole conversation. The brilliant and sometimes dazzling expression of his eye could not be overlooked. It was not, however, a permanent lustre, for it was only remarkable when he was excited by some point of particular interest. It is impossible to imagine an expression of more entire mildness, I may almost call it of benignity and kindness, than that which played over his features during the whole interview. If, therefore, he were at this time out of health and in low spirits, his power of self-command must have been even more extraordinary than is generally supposed ; for his whole deportment, his conversation, and the expression of his countenance, indicated a frame in perfect health and a mind at ease.”¹

The date of this meeting was 13th August, 1817.

In the above interview, Buonaparte played a natural part. Upon another remarkable occasion, 1st July, 1817, when he received Lord Amherst and the gentlemen composing and attached to the embassy, then returning from China, his behaviour and conversation were of a much more studied, constrained, and empirical character. He had obviously a part to play, a statement to make, and propositions to announce, not certainly with the view that the seed he had sowed might fall into

¹ [Captain Hall's Voyage to the Eastern Seas, vol. i. ch. vii. pp. 302, 319.]

barren ground, but that it might be retained, gathered up, and carried back to Britain, there to take root in public credulity, and bear fruit seven-fold. He rushed at once into a tide of politics, declaring that the Russian ascendancy was to be the destruction of Europe; yet, in the same moment, proclaimed the French and English to be the only effective troops deserving notice for their discipline and moral qualities. Presently after, he struck the English out of the field on account of the smallness of the army, and insisted that, by trusting to our military forces, we were endangering our naval ascendancy. He then entered upon a favourite topic—the extreme negligence of Lord Castlereagh in failing to stipulate, or rather extort, a commercial treaty from France, and to wring out of Portugal reimbursement of our expenses. He seemed to consider this as sacrificing the interest and welfare of his country, and stated it as such with a confidence which was calculated to impress upon the hearers that he was completely serious in the extravagant doctrines which he announced.

He failed, of course, to make any impression on Lord Amherst, or on Mr Henry Ellis, third commissioner of the embassy, to whom a large portion of this violent tirade was addressed, and who has permitted us to have the perusal of his private journal, which is much more full on the subject of this interview than the account given in the printed narrative of the embassy which appeared in 1817.¹

¹ See APPENDIX, No. IV., for one of the best and most authentic accounts of Napoleon's conversation and mode of reasoning.

Having stated Lord Castlereagh's supposed errors towards the state, Napoleon was not silent upon his own injuries. It was chiefly in his conversation with Lord Amherst that he dwelt with great bitterness on Sir Hudson Lowe's conduct to him in various respects; but totally failed in producing the conviction which he aimed at. It seemed, on the contrary, to the ambassador and his attendants, that there never, perhaps, was a prisoner of importance upon whose personal liberty fewer actual restraints had been imposed, than on that of the late Sovereign of France. Mr Ellis, after personal inspection, was induced to regard his complaints concerning provisions and wine as totally undeserving of consideration, and to regret that real or pretended anger should have induced so great a man to countenance such petty misrepresentations. The house at Longwood, considered as a residence for a sovereign, Mr Ellis allowed to be small and inadequate; but, on the other hand, regarded as the residence of a person of rank living in retirement, being the view taken in England of the prisoner's condition, it was, in his opinion, both convenient and respectable. Reviewing, also, the extent of his limits, Mr Ellis observes that greater personal liberty, consistent with any pretension to security, could not be granted to an individual supposed to be under any restraint at all. His intercourse with others, he observes, was certainly under immediate surveillance, no one being permitted to enter Longwood, or its domains, without a pass from the governor; but this pass, he affirms, was readily granted, and had never formed

any check upon such visitors as Napoleon desired to see. The restraint upon his correspondence is admitted as disagreeable and distressing to his feelings, but is considered as a "necessary consequence of that which he now is, and had formerly been." "Two motives," said Mr Ellis, "may, I think, be assigned for Buonaparte's unreasonable complaints: The first, and principal, is to keep alive public interest in Europe, but chiefly in England, where he flatters himself that he has a party; and the second, I think, may be traced to the personal character and habits of Buonaparte, who finds an occupation in the petty intrigues by which these complaints are brought forward, and an unworthy gratification in the *tracasseries* and annoyance which they produce on the spot."

The sagacity of Mr Ellis was not deceived; for General Gourgaud, among other points of information, mentions the interest which Buonaparte had taken in the interview with the embassy which returned to Britain from China, and conceived that his arguments had made a strong impression upon them. The publication of Mr Ellis's account of the embassy dispelled that dream, and gave rise to proportional disappointment at St Helena.

Having now given some account of the general circumstances attending Buonaparte's residence in St Helena, while he enjoyed a considerable portion of health, of his mode of living, his studies and amusements, and having quoted two remarkable instances of his intercourse with strangers of observation and intelligence, we have to resume, in the

next chapter, the melancholy particulars of his decline of health, and the few and unimportant incidents which occurred betwixt the commencement of his sickness and its final termination.

CHAPTER XCVII.

Napoleon's Illness—viz. Cancer in the Stomach.—Removal of Las Cases.—Montholon's Complaints brought forward by Lord Holland—and replied to by Lord Bathurst.—Effect of the failure of Lord Holland's motion.—Removal of Dr O'Meara from his attendance on Buonaparte—who refuses to permit the visits of any other English Physician.—Two Priests sent to St Helena at his desire.—Dr Antommarchi.—Continued Disputes with Sir Hudson Lowe.—Plans for Effecting Buonaparte's Escape.—Scheme of a Smuggler to approach St Helena in a Submarine Vessel.—Seizure of the Vessel.—Letter expressing the King of England's interest in the Illness of Napoleon.—Consent of the latter to admit the visits of Dr Arnott.—Napoleon employs himself in making his Will—and gives other directions connected with his Decease.—Extreme Unction administered to him.—HIS DEATH, on 5th May, 1821.—Anatomization of the Body.—His Funeral.

REPORTS had been long current concerning the decline of Buonaparte's health, even before the battle of Waterloo; and many were disposed to impute his failure in that decisive campaign, less to the superiority of his enemies than to the decrease of his own habits of activity. There seems no room for such a conclusion: The rapid manner in which he concentrated his army upon Charleroi, ought to have silenced such a report for ever. He was subject occasionally to slight fits of sleepiness, such as

are incident to most men, especially after the age of forty, who sleep ill, rise early, and work hard. When he landed at St Helena, so far did he seem from showing any appearance of declining health, that one of the British grenadiers, who saw him, exclaimed, with his national oath, " They told us he was growing old ;—he has forty good campaigns in his belly yet, d—n him ! " A speech which the French gentlemen envied, as it ought, they said, to have belonged to one of the Old Guard. We have mentioned Captain Hall's account of his apparent state of health in summer 1817 ; that of Mr Ellis, about the same period, is similar, and he expresses his belief that Buonaparte was never more able to undergo the fatigues of a campaign than at the moment he saw him. Yet at this time, viz. July, 1817, Napoleon was alleging the decline of his health as a reason for obtaining more indulgence, while, on the other hand, he refused to take the exercise judged necessary to preserve his constitution, unless a relaxation of superintendence should be granted to him. It is probable, however, that he himself felt, even at that period, the symptoms of that internal malady which consumed his life. It is now well known to have been the cruel complaint of which his father died, a cancer, namely, in the stomach, of which he had repeatedly expressed his apprehensions, both in Russia and elsewhere. The progress of this disease, however, is slow and insidious, if indeed it had actually commenced so early as 1817. Gourgaud, at a much later period, avowed himself a complete disbeliever in his illness. He allowed, indeed, that he was in low spirits to

such an extent as to talk of destroying himself and his attached followers, by shutting himself and them up in a small apartment with burning charcoal—an easy death, which Berthollet the chemist had, it seems, recommended. Nevertheless, “on the subject of General Buonaparte’s health, General Gourgaud stated, that the English were much imposed upon; for that he was not, as far as bodily health was concerned, in any degree materially altered, and that the representations upon this subject had little, if any, truth in them. Dr O’Meara was certainly the dupe of that influence which General Buonaparte always exercises over those with whom he has frequent intercourse, and though he (General Gourgaud) individually had only reason *de se louer de Mr O’Meara*, yet his intimate knowledge of General Buonaparte enabled him confidently to assert, that his state of health was not at all worse than it had been for some time previous to his arrival at St Helena.”

Yet, as before hinted, notwithstanding the disbelief of friends and foes, it seems probable that the dreadful disease of which Napoleon died, was already seizing upon the vitals, though its character was not decisively announced by external symptoms. Dr Arnott, surgeon to the 20th regiment, who attended on Napoleon’s death-bed, has made the following observations upon this important subject :

“We are given to understand, from great authority,¹ that this affection of the stomach cannot be produced without a considerable predisposition of the parts to disease. I will not venture an opi-

¹ “See Dr Bailie’s inestimable book on Morbid Anatomy, pp. 141, 142.”

nion ; but it is somewhat remarkable, that he often said that his father died of scirrhus of the pylorus ; that the body was examined after death, and the fact ascertained. His faithful followers, Count and Countess Bertrand, and Count Montholon, have repeatedly declared the same to me.

“ If, then, it should be admitted that a previous disposition of the parts to this disease did exist, might not the depressing passions of the mind act as an exciting cause ? It is more than probable that Napoleon Buonaparte’s mental sufferings in St Helena were very poignant. By a man of such unbounded ambition, and who once aimed at universal dominion, captivity must have been severely felt.

“ The climate of St Helena I consider healthy. The air is pure and temperate, and Europeans enjoy their health, and retain the vigour of their constitution, as in their native country.”

Dr Arnott proceeds to state, that notwithstanding this general assertion, dysentery, and other acute diseases of the abdominal viscera, prevailed among the troops. This he imputes to the carelessness and intemperance of the English soldiers, and the fatigue of the working parties ; as the officers, who had little night duty, retained their health and strength as in Europe.

“ I can therefore safely assert,” continues the physician, “ that any one of temperate habits, who is not exposed to much bodily exertion, night air, and atmospherical changes, as a soldier must be, may have as much immunity from disease in St Helena as in Europe ; and I may therefore farther assert, that the disease of which Napoleon Buonaparte died was *not* the effect of climate.”

In support of Dr Arnott’s statement, it may be observed, that of Napoleon’s numerous family of nearly fifty persons, English servants included, only one died during all their five years’ residence on the island ;¹ and that person (Cipriani, the majordomo) had contracted the illness which carried him

¹ See, for a detailed account of the establishment at Longwood, APPENDIX, No. V.

off, being a species of consumption, before he left Europe.

Dr Arnott, to whose opinion we are induced to give great weight, both from the excellence of his character and his having the best opportunities of information, states that the scirrhus, or cancer of the stomach, is an obscure disease; the symptoms which announce it being common to, and characteristic of, other diseases in the same region; yet he early conceived that some morbid alteration of the structure of the stomach had taken place, especially after he learned that his patient's father had died of scirrhus of the pylorus. He believed, as already hinted, that the disease was in its incipient state, even so far back as the end of the year 1817, when the patient was affected with pain in the stomach, nausea, and vomiting, especially after taking food; which symptoms never left him from that period, but increased progressively till the day of his death.

From this period, therefore, Napoleon was in a situation which, considering his great actions, and the height of his former fortunes, deserved the compassion of his most bitter enemies, and the sympathy of all who were disposed to take a moral lesson from the most extraordinary vicissitude of human affairs which history has ever presented. Nor can we doubt that such reflections might have eventually led to much relaxation in the severity with which the prisoner was watched, and, it may be, at length to his entire emancipation. But to attain this end, it would have been necessary that Napoleon's conduct, while under restrictions, should

have been of a very different character from that which he thought it most politic, or felt it most natural, to adopt. First, to obtain the sympathy and privileges due to an invalid, he ought to have permitted the visits of some medical person, whose report might be held as completely impartial. This could not be the case with that of Dr O'Meara, engaged as he was in the prisoner's intimate and even secret service, and on the worst terms with the governor ; and Napoleon's positive rejection of all other assistance seemed to countenance the belief, however unjust, that he was either feigning indisposition, or making use of some slight symptoms of it to obtain a relaxation of the governor's vigilance. Nor was it to be supposed that Dr Antommarchi's evidence, being that of an individual entirely dependent on Napoleon, could be considered as more authentic, till corroborated by some indifferent, and, at the same time, competent medical authority.

Secondly, It is to be remembered, that the fundamental reason on which Napoleon's confinement was vindicated, was, that his liberty was inconsistent with the tranquillity of Europe. To prove the contrary, it would have been necessary that the Ex-Emperor should have evinced a desire to retreat from political disputes, and shown symptoms of having laid aside or forgotten those ambitious projects which had so long convulsed Europe. Compassion, and the admiration of great talents, might then have led the states of Europe to confide in the resigned dispositions of one, whom age, infirmities, and sufferings, appeared to incline to

dedicate the remainder of his days to ease and retirement, and in whom they might seem a sure guarantee for his pacific intentions. But so far were such feelings from being exhibited, that every thing which emanated from St Helena showed that the Ex-Emperor nourished all his former plans, and vindicated all his former actions. He was not satisfied that the world should adopt the opinion that his ambition was allayed, and his pretensions to empire relinquished. On the contrary, his efforts, and those of the works into which he breathed his spirit, went to prove, if they proved any thing, that he never entertained ambition of a culpable character—that his claims of sovereignty were grounded upon national law and justice—that he had a right to entertain them formerly, and that he was disposed and entitled to assert them still. He was at pains to let the world know that he was not altered in the slightest degree, was neither ashamed of his projects, nor had renounced them ; but, if restored to Europe, that he would be in all respects the same person, with the same claims, and little diminished activity, as when he landed at Cannes to recover the empire of France.

This mode of pleading his cause had the inevitable consequence of confirming all those who had deemed restrictions on his freedom to be necessary in the outset (and these were the great majority of Europe), in the belief that the same reasons existed for continuing the restraint, which had originally caused it to be imposed. We are unwilling to revert again to the hackneyed simile of

the imprisoned lion ; but certainly, if the royal animal which Don Quixote desired to set at liberty, had, instead of demeaning himself peaceably and with urbanity, been roaring, ramping, and tearing the bars of his cage, it may be questioned whether the Great Redresser of Wrongs himself would have advocated his freedom.

In November 1816, Napoleon sustained a loss to which he must have been not a little sensible, in the removal of Count Las Cases from his society. The devoted attachment of the count to his person could not be doubted, and his age and situation as a civilian, made him less apt to enter into those feuds and quarrels, which sometimes, notwithstanding their general attachment to Napoleon, seemed to have arisen among the military officers of the household of Longwood. He was of a literary turn, and qualified to converse upon general topics, both of history and science. He had been an emigrant, and understanding all the manœuvres and intrigues of the ancient noblesse, had many narrations which Napoleon was not unwilling to listen to. Above all, he received and recorded every thing which was said by Napoleon, with undoubting faith and unwearied assiduity. And, like the author of one of the most entertaining books in the English language (Boswell's *Life of Johnson*), Count Las Cases thought nothing trivial that could illustrate his subject. Like Boswell, too, his veneration for his principal was so deep, that he seems to have lost, in some cases, the exact perception of right and wrong, in his determination to consider Napoleon as always in the right. But his attachment,

if to a certain degree tending to blind his judgment, came warm from his heart. The count gave a substantial mark, also, of his sincerity, in dedicating to his master's service a sum of L.4000, or thereabout, his whole private fortune, which was vested in the English funds.¹

For our misfortune, as also for his own, since he must have considered his separation from Buonaparte as such, Count Las Cases had been tempted into a line of conduct inconsistent with the engagement he had come under with the other attendants of the Ex-Emperor, not to hold secret communication beyond the verge of the island. The opportunity of a servant of his own returning to England, induced him to confide to the domestic's charge a letter, written upon a piece of white silk, that it might be the more readily concealed, which was stitched into the lad's clothes. It was addressed to Prince Lucien Buonaparte. As this was a direct transgression, in a most material point, of the conditions which Count Las Cases had promised to observe, he was dismissed from the island and sent to the Cape of Good Hope, and from thence to Europe.² His Journal remained for some time in the hands of Sir Hudson Lowe; but, as we had formerly occasion to mention, alterations and additions were afterwards made, which, in general, are more vituperative of the governor, than the manuscript as it originally stood when the count left St Helena. The abridgement of the count's stay at the island was much to be regretted, as his Journal

¹ [Las Cases, t. iii. p. 359.] ² [Las Cases, t. iv. p. 281.]

forms the best record, not only of Napoleon's real thoughts, but of the opinions which he desired should be received as such. Unquestionably, the separation from this devoted follower added greatly to the disconsolate situation of the Exile of Longwood ; but it is impossible to suppress the remark, that, when a gentleman attached to Napoleon's suite found himself at liberty thus to break through a plighted engagement in his chief's behalf, it sufficiently vindicated Sir Hudson Lowe for putting little faith in the professions made to him, and declining to relax any reasonable degree of vigilance which the safe custody of his prisoner seemed to demand.

The complaints of Napoleon and his followers produced, as they ought to have done, an enquiry into the personal treatment of the Ex-Emperor, in the British Parliament ; when the general reasoning which we have hinted at, joined to the exposure which ministers afforded of the exaggerated representations that had been made in the statements which had come from St Helena, were found greatly to preponderate over the arguments of Napoleon's compassionate and accomplished advocate, Lord Holland.

The question came before the House of Lords, on 18th March, 1817.¹ Lord Holland, in a speech of great good sense and moderation, disowned all attempts at persuading the House, that the general line of policy adopted with respect to Napoleon should be changed. It had been adopted in contra-

¹ [See Parl. Debates, vol. xxxv. p. 1137.]

diction to his (Lord Holland's) sentiments, but it had been confirmed by Parliament, and he did not hope to obtain a reversal of their judgment. But, if the confining Napoleon was, as had been alleged, a measure of necessity, it followed that necessity must limit what necessity had created, and of course that the prisoner should be treated with no unnecessary harshness. His lordship did not presume to state the reports which had reached him as absolute matters of fact, but only as rumours which demanded an enquiry, where the honour of the country was so nearly concerned. Most of the allegations on which Lord Holland grounded his motion, were contained in a paper of complaints sent by General Montholon. The particulars noticed in this remonstrance were circumstances which have been already adverted to, but may be here briefly noticed, as well as the answers by the British Government.

First, the restrictions upon the exercising ground formerly allowed to Napoleon, was alleged as a grievance. The climate of St Helena, Lord Holland admitted, was good, but his lordship complained that the upper part of the island, where Longwood was situated, was damp and unhealthy. The inconvenience of the house was also complained of.

Lord Bathurst, the colonial secretary of state, replied to this charge, that the general accounts of Longwood described it as healthy. It had been the usual country residence of the lieutenant-governor, which went far to show that the site could not be ineligible. The situation had been preferred

by Napoleon himself, who was so impatient to take possession of it, that he even wished to have pitched a tent there till the house could be cleared for his reception. The restriction of the bounds of exercise, he explained to have been caused by Napoleon's evincing some disposition to tamper with the inhabitants. He still had a circuit of eight miles, within which he might range unattended and uncontrolled. If he wished to go farther, he was at liberty to traverse the island, upon permitting an orderly officer to join his suite. His refusal to take exercise on such terms, was not the fault of the British Government; and if Napoleon's health suffered in consequence, it was the result not of the regulations, which were reasonable and indispensable, but of his own wilfulness in refusing to comply with them.

The second class of exceptions taken by Lord Holland, was against what he considered as the harsh and iniquitous restrictions upon the exile's communication with Europe. He was not, his lordship stated, permitted to obtain books, or to subscribe for journals and newspapers. All intercourse by letter was interdicted to the distinguished prisoner, even with his wife, his child, and his nearest and dearest relatives. He was not allowed to write under seal to the Prince Regent.

Upon these several topics Lord Bathurst answered, that a list of books, the value of which amounted to L.1400 or L.1500 (which General Montholon termed a few books), had been sent by Napoleon to Britain; that the commissioners put this list into the hands of an eminent French book-

seller, who had supplied as many as could be obtained in London and Paris, but several of them, chiefly works on military matters, could not be procured. The volumes which could be procured, had been sent, with an apology for the omission of those which were not to be gotten; but the residents of Longwood had not admitted the excuse. Respecting the permission of a free subscription by Napoleon to journals, Lord Bathurst deemed it his duty to place some restriction upon that species of indulgence, attempts having been detected to establish a correspondence with Napoleon through the medium of newspapers. On the subject of intercourse with Europe by letter, Lord Bathurst stated that it was not interdicted, unless by the condition that Sir Hudson Lowe should previously be permitted to read the letter, whether of business or otherwise. This right, Lord Bathurst stated, had been exercised only by the governor in person, and with strict delicacy and feeling; and he repelled, with the most flat contradiction, the assertions of Montholon, that the governor of St Helena had broken open and detained letters, under pretence that they did not come through the channel of the English minister. Lord Bathurst said, that General Montholon had been challenged by Sir Hudson Lowe to produce a single instance of such tyranny having been permitted, but that the French general had remained silent, the assertion being absolutely false. All the letters which the relatives of Napoleon were disposed to send through his, Lord Bathurst's, office, he said, should be instantly forwarded, but it was a necessary preliminary that

such should be written. Now, a letter from his brother Joseph, which was received in October last, and instantly forwarded, was the only one from any of his family or relatives which had reached the office. His lordship then adverted to the regulation which enacted, that even a letter to the Prince Regent must pass through the governor of St Helena's hands in an open state. Lord Bathurst explained that the regulation gave the governor no authority or option as to transmitting the letter, which he was directed to forward instantly. The rule only required that Sir Hudson Lowe should be privy to the contents, in order, that, if it should contain any impeachment of his conduct, his defence or apology might reach London as soon as the accusation. This, his lordship remarked, was necessary, in order that no time might be lost in redressing a complaint of a grave character, or in repelling any frivolous and unsubstantial charge. He added, that should any sealed letter be addressed to the Prince Regent by Napoleon, he, Lord Bathurst, would have no hesitation to open it, if the governor had not previously done so. He should conceive it to be his duty to forward it instantly as addressed, whenever he was acquainted with the contents; but being in his department responsible for the acts of the sovereign, he would feel it his duty to make himself previously acquainted with the nature of the communication.

Thirdly, Lord Holland touched on the inadequacy of the sum allowed for the maintenance of Napoleon, and on the unworthiness of making that personage contribute to bear his own charges. The

ministers, his lordship stated, having placed him in a situation where great expense was necessary, turned round upon him, and insisted that he should himself be in a great measure at the charge of supporting it.

Lord Bathurst replied by stating the facts with which the reader is already acquainted. He mentioned, that the sum of L.8000 had been fixed upon as adequate, after the heavy expenses of the first year; and that it was increased to L.12,000 on the remonstrance of Sir Hudson Lowe. This allowance, he said, was the same given to the governor, who had to bear the cost of frequent entertainments. It did not appear to government, that the family of Napoleon, which was to be maintained on the footing of that becoming a general officer of distinction, ought to cost more than that of Sir Hudson Lowe, who actually held that condition, with the necessity of discharging the expenses of his staff, and all other incumbent disbursements. He gave some details on the subject of the provisions and the cellar, from which it appeared, that, besides the inferior species of wine, the table of Napoleon was supplied at the rate of two bottles daily of those of a superior quality for each individual.

Lord Holland concluded with stating, that although Queen Mary could be no otherwise regarded than as the bitterest enemy of the illustrious Elizabeth, yet the greatest stain upon the memory of the latter sovereign was not the unjust, for *unjust* it was not, but the harsh and ungenerous treatment of Mary. He reminded the House, that

it would not be considered by posterity, whether Buonaparte had been justly punished for his crimes, but whether Great Britain had acted in that generous manner which became a great country. He then moved for the production of such papers and correspondence betwixt St Helena and the British Government, as should seem best fitted to throw light on the personal treatment of Napoleon.

It may be observed, that in the candid and liberal manner in which Lord Holland stated the case, he was led into a comparison unfavourable to his own argument. To have rendered the case of Mary (the justice of which his lordship admitted, in questioning its generosity) parallel to that of Napoleon, two remarkable circumstances were wanting. First, Mary, far from being at war with Queen Elizabeth, was ostensibly on the most friendly terms with that sovereign when she took refuge in England; secondly, the British Ministry testified no design to finish Napoleon's confinement by cutting off his head.

Lord Darnley, who had concurred with Lord Holland in desiring an enquiry, now considered the reports alluded to as totally refuted by the candid and able statement of Lord Bathurst, and was not of opinion that Lord Holland should press the motion farther. The Marquis of Buckingham's opinion was founded on the broad ground of Napoleon's delinquencies towards Europe, and England in particular. He was of opinion, that every degree of restraint necessary to prevent his escape, should be imposed and enforced. The severe and

close durance to which General Buonaparte was subjected, was not, his lordship said, dictated by motives of revenge, but of security. It was a piece of political justice which we owed to Europe, and the defeat of which would never be forgotten in this or in any other state of the civilized world.

The motion of Lord Holland does not appear to have been seconded, and was negatived without a division.

There can be no doubt, that the failure of this effort in the British Senate had a deep effect on Napoleon's spirits, and may, perhaps, have aggravated that tendency to disease in the stomach, which was suspected to have already taken place. Nothing is better known, though perhaps few things are more difficult to be satisfactorily explained, than the mysterious connexion betwixt distress of mind and the action of the digestive powers. Violent sickness is produced on many persons by extreme and sudden affliction, and almost every one feels the stomach more or less affected by that which powerfully and painfully occupies the mind. And here we may add, that Lord Holland's kindness and compassion for so great a man, under such severe circumstances, were shown by a variety of delicate attentions on his part and that of his lady, and that the supplies of books and other articles sent by them through the Foreign Office, where every facility was afforded for the conveyance, continued from time to time to give Napoleon assurance of their sympathy. But though he gratefully felt their attentions, his distress of body, and perhaps of mind,

assumed a character incapable of receiving consolation.

This unhappy state was kept up and prolonged by the extent to which Buonaparte indulged in determined opposition to the various regulations respecting the custody of his person; on which subject every thing which occurred occasioned a struggle against the authority of Sir Hudson Lowe, or a new effort to obtain the Imperial distinctions which he considered as due to his rank.

The last point seems to have been carried to the length of childish extravagance. It was necessary, for example, that Dr O'Meara should report to the governor of the island the state of the prisoner's health, which began to give room for serious apprehension. Napoleon insisted, that when this bulletin was rendered in writing, O'Meara, whom he considered as in his own service, should give him the title of Emperor. It was in vain that the Doctor remonstrated, pleading that the instructions of Government, as well as the orders of Lieutenant-General Lowe, prohibited him from using this forbidden epithet; and it was with difficulty that he at last prevailed that the word Personage or Patient might be substituted for the offensive phrase of *General Buonaparte*. Had this ingenious device not been resorted to, there could have been no communication with the Government on the subject of Napoleon's health.

The physician of Napoleon had till now enjoyed an easy office. His health was naturally sound; and, like many persons who enjoy the same inestimable advantage, the Ex-Emperor doubted of the

healing powers of medicines which he never needed to use. Abstinence was his chief resource against stomach complaints, when these began to assail him, and the bath was frequently resorted to when the pangs became more acute. He also held it expedient to change the character of his way of living, when he felt affected with illness. If it had been sedentary, he rode hard and took violent exercise; and if, on the contrary, he had been taking more exercise than usual, he was accustomed to lay it aside for prolonged repose. But more recently he had not the wish to mount on horseback, or take exercise at all.

About the 25th of September, 1817, Napoleon's health seems to have been seriously affected. He complained much of nausea, his legs swelled, and there were other unfavourable symptoms, which induced his physician to tell him that he was of a temperament which required much activity; that constant exertion of mind and body was indispensable; and that without exercise he must soon lose his health. He immediately declared, that while exposed to the challenge of sentinels, he never would take exercise, however necessary. Dr O'Meara proposed calling in the assistance of Dr Baxter, a medical gentleman of eminence on Sir Hudson Lowe's staff. "He could but say the same as you do," said Napoleon, "and recommend my riding abroad; nevertheless, as long as the present system continues, I will never stir out." At another time he expressed the same resolution, and his determination to take no medicines. Dr O'Meara replied, that, if the disease should not be encoun-

tered by remedies in due time, it would terminate fatally. His answer was remarkable: "I will have at least the consolation that my death will be an eternal dishonour to the English nation, who sent me to this climate to die under the hands of * * * *." The physician again represented, that, by neglecting to take medicine, he would accelerate his own death. "That which is written is written," said Napoleon, looking up. "Our days are reckoned."¹

This deplorable and desperate course seems to have been adopted partly to spite Sir Hudson Lowe, partly in the reckless feelings of despondency inspired by his situation, and in some degree, perhaps, was the effect of the disease itself, which must necessarily have disinclined him to motion. Napoleon might also hope, that, by thus threatening to injure his health by forbearing exercise, he might extort the governor's acquiescence in some points which were disputed betwixt them. When the governor sent to offer him some extension of his riding ground, and Dr O'Meara wished him to profit by the permission, he replied, that he should be insulted by the challenge of the sentinels, and that he did not choose to submit to the caprice of the governor, who, granting an indulgence one day, might recall it the next. On such grounds as these,—which, after all, amounted just to this, that being a prisoner, and one of great importance, he was placed under a system of vigilance, rendered more necessary by the constant intrigues carried on for his escape,

¹ Voice, &c. vol. ii. p. 256.

—did he feel himself at liberty to neglect those precautions of exercise and medicine, which were necessary for the preservation of his health. His conduct on such occasions can scarce be termed worthy of his powerful mind; it resembled too much that of the froward child, who refuses its food, or its physic, because it is contradicted.

The removal of Dr O'Meara from Napoleon's person, which was considered by him as a great injury, was the next important incident in the monotony of his life. It seems, from quotations given elsewhere in this volume, that Dr O'Meara had been for some time a confidant of Sir Hudson Lowe, and was recommended by him to ministers as a person by whose means he could learn what passed in the family of Napoleon. But in process of time, Dr O'Meara, growing, perhaps, more intimate with the prisoner, became unwilling to supply the governor with the information of which he had been formerly profuse, and a quarrel took place betwixt him and Sir Hudson Lowe. In describing the scenes which passed between him and the governor, we have already said that Dr O'Meara writes with a degree of personal animosity, which is unfavourable to his own credit. But his departure from St Helena was occasioned by a warmer mark of the interest which he took in Napoleon's fortunes, than could be inferred from his merely refusing to inform Sir Hudson of what was said at Longwood.

Dr O'Meara seems not only to have taken the part of Napoleon in his controversies with the governor, but also to have engaged deeply in forwarding a secret correspondence with a Mr Holmes, the

Ex-Emperor's agent in London. This appears to have been clearly proved by a letter received from the agent, relating to large remittances of money to St Helena, by the connivance of the physician.¹ Under such suspicions Dr O'Meara was withdrawn by the governor's mandate from attending on the person of Napoleon, and sent back to England. Napoleon had never obeyed his medical injunctions, but he complained severely when he was recalled from his household; expressing his belief that the depriving him of the medical attendant, whose prescriptions he had never followed, was a direct and bold step in the plan contrived for murdering him. It is probable, however, he regretted Dr O'Meara's secret services more than those which were professional.

Sir Hudson Lowe again offered the assistance of Dr Baxter, but this was construed at Longwood into an additional offence. It was even treated as an offer big with suspicion. The governor tried, it was said, to palm his own private physician upon the Emperor, doubtless that he might hold his life more effectually in his power. On the other hand, the British ministers were anxious that every thing should be done which could prevent complaints on this head. "You cannot better fulfil the wishes of his Majesty's Government" (says one of Lord Bathurst's despatches to the governor) "than by giving effect to any measure which you may consider cal-

¹ The letter alluded to is quoted at full length in the *Quarterly Review*, vol. xxviii. p. 224, to p. 226. It was received after Dr O'Meara's dismissal; which therefore must have been occasioned only by the suspicion of what was afterwards proved.

culated to prevent any just ground of dissatisfaction on the part of General Buonaparte, on account of any real or supposed inadequacy of medical attendance."

Dr Stokoe, surgeon on board the *Conqueror*, was next called in to visit at Longwood. But differences arose betwixt him and the governor, and after a few visits his attendance on Napoleon was discharged.

After this period, the prisoner expressed his determination, whatever might be the extremity of his case, not to permit the visits of an English physician; and a commission was sent to Italy to obtain a medical man of reputation from some of the seminaries in that country. At the same time, Napoleon signified a desire to have the company of a Catholic priest. The proposition for this purpose came through his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, to the papal government, and readily received the assent of the British Ministry. It would appear that this mission had been thought by his holiness to resemble, in some degree, those sent into foreign and misbelieving countries; for two churchmen were despatched to St Helena instead of one.

The senior priest, Father Bonavita, was an elderly man, subject to the infirmities belonging to his period of life, and broken by a residence of twenty-six years in Mexico. His speech had been affected by a paralytic stroke. His recommendation to the office which he now undertook, was his having been father confessor to Napoleon's mother. His companion was a young abbé, called Vignali.¹

¹ ["As member of the College of the Propaganda, he could not go alone. Missions in which the line is to be crossed, must be

Both were pious, good men, well qualified, doubtless, to give Napoleon the comfort which their church holds out to those who receive its tenets, but not so much so to reclaim wanderers, or confirm those who might doubt the doctrines of the church.

Argument or controversy, however, were not necessary. Napoleon had declared his resolution to die in the faith of his fathers. He was neither an infidel, he said, nor a philosopher. If we doubt whether a person who had conducted himself towards the pope in the way which history records of Napoleon, and who had at one time been excommunicated (if, indeed, the ban was yet removed), could be sincere in his general professions of Catholicism, we must at least acquit the Exile of the charge of deliberate atheism. On various occasions, he expressed, with deep feelings of devotion, his conviction of the existence of the Deity, the great truth upon which the whole system of religion rests ; and this at a time when the detestable doctrines of atheism and materialism were generally current in France. Immediately after his elevation to the dignity of First Consul, he meditated the restoration of religion ; and thus, in a mixture of feeling and of policy, expressed himself upon the subject to Thibaudcau, then a counsellor of state. Having combated for a long time the systems of modern philosophers upon different kinds of worship, upon deism, natural religion, and so forth, he

composed of at least two missionaries ; and the Abbé Vignali, who had some notions of medicine, was attached to Bonavita. Princess Pauline gave her cook ; Madame Mère one of her valets ; and thus a little colony was formed."—*Antommarchi*, v. i. p. 9.]

proceeded. "Last Sunday evening, in the general silence of nature, I was walking in these grounds (of Malmaison). The sound of the church-bell of Ruel fell upon my ear, and renewed all the impressions of my youth. I was profoundly affected, such is the power of early habit and associations; and I considered, if such was the case with me, what must not be the effect of such recollections upon the more simple and credulous vulgar? Let your philosophers answer that. The people must have a religion." He went on to state the terms on which he would negotiate with the pope, and added, "They will say I am a Papist—I am no such thing. I was a Mahomedan in Egypt. I will be a Catholic here, for the good of the people. I do not believe in forms of religion, but in the existence of a God!" He extended his hands towards heaven—"Who is it that has created all above and around us?"¹ This sublime passage proves that Napoleon (unfortunate in having proceeded no farther towards the Christian shrine) had at least crossed the threshold of the temple, and believed in and worshipped the Great Father of the Universe.

The missionaries were received at St Helena with civility, and the rites of mass were occasionally performed at Longwood. Both the clergymen were quiet, unobtrusive characters, confining themselves to their religious duties, and showing neither the abilities nor the active and intriguing spirit which Protestants are apt to impute to the Catholic priesthood.

¹ Mémoire sur le Consulat, 1799 et 1804.

The same vessel which arrived at St Helena on the 18th September, in 1819, with these physicians for the mind, brought with them Dr F. Antommarchi, anatomic pro-sector (that is, assistant to a professor of anatomy) to the Hospital of St Marie Neuve at Florence, attached to the University of Pisa, who was designed to supply the place about the prisoner's person, occupied by Dr O'Meara, and after him provisionally by Dr Stokoe. He continued to hold the office till Napoleon's death, and his *Account of his Last Moments*, a work in two volumes, though less interesting, and showing far less acuteness than that of Las Cases, or of O'Meara, is yet useful and entertaining, as relating to the last days of so extraordinary a person. Dr Antommarchi seems to have been acceptable to Napoleon, and the rather that he was a native of Corsica. He brought also news from his family. The Princess Pauline Borghese had offered to come to attend him. "Let her remain where she is," said Napoleon; "I would not have her witness the degrading state which I am reduced to, and the insults to which I am subjected."

It is needless to resume the subject of these alleged insults. They consisted in the precautions which Sir Hudson Lowe deemed himself obliged to take for the security of his prisoner; particularly in requiring that a British officer should be regularly made assured of his being at Longwood, and that an officer, not under the rank of captain, should attend him on the excursions which he proposed to make through the island. On these subjects, Napoleon had made his mind up to a species of passive

resistance; and had, as we have seen, already expressed himself determined to take no exercise, however indispensable to his health, unless the regulations of his confinement were entirely dispensed with, or modified according to his own pleasure. This was an argument *ad misericordiam*, which must have given the governor great distress and uneasiness; since, if the health of the prisoner should fail, even though it was through his own wilfulness, Sir Hudson could not expect that his conduct would escape censure. At the same time, if he yielded to this species of compulsory argument, it might be carried to an extent altogether inconsistent with the safe custody of the captive. His vigilance was also sharpened by constant reports of plots for the liberation of Napoleon; and the sums of money which he and his family had at their command, rendered it dangerous to trust to the natural securities of the island. It is remarkable, too, that, in demanding, as a matter of right, freedom from the restrictions of which he complained, Napoleon never proposed any concessions on his part, by offer of his parole or otherwise, which might tend to give any additional moral assurance, in place of those limitations which he desired to have removed. Yet, to accommodate himself in some degree to his prisoner's obstinacy, Sir Hudson Lowe was content that the British officer, whose duty it was to report on the presence of Napoleon at Longwood, should only be required to satisfy himself of it by such indirect opportunities as his walking in the garden, or appearing at the window, permitted him to enjoy, and on such

occasions he was enjoined to keep his own person concealed. In this way there were days which passed without any regular report on this most important point, for which Sir Hudson Lowe would have been highly responsible if an escape had been effected. We beg to refer to Dr Antommarchi's work for instances of the peculiar and grossly indelicate opportunities, which, to compound between the necessity of the case and the obstinacy of Napoleon, his attendants took to make his person visible when he was not aware of it.¹

Schemes for Napoleon's escape were not wanting. A Colonel Latapie, distinguished as a partisan officer, was said to be at the head of an attempt to carry him off from St Helena, which was to be undertaken by a band of desperadoes from America. But Napoleon said, he knew too well the character of such adventurers to hope to profit by them. Government had other information of attempts to be made from America, but none of them seem to have proceeded to any serious length.

It was different with the undertaking of Johnstone, a smuggler of an uncommonly resolute character, and whose life had been a tissue of desperate risks. He had made a memorable escape from Newgate, and had afterwards piloted Lord Nelson's vessel to the attack of Copenhagen, when the ordinary masters of the fleet, and pilots, declined the task. Johnstone was also said to have meditated a bold attempt to carry off Buonaparte on a former occasion, when he trusted himself on the

¹ [Antommarchi, v. ii. p. 71.]

water for the purpose of visiting Flushing.¹ And now he certainly engaged in a plot to deliver Napoleon from St Helena, of a very singular kind. A submarine vessel, that is, a ship capable of being sunk under water for a certain time, and of being raised again at pleasure by disengaging certain weights, was to be the means of effecting this enterprise. It was thought that by sinking the vessel during the daytime, she might escape the notice of the British cruisers, and being raised at night, might approach the guarded rock without discovery. The vessel was actually begun in one of the building-yards upon the Thames; but the peculiarity of her construction having occasioned suspicions, she was seized by the British Government.

These, and others which we could name, were very perilous and wild attempts, yet calculated to keep vigilance alive; for in every case in which great natural difficulties had been surmounted by such enterprises, it has been because these difficulties have been too much relied upon. But while

¹ Such at least was the report. The attempt was to have been made by Johnstone and his desperate associates in a boat, which they were to row across the Scheldt towards Flushing, just when Napoleon was proceeding thither. They were to board the Imperial barge, throw every one save Napoleon into the sea, and, removing him to their own light row-boat, were to pull out and deliver him up to the British squadron, then cruising off the island. It is added, that Napoleon took the alarm from seeing a boat rowing very swiftly towards him, and, ordering his crew to pull harder, or give way, as it is called, the smuggler, instead of running athwart the barge, fell astern, and the opportunity was lost. We do not know that there is any good authority for this story.

such precarious means of escape were presented from time to time, the chance upon which Napoleon secretly relied for release from his present situation was vanishing from his eyes.

His case was mentioned in the House of Commons, but incidentally only, on the 12th July, 1819.¹ The subject was introduced into a debate on finance, when Mr C. H. Hutchinson pointed out the yearly expense of detaining Napoleon at St Helena, which he stated to amount to half-a-million sterling, as a useless expenditure of public money. In this statement he received no countenance from any one except Mr Joseph Hume. It was answered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and the expense was declared not to exceed a fifth part of the sum alleged. The leading members of Opposition seemed to take no interest in the question; and it was believed at St Helena, that Napoleon's disappointment in the hopes which he had entertained of their strong and overpowering interposition in his behalf, first led to his mental depression and total abandonment of hope.

The complexion of the times, indeed, had become such as to strengthen every reason which existed for detaining him in captivity. The state of England, owing to the discontent and sufferings of the manufacturing districts,—and more especially that of Italy, convulsed by the short-lived revolutions of Naples and Savoy,—rendered the safe custody of Napoleon a matter of more deep import than it had been at any time since his fall. What the effect

¹ [Parl. Deb. vol. xl. p. 1559.]

of his name might have produced in that moment of general commotion, cannot be estimated, but the consequences of his escape must have been most formidable.

The British Ministry, aware of the power of such a spirit to work among the troubled elements, anxiously enjoined additional vigilance to the governor of St Helena :

“ The overthrow of the Neapolitan government, the revolutionary spirit which more or less prevails over all Italy, and the doubtful state of France itself, must excite his attention, and clearly show that a crisis is fast approaching, if not already arrived, when his escape would be productive of important consequences. That his partisans are active cannot be doubted ; and if he be ever willing to hazard the attempt, he will never allow such an opportunity to escape. You will, therefore, exert all your attention in watching his proceedings, and call upon the admiral to use his utmost vigilance, as upon the navy so much must ultimately depend.” ¹

The alarm was natural, but there was no real cause for apprehension. Politics and war were never more to know the powerful influence of Napoleon Buonaparte. His lost hopes aggravating the progress of the cruel disease, which had its source in the stomach, it now affected the whole frame, and undermined the strength of the constitution. Death was now finally to terminate the fretful and degrading discussions, by which he inflicted, and from which he received, so much pain, and to open the gates of a prison, for which Hope herself could scarce present another key. The symptoms of disorganization in the digestive powers became more and more apparent, and his reluctance to take any

¹ Despatches to Sir Hudson Lowe, 30th September, 1820.

medicine, as if from an instinctive persuasion that the power of physic was in vain, continued as obstinate as ever. On one of the many disputes which he maintained on this subject, he answered Antommarchi's reasoning thus :—" Doctor, no physicking. We are, as I already told you, a machine made to live. We are organized for that purpose, and such is our nature. Do not counteract the living principle. Let it alone—leave it the liberty of defending itself—it will do better than your drugs. Our body is a watch, that is intended to go for a given time. The watchmaker cannot open it ; and must, on handling it, grope his way blindfolded and at random. For once that he assists and relieves it by dint of tormenting it with his crooked instruments, he injures it ten times, and at last destroys it."¹ This was on the 14th of October, 1820.

As the Ex-Emperor's health grew weaker, it cannot be thought extraordinary that his mind became more and more depressed. In lack of other means of amusing himself, he had been somewhat interested in the construction of a pond and fountain in the garden of Longwood, which was stocked with small fishes. A mixture of copperas in the mastick employed in cementing the basin, had affected the water. The creatures, which had been in a good measure the object of Napoleon's attention, began to sicken and to die. He was deeply affected by the circumstance, and, in language strongly resembling the beautiful verses of Moore, expressed his sense of the fatality which seemed to

¹ [Antommarchi, v. i. p. 339.]

attach itself to him. "Every thing I love—every thing that belongs to me," he exclaimed, "is immediately struck."¹ Heaven and mankind unite to afflict me."² At other times he lamented his decay of energy. The bed, he said, was now a place of luxury, which he would not exchange for all the thrones in the universe. The eyes, which formerly were so vigilant, could now scarcely be opened. He recollected that he used to dictate to four or five secretaries at once. "But then," he said, "I was Napoleon—now I am no longer any thing—my strength, my faculties, forsake me—I no longer live, I only exist."³ Often he remained silent for many hours, suffering, as may be supposed, much pain, and immersed in profound melancholy.

About the 22d January, 1821, Napoleon appeared to resume some energy, and to make some attempt to conquer his disease by exercise. He mounted his horse, and galloped, for the last time, five or six miles around the limits of Longwood, but nature was overcome by the effort. He complained that his strength was sinking under him rapidly.⁴

¹ [Antommarchi, v. i. p. 363.]

² "'Twas ever thus—from childhood's hour
I've seen my fondest hopes decay;
I never loved a tree or flower,
But was the first to fade away."

³ [Antommarchi, v. i. p. 371.]

⁴ ["He repeated the attempt three or four times, and with as little success. 'I now see,' said he, with a tone of affliction, 'that my strength forsakes me. Nature no longer answers, as formerly, to the appeals of my will; violent shocks are no longer suited to my debilitated frame: but I shall attain the end I propose by moderate exercise.' On the following day the Emperor was labouring under profound depression of spirits;—he still felt

The governor had already transmitted to Britain accounts of Napoleon's decay of health, without having it, however, in his power to ascertain how far it was real, or how far the appearances were assumed. The patient would neither receive the visit of any English surgeon or physician, nor would he authorize the communication of Dr Antommarchi with Sir Hudson Lowe. The governor was obliged to state accounts of the prisoner's declining health as reports, the reality of which he had no means of ascertaining. The generous feelings of the great personage at the head of the British Government were naturally deeply interested in the fate of the prisoner, and prompted him, by every means in his power, and especially by expressions of his own sympathy, to extend such hope and comfort to Napoleon as he could be supposed to receive, under the necessity of his continued captivity. The following is Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir Hudson Lowe on this interesting subject, dated 16th February, 1821 :—

“ I am aware how difficult it is to make any communication to the General which will not be liable to misrepresentation ; and yet, if he be really ill, he may derive some consolation by knowing, that the repeated accounts which have of late been transmitted of his declining health have not been received with indifference. You will, therefore, communicate to General Buonaparte the great interest which his Majesty has taken in the recent accounts of his indisposition, and the anxiety which his Majesty feels to afford him every relief of which his situation admits. You will

persuaded that exercise would save him. ‘ Sire,’ said Montholon, ‘ perhaps the see-saw would do your Majesty good ? ’—‘ True, I will try : have one arranged.’ This was immediately done ; but this motion produced no favourable effect, and he gave it up.”—*ANTOMMARCHI*, v. i. p. 393.]

assure General Buonaparte, that there is no alleviation which can be derived from additional medical assistance, nor any arrangement consistent with the safe custody of his person at St Helena (and his Majesty cannot now hold out any expectation of his removal), which his Majesty is not most ready and desirous to afford. You will not only repeat the offer which has already been more than once made, of such further medical assistance as the island of St Helena affords, but you will give him the option of procuring the attendance of any of the medical gentlemen who are at the Cape, where there is one, at least, of considerable eminence in his profession : and in case of any wish being expressed by the General to receive such assistance, you will consider yourself authorized to make a communication to the Cape, and take such other measures as may be necessary to secure the immediate attendance of the person whom the General may name."

Napoleon had not the satisfaction to know the interest which his Majesty took in his illness, which would probably have afforded him some gleam of consolation. The tenor of the letter might, perhaps, have induced him to think, that his own system of pertinacious contest with the authorities under whose charge he was placed, had been so far injudicious, as to lead to doubts of the reality of the disorder under which he was dying ; and had therefore been one great cause of intercepting the sympathy, and perhaps the relief, which must otherwise have extended itself to a situation so well deserving of commiseration.

Towards the end of March the disease assumed a character still more formidable, and Dr Antomarchi became desirous of obtaining a consultation with some of the English medical men. The Emperor's aversion to their assistance had been increased by a well-meant offer of the governor, announcing that a physician of eminence had arrived at the island, whom he therefore placed at

General Buonaparte's devotion.¹ This proposal, like every other advance on the part of Sir Hudson Lowe, had been received as a meditated injury; "He wants to deceive Europe by false bulletins," said Napoleon; "I will not see any one who is in communication with him."² To refuse seeing every physician but his own, was certainly an option which ought to have been left in Napoleon's choice, and it was so left accordingly. But in thus obstinately declining to see an impartial medical man, whose report must have been conclusive respecting his state of health, Napoleon unquestionably strengthened the belief, that his case was not so desperate as it proved to be.

At length the Ex-Emperor consented that Dr Antommarchi should consult with Dr Arnott, surgeon of the 20th regiment.³ But the united opinion of the medical gentlemen could not overcome the aversion of Napoleon to medicine, or shake the belief which he reposed in the gloomy

¹ Dr Shortt, physician to the forces; who, at this time, replaced Dr Baxter as principal medical officer at St Helena, and to whom we have been obliged for much valuable information.

² [Antommarchi, v. ii. p. 59.]

³ ["I seized a moment, when the Emperor was more tranquil, to hazard a few words about the necessity of a consultation.— 'A consultation! what would be the use of it? You all work in the dark. No! I will have none of them.' The Emperor was warm, and I therefore did not insist for the moment, but waited until he was more calm, when I again pressed the subject. 'You persist,' said he, with a tone of kindness, 'consult with the physician of the island that you consider the most skilful. I accordingly applied to Dr Arnott.'—ANTOMMARCHI, v. ii. p. 59.]

doctrines of fatalism. "Quod scriptum scriptum," he replied in the language of a Moslem; "All that is to happen is written down. Our hour is marked, and it is not in our power to claim a moment longer of life than Fate has predestined for us."¹

Dr Antommarchi finally prevailed in obtaining admittance for Dr Arnott into the apartment and presence of the patient, who complained chiefly of his stomach, of the disposition to vomit, and deficiency of the digestive powers. He saw him, for the first time on 2d April, 1821, and continued his visits regularly. Napoleon expressed his opinion that his liver was affected. Dr Arnott's observations led him to think, that though the action of the liver might be imperfect, the seat of the disease was to be looked for elsewhere. And here it is to be remarked, that Napoleon, when Dr Antommarchi expressed doubts on the state of his stomach, had repelled them with sharpness, though his own private belief was, that he was afflicted with the disease of his father. Thus, with a capricious inconsistency, natural enough to a sick-bed, he communicated to some of his retinue his sense of what disease afflicted him, though, afraid perhaps of some course of medicine being proposed, he did not desire that his surgeon should know his suspicions.² From the 15th to the 24th of April, Napoleon was engaged from time to time in making

¹ [Antommarchi, v. ii. p. 65.]

² Madame Bertrand mentioned to Dr Shortt that Napoleon conceived himself dying of cancer in the stomach, which she considered as a mere whim.

his testamentary bequests, of which we shall have occasion to make some mention hereafter, as illustrative of his peculiar character and sentiments. On the day last mentioned, he was greatly exhausted by the fatigue of writing, and showed symptoms of over-excitation. Among these may be safely included, a plan which he spoke of for reconciling all religious dissensions in France, which he said he had designed to carry into effect.

As the strength of the patient gradually sunk, the symptoms of his disease became less equivocal, until, on the 27th April, the ejection of a dark-coloured fluid gave farther insight into the nature of the malady. Dr Antommarchi persevered in attributing it to climate, which was flattering the wish of the patient, who desired to lay his death upon his confinement at St Helena; while Dr Arnott expressed his belief that the disease was the same which cut off his father in the pure air of Montpellier. Dr Antommarchi, as usually happens to the reporter of a debate, silenced his antagonist in the argument, although Dr Arnott had by this time obtained the patient's own authority for the assertion. Upon the 28th of April, Napoleon gave instructions to Antommarchi, that after his death his body should be opened, but that no English medical man should touch him, unless in the case of assistance being absolutely necessary, in which case he gave Antommarchi leave to call in that of Dr Arnott. He directed that his heart should be conveyed to Parma, to Maria Louisa; and requested anxiously that his stomach should be particularly examined, and the report transmitted to his son.

“The vomitings,” he said, “which succeed one another without interruption, lead me to suppose that the stomach is, of all my organs, the most diseased; and I am inclined to believe that it is attacked with the same disorder which killed my father,—I mean a scirrhus in the pylorus.” On the 2d May, the patient returned to the same interesting subject, reminded Antommarchi of his anxiety that the stomach should be carefully examined. The physicians of Montpellier had announced that the scirrhus in the pylorus would be hereditary in my family. Their report is, I believe, in the hands of Louis. Ask for it, and compare it with your own observations, that I may save my son from the sufferings I now experience.”

During the 3d May, it was seen that the life of Napoleon was drawing evidently to a close; and his followers, and particularly his physician, became desirous to call in more medical assistance;—that of Dr Shortt, physician to the forces, and of Dr Mitchell, surgeon of the flag-ship, was referred to. Dr Shortt, however, thought it proper to assert the dignity belonging to his profession, and refused (being under the same roof with the patient), to give an opinion on a case of so much importance in itself, and attended with so much obscurity, unless he were permitted to see and examine him. The officers of Napoleon’s household excused themselves, by professing that the Emperor’s strict commands had been laid on them, that no English physician, Dr Arnott excepted, should approach his dying bed. They said, that even when he was

speechless they would be unable to brook his eye, should he turn it upon them in reproof for their disobedience.

About two o'clock of the same day, the priest Vignali administered the sacrament of extreme unction. Some days before, Napoleon had explained to him the manner in which he desired his body should be laid out in state, in an apartment lighted by torches, or what Catholics call *une chambre ardente*. "I am neither," he said, in the same phrase which we have formerly quoted, "a philosopher nor a physician. I believe in God, and am of the religion of my father. It is not every body who can be an atheist. I was born a Catholic, and will fulfil all the duties of the Catholic Church, and receive the assistance which it administers." He then turned to Dr Antommarchi, whom he seems to have suspected of heterodoxy, which the doctor, however, disowned. "How can you carry it so far?" he said. "Can you not believe in God, whose existence every thing proclaims, and in whom the greatest minds have believed?"¹

As if to mark a closing point of resemblance betwixt Cromwell and Napoleon, a dreadful tempest arose on the 4th May, which preceded the day that was to close the mortal existence of this extraordinary man. A willow, which had been the Exile's favourite, and under which he had often enjoyed the fresh breeze, was torn up by the hurricane; and almost all the trees about Longwood shared the same fate.

¹ [Antommarchi, v. ii. p. 120.]

The 5th of May came amid wind and rain. Napoleon's passing spirit was deliriously engaged in a strife more terrible than that of the elements around. The words "*tête d'armée*," the last which escaped his lips, intimated that his thoughts were watching the current of a heady fight. About eleven minutes before six in the evening, Napoleon, after a struggle which indicated the original strength of his constitution, breathed his last.

THE officers of Napoleon's household were disposed to have the body anatomized in secret. But Sir Hudson Lowe had too deep a sense of the responsibility under which he and his country stood, to permit this to take place. He declared, that even if he were reduced to make use of force, he would insure the presence of English physicians at the dissection.

Generals Bertrand and Montholon, with Marchand, the valet-de-chambre of the deceased, were present at the operation, which took place on the 6th of May. It was also witnessed by Sir Thomas Reade, and some British staff-officers. Drs Thomas Shortt, Archibald Arnott, Charles Mitchell, Matthew Livingstone, and Francis Burton, all of them medical men, were also present. The cause of death was sufficiently evident. A large ulcer occupied almost the whole of the stomach. It was only the strong adhesion of the diseased parts of that organ to the concave surface of the lobe of the liver, which,

being over the ulcer, had prolonged the patient's life by preventing the escape of the contents of the stomach into the cavity of the abdomen. All the other parts of the viscera were found in a tolerably healthy state. The report was signed by the British medical gentlemen present. Dr Antommarchi was about to add his attestation, when, according to information which we consider as correct, General Bertrand interdicted his doing so, because the report was drawn up as relating to the body of *General Buonaparte*. Dr Antommarchi's own account does not, we believe, greatly differ from that of the British professional persons, though he has drawn conclusions from it which are apparently inconsistent with the patient's own conviction, and the ghastly evidence of the anatomical operation. He continued to insist that his late patron had not died of the cancer which we have described, or, in medical language, of scirrhus of the pylorus, but of a *chronic gastro hepatitis*, a disease he stated to be endemic in the island of St Helena; although we do not observe it asserted or proved that the hospital of the island, at any time, produced a single case like that of the deceased captive.

The gentlemen of Napoleon's suite were desirous that his heart should be preserved and given to their custody. But Sir Hudson Lowe did not feel himself at liberty to permit this upon his own authority. He agreed, however, that the heart should be placed in a silver vase, filled with spirits, and interred along with the body; so that, in case his instructions from home should so permit, it might be afterwards disinhumed and sent to Europe.

The place of interment became the next subject of discussion. On this subject Napoleon had been inconsistent. His testamentary disposition expressed a wish that his remains should be deposited on the banks of the Seine ; a request which he could not for an instant suppose would be complied with, and which appears to have been made solely for the sake of producing effect. The reflection of an instant would have been sufficient to call to recollection, that he would not, while in power, have allowed Louis XVIII. a grave in the land of his fathers ; nor *did* he permit the remains of the Duc D'Eng-hien any other interment than that assigned to the poorest outcast, who is huddled to earth on the spot on which he dies. But neither did the agitated state of the public mind, now general through Italy, recommend the measure.

A grave for the Emperor of France, within the limits of the rocky island to which his last years were limited, was the alternative that remained ; and sensible that this was likely to be the case, he had himself indicated the spot where he wished to lie. It was a small secluded recess, called Slane's, or Haines' Valley, where a fountain arose, at which his Chinese domestics used to fill the silver pitchers which they carried to Longwood for Napoleon's use. The spot had more of verdure and shade than any in the neighbourhood ; and the illustrious Exile was often accustomed to repose under the beautiful weeping willows which overhung the spring. The body, after lying in state in his small bed-room, during which time it was visited by every person of condition in the island, was, on

the 8th May, carried to the place of interment. The pall which covered the coffin was the military cloak which Napoleon had worn at the battle of Marengo. The members of his late household attended as mourners, and were followed by the governor, the admiral, and all the civil and military authorities of the island. All the troops were under arms upon the solemn occasion. As the road did not permit a near approach of the hearse to the place of sepulture, a party of British grenadiers had the honour to bear the coffin to the grave. The prayers were recited by the priest, Abbé Vignali. Minute guns were fired from the admiral's ship. The coffin was then let down into the grave, under a discharge of three successive volleys of artillery, from fifteen pieces of cannon. A large stone was then lowered down on the grave, and covered the moderate space now sufficient for the man for whom Europe was once too little.

CONCLUSION.

ARRIVED at the conclusion of this momentous narrative, the reader may be disposed to pause a moment to reflect on the character of that wonderful person, on whom Fortune showered so many favours in the beginning and through the middle of his career, to overwhelm its close with such deep and unwonted afflictions.

The external appearance of Napoleon was not imposing at the first glance, his stature being only five feet six inches English. His person, thin in youth, and somewhat corpulent in age, was rather delicate than robust in outward appearance, but cast in the mould most capable of enduring privation and fatigue. He rode ungracefully, and without the command of his horse which distinguishes a perfect cavalier ; so that he showed to disadvantage when riding beside such a horseman as Murat. But he was fearless, sat firm in his seat, rode with rapidity, and was capable of enduring the exercise for a longer time than most men. We have already mentioned his indifference to the quality of his food, and his power of enduring abstinence. A morsel of food, and a flask of wine hung at his saddle-bow, used, in his earlier campaigns, to support him for days. In his latter wars, he more frequently used a carriage ; not, as has been surmised,

from any particular illness, but from feeling in a frame so constantly in exercise the premature effects of age.

The countenance of Napoleon is familiar to almost every one from description, and the portraits which are found every where. The dark-brown hair bore little marks of the attentions of the toilet. The shape of the countenance approached more than is usual in the human race to a square. His eyes were grey, and full of expression, the pupils rather large, and the eyebrows not very strongly marked. The brow and upper part of the countenance was rather of a stern character. His nose and mouth were beautifully formed. The upper lip was very short. The teeth were indifferent, but were little shown in speaking.¹ His smile possessed uncommon sweetness, and is stated to have been irresistible. The complexion was a clear olive, otherwise in general colourless. The prevailing character of his countenance was grave, even to melancholy, but without any signs of severity or violence. After death, the placidity and dignity of expression which continued to occupy the features, rendered them eminently beautiful, and the admiration of all who looked on them.

Such was Napoleon's exterior. His personal and private character was decidedly amiable, excepting in one particular. His temper, when he received, or thought he received, provocation, especially if of a personal character, was warm and vindictive. He was, however, placable in the case even of his ene-

¹ When at St. Helena, he was much troubled with toothache and scurvy in the gums.

mies, providing that they submitted to his mercy ; but he had not that species of generosity which respects the sincerity of a manly and fair opponent. On the other hand, no one was a more liberal rewarder of the attachment of his friends. He was an excellent husband, a kind relation, and, unless when state policy intervened, a most affectionate brother. General Gourgaud, whose communications were not in every case to Napoleon's advantage, states him to have been the best of masters, labouring to assist all his domestics wherever it lay in his power, giving them the highest credit for such talents as they actually possessed, and imputing, in some instances, good qualities to such as had them not.

There was gentleness, and even softness, in his character. He was affected when he rode over the fields of battle, which his ambition had strewed with the dead and the dying, and seemed not only desirous to relieve the victims,—issuing for that purpose directions, which too often were not, and could not be, obeyed,—but showed himself subject to the influence of that more acute and imaginative species of sympathy, which is termed sensibility. He mentions a circumstance which indicates a deep sense of feeling. As he passed over a field of battle in Italy, with some of his generals, he saw a houseless dog lying on the body of his slain master. The creature came towards them, then returned to the dead body, moaned over it pitifully, and seemed to ask their assistance. “ Whether it were the feeling of the moment,” continued Napoleon, “ the scene, the hour, or the circumstance itself,

I was never so deeply affected by any thing which I have seen upon a field of battle. That man, I thought, has perhaps had a house, friends, comrades, and here he lies deserted by every one but his dog. How mysterious are the impressions to which we are subject! I was in the habit, without emotion, of ordering battles which must decide the fate of a campaign, and could look with a dry eye on the execution of manœuvres which must be attended with much loss; and here I was moved—nay, painfully affected—by the cries and the grief of a dog. It is certain that at that moment I should have been more accessible to a suppliant enemy, and could better understand the conduct of Achilles in restoring the body of Hector to the tears of Priam.”¹ The anecdote at once shows that Napoleon possessed a heart amenable to humane feelings, and that they were usually in total subjection to the stern precepts of military stoicism. It was his common and expressive phrase, that the heart of a politician should be in his head; but his feelings sometimes surprised him in a gentler mood.

A calculator by nature and by habit, Napoleon was fond of order, and a friend to that moral conduct in which order is best exemplified. The libels of the day have made some scandalous averments to the contrary, but without adequate foundation. Napoleon respected himself too much, and understood the value of public opinion too well, to have plunged into general or vague debauchery.

¹ Las Cases, t. i. pt. ii. p. 5.

Considering his natural disposition, then, it may be assumed that if Napoleon had continued in the vale of private life, and no strong temptation of passion or revenge had crossed his path, he must have been generally regarded as one whose friendship was every way desirable, and whose enmity it was not safe to incur.

But the opportunity afforded by the times, and the elasticity of his own great talents, both military and political, raised him with unexampled celerity to a sphere of great power, and at least equal temptation. Ere we consider the use which he made of his ascendancy, let us briefly review the causes by which it was accomplished.

The consequences of the Revolution, however fatal to private families, were the means of filling the camps of the nation with armies of a description which Europe had never seen before, and it is to be hoped, will never witness again. There was neither safety, honour, nor almost subsistence, in any other profession than the military; and accordingly it became the refuge of the best and bravest of the youth of France, until the army ceased to consist, as in most nations, of the miserable and disorderly class of the community, but was levied in the body and bosom of the state, and composed of the flower of France, whether as regarded health, moral qualities, or elevation of mind. With such men, the generals of the republic achieved many and great victories, but without being able to ensure corresponding advantages. This may have been in a great measure occasioned by the dependence in which these leaders were held by the various

administrators of the republic at home—a dependence accounted for by the necessity of having recourse to those in power at Paris, for the means of paying and supporting their armies. From the time that Napoleon passed the Alps, he inverted this state of things; and made the newly conquered countries not only maintain the army by means of contributions and confiscations, but even contribute to support the government. Thus war, which had hitherto been a burden to the republic, became in his hands a source of public revenue; while the youthful general, contributing to the income of the state, on which his predecessors had been dependent, was enabled to assert the freedom at which he speedily aimed, and correspond with the Directory upon a footing approaching to equality. His talents as a soldier, and situation as a victorious general, soon raised him from equality to pre-eminence.

These talents applied not less to the general arrangements of the campaign, than to the dispositions for actual battle. In each of these great departments of war, Napoleon was not merely a pupil of the most approved masters of the art,—he was an improver, an innovator, and an inventor.

In strategie, he applied upon a gigantic scale the principles upon which Frederick of Prussia had acted, and gained a capital or a kingdom, when Frederick would have won a town or a province. His system was, of course, that of assembling the greatest possible force of his own upon the vulnerable point of the enemy's position, paralysing, perhaps, two parts of their army, while he cut the

third to pieces, and then following up his position by destroying the remainder in detail. For this purpose, he taught generals to divide their armies upon the march, with a view to celerity of movement and facility of supply, and to unite them at the moment of contest, where an attack would be most feebly resisted, because least expected. For this, also, he first threw aside all species of baggage which could possibly be dispensed with—supplied the want of magazines by the contributions exacted from the country, or collected from individuals by a regular system of marauding—discontinued the use of tents, and trusted to bivouacking with his soldiers, where hamlets could not be found, and there was no time to erect huts. His system was ruinous in point of lives, for even the military hospitals were often dispensed with; but although Moreau termed Napoleon a conqueror at the rate of ten thousand men a-day, yet the sacrifice for a length of time uniformly attained the object for which it was designed. The enemy who had remained in their extensive cantonments, distracted by the reports of various columns moving in different directions, were surprised and defeated by the united force of the French, which had formed a junction where and when it was least expected. It was not till they had acquired the art of withdrawing from his attack so soon as made, that the allies learned to defeat the efforts of his movable columns.

Napoleon was not less original as a tactician than as a strategist. His manœuvres on the field of battle had the promptness and decision of the thunder-

bolt. In the actual shock of conflict, as in the preparations which he made for bringing it on, his object was to amuse the enemy upon many points, while he oppressed one by an unexpected force of numbers. The breaking through the line, the turning of a flank, which had been his object from the commencement of the fight, lay usually disguised under a great number of previous demonstrations, and was not attempted until both the moral and physical force of the enemy was impaired by the length of the combat. It was at this period that he brought up his guards, who, impatient of inactivity, had been held in readiness for hours, and now, springing forward like wolf-dogs from the leash, had the glorious task, in which they rarely failed, of deciding the long-sustained contest. It may be added, as further characteristic of his tactics, that he preferred employing the order of the column to that of the line; perhaps on account of the faith which he might rest in the extreme valour of the French officers by whom the column was headed.

The interest which Napoleon preserved in the French soldier's affection by a frequent distribution of prizes and distinctions, as well as by his familiar notice of their persons, and attention to their wants, joined to his possession of absolute and independent command, rendered it no difficult matter for him to secure their support in the revolution of the eighteenth Brumaire, and in placing him at the head of affairs. Most part of the nation were heartily tired by this time of the continually unsettled state of the government, and the various changes which it had experienced, from the visionary speculations

of the Girondists, the brutal and bloody ferocity of the Jacobins, and the sordid and undecided versatility and imbecility of the Directory; and the people in general desired a settled form of government, which, if less free, should be more stable in duration, and better calculated to assure to individuals the protection of property and of personal freedom, than those which had followed the downfall of the monarchy. A successful general, of a character more timid, or conscience more tender, than that of Napoleon, might have attempted the restoration of the Bourbons. But Napoleon foresaw the difficulties which would occur by an attempt to reconcile the recall of the emigrants to the assurance of the national sales, and aptly concluded, that the parties which tore France to pieces would be most readily amalgamated together under the authority of one, who was in a great measure a stranger to them all.

Arrived at the possession of supreme power, a height that dazzles and confounds so many, Napoleon seemed only to occupy the station for which he was born, to which his peculiar powers adapted him, and his brilliant career of success gave him, under all circumstances, an irresistible claim. He continued, therefore, with a calm mind and enlightened wisdom, to consider the means of rendering his power stable, of destroying the republican impulse, and establishing a monarchy, of which he destined himself to be the monarch. To most men the attempt to revive, in favour of a military adventurer, a form of government, which had been rejected by what seemed the voice of the nation with universal ac-

claim, would have appeared an act of desperation. The partisans of the Republic were able statesmen, and men of superior talent, accustomed also to rule the fierce democracy, and organize those intrigues which had overthrown crown and altar ; and it was hardly to be supposed that such men would, were it but for shame's sake, have seen their ten years' labour at once swept away by the sword of a young though successful general.

But Napoleon knew himself and them ; and felt the confidence, that those who had been associates in the power acquired by former revolutions, must be now content to sink into the instruments of his advancement, and the subordinate agents of his authority, contented with such a share of spoil as that with which the lion rewards the jackall.

To the kingdom at large, upon every new stride towards power, he showed the certificate of superior efficacy, guaranteed by the most signal success ; and he assumed the empire of France under the proud title, *Detur dignissimo*. Neither did his actions up to this point encourage any one to challenge the defects or flaws of his title. In practice, his government was brilliant abroad, and, with few exceptions, liberal and moderate at home. The abominable murder of the Duc d'Enghien showed the vindictive spirit of a savage ; but, in general, the public actions of Napoleon, at the commencement of his career, were highly laudable. The battle of Marengo, with its consequences,—the softening of civil discord, the reconciliation with the Church of Rome, the recall of the great body of the emigrants, and the revivification of National Jurispru-

dence,—were all events calculated to flatter the imagination, and even gain the affections, of the people.

But, with a dexterity peculiar to himself, Napoleon proceeded, while abolishing the Republic, to press into his service those very democratical principles which had given rise to the Revolution, and encouraged the attempt to found a commonwealth. His sagacity had not failed to observe, that the popular objections to the ancient government were founded less upon any objection to the royal authority in itself, than a dislike, amounting to detestation, of the privileges which it allotted to the nobles and to the clergy, who held, from birth and office, the right to fill the superior ranks in every profession, and barred the competition of all others, however above them in merit. When, therefore, Napoleon constructed his new form of monarchical government, he wisely considered that he was not, like hereditary monarchs, tied down to any particular rules arising out of ancient usage, but, being himself creator of the power which he wielded, he was at liberty to model it according to his own pleasure. He had been raised also so easily to the throne, by the general acknowledgment of his merits, that he had not needed the assistance of a party of his own; consequently, being unfettered by previous engagements, and by the necessity of gratifying old partisans, or acquiring new ones, his conduct was in a very unusual degree free and unlimited.

Having, therefore, attained the summit of human power, he proceeded, advisedly and deliberately, to

lay the foundation of his throne on that democratic principle which had opened his own career, and which was the throwing open to merit, though without farther title, the road to success in every department of the state. This was the secret key of Napoleon's policy; and he was so well aided in the use of it, by acute perception of character, as well as by good nature and good feeling (both of which, in his cooler moments, he possessed), that he never, through all his vicissitudes, lost an opportunity of conciliating and pleasing the multitude by evincing a well-timed attention to distinguish and reward talent.¹ To this his conversation perpetually alluded; and for this he claims, and is entitled to, the highest praise. We have little hesitation in repeating, that it was thus opening a full career to talent of every kind, which was the keystone of his reputation, and the main foundation of his power. Unhappily, his love of merit, and disposition to reward it, were not founded exclusively upon a patriotic attention to the public welfare, far less on a purely benevolent desire to reward what was praiseworthy; but upon a principle of selfish policy, to which must be ascribed a great part of his success, no small portion of his misfortunes, and almost all his political crimes.

We have quoted elsewhere the description given of the Emperor by his brother Lucien, in a moment probably of spleen, but which has been nevertheless confirmed by almost all the persons habitually conversant with Napoleon, at whom we have

¹ [See APPENDIX, No. VI.]

had an opportunity of making enquiries. "His conduct," said his brother, "is entirely regulated by his policy, and his policy is altogether founded upon egotism." No man, perhaps, ever possessed (under the restrictions to be presently mentioned) so intense a proportion of that selfish principle which is so common to humanity. It was planted by nature in his heart, and nourished by the half monastic, half military education, which so early separated him from social ties ; it was encouraged by the consciousness of possessing talents which rendered him no mate for the ordinary men among whom his lot seemed cast ; and became a confirmed habit, by the desolate condition in which he stood at his first outset in life, without friend, protector, or patron. The praise, the promotion he received, were given to his genius, not to his person ; and he who was conscious of having forced his own way, had little to bind him in gratitude or kindness to those, who only made room for him because they durst not oppose him. His ambition was a modification of selfishness, sublime indeed in its effects and consequences, but yet, when strictly analyzed, leaving little but egotism in the crucible.

Our readers are not, however, to suppose, that the selfishness of Napoleon was of that ordinary and odious character, which makes men miserly, oppressive, and fraudulent in private life ; or which, under milder features, limits their exertions to such enterprises as may contribute to their own individual profit, and closes the heart against feelings of patriotism, or of social benevolence. Napoleon's egotism and love of self was of a far nobler and

more elevated kind, though founded on similar motives,—just as the wings of the eagle, who soars into the regions of the sun, move on the same principles with those which cannot bear the dunghill fowl over the pales of the poultry-yard.

To explain our meaning, we may add that Napoleon loved France, for France was his own. He studied to confer benefits upon her, for the profit redounded to her emperor, whether she received amended institutions, or enlarged territories. He represented, as he boasted, the People as well as the Sovereign of France ; he engrossed in his own person her immunities, her greatness, her glory, and was bound to conduct himself so as to exalt at the same time the emperor and the empire. Still, however, the sovereign and the state might be, and at length actually were, separated ; and the egotistical character of Buonaparte could, after that separation, find amusement and interest in the petty scale of Elba, to which his exertions were then limited.¹ Like the magic tent in the Arabian Tales, his faculties could expand to enclose half a world, with all its cares and destinies, or could accommodate themselves to the concerns of a petty rock in the Mediterranean, and his own conveniences when he retreated to its precincts. We believe that while France acknowledged Napoleon as emperor, he would cheerfully have laid down his life for her benefit ; but we greatly doubt, if, by merely raising his finger, he could have made her happy under the Bourbons, whether (unless the merit of

¹ See *ante*, vol. xv. p. 212.

the action had redounded to his own personal fame) that finger would have been lifted. In a word, his feelings of self-interest were the central point of a circle, the circumference of which may be extended or contracted at pleasure, but the centre itself remains fixed and unchanged.

It is needless to enquire how far this solicitous, and we must add, enlightened attention to his own interest, facilitated Buonaparte's ascent to the supreme power. We daily witness individuals, possessed of a very moderate proportion of parts, who, by intently applying themselves to the prosecution of some particular object, without being drawn aside by the calls of pleasure, the seductions of indolence, or other interruptions, succeed ultimately in attaining the object of their wishes. When, therefore, we conceive the powerful mind of Napoleon, animated by an unbounded vivacity of imagination, and an unconquerable tenacity of purpose, moving forward, without deviation or repose, to the accomplishment of its purpose, which was nothing less than to acquire the dominion of the whole world, we cannot be surprised at the immense height to which he raised himself.

But the egotism which governed his actions,—subject always to the exercise of his excellent sense, and the cultivation of his interest in the public opinion,—if in a great measure it favoured the success of his various enterprises, did him in the end much more evil than good; as it instigated his most desperate enterprises, and was the source of his most inexcusable actions.

Moderate politicians will agree, that after the

imperial system was substituted for the republican, the chief magistrate ought to have assumed and exerted a considerable strength of authority, in order to maintain that re-establishment of civil order, that protection of the existing state of things, which was necessary to terminate the wild and changeful recurrence of perpetual revolutions. Had Napoleon stopped here, his conduct would have been unblamable, and unblamed, unless by the more devoted followers of the House of Bourbon, against whom Providence appeared to most men to have closed the gate of restoration. But his principles of egotism would not be satisfied until he had totally destroyed every vestige of those free institutions which had been acquired by the perils, the blood, the tears of the Revolution, and reduced France, save for the influence of public opinion, to the condition of Constantinople, or of Algiers. If it was a merit to raise up the throne, it was natural that he who did so should himself occupy it; since in ceding it to the Bourbons, he must have betrayed those at whose hands he accepted power; but to plunder the nation of their privileges as free-born men, was the act of a parricide. The nation lost, under his successive encroachments, what liberty the ancient government had left them, and all those rights which had been acquired by the Revolution. Political franchises, individual interests, the property of municipalities, the progress of education, of science, of mind and sentiment, all were usurped by the government. France was one immense army, under the absolute authority of a military com-

mander, subject to no control nor responsibility. In that nation so lately agitated by the nightly assembly of thousands of political clubs, no class of citizens under any supposable circumstances, had the right of uniting in the expression of their opinions. Neither in the manners nor in the laws, did there remain any popular means of resisting the errors or abuses of the administration. France resembled the political carcass of Constantinople, without the insubordination of the Pachas, the underhand resistance of the Ulemas, and the frequent and clamorous mutinies of the Janizaries.¹

Whilst Napoleon destroyed successively every barrier of public liberty—while he built new state prisons, and established a high police, which filled France with spies and jailers—while he took the charge of the press so exclusively into his own hand—his policy at once, and his egotism, led him to undertake those immense public works, of greater or less utility or ornament as the chance might be, but which were sure to be set down as monuments of the Emperor's splendour. The name given him by the working classes, of the General Undertaker, was by no means ill bestowed; but in what an incalculably greater degree do such works succeed, when raised by the skill and industry of those who propose to improve their capital by the adventure, than when double the expense is employed at the arbitrary will of a despotic sovereign! Yet it had been well if bridges, roads, harbours, and public works, had been the only compensation which

¹ Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule, par Le Général Foy.

Napoleon offered to the people of France for the liberties he took from them. But he poured out to them, and shared with them, to drown all painful and degrading recollections, the intoxicating and fatal draught of military glory and universal domination. To lay the whole universe prostrate at the foot of France, while France, the Nation of Camps, should herself have no higher rank than the first of her own Emperor's slaves, was the gigantic project, at which he laboured with such tenacious assiduity. It was the Sisyphean stone, which he rolled so high up the hill, that at length he was crushed under its precipitate recoil.

The main objects of that immense enterprise were such as had been undertaken while his spirit of ambition was at its height ; and no one dared, even in his councils, to interfere with the resolutions which he adopted. Had these been less eminently successful, it is possible he might have paused, and perhaps might have preferred the tranquil pursuit of a course which might have rendered one kingdom free and happy, to the subjugation of all Europe. But Napoleon's career of constant and uninterrupted success under the most disadvantageous circumstances, together with his implied belief in his Destiny, conspired, with the extravagant sense of his own importance, to impress him with an idea that he was not "in the roll of common men,"¹ and induced him to venture on the most desperate undertakings, as if animated less by the result of reason than by an internal assurance of

¹ [“ And all the courses of my life do show, I am not in the roll of common men.”—*Hen. IV.*, act iii. sc. 2.]

success. After great miscarriages, he is said sometimes to have shown a corresponding depression; and thence he resigned four times the charge of his army when he found his situation embarrassing, as if no longer feeling confidence in his own mind, or conceiving he was deserted for the moment by his guardian genius. There were similar alternations, too, according to General Gourgaud's account, in his conversation. At times, he would speak like a deity,¹ at others, in the style of a very ordinary person.

To the egotism of Napoleon, we may also trace the general train of deception which marked his public policy, and, when speaking upon subjects in which his own character was implicated, his private conversation.

In his public capacity, he had so completely prostituted the liberty of the press, that France could know nothing whatever but through Napoleon's own bulletins. The battle of Trafalgar was not hinted at till several months after it had been fought, and then it was totally misrepresented; and so deep and dark was the mantle which covered the events in which the people were most interested, that, on the very evening when the battle of Montmartre was fought, the *Moniteur*, the chief organ of public intelligence, was occupied in a commentary on *nosographie*, and a criticism on a drama on the subject of the chaste Susannah.² The hiding the

¹ ["For deity, read great man, and Gourgaud's account is perfectly correct."—JOSEPH BUONAPARTE, *Erreurs de Bourrienne*, t. i. p. 233.]

² [Memorable Events at Paris, p. 93.]

truth is only one step to the invention of falsehood, and, as a periodical publisher of news, Napoleon became so eminent for both, that, to "lie like a bulletin," became an adopted expression, not likely soon to lose ground in the French language, and the more disgraceful to Napoleon, that he is well known to have written those official documents in most instances himself.

Even this deceptive system, this plan of alternately keeping the nation in ignorance, or abusing it by falsehood, intimated a sense of respect for public opinion. Men love darkness, because their deeds are evil. Napoleon dared not have submitted to the public an undisguised statement of his perfidious and treacherous attacks upon Spain, than which a more gross breach of general good faith and existing treaties could scarce have been conceived. Nor would he have chosen to plead at the public bar, the policy of his continental system, adopted in total ignorance of the maxims of political economy, and the consequences of which were, first, to cause general distress, and then to encourage universal resistance against the French yoke throughout the whole continent of Europe. Nor is it more likely that, could the public have had the power of forming a previous judgment upon the probable event of the Russian campaign, that rash enterprise would ever have had an existence. In silencing the voice of the wise and good, the able and patriotic, and communicating only with such counsellors as were the echoes of his own inclinations, Napoleon, like Lear,

"Kill'd his physician, and the fee bestow'd
Upon the foul disease."

This was the more injurious, as Napoleon's knowledge of the politics, interests, and character of foreign courts was, excepting in the case of Italy, exceedingly imperfect. The peace of Amiens might have remained uninterrupted, and the essential good understanding betwixt France and Sweden need never have been broken, if Napoleon could, or would, have understood the free constitution of England, which permits every man to print or publish what he may choose ; or if he could have been convinced that the institutions of Sweden did not permit their government to place their fleets and armies at the disposal of a foreign power, or to sink the ancient kingdom of the Goths into a secondary and vassal government.

Self-love, so sensitive as that of Napoleon, shunned especially the touch of ridicule. The gibes of the English papers, the caricatures of the London print-shops, were the petty stings which instigated, in a great measure, the breach of the peace of Amiens. The laughter-loving Frenchmen were interdicted the use of satire, which all-licensed during the times of the republic, had, even under the monarchy, been only punished with a short and easy confinement in the Bastile. During the time of the consulate, Napoleon was informed that a comic opera, something on the plan of the English farce of *High Life Below Stairs*, had been composed by Monsieur Dupaty, and brought forward on the stage, and that, in this audacious performance, three valets mimicked the manners, and even the dress, of the three Consuls, and especially his own. He ordered that the actors should be

exposed at the Grève, in the dresses they had dared to assume, which should be there stripped from their backs by the executioner ; and he commanded that the author should be sent to St Domingo, and placed, as a person under requisition, at the disposal of the commander-in-chief. The sentence was not executed, for the offence had not existed, at least to the extent alleged ;¹ but the intention shows Napoleon's ideas of the liberty of the stage, and intimates what would have been the fate of the author of the *Beggar's Opera*, had he written for the French Opera Comique.

But no light, which reason or information could supply, was able to guide the intensity of a selfish ambition, which made Napoleon desire that the whole administration of the whole world should not only remotely, but even directly and immediately, depend on his own pleasure. When he distributed kingdoms to his brothers, it was under the express understanding that they were to follow in every thing the course of politics which he should dictate ; and after all, he seemed only to create dependent states for the purpose of resuming them. The oppressions, which, in the name of France, he imposed upon Holland, were the direct, and, in all probability, the calculated means of dethroning his brother Louis ; and he had thoughts of removing Joseph from Spain, when he saw of what a fair and goodly realm he had pronounced him king. In his wild and insatiable extravagance of administering in person the government of every realm which

¹ Thibaudaud, Mémoires sur le Consulat, p. 148.

he conquered, he brought his powerful mind to the level of that of the spoiled child, who will not be satisfied without holding in its own hand whatever has caught its eye. The system, grounded on ambition so inordinate, carried with it in its excess the principles of its own ruin. The runner who will never stop for repose must at last fall down with fatigue. Had Napoleon succeeded both in Spain and Russia, he would not have rested, until he had found elsewhere the disasters of Baylen and of Moscow.

The consequences of the unjustifiable aggressions of the French Emperor were an unlimited extent of slaughter, fire, and human misery, all arising from the ambition of one man, who, never giving the least sign of having repented the unbounded mischief, seemed, on the contrary, to justify and take pride in the ravage which he had occasioned. This ambition, equally insatiable and incurable, justified Europe in securing his person, as if it had been that of a lunatic, whose misguided rage was not directed against an individual, but against the civilized world; which, wellnigh overcome by him, and escaping with difficulty, had a natural right to be guaranteed against repetition of the frantic exploits of a being who seemed guided by more than human passion, and capable of employing in execution of his purpose more than human strength.

The same egotism, the same spirit of self-deception, which marked Napoleon during his long and awful career of success, followed him into adversity. He framed apologies for the use of his little company of followers, as he had formerly manufac-

tured bulletins for the Great Nation. Those to whom these excuses were addressed, Las Cases and the other gentlemen of Napoleon's suite, being too much devoted to him, and too generous to dispute after his fall doctrines which it would have been dangerous to controvert during his power, received whatever he said as truths delivered by a prophet, and set down doubtless to the score of inspiration what could by no effort be reconciled to truth. The horrid evils which afflicted Europe during the years of his success, were represented to others, and perhaps to his own mind, as consequences which the Emperor neither wished nor contemplated, but which were necessarily and unalterably attached to the execution of the great plans which the Man of Destiny had been called upon earth to perform, resembling in so far the lurid and fear-inspiring train pursuing the rapid course of a brilliant comet, which the laws of the universe have projected through the pathless firmament.

Some crimes he committed of a different character, which seem to have sprung, not like the general evils of war, from the execution of great and calculated plans of a political or military kind, but must have had their source in a temper naturally passionate and vindictive. The Duc d'Enghien's murder was at the head of this list; a gratuitous act of treachery and cruelty, which, being undeniable, led Napoleon to be believed capable of other crimes of a secret and bloody character,—of the murder of Pichegru and of Wright,—of the spiriting away of Mr Windham, who was never afterwards heard of,—and of other actions of similar atrocity. We

pause before charging him with any of those which have not been distinctly proved. For while it is certain that he had a love of personal vengeance—proper, it is said, to his country—it is equally evident, that, vehement by temperament, he was lenient and calm by policy; and that, if he had indulged the former disposition, the security with which he might have done so, together with the ready agency of his fatal police, would have made his rage resemble that of one of the Roman emperors. He was made sensible, too late, of the general odium drawn upon him by the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, and does not seem to have been disposed to incur farther risks of popular hatred in prosecution of his individual resentment. The records of his police, however, and the persecutions experienced by those whom Napoleon considered as his personal enemies, show that, by starts at least, nature resumed her bent, and that he, upon whom there was no restraint, save his respect for public opinion, gave way occasionally to the temptation of avenging his private injuries. He remarked it as a weakness in the character of his favourite Cæsar, that he suffered his enemies to remain in possession of the power to injure him; and Antommarchi, the reporter of the observation, admitted, that when he looked on the person before him, he could not but acknowledge that *he* was unlikely to fall into such an error.¹

When Napoleon laid aside reserve, and spoke what were probably his true sentiments, he endea-

¹ [Antommarchi, v. i. p. 249.]

voured to justify those acts of his government which transgressed the rules of justice and morality, by political necessity, and reasons of state ; or, in other words, by the pressure of his own interest. This, however, was a plea, the full benefit of which he reserved to vindicate his own actions, never permitting it to be used by any other sovereign. He considered *himself* privileged in transgressing the law of nations, when his interests required it ; but pleaded as warmly upon the validity of public law, when alleging it had been infringed by other states, as if he himself had in all instances respected its doctrines as inviolable.

But although Napoleon thus at times referred to state necessity as the ultimate source of actions otherwise unjustifiable, he more frequently endeavoured to disguise his errors by denial, or excuse them by apologies which had no foundation. He avers in his Will,¹ that by the confession of the Duc d'Enghien, the Comte d'Artois maintained sixty assassins against his life ;² and that for this reason the Duc d'Enghien was tried, convicted, and put to death. The examination of the duke bears no such confession, but, on the contrary, an express denial of the whole of the alleged system ;

¹ [See APPENDIX, No VII.]

² The precise words of the Will seem to bear, that it was the *Comte d'Artois*' confession which established this charge. But no such confession was ever made ; neither, if made, could it have been known to Napoleon at the time of the trial ; nor, if known, could it have constituted evidence against the party accused, who was no accessary to the fact alleged. The assertion is utterly false in either case, but under the latter interpretation, it is also irrelevant. The Duc d'Enghien might be affected by his own confession, certainly not by that of his kinsman.

nor was there the slightest attempt made to contradict him by other testimony. He bequeathed, in like manner, a legacy to a villain¹ who had attempted the assassination of the Duke of Wellington; the assassin, according to his strange argument, having as good a right to kill his rival and victor, as the English had to detain him prisoner at St Helena. This clause in the last will of a dying man, is not striking from its atrocity merely, but from the inaccuracy of the moral reasoning which it exhibits. Napoleon has drawn a parallel betwixt two cases, which must be therefore both right or both wrong. If both were wrong, why reward the ruffian with a legacy? but if both were right, why complain of the British Government for detaining him at St Helena?

But, indeed, the whole character of Napoleon's autobiography marks his desire to divide mankind into two classes,—his friends and his enemies;—the former of whom are to be praised and vindicated; the latter to be vilified, censured, and condemned, without any regard to truth, justice, or consistency. To take a gross example, he stoutly affirmed, that the treasures which were removed from Paris in April 1814, and carried to Orleans, were seized and divided by the ministers of the allied powers,—Talleyrand, Metternich, Hardenberg, and Castlereagh; and that the money thus seized included the marriage-portion of the Empress Maria Louisa.² Had this story been true,

¹ [Cantillon. See Fourth Codicil to Will, APPENDIX, No. VII.]

² See Dr O'Meara's Voice from St Helena, who seems himself

it would have presented Napoleon with a very simple means of avenging himself upon Lord Castlereagh, by putting the British public in possession of the secret.

It is no less remarkable, that Napoleon, though himself a soldier and a distinguished one, could never allow a tribute of candid praise to the troops and generals by whom he was successively opposed. In mentioning his victories, he frequently bestows commendation upon the valour and conduct of the vanquished. This was an additional and more delicate mode of praising himself and his own troops by whom these enemies were overthrown. But he never allows any merit to those by whom he was defeated in turn. He professes never to have seen the Prussian troops behave well save at Jena, or the Russians save at Austerlitz. Those armies of the same nations, which he both saw and felt in the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, and before whom he made such disastrous retreats as those of Moscow and Leipsic, were, according to his expressions, mere *canaille*.

In the same manner, when he details an action in which he triumphed, he is sure to boast, like the old Grecian (very justly perhaps), that in this Fortune had no share; while his defeats are entirely and exclusively attributed to the rage of the elements, the combination of some most extraordinary and unexpected circumstances, the failure of

to have been startled at the enormity of the fiction. What makes it yet more extravagant is, that Napoleon's Will disposes of a part of that very treasure, as if it were still in the hands of Maria Louisa.

some of his lieutenants or mareschals, or, finally, the obstinacy of the general opposed, who, by mere dint of stupidity, blundered into success through circumstances which should have ensured his ruin.

In a word, from one end of Napoleon's works to the other, he has scarcely allowed himself to be guilty of a single fault or a single folly, excepting of that kind, which, arising from an over confidence and generosity, men secretly claim as merits, while they affect to give them up as matters of censure. If we credit his own word, we must believe him to have been a faultless and impeccable being. If we do not, we must set him down as one that, where his own reputation was concerned, told his story with a total disregard to candour and truth.

Perhaps it was a consequence of the same indifference to truth, which induced Napoleon to receive into his favour those French officers who broke their parole by escape from England. This, he alleged, he did by way of retaliation, the British Government having, as he pretended, followed a similar line of conduct. The defence is false, in point of fact; but if it were true, it forms no apology for a sovereign and a general countenancing a breach of honour in a gentleman and a soldier. The French officers who liberated themselves by such means, were not the less dishonoured men, and unfit to bear command in the army of France, though they could have pointed with truth to similar examples of infamy in England.

But the most extraordinary instance of Napoleon's deceptive system, and of his determination, at all events, to place himself under the most fa-

avourable light to the beholders, is his attempt to represent himself as the friend and protector of liberal and free principles. He had destroyed every vestige of liberty in France—he had persecuted as ideologists all who cherished its memory—he had boasted himself the restorer of monarchical government—the war between the Constitutionalists and him, covered, after the return from Elba, by a hollow truce, had been renewed, and the liberalists had expelled him from the capital—he had left in his Testament, the appellation of *traitor* with La Fayette, one of their earliest, most devoted, and most sincere chiefs—yet, notwithstanding all this constant opposition to the party which professes most to be guided by them, he has ventured to represent himself as a friend of liberal ideas ! He has done so, and he has been believed.

There is but one explanation of this. The friends of revolution are upon principle the enemies of ancient and established governments—Napoleon became the opponent of the established powers from circumstances ; not because he disputed the character of their government, but because they would not admit him into their circle ; and though there was not, and could not be, any real connexion betwixt his system and that of the liberalists, yet both had the same opponents, and each loved in the other the enemy of their enemies. It was the business of Napoleon in his latter days, to procure, if professions could gain it, the sympathy and good opinion of any or every class of politicians ; while, on the contrary, it could not be indifferent to those to whom he made advances, to number among their

disciples, even in the twelfth hour, the name of Napoleon. It resembled what sometimes happens in the Catholic church, when a wealthy and powerful sinner on his death-bed receives the absolution of the church on easy terms, and dies after a life spent in licentious courses, wrapt up in the mantle, and girded with the cord, of some order of unusual strictness. Napoleon, living a despot and a conqueror, has had his memory consecrated and held up to admiration by men, who term themselves emphatically the friends of freedom.

The faults of Buonaparte, we conclude as we commenced, were rather those of the sovereign and politician, than of the individual. Wisely is it written, that "if we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." It was the inordinate force of ambition which made him the scourge of Europe ; it was his efforts to disguise that selfish principle, that made him combine fraud with force, and establish a regular system for deceiving those whom he could not subdue. Had his natural disposition been coldly cruel, like that of Octavius, or had he given way to the warmth of his temper, like other despots, his private history, as well as that of his campaigns, must have been written in letters of blood. If, instead of asserting that he never committed a crime, he had limited his self-eulogy to asserting, that in attaining and wielding supreme power, he had resisted the temptation to commit many, he could not have been contradicted. And this is no small praise.

His system of government was false in the extreme. It comprehended the slavery of France,

and aimed at the subjugation of the world. But to the former he did much to requite them for the jewel of which he robbed them. He gave them a regular government, schools, institutions, courts of justice, and a code of laws. In Italy, his rule was equally splendid and beneficial. The good effects which arose to other countries from his reign and character, begin also to be felt, though unquestionably they are not of the kind which he intended to produce. His invasions, tending to reconcile the discords which existed in many states between the governors and governed, by teaching them to unite together against a common enemy, have gone far to loosen the feudal yoke, to enlighten the mind both of prince and people, and have led to many admirable results, which will not be the less durably advantageous, that they have arisen, are arising slowly, and without contest.

In closing the Life of NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE, we are called upon to observe, that he was a man tried in the two extremities, of the most exalted power and the most ineffable calamity, and if he occasionally appeared presumptuous when supported by the armed force of half a world, or unreasonably querulous when imprisoned within the narrow limits of St Helena, it is scarce within the capacity of those whose steps have never led them beyond the middle path of life, to estimate either the strength of the temptations to which he yielded, or the force of mind which he opposed to those which he was able to resist.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

REMARKS ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815,

BY CAPTAIN JOHN W. PRINGLE, OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.

[*See p. 22.*]

THE following observations were hastily made, at a time when much public interest was excited by the various accounts of the campaign of 1815, edited by several individuals, all claiming the peculiar distinction of having been dictated by Napoleon, or written under his immediate direction. With some slight exceptions, and occasional anecdotes, they nearly correspond, as far as relates to the military details.¹ The 9th volume of the *Memoirs of Napoleon*, published by O'Meara, is perhaps the original from which the greatest part of the other productions are derived. It is now generally acknowledged to have been, to a certain extent, composed by Buonaparte.

These works have had one particular object,—the defence of

¹ Liv. ix. *Mémoires Historiques de Napoleon*. London, Sir R. Philips, 1820.—Montholon, *Mémoires de Napoleon*, Colburn, London, 1823.—Las Cases; London, 2 vols.—Gourgaud, *War of 1815*. London, 1824.—Many passages in these works will be found quite parallel; for instance, Montholon, vol. ii. p. 272-289, with Liv. ix. p. 43. Grouchy, page 4, designates these works from St Helena, as containing, “des instructions et des ordres supposés; des mouvements imaginaires,” &c. &c.; also, “des assertions erronnées, des hypothèses faites après coup;” see also p. 26. P. 22, he says, with justice, of these authors: “Des individus qui se persuadent que l'aurole de gloire d'un grand homme, en les éclairant un moment, les a transformés en d'irrecusables autorités, et ne voyant pas qu'un éclat d'emprunt qui ne se réfléchit sur aucun fait d'armes connus, sur aucuns services éminens, ne sert qu'à mieux faire ressortir la presumptueuse imperitie des jugemens qu'ils prononcent.”

an unfortunate and great man. The individual, however, is always held up to view; the actions are softened or strengthened to suit this purpose, and in the extension of this design, the reputation of his own officers, and a strict adherence to facts, are occasionally sacrificed. The military features of the campaign have remained unanswered; whilst the wounded honour and fame of his generals have called for some counter-statements, which throw curious light on the whole campaign, and on the machinery of a system which so long alarmed the world. These last are little known in Britain.

Whoever has perused the mass of military works by French officers, most of them ably written, and many artfully composed, must feel how much they tend to encourage a peculiar feeling of national superiority in young minds, in a country where only their own military works are read. In these works they never find a French army beaten in the field, without some plausible reason; or, as Las Cases terms it [vol. ii. p. 15], "a concurrence of unheard-of fatalities," to account for it. Upon the minds of young soldiers, this has an effect of the most powerful description.

Great care appears to have been taken in these various works, to meet the accusations of military men respecting the disposition and employment of the French army. Where a fault is admitted, the error is at least transferred from Buonaparte to the incapacity or remissness of his generals. The talents and honour of the British commanders are rated at a low state; their success attributed more to chance than to military skill, and the important result of the battle, less to the courage of the British troops, than to the opportune arrival of the Prussians, whom they allege to have saved the British army from destruction. What are now termed liberal ideas, seem to have made it a fashion to assert, and give credence to these accounts; and it is no uncommon occurrence to meet with Englishmen who doubt the glory and success of their countrymen on that eventful day. A wounded spirit of faction has contributed to this feeling, and in the indulgence of its own gratification, and under the mask of patriotism, endeavoured to throw a doubt over the military achievements of our countrymen, eagerly laid hold of any faults or failures, palliating, at the same time, those of their enemies, and often giving that implicit belief to the garbled accounts of the French, which they deny to the simple and manly despatch of a British general.

There does appear in this a decay of that national feeling, and jealousy of our country's honour, the main spring of all great actions, which other nations, our rivals, cling to with renewed ardour. No man could persuade a Frenchman that it was British valour

which has conquered in almost every battle, from Cressy, down to Waterloo ; and it is impossible to forget that national pride, so honourable to the French name, which could make their unfortunate emigrants even forget for a while their own distresses, in the glory which crowned the arms of the Republicans at that Revolution which drove them from their homes.

The British works on the campaign, with one exception [Batty], are incomplete productions, written by persons unacquainted with military affairs, and hastily composed of rude materials, collected from imperfect sources.¹

Whoever has endeavoured to analyze the accounts of modern actions, and to separate in them what can be proved to be facts, from what is affirmed to be so, or to compare the private accounts (too often indiscreetly published) with the official documents, and the information procured from proper sources, will not be surprised to find in these home-made accounts of this campaign, fulsome praises lavished on individuals and regiments ;² tales of charges, which one would imagine must have annihilated whole corps, and yet find not more than fifty or sixty men killed and wounded in a whole regiment.³

Our officers, whatever their corps may be, should be above the idea of vain boasting or exaggeration. It is much that we can claim, during a long period of eight years, the praise of having successfully contended with troops of the first military power in Europe ; while our soldiers have disputed the palm of valour ; and our officers, with less trumpeted claims than their boasted marshals, have shown as great military skill ; and our armies, in the moment of victory, a spirit of humanity and moderation, not frequently evinced by their antagonists.

In the following observations, it is not pretended that any new

¹ The best account of the campaign is by an anonymous author, C. de W., published at Stutgard, 1817, and is attributed to Baron Muffling. It does honour to its illustrious author, from its candour and manliness, though he naturally wishes to give more effect to the Prussian attack on the 18th, than was actually the case ; that is, he brings them into action, with their whole force, considerably too early in the day.

² It is well remarked, in liv. ix. p. 150,—“ Ces détails en appartiennent plus à l'histoire de chaque regiment qu'à l'histoire générale de la bataille.”

³ Rogniat, p. 147, speaking of charges, says,—“ S'ils marchent, à la baïonnette, ce n'est qu'un simulacre d'attaque : ils ne la croisent jamais avec cette d'un ennemi qu'ils craignent d'aborder, parcequ'ils se sentent sans defence contre ses coups, et l'un de deux partis prend la fuite avant d'en venir aux mains.”—Such is the case in all charges.

matter can be given on a subject already so much discussed ; still some facts and considerations are treated of, which have not been perhaps fully or fairly appreciated. Many charges of blame have been brought forward against the generals of the allied forces ; and superior talent in profiting by their mistakes, has been attributed to their opponents, which might well be accounted for, as arising from the situations in which they were relatively placed. In order to judge, for instance, of the credit given to Napoleon, of having surprised their armies in their cantonments, it is necessary to be aware of the state of both countries (France and Belgium), and the objects, besides the mere watching of the frontiers, to which the attention of the allied commanders was necessarily directed previous to the commencement of the war, and whilst it may be supposed as still in some measure doubtful.

France, as is well known, is, on the Belgian frontier, studded with fortresses. Belgium, on the contrary, is now defenceless. The numerous fortresses in the Low Countries, so celebrated in our former wars, had been dismantled in the reign of the Emperor Joseph ; and their destruction completed by the French when they got possession of the country at the battle of Fleurus, 1794, with the exception of Antwerp, Ostend, and Nieuport, which they had kept up on account of their marine importance. These circumstances placed the two parties in very different situations both for security, and for facility of preparing and carrying into execution the measures either for attack or defence.

The French had maintained their own celebrated triple line of fortresses ; extending, on that part of the frontier, from Dunkirk to Philipville, and which had been put into a state of defence during the war in the preceding year [liv. ix. p. 36] ;—these gave every facility for the concentration and formation of troops—for affording a supply of artillery, and every requisite for taking the field, and for concealing their movements—particularly from the French organization of their national guards, which enabled the latter immediately to take the garrison duties, or relieve and occupy the outposts along the frontiers ;—such was the relative situation of the frontiers at the period of Napoleon's return from Elba.

The necessity of re-establishing the principal fortresses on the Belgian frontier, which commanded the sluices and inundation of the country, had indeed already been evident ; and decided upon whilst Napoleon was yet in Elba. A committee of British engineers had been employed in examining the country for that purpose, but only the general plans and reports had been prepared,

when Buonaparte's sudden return and rapid advance upon Paris, and the probability of a speedy renewal of the war, called for expeditious and immediate means of defence. The declaration of the Congress of Vienna, of the 13th March, reached Paris on the same day he arrived there, which must have convinced him he would not be allowed quietly to repossess his throne.

It may be well supposed, that the general impression in Belgium was, that he would lose no time to endeavour to regain a country which he considered as almost part of France; important to him from the resources it would have afforded, and perhaps still more so, as it would deprive his enemies of so convenient a base of operations, for the preparation of the means for attacking France. The discontent in Belgium, and the Prussian provinces on the Rhine, also amongst the Saxon troops who had served in his army, was known.—[Liv. ix. pp. 58–61.]—The mutinous spirit of these troops appeared to be in concert with the movements of the French forces on the frontiers; so much so, that they were disarmed and sent to the rear.—[Muffling, p. 5.]—In the former, the discontent was particularly favoured by the number of French officers and soldiers, who had been discharged as aliens from the French army, in which they had served nearly since the Revolution, and now gave themselves little care to conceal their real sentiments and attachments. The flight of Louis from Lisle, through Flanders, added to this feeling in Belgium—such appeared to be the prevailing spirit. The force the British had to keep it in check, and resist an invasion, amounted only to 6000 or 7000 men, under the orders of Sir Thomas Graham, consisting chiefly of second battalions, hastily collected, a great portion of our best troops not having yet returned from America. There were also in Belgium the German Legion, together with 8000 to 10,000 men of the new Hanoverian levies. The organization of the Belgian troops had been just commenced, so that the force of the Prince of Orange might amount to about 20,000 men.

The Prussian General Kleist, who commanded on the Rhine and Meuse, had 30,000 men, afterwards augmented to 50,000, which, however, included the Saxons.—[Muffling, p. 1–5.]

These generals had immediately agreed to act in concert; but from what we have mentioned, had Napoleon concentrated 36,000 men at Lisle on the 1st April, which he says was possible for him to have done,—[Montholon, v. ii. p. 281; Liv. ix. p. 58]—and advanced into Belgium, it is certainly probable he might have obtained the most important results; for the Prince of

Orange, who had united his troops at Ath, Mons, and Tournay, was not strong enough to have covered Brussels, and must have either fallen back on Antwerp, or formed a junction with the Prussian General Kleist. The intelligence of Napoleon having landed at Cannes on the 1st March, reached Brussels on the 9th. Preparations were immediately made for the defence of the country. The British troops under General Clinton concentrated, with their allies, near Ath, Mons, and Tournay; and these places, with Ypres, Ghent, and Oudenarde, were ordered to be put in a state of defence consistently with the exigence of the moment. To effect this, every use was made of what remained of the old fortifications. New works were added, and advantage was taken of the great system of defence in that country, which is generally under the level of some canal, or the sea, and consequently capable of being inundated. The sluices which commanded the inundations were covered by strong redoubts.

The inundation of the country near the sea, admits of being made in two ways. The canals or rivers are drains for the fresh water of the country to the sea. The sluice gates are opened for its egress at low water, and shut to prevent the ingress of the salt water at the return of the tide. It is evident, therefore, that we could have laid the country under water, and so covered their fortresses on two or three sides, which would prevent the necessity of their having large garrisons to defend them.¹ But salt-water inundation ruins the soil for several years, and it was determined only to employ it as a last resource; and in the mean time the sluice-gates were merely kept shut to prevent the egress of the fresh water, which in that wet season soon accumulated; and the fresh water inundation only destroyed the crops of one season.

About 20,000 labourers, called in by requisitions on the country, were daily employed on the works, in addition to the working parties furnished by the troops. The necessary artillery and stores were supplied from England and Holland. Troops arrived daily, and were immediately moved to the frontiers, where, from the movements that were constantly taking place, it is probable that exaggerated accounts were transmitted to the enemy. By these vigorous and prompt measures, confidence became restored—the panic amongst the people of Belgium was removed—they saw that their country was not to be given up without a severe struggle—it fixed the wavering, and silenced the disaffected.

¹ The salt-water inundation could be raised at Ghent, so as to place the Great Square five feet under water.

In less than a month, most of the frontier places were safe from a coup-de-main.

The Duke of Wellington had arrived at Brussels from Vienna early in April, and immediately inspected the frontier and the fortresses; after which, he agreed on a plan of operations with the Prussians, by which they concentrated their troops along the Sambre and Meuse, occupying Charleroi, Namur, and Liege, so as to be in communication with his left. The Prussians had repaired the works round Cologne, which assured their communications with Prussia, and gave them a tête-du-pont on the Rhine. The small fortress of Juliers afforded them the command of the Roer on the same line, and they held Maestricht on the Lower Meuse. It was important to occupy Liege and Namur, though their fortifications had been destroyed. They afforded a facility to act rapidly on either side of the Meuse, and a choice of the strong positions along the banks of that river. The disaffection in the provinces on the Rhine, which had been recently added to Prussia, was considered even greater than in Belgium. The fortress of Luxembourg was the great key which Prussia possessed for their preservation; and her interest would have led her to make that her dépôt and base of operations for the invasion of France; but besides being so far distant from Brussels, that armies occupying such distant points could not act in concert, the roads in that part of the country, between the Meuse and the Moselle, were in a state almost impracticable for artillery, and for the general communication of an army. On the other hand, the roads and communications to cross the Rhine at Cologne are good, the town itself could be put in a state of defence, and have become the best and safest line of communication. Reference to the map will elucidate these observations, and show that the cantonments of the Prussians, along the Sambre and Meuse, enabled them to act in concert with our army; to cover their line of communication with Prussia; and to move rapidly into the provinces of the Moselle, in the event of the enemy advancing from Metz.¹

The Russians were to have come into the line at Mayence, but they did not reach the Rhine until June, and then only the first corps; so that, for the present, a gap existed from the Prussian left at Dinant, to the Austro-Bavarian right at Manheim.

It was an important object to cover Brussels; and it is to be

¹ Such, however, could only be a desultory attack, for the chaussée by Charleroi and Givet was the nearest entry from France on this side. The country from this to Mayence was then nearly impracticable for large armies. Good roads have since been made through it.

considered, that this city forms, as it were, a centre to a large portion of the French frontier, extending about seventy miles from the Lys to the Meuse, viz. from Menin to Philipville or Givet; that it is about fifty miles distant from these extreme points; and that it was necessary to guard the entry from France by Tournay, Mons, and Charleroi; and also to prevent Ghent, a very important place, from being attacked from Lisle. The protection of all these distant points, with the difficulty of subsisting troops, particularly cavalry and artillery, are sufficient causes to explain why the armies were not more united in their cantonments.¹ Buonaparte appears to have attached much importance to the occupation of Brussels, as appears by the bulletins, found ready printed in his baggage, which was captured. It was therefore of much importance in every point of view, to prevent even a temporary occupation of this city, and this could only be done by risking an action in front of it. The Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher had also separate views in preserving their lines of operation,—the one by Cologne with Prussia; the other with England, by Brussels, which neither was disposed willingly to abandon. This probably may have been the cause why Quatre Bras and Ligny were chosen as positions covering both.

It is evident, that an army placed in cantonments, so as to meet all these objects, could only be concentrated in a position covering the city, by the troops in advance being able to keep the enemy in check, so as to afford time for that concentration, which was certainly accomplished. The positions on the different roads of approach from the French frontier had been attentively reconnoitred; that of Mont St Jean, or Waterloo, very particularly; and no precaution appears to have been omitted, by which an offensive movement of the enemy was to be encountered.

¹ Buonaparte blames the allied generals for not having formed a camp in front of Brussels, as he alleges might have been done in the beginning of May. The wet season, and difficulty of subsisting so large a body of troops, is some reason against it. Besides which, Buonaparte might have made demonstrations in front, and sent 20,000 men from his garrisons to ravage Ghent and the country beyond the Scheldt, and cut off our communications with Ostend. In 1814, when the Prussians were concentrated near Brussels, this had been done with effect from Lisle. Though little advantage might have resulted to the enemy from such a measure, much blame would have been attached for not taking precautions against it. To cover Brussels, the capital of the country, was certainly of great importance; and had that been the only object, a camp in its front would have certainly been the best means of effecting it.

Some movements were observed on the French frontier between Lisle and Berguer, as if preparing for offensive operations, about the end of March, at which period the troops, cantoned near Menin, had orders, after making due resistance, and destroying the bridge on the Lys, to fall back on Courtrai, their point of assembling; and then, after such a resistance as would not compromise their safety in retreat, to endeavour to ascertain the object of the enemy's movements, and give time for the troops to assemble. They were to retire on Oudenarde and Ghent, opening the sluices, and extending the inundation. About the beginning of May similar movements were also observed, but less was then to be apprehended, since, by the advanced state of the works at Tournay, the tête-de-pont at Oudenarde and Ghent, we then commanded the Scheldt, and could have assumed the offensive.

Great credit is undoubtedly due to Napoleon, for the mode in which he concealed his movements, and the rapidity with which he concentrated his army. The forced marches he was obliged to make, appear, however, to have paralysed his subsequent movements, from the fatigue his troops underwent. The numerous French fortresses favoured his plans in a very great degree, by affording him the means of employing the garrison and national guards to occupy the advanced posts along the frontier, and opportunity afterwards to make demonstrations across the frontiers near Lisle, whilst he assembled his army on the Sambre. [Liv. ix. pp. 68-85; Montholon, v. ii. p. 153.] They were also somewhat favoured by the circumstance, that hostilities were not actually commenced, which prevented our advanced posts (even if they suspected a change in the troops opposed to them) from obliging the enemy to show himself, or, by bringing on a skirmish, to obtain from prisoners intelligence of their movements. He had another advantage of powerful consequence. The army he commanded were mostly old soldiers of the same nation, under a single chief. The allied armies were composed of different nations, a great portion young levies, and under two generals, each of such reputation, as not likely to yield great deference to the other.¹

On the night of the 14th June, the French army bivouacked in three divisions, as near the frontier as possible, without being observed by the Prussians; the left at Ham-sur-heure, the centre at Beaumont, where the headquarters were established, and the right at Philipville.²

¹ Buonaparte himself has remarked,—"L'unité de commandement est la chose la plus importante dans la guerre."

² Buonaparte, liv. ix. p. 69, rates his force at 122,400 men and 350

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At three o'clock, A.M., on the 15th June, the French army crossed the frontier in three columns, directed on Marchiennes, Charleroi, and Chatelet. The Prussian out-posts were quickly driven in; they, however, maintained their ground obstinately at three points, until eleven o'clock, when General Ziethen took up a position at Gilly and Gosselies, in order to check the advance of the enemy, and then retired slowly on Fleurus, agreeably to the orders of Mareschal Blucher, to allow time for the concentration of his army.¹ The bridge at Charleroi not having been completely destroyed, was quickly repaired by the enemy. Upon Ziethen's abandoning the chaussée, which leads to Brussels through Quatre Bras, Marshal Ney, who commanded the left of the French army, was ordered to advance by this road upon Gosselies, and found at Frasnes part of the Duke of Wellington's army, composed of Nassau troops, under the command of Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar, who, after some skirmishing, maintained his position.² The French army was formed on the night of the 15th, in three columns, the left at Gosselies, the centre near Gilly, and the right at Chatelet. Two corps of the Prussian army occupied the position at Somhref on the same night, where they were joined by the 1st corps, and occupied St Amand, Bry, and Ligny; so that, notwithstanding all the exertions of the French, at a moment where time was of such importance, they had only been able to advance about fifteen English miles during the day, with nearly fifteen hours of daylight.³ The corps of Ziethen had suffered considerably, but he had effected his orders; so that Mareschal Blucher was enabled to assemble three corps of his army,

guns. Muffling, p. 17, at 130,000. Other accounts make it smaller, and Batty, 127,400, with 350 guns.

¹ Grouchy, p. 59, speaks of the rapidity with which Blucher assembled his army. It is also adverted to by several French military writers.

² Ney might probably have driven back these troops, and occupied the important position at Quatre Bras; but hearing a heavy cannonade on his right flank, where Ziethen had taken up his position, he thought it necessary to halt, and detach a division in the direction of Fleurus. This brings forward a remarkable case, as he was severely censured by Napoleon, for not having literally followed his orders, and pushed on to Quatre Bras. This was done in the presence of Mareschal Grouchy,—(see Grouchy's Observations)—who gives it as a reason (pp. 32, 33, 61) for acting in the manner he did on the 18th, and not moving to his left to support Napoleon at Waterloo.

³ Rogniat, p. 341, says that a great portion of the French army only reached Charleroi late on the 15th, and Fleurus at 11 A.M. on the 16th —See Grouchy, p. 36.

80,000 men, in position early on the 15th, and his 4th corps was on its march to join him that evening.

The Duke of Wellington seems to have expected an attack by the Mons ohaussée,¹ and on his first receiving information of the enemy's movements, merely ordered his troops to hold themselves in readiness; this was on the evening of the 15th of June, at six o'clock. Having obtained farther intelligence about eleven o'clock, which confirmed the real attack of the enemy to be along the Sambre, orders were immediately given for the troops to march upon Quatre-bras; a false movement of the English general to his right, at that period, could not have been easily remedied in time to have fought in front of Brussels, and to have effected his junction with the Prussians; and in such a case, as Mareschal Blucher only fought at Ligny on the expectation of being supported by the Duke of Wellington, it is probable that that action would not have taken place. He had, however, a safe retreat on Bulow's corps and Maestricht, as had the Duke of Wellington on Ghent and Antwerp, or else the plan afterwards adopted of concentrating at Waterloo and Wavres, could not have been easily executed. It is, indeed, a matter of surprise, that Buonaparte did not make a more important demonstration on the side of Lisle and Mons. The duke, in deciding on these movements, was under the necessity of acting on the intelligence given by spies or deserters, which can only be so far depended on, as it is confirmed by reports from the outposts, who may be themselves deceived.² What was true at their departure, may be entirely changed at their arrival with the information; and whatever may have been the case formerly, few or no instances occur at present of a person in the confidence of the cabinet, particularly of a military officer, betraying the confidence placed in him.

The Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre-bras on the 16th, at an early hour, and immediately proceeded to Bry, to concert measures with Marshal Blucher, for arranging the most efficient plan of support. It appeared at that time, that the whole French attack would be directed against the Prussians, as considerable masses of the enemy were in movement in their front. Blucher was at this time at the wind-mill of Bry, about five English miles

¹ Official Despatch; Muffling, p. 10, 8; Do. 18.

² Muffling, p. 17. Yet a story is told of Fouché, who is said to have sent intelligence of Buonaparte's movements to Lord Wellington. The courier was attacked and waylaid, as supposed by Fouché's contrivance, so that he had an excuse ready for both parties.

from Quatre-bras. [Muffling, p. 10.] The duke proposed to advance upon Frasnés and Gosselies, which would have been a decided movement, as acting on the French communications, and immediately in rear of their left flank; but as the troops could not be ready to advance from Quatre-bras before four o'clock, the attack must have been too late, and in the mean time the Prussians would have to sustain the attack of nearly the whole French army. Mareschal Blücher, therefore, judged it more desirable, that the duke should form a junction with the Prussian right, by marching direct by the chaussée from Quatre-bras to Bry.¹

The object of the enemy on the 16th, as may be seen by the general orders of Napoleon, communicated by Soult to Ney and Grouchy, was to turn the Prussian right, by driving the British from Quatre-bras, and then to march down the chaussée upon the Bry, and thus separate the armies. [Batty, p. 150.] For this purpose, Ney was detached with 43,000 men. [Liv. ix. p. 103.] On reference to the above orders, it appears that not much resistance was expected in getting possession both of Sombref and Quatre-bras.² Ney has been accused of delaying to attack, but reference to those orders will show, that Ney had not been commanded to attack³ until two o'clock p.m., in consequence of the allies having assembled in force at Quatre-bras. The plan was excellent, and if Ney had been successful, would have led to important results. After obtaining possession of Quatre-bras, he was to have detached part of his forces to attack the Prussian right flank in rear of St Amand, whilst Buonaparte was making the chief attack on that village, the strongest in the position, and at the same time keeping the whole Prussian line engaged. Half of Ney's force was left in reserve near Frasnés, to be in readiness either to support the attacks on Quatre-bras or St Amand, and in the event of both succeeding, to turn the Prussian right, by marching direct on Wagnelle or Bry.⁴

¹ Muffling, p. 64, allows that the position at Ligny was too much extended to the left, but the object of this was to have a line of communication with the Meuse and Cologne; a fault alluded to as arising from having two armies, and two chiefs with different objects in view.

² Grouchy, p. 47; Gourgaud, Liv. ix. p. 102.

³ It is hardly to be supposed that an officer of Ney's bold and enterprising character, with so much at stake, would have hesitated to attack at Quatre-bras, if he had had his troops in readiness, but it appears that he could not have had time to move to that point at the early hour stated by Buonaparte. Ney had, also, too much experience of the nature of the troops he was opposed to, to act rashly.

⁴ The French did not attack until 3 p.m., the different corps not

The village of St Amand was well defended; it formed the strength of the Prussian right, and from the intersection of several gardens and hedges, was very capable of defence; although so much in advance of the rest of the Prussian position. The face of the country in front of this position possesses no remarkable features; the slopes towards the stream are gentle, and of easy access. After a continued attack for two hours, the enemy had only obtained possession of half the village of St Amand, and a severe attack was made upon Ligny, which was taken and retaken several times.¹ At this time Buonaparte sent for the corps of reserve left by Ney at Frasnes; before, however, it reached St Amand, in consequence of the check they had sustained at Quatre-bras, it was countermarched, and from this circumstance became of little use either to Buonaparte or Ney. Buonaparte having observed the masses of troops which Blücher had brought up behind St Amand (and probably in consequence of the corps above mentioned being necessary at Quatre-bras),² appears to have changed the disposition of his reserves, who were marching upon St Amand, and moved them towards the right, to attack the Prussian centre at Ligny, which they succeeded in forcing, and so obtained possession of that village.³ A large body of French cavalry, and another of infantry, then pushed forward to the height between Bry and Sombref, immediately in the rear of Ligny, and quite in the heart of the Prussian position, where they were attacked by Blücher at the head of his cavalry; this attempt to re-establish the action failed, and the Prussian cavalry were driven back upon the infantry.⁴ It was now nine o'clock, about dark, which prevented the French from advancing farther, and they contented themselves with the occupation of Ligny. The Prussians did not evacuate Bry before three o'clock A.M. on the 17th.⁵ In the course of the night, the Prussians

being arrived to make the necessary arrangements at an earlier hour.

—GROUCHY, p. 36. ROGNAT, p. 341.

¹ Ney's Letter to the Duc d'Otranto. Paris, 1815.—Muffling, p. 14.

² Muffling, pp. 15-64.—Blücher had employed his reserves to support his right at St Amand, and was not prepared for this change of attack. Muffling, however, considers, that, instead of his cavalry, had he moved his infantry from St Amand to retake Ligny, he would have succeeded and gained the action.

³ Grouchy, p. 10, shows how little decisive the battle was. "La bataille de Ligny n'a fini que vers la neuf heure de soir; seulement alors la retraite des Prussiens a été presumée."

⁴ Here it was that Blücher was so nearly falling into the hands of the French cavalry.

⁵ Grouchy, p. 11, says, that, even on the 17th, it was supposed the

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fell back on Tilly and Gembloux. The loss of the Prussians, according to their own account, amounted to 14,000 men, and fifteen pieces of artillery. The French official account in the *Moniteur*, to 15,000.¹ The French acknowledge to have lost 7000. It is evident that Buonaparte, in changing the point of attack from the Prussian right at St Amand, to the centre at Ligny, in a manner forced the Prussians, if defeated, to retreat upon the British army, and give up their own line of operations; but still, at that hour in the evening, when the situation of the armies is considered, the change of attack appears to be the only hope he had of obtaining even a partial success; under such circumstances, it was perhaps the best course he could pursue.²

It is not easy to conceive that a defeat, in any case, would have been such as to prevent their junction, since each army had such considerable reinforcements moving up, and close upon them; but even in an extreme case, they could each have retired on their fortresses, and formed intrenched camps of perfect security, with every means of repairing the losses they sustained.³

The force of the enemy, at the time the Duke of Wellington left Quatre-bras to communicate with Blucher, appeared to be

Prussians had retired upon Namur, so feebly were they followed; the light cavalry of General Pajot pursued them in this direction on the 17th, captured a few guns, which, with some stragglers, as are found in all armies, was his whole success.

¹ The St Helena productions raise the amount to 20,000 men, 40 guns, standards, &c. See Gronchy pp. 48, 49.—Montholon says they lost 60,000.—Liv. x. 148, says that the Prussian army was reduced to 40,000 men by the loss they had sustained; 30,000 men killed and wounded, and 20,000 men, who had disbanded and ravaged the banks of the Meuse, and by the detachments sent to cover their retreat, and that of the baggage, in the direction of Namur.

² The intention of the allied marshals to remain together, whatever might be the issue, is known. Lord Wellington had ordered the inundations of Antwerp to be effected to their utmost extent. The fortresses were to have been abandoned to their own strength, and had the events of the 16th been such as to necessitate a retreat, and give up Brussels, Maestricht is probably the point on which both armies would have retired.

³ Had earlier or more positive information of the enemy's plans been received by Lord Wellington, and the troops put in movement on the evening of the 15th, the combinations of the two allied chiefs would have been perfect. Nothing more is necessary to show how well their plans had been laid, but which were not carried into full effect, by one of those accidental occurrences which no human foresight can prevent.

so weak, that no serious attack was at that time to be apprehended; but on his return to that position, about three o'clock, he found they had assembled a large force at Frasnes, and were preparing for an attack, which was made about half-past three o'clock by two columns of infantry, and nearly all their cavalry, supported by a heavy fire of artillery. The force at that time under his orders, was 17,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, of which about 4500 were British infantry, the rest Hanoverians, and Belgians, and Nassau troops.¹ They at first obtained some success, driving back the Belgian and Brunswick cavalry; their cavalry penetrated amongst our infantry before they had quite time to form squares, and forced a part to retire into the adjoining wood; they were, however, repulsed. At this period of the action, the third British division, under General Alten, arrived about four o'clock, soon after the action had commenced. They consisted of about 6300 men, and were composed of British, King's German legion, and Hanoverians. They had some difficulty in maintaining their ground, and one regiment lost a colour.² They succeeded, however, in repelling the enemy from the advanced points he had gained at the farm of Gemincourt and village of Pierremont.

Ney still, however, occupied part of the wood of Bossu, which extends from Quatre-bras, on the right of the road towards Frasnes, to the distance of about a mile. This favoured an attack on the right of our position, which he accordingly made, after having been repulsed on the left. At this moment the division of General Cooke (Guards), 4000 strong, arrived from Enghien, and materially assisted to repel this attack, which, after considerable exertions, was done, and the enemy driven back upon Frasnes, in much confusion. This affair was severely contested, and though the enemy were repulsed, the loss on each side was nearly equal, owing to the superiority of the French in artillery. The loss, however, inflicted on the French by the fire

¹ Liv. ix. p. 103. Buonaparte says, that Ney attacked with 16,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 44 guns, leaving 16,000 infantry, 4500 cavalry, and 64 guns, in reserve at Frasnes.

² This belonged to the 69th regiment, not to the 42d, as Liv. ix. states, p. 104, and was almost the only one captured during the whole war. It may here be remarked, that if the French had carried one quarter the number of eagles with their regiments that we have of colours, a much larger proportion would now be found at Whitehall. A weak battalion of English infantry always carries two large colours, very heavy and inconvenient, whilst a French eagle, about the size of a blackbird, was only given to a regiment composed of several battalions, which was easily secured in case of defeat.

of musketry, which their attacking columns were exposed to, was very considerable, and counterbalanced the advantage they derived from their artillery. It required great exertions to maintain the important post of Quatre-bras, in the present relative situations of the two armies. It is certain that, if Ney had advanced as rapidly as Buonaparte says he might have done, he would have obtained his object. Ney, however, in his letter, contradicts the possibility of his having done so, which seems to be confirmed by Soult's letter to him, dated at 2 o'clock P.M., where he tells him, that Grouchy is to attack Bry with the 3d and 4th corps, at half past 2 P.M. [Batty, App.]; that he is to attack the corps in his front, and afterwards to assist Grouchy; but that if he (Ney) defeats the troops in his front first, Grouchy would be ordered to assist his operations. It is most probable that the corps left at Frasnes, which Ney complains was taken away without his knowledge, was destined to assist either attack as might be found necessary.

Even had Ney got possession of Quatre-bras at an early hour, he would scarcely have been able to detach any sufficient force against the Prussians, seeing, as he must have done, or at least ought to have calculated, that the British forces were arriving rapidly on the point which we suppose him to have occupied. The British could have still retreated on Waterloo, and been concentrated on the 17th at that position; and there was nothing to prevent the Prussians retreating on Wavre, as they afterwards did. Though Buonaparte says [Liv. ix. p. 209], that on the 15th every thing had succeeded as he wished, and that the Duke of Wellington had manœuvred as he would have wished him to do; yet one corps of the Prussian army had so far kept him in check, that he was not able to reach Fleurus; and on the 16th, could not commence the attack until three hours after mid-day. He did not gain possession of Quatre-bras until the forenoon of the 17th. He had sustained a severe check with one part of his army, and gained an indecisive action with the other; the loss of the allies not exceeding his own, whilst they had the advantage of retiring leisurely on their resources and reinforcements, and by the retreat, gave up no place or position now of consequence to the pursuing enemy. The result of the operations of the 16th produced no important consequences to the French. The celebrated engineer, General Rogniat, does not hesitate to term it an indecisive action. The success of the British in repelling the attack of Quatre-bras, tended to make them meet the renewed attack at Waterloo with more confidence, and probably had a

contrary effect on the enemy; whilst the manner in which the Prussian corps of Thielman received the attack of Grouchy on the 18th, who had superior forces, showed how little the confidence of the Prussians had been shaken by the action at Ligny. It may be observed, that the forces engaged at Ligny were nearly equal, even deducting D'Erlon's corps, which was left at Frasnes, as not engaged. The French passed the frontiers with about 125,000 men—Blucher had 80,000—and at the close of the day, Lord Wellington had 30,000.¹ The commanders of the allied armies appear not to have overrated what was to be expected from their troops, which was not exactly the case with their opponents.

The outline of the operations, and the strategie on the part of Napoleon to separate the two armies, was no doubt finely conceived, and, as we have seen, was nearly successful; yet it is presumed, that, had it been so, even to the extent Buonaparte could hope or expect, the allies had still a safe retreat, and sufficient resources. On all sides, it was a calculation of hours. It is hardly possible to know the point an enterprising enemy means to attack, especially on so extended a line; and here the assailant has the advantage. Fault has been found with the Duke of Wellington for having no artillery and very few cavalry upon the 16th. No portion of either were with the reserve at Brussels, which is remarkable, particularly as regards the artillery.²

The spirited manner in which the allied *mareschals* adhered to their plans of defence previously agreed on, and extricated themselves from the difficulties which they found themselves placed in, by the sudden and vigorous attack they had to sustain, and which their distinct commands tended rather to increase, must command admiration; and since war is only a great game, where the move-

¹ Liv. ix. p. 60. Buonaparte remarks, that the numbers of the allied army must not be rated at their numerical force. "*Parceque l'armée des alliés étoit composée de troupes plus ou moins bonnes. Un Anglois pourrait être compté pour un Français; et deux Hollandais, Prussiens, ou hommes de la confédération, pour un Français. Les armées ennemies étoient cantonnées sous le commandement de deux Généraux différents, et formées de deux nations divisées d'intérêts et de sentiments.*" His army, on the contrary, was under one chief, the idol of his soldiers, who were of the best description—veterans who had fought in the brilliant campaign of 1813-14, and draughts from the numerous garrisons who had since entered France from Antwerp, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Dantzic, Mayence, Alexandria, Mantua, &c. with the numerous prisoners from England. Liv. ix. p. 201.

² Three brigades of iron eighteen-pounders were preparing at Brussels, but not in a state of forwardness to be sent to Waterloo.

ments are influenced by many events which occur during their execution and progress—events which human calculation cannot foresee—it becomes easy to criticise when the operations are passed, when all the data on which they rested, or might have rested, are known; but to form a good plan of attack, or a campaign—to act with decision and firmness, and with a “*coup d'œil*,” so as immediately to profit by the changes which incessantly take place, can be said of very few men of the many who have ever arrived at the command of an army.

On the morning of the 17th, the British troops remained in possession of Quatre-bras, where the rest of the army had joined the Duke of Wellington, who was prepared to maintain that position against the French army, had the Prussians remained in the position of Ligny, so as to give him support.

Mareschal Blucher had sent an aide-de-camp to inform the duke of his retreat, who was unfortunately killed; and it was not until seven o'clock on the 17th, that Lord Wellington learned the direction which the Prussians had taken. A patrol sent at daylight to communicate with the Prussians, advanced beyond Bry and Sombref, which confirmed how little of the Prussian position had been occupied by the French. The Prussians had fallen back very leisurely on Wavre, their rear-guard occupying Bry, which they did not evacuate before three o'clock on the morning of the 17th. Buonaparte, in deceiving the French people, by the accounts he gave of the defeat of the Prussians at Ligny, seems almost to have deceived himself. He must have known that the action was not a decisive one—that the enemy had retired in excellent order—that he had not been able to pursue them—and that his own loss must have considerably weakened his army, whilst the Prussians were falling back upon their reinforcements—and, above all, that Mareschal Blucher commanded them. The Prussian army was concentrated at Wavre at an early hour, and communication took place between the Duke of Wellington and Blucher, by which a junction of the army was arranged for the succeeding day at Waterloo.¹ The retrograde movement of the Prussians rendered a corresponding one necessary on the part of the British, which was performed in the most leisurely manner, the duke allowing the men time to finish their cooking. About ten o'clock, the whole army retired, in three columns, by Genappe and Nivelles, towards a position at Waterloo—a rear-guard was left to occupy the ground, so as to conceal the movement

¹ Muffling, p. 20, says, “that Blucher only asked for time to distribute food and cartridges to his men.”

from the enemy, who, about mid-day, deployed their troops in columns of attack, as if expecting to find the English army in position there. They immediately followed up the retreat with cavalry and light-artillery. An affair of cavalry occurred at Genappe, where the 7th hussars attacked a French regiment of lancers without success; upon which the heavy cavalry were brought up by the Marquis of Anglesea, who checked the enemy's advance by a vigorous and decisive charge.

As the troops arrived in position in front of Mont Saint Jean, they took up the ground they were to maintain, which was effected early in the evening. The weather began to be very severe at this period. The whole French army, under Buonaparte, with the exception of two corps under Grouchy (32,000 men, and 108 guns), took up a position immediately in front; and after some cannonading, both armies remained opposite to each other during the night, the rain falling in torrents. The duke had already communicated with Mareschal Blucher, who promised to come to his support with the whole of his army, on the morning of the 18th. It was consequently decided upon to cover Brussels (the preservation of which was of such importance, in every point of view, to the King of the Netherlands), by maintaining the position of Mont St Jean. The intention of the allied chiefs, if they were not attacked on the 18th, was to have attacked the enemy on the 19th.

Since we are now arrived at the position of Mont St Jean, it may be necessary to offer a few remarks as regards the position itself, which has been considered as a bad one by some writers,¹ and some loose allusions to its defects thrown out; but more particularly fixing upon its not affording a secure retreat, in the event of the enemy's attack having proved successful. Previous, however, to entering into any disquisition as to the merits of the position of Mont St Jean, it may be well to consider a few of the conditions that are judged essential in a greater or less degree, for every position taken up by an army. The first requisite is, that the ground in front, within cannon-shot, should be well seen; and every point of approach with musket-shot, well discovered.—2d, That the ground which is occupied should admit of a free communication for troops and guns, from right to left, and from front to rear, in order to move supports wherever they may be wanted; also that, by the sinuosities of the ground, or other cover, such movements may be made unseen by the enemy.—3d, That your

¹ Montholon, vii. p. 134; Liv. ix. pp. 123-207; Gourgaud, p. 131.

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flanks rest on some support, secure from being turned—And, lastly, that your retreat be ensured in the event of your position being forced or turned.

The site of the position of Mont St Jean, and the features of the ground round it, have been so often and well described, that we may conclude it to be familiar to most people; and hence the possession of these necessary conditions will be already evident. The easy slope from our front into the valley, from whence it rises in an ascent equally gentle and regular, to the opposite heights, on which the enemy were posted at the distance of about a mile, or a mile and a half, gave it, in an eminent degree, the condition stated in the first remark. The two chaussées, running nearly perpendicular to our line,—the valley immediately in rear of our first line, and parallel to it, with two country roads passing in the same direction; also the openness of the country,—gave the position the requisites mentioned in the second. The same valley afforded cover for the support of the first line; also for its artillery, and spare ammunition-waggons; whilst the second line and reserves, placed on and behind the next ridge, and about 500 or 600 yards in rear of the first, were unseen from the enemy's position, although certainly so far exposed, that many of his shot and shells, which passed over the first line, ricocheted into the second, and amongst the reserves. The fourth requisite, as far as regards the security of the flanks, was completely obtained, by the occupation of the village of Braine la Leude on its right, which would have been intrenched, but for an accidental misunderstanding of orders; and La Haye and Ohain on the left; also by both flanks being thrown back on the forest of Soignies.

That our retreat, in case of a reverse, was sufficiently provided for, we trust, notwithstanding the criticism above noticed, to establish in a satisfactory manner. Our position was sufficiently in advance of the entrance of the chaussée into the forest, to give a free approach from every part of the field to that point; which the unenclosed state of the country afforded the troops every means of profiting by. Had our first position been forced, the village of Mont St Jean, at the junction of the two chaussées, afforded an excellent centre of support for a second, which the enemy would have had equal difficulty in carrying;—besides which there is another farm house and wood immediately behind Mont St Jean, and in front of the entrance of the forest; which would have enabled us to keep open that entrance. By occupying these points, we might have at any time effected a retreat; and with sufficient leisure to have allowed all the guns, that were

in a state to be moved, to file off into the forest. Undoubtedly, had our centre been broken by the last attack of the enemy [about half-past seven], a considerable part of our artillery must have been left behind, a number of guns disabled, and many men and horses killed and wounded; these must have fallen into the enemy's hands; also the brigades at the points attacked, which were placed rather in front of the infantry, and remained until the last, firing grape-shot into the enemy's columns. The men and horses would have saved themselves with the infantry, and soon found a fresh equipment in the fortresses. The troops at Hougomont would have been cut off had that attack succeeded, but their retreat was open, either upon the corps of 16,000 men left at Halle to cover Brussels, or upon Braine la Leude, which was occupied by a brigade of infantry, who had strengthened their post; between which and our right flank a brigade of cavalry kept a communication open. From Braine la Leude there is a very good road through the forest by Alemberg to Brussels, by which the troops and artillery of our right flank could have effected their retreat. If we now suppose, that the enemy, instead of our right centre, had broken our left centre by the great attack made on it at three o'clock, Ohain afforded nearly the same advantage to the left of our army, that Braine la Leude would have done on the right. A road leads from it through the forest to Brussels; or that wing might have retired on the Prussians at Wavre; so that, had either of these two grand attacks succeeded, the retreat into the defiles of the forest need not have been precipitated. It is no fault of our troops to take alarm and lose confidence, because they find themselves turned or partially beaten. Of this many instances might be given. The best proof, however, is, that the enemy can scarcely claim having made a few hundred prisoners during the whole of the last war. No success on the part of the enemy, which they had a right to calculate on, could have then precipitated us into the forest in total disorder. The attacks we sustained to the last on the 18th, were as determined and severe as can be conceived. Still, to the last, a part of the reserve and the cavalry had not suffered much; whereas the French cavalry (heavy) had all been engaged before five o'clock. and were not in a state, from the severe losses they had sustained, to take advantage of a victory.¹

¹ See Liv. ix. p. 196. "Ainsi à cinq heures après midi, l'armée se trouva sans avoir une réserve de cavalerie. Si, à huit heures et demi, cette réserve eût existée," &c. &c. It is singular how great soldiers, in reporting military actions, will contradict each other. Napoleon

But suppose we had been driven into the wood in a state of deroute, similar to what the French were, the forest did not keep us hermetically sealed up, as an impenetrable marsh did the defeated troops at Austerlitz. The remains of our shattered battalions would have gained the forest, and found themselves in security. It consists of tall trees without underwood, passable almost any where for men and horses. The troops could, therefore, have gained the chaussée through it, and when we at last came to confide ourselves to the defence of the entrance to the forest, every person, the least experienced in war, knows the extreme difficulty in forcing infantry from a wood which cannot be turned. A few regiments, with or without artillery, would have kept the whole French army in check, even if they had been as fresh as the day they crossed the frontiers.¹ Indeed, the forest in our rear gave us so evident an advantage, that it is difficult to believe that an observation to the contrary was made by Napoleon. Could he quite forget his own retreat? It little availed him to have two fine chaussées, and an open country in his rear; his materiel was all abandoned, and not even a single battalion kept together.

The two farms in front of the position of Mont St Jean, gave its principal strength. That of Hougomont, with its gardens and enclosures, could contain a force sufficient to make it a most important post. La Haye Saiote was too small for that purpose; otherwise its situation in the Genappe chaussée, in the centre of the position, rendered it better adapted for that purpose. These farms lay on the slope of the valley, about 1500 yards apart, in front of our line; so that no column of the enemy could pass between them, without being exposed to a flank fire. Indeed, without these posts, the ground gave us little advantage over our enemy, except the loss he must be necessarily exposed to in advancing in column upon a line already fixed.

From these observations it will appear that our retreat was well secured, and that the advantages of the position for a field of battle

ascribes the loss of the battle in great measure to his cavalry being so soon and generally engaged, that he had not a reserve left to protect his retreat. General Foy, on the contrary, affirms, that it was not the French, but the British cavalry, which was annihilated at Waterloo. —*Guerre de la Peninsule*, p. 116, Note.

¹ On the 16th, at Quatre-bras, the 33d regiment (British), and afterwards two battalions of the Guards, when obliged to give way to an attack of the enemy, and pursued by the French cavalry, saved themselves in the wood of Bossu, formed along the skirts of it, and repelled the enemy with severe loss.

were very considerable; so that there was little risk but that it would have been successfully defended, even if the Prussians had by "some fatality" been prevented from forming a junction. The difficulties of the roads, from the severe rains, detained them from joining us at least double the time that was calculated upon. We had therefore to sustain the attack of a superior army so much longer; yet they were not able to make any impression. Every attack had been most successfully repulsed; and we may safely infer that, even if the Prussians had not joined in time, we would still have been able to maintain our position, and repulse the enemy, but might have been perhaps unable, as was the case at Talavera, to profit by this advantage, or to follow up our success.¹

The morning of the 18th, and part of the forenoon, were passed by the enemy in a state of supineness, for which it was difficult to account. The rain had certainly retarded his movements, more particularly that of bringing his artillery into position; yet it was observed that this had been accomplished at an early hour. In Grouchy's publication, we find a reason which may have caused this delay; namely, that Napoleon's ammunition had been so much exhausted in the preceding actions, that there was only a sufficiency with the army for an action of eight hours. Buona-partte states [Liv. ix.] that it was necessary to wait until the ground was sufficiently dried, to enable the cavalry and artillery to manœuvre [Montholon, t. ii. p. 136]; however, in such a soil, a few hours could make very little difference, particularly as a drizzling rain continued all the morning, and indeed after the action had commenced. The heavy fall of rain on the night of the 17th to 18th, was no doubt more disadvantageous to the enemy than to the troops under Lord Wellington; the latter were in position, and had few movements to make; whilst the enemy's columns, and particularly his cavalry, were much fatigued and impeded by the state of the ground, which, with the trampled

¹ The armies were now placed under their favourite commanders, as the military of both nations had long wished; and on an arena which may be considered as fair a one as could well have offered in the chances of war. The British troops, however, were not composed of our best regiments, at least our infantry, nor equal to that army which had been in the preceding year in the south of France. Many of the most efficient regiments had been sent to America; first a brigade from Bourdeaux to Washington; another to Canada; and afterwards a force from Portsmouth to New Orleans. None of these returned in time for Waterloo, though they were *on their way*.—Liv. ix, p. 208. It has been shown how the French army was composed.

corn, caused them to advance more slowly, and kept them longer under fire. On the other hand, the same causes delayed the Prussians in their junction, which they had promised to effect at eleven o'clock, and obliged Lord Wellington to maintain the position alone, nearly eight hours longer than had been calculated upon.

About twelve o'clock, the enemy commenced the action by an attack upon Hougoumont, with several columns, preceded by numerous light troops, who, after severe skirmishing, drove the Nassau troops from the wood in its front, and established themselves in it. This attack was supported by the constant fire of a numerous artillery. A battalion of the Guards occupied the house and gardens, with the other enclosures, which afforded great facilities for defence; and after a severe contest, and immense loss, the enemy were repulsed, and a great part of the wood regained.¹

During the early part of the day, the action was almost entirely confined to this part of the line, except a galling fire of artillery along the centre, which was vigorously returned by our guns. This fire gradually extended towards the left, and some demonstrations of an attack of cavalry were made by the enemy. As the troops were drawn up on the slope of the hill, they suffered most severely from the enemy's artillery. In order to remedy this, Lord Wellington moved them back about 150 or 200 yards, to the reverse slope of the hill, to shelter them from the direct fire of the guns; our artillery in consequence remained in advance, that they might see into the valley. This movement was made between one and two o'clock by the duke in person; it was

¹ Buonaparte, liv. ix. 142, says, that he saw with pleasure that the English guards were placed on our right, as they were our best troops, which rendered his premeditated attack on our left more easy. Our guards are not, as is the case in other armies, the élite of our army; they are not selected, as in other services, from the best soldiers in other regiments, but are recruited exactly as troops of the line, except that they are required to be somewhat taller. It may be here remarked, the great superiority in *appearance*, that the French and other troops possessed over ours at the close of the war. The mode of recruiting accounts for this. Even our militia were much superior in this point of view to the troops of the line, and most of the best men were obtained from them. Our recruits were in general composed of the population of large cities, or of manufacturing towns, certainly not the best specimens of our population; the military service is not in any estimation amongst our peasantry, whilst the French army was composed of the picked men of thirty millions, and other nations in proportion.

general along the front or centre of the position, on the height to the right of La Haye Sainte.

It is by no means improbable, that the enemy considered this movement as the commencement of a retreat, since a considerable portion of our troops were withdrawn from his sight, and determined in consequence to attack our left centre, in order to get possession of the buildings, called Ferme de M. St Jean, or of the village itself, which commanded the point of junction of the two chaussées. The attacking columns advanced on the Genappe chaussée, and by the side of it; they consisted of four columns of infantry (D'Erlon's corps, which was not engaged on the 16th), thirty pieces of artillery, and a large body of cuirassiers (Milhaud's). On the left of this attack, the French cavalry took the lead of the infantry, and had advanced considerably, when the Duke of Wellington ordered the heavy cavalry (Life Guards) to charge them as they ascended the position near La Haye Sainte. They were driven back on their own position, where the chaussée, being cut into the rising ground, leaves steep banks on either side. In this confined space they fought at swords' length for some minutes, until the enemy brought down some light artillery from the heights, when the British cavalry retired to their own position. The loss of the cuirassiers did not appear great. They seemed immediately to re-form their ranks, and soon after advanced to attack our infantry, who were formed into squares to receive them, being then unsupported by cavalry. The columns of infantry in the mean time, pushed forward on *our* left of the Genappe chaussée, beyond La Haye Sainte, which they did not attempt in this attack to take. A Belgian brigade of infantry, formed in front, gave way, and these columns crowned the position. When Sir Thomas Picton moved up the brigade of General Pack from the second line (the 92d regiment in front), which opened a fire on the column just as it gained the height, and advanced upon it, when within thirty yards, the column began to hesitate; at this moment a brigade of heavy cavalry (the 1st and 2d Dragoons) wheeled round the 92d regiment, and took the column in flank; a total rout ensued; the French, throwing down their arms, ran into our position to save themselves from being cut down by the cavalry; many were killed, and two eagles, with 2000 prisoners, taken. But the cavalry pursued their success too far, and being fired upon by one of the other columns. and at the same time, when in confusion, being attacked by some French cavalry, who had been sent to support the attack, the British were obliged to retire with considerable loss. In this attack the

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enemy had brought forward several pieces of artillery, which were captured by our cavalry; the horses in the guns were killed, and we were obliged to abandon the guns. General Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry, was killed. The gallant Sir Thomas Picton also fell, leading on his division to repel this attack.¹ The number of occurrences which crowded on the attention, rendered it impossible for any individual to see the whole action, and in the midst of noise, bustle, and personal danger, it is difficult to note the exact time in which the event happens.²

It is only afterwards, in discussing the chances and merits of each, that such questions become of interest, which may in some measure account for the discrepancy of the statements of officers present, as to the time and circumstances of some of the principal events. From this period, half-past two, until the end of the action, the British cavalry were scarcely engaged, but remained in readiness in the second line.³ After the French cuirassiers had re-formed, and were strongly reinforced,⁴ they again advanced upon our position, and made several desperate attacks upon our infantry, who immediately formed into squares, and maintained themselves with the most determined courage and coolness. Some time previous to this, about three o'clock, an attack was made upon La Haye Sainte, which is merely a small farm-house; it was occupied by two companies of the German Legion. The enemy had advanced beyond it, so that the communication was cut off for some time, and it could not be reinforced. The troops having expended their ammunition, the post was carried. A continued fire was kept up at this point, and the enemy was soon afterwards obliged to abandon it, without being able to avail himself of it as a point of support for his attacking columns. The house was too small for a sufficient number of troops to maintain themselves so close to our position, under such a heavy fire.

The French cavalry, in the attack on the centre of our line above

¹ Rogniat, p. 251, blames both generals for the too early employment of their cavalry. In the case here mentioned, he says, the success was "*contre toute probabilité*," as the cavalry charged unbroken infantry. The head of the attacking columns had, however, been already shaken by the charge of the 92d regiment, which took place nearly at the moment the cavalry charged.

² Muffling, p. 26, observes, "*La fumée étoit si épaisse que personne ne voyoit l'ensemble de l'action.*"

³ Liv. ix. p. 209. Buonaparte says, "*L'infanterie Anglaise a été ferme et solide. La cavalerie pouvait mieux faire.*"

⁴ Rogniat, p. 231, says they amounted to 12,000, including other heavy cavalry.

mentioned, were not supported by infantry. They came on, however, with the greatest courage, close to the squares of our infantry; the artillery, which was somewhat in advance, kept up a well directed fire upon them as they advanced, but on their nearer approach, the gunners were obliged to retire into the squares, so that the guns were actually in possession of the enemy's cavalry, who could not, however, keep possession of them, or even spike them, if they had the means, in consequence of the heavy fire of musketry to which they were exposed. The French accounts say, that several squares were broken, and standards taken, which is decidedly false; on the contrary, the small squares constantly repulsed the cavalry, whom they generally allowed to advance close to their bayonets before they fired. They were driven back with loss on all points, and the artillerymen immediately resumed their guns in the most prompt manner, and opened a severe and destructive fire of grape-shot on them as they retired.¹

After the failure of the first attack, the French had little or no chance of success by renewing it; but the officers perhaps ashamed of the failure of such boasted troops, endeavoured repeatedly to bring them back to charge the squares; but they could only be brought to pass between them, and round them. They even penetrated to our second line, where they cut down some stragglers and artillery-drivers, who were with the limbers and ammunition-waggons. They charged the Belgian squares in the second line, with no better success, and upon some heavy Dutch cavalry showing themselves, they soon retired.

If the enemy supposed us in retreat, then such an attack of cavalry might have led to the most important results; but by remaining so uselessly in our position, and passing and repassing our squares of infantry, they suffered severely by their fire; so much so, that before the end of the action, when they might have been of great use, either in the attack, or in covering the retreat, they

¹ The cavalry came up to one of the squares at a trot, and appeared to be hanging back as if expecting our fire; they closed round two sides of it, having a front of seventy or eighty men, and came so close to one angle, that they appeared to try to reach over the bayonets with their swords. The squares were generally formed four deep, rounded at the angles; on the approach of the cavalry two files fired, the others reserving their fire; the cavalry then turned, and it is not easy to believe how few fell,—only one officer and two men; no doubt many were wounded, but did not fall from their horses. Many squares fired at the distance of thirty paces, with no other effect. In fact, our troops fired too high, which must have been noticed by the most casual observer.

were nearly destroyed.¹ The only advantage which appeared to result from their remaining in our position, was preventing the fire of our guns on the columns which afterwards formed near La Belle Alliance, in order to debouche for a new attack. The galling fire of the infantry, however, forcing the French cavalry at length to retire into the hollow ground, to cover themselves, the artillerymen were again at their guns, and being in advance of the squares, saw completely into the valley, and by their well-directed fire, seemed to make gaps in them as they re-formed to repeat this useless expenditure of lives. Had Buonaparte been nearer the front, he surely would have prevented this useless sacrifice of his best troops. Indeed, the attack of cavalry at this period, is only to be accounted for by supposing the British army to be in retreat. He had had no time to avail himself of his powerful artillery to make an impression on that part of the line he meant to attack, as had always been his custom, otherwise it was not availing himself of the superiority he possessed; and it was treating his enemy with a contempt, which, from what he had experienced at Quatre Bras, could not be justified.² He allows, in liv. ix. p. 156, that this charge was made too soon,³ but that it was necessary to support it, and that the cuirassiers of Kellerman, 3000 in number, were consequently ordered forward to maintain the position. And at p. 196 and 157, liv. ix. he allows that the grenadiers-à-cheval, and dragoons of the guard, which were in reserve, advanced without orders; that he sent to recall them, but, as they were already engaged, any retrograde movement would then have been dangerous. Thus, every attack of the enemy had

¹ It has been said, that if the enemy had brought up infantry and light artillery, our squares must have given way. This would no doubt have been preferable; but then our reserve and cavalry would have been moved forward to check the cavalry, and the squares would have probably repelled the attack of the infantry. The enemy had tried to bring guns with the attacking columns, on our left, early in the day; the consequence was, that the horses were killed before they had advanced far, so that they could not follow the movements of the infantry, and were left behind. A similar attempt was made in the south of France, in the attack of Lord Hill's corps on the Nive; the guns were harnessed, so as to allow them to fire as they advanced, but the horses were soon killed or disabled, and the guns were abandoned when the attack was repulsed.

² This was what Marmont had done at the Aripiles, at the battle of Salamanca, and for which he suffered so severely.

³ Muffling, p. 27, says, after this attack, which he states to be at four o'clock, "*La bataille avoit été très sanglante, mais il n'y avoit point de danger pour l'armée Anglaise.*" He says it was then five o'clock.

been repulsed, and a severe loss inflicted. The influence this must have had on the "morale" of each army, was much in favour of the British, and the probability of success on the part of the enemy was consequently diminished from that period.

The enemy now seemed to concentrate their artillery, particularly on the left of the Genappe chaussée, in front of La Belle Alliance, and commenced a heavy fire (a large proportion of his guns were twelve-pounders) on that part of our line extending from behind La Haye Sainte towards Hougomont. Our infantry sheltered themselves by lying down behind the ridge of the rising ground, and bore it with the most heroic patience. Several of our guns had been disabled, and many artillerymen killed and wounded, so that this fire was scarcely returned, but when the new point of attack was no longer doubtful, two brigades were brought from Lord Hill's corps on the right, and were of most essential service.

It may here be proper to consider the situation of the Prussian army, and the assistance they had rendered up to this time, about six o'clock.

The British army had sustained several severe attacks, which had been all repulsed, and no advantage of any consequence had been gained by the enemy. They had possessed part of the wood and garden of Hougomont, and La Haye Sainte, which latter they were unable to occupy. Not a square had been broken, shaken, or obliged to retire. Our infantry continued to display the same obstinacy, the same cool, calculating confidence in themselves, in their commander, and in their officers, which had covered them with glory in the long and arduous war in the peninsula. From the limited extent of the field of battle, and the tremendous fire their columns were exposed to, the loss of the enemy could not have been less than 15,000 killed and wounded. Two eagles, and 2000 prisoners, had been taken, and their cavalry nearly destroyed. We still occupied nearly the same position as we did in the morning, but our loss had been severe, perhaps not less than 10,000 killed and wounded. Our ranks were further thinned by the numbers of men who carried off the wounded, part of whom never returned to the field. The number of Belgian and Hanoverian troops, many of whom were young levies, that crowded to the rear, was very considerable, besides the number of our own dismounted dragoons, together with a proportion of our infantry, some of whom, as will always be found in the best armies, were glad to escape from the field. These thronged the road leading to Brussels, in a manner that none but an eyewitness could have

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believed, so that perhaps the actual force under the Duke of Wellington at this time, half-past six, did not amount to more than 34,000 men.¹ We had at an early hour been in communication with some patrols of Prussian cavalry on our extreme left. A Prussian corps, under Bulow, had marched from Wavre at an early hour to manœuvre on the right and rear of the French army, but a large proportion of the Prussian army were still on the heights above Wavre, after the action had commenced at Waterloo.² The state of the roads, and the immense train of artillery they carried, detained Bulow's corps for a remarkably long time, they had not more than twelve or fourteen miles to march. At one o'clock,³ the advanced guard of this corps was discovered by the French; about two o'clock the patrols of Bulow's corps were discovered from part of our position. The French detached some light cavalry to observe them, which was the only diversion that had taken place up to this time. At half-past four, Blucher had joined in person Bulow's corps, at which time two brigades of infantry and some cavalry were detached to act on the right of the French. [Muffling, p. 30.] He was so far from the right of the French, that his fire of artillery was too distant to produce any effect, and was chiefly intended to give us notice of his arrival. [Muffling, p. 31.] It was certainly past five o'clock before the fire of the Prussian artillery [Bulow's corps] was observed from our position; and it soon seemed to cease altogether. It appears that they had advanced, and obtained some success, but were afterwards driven back to a considerable distance by the French, who sent a corps under General Lobau to keep them in check.⁴ About half-past six, the first Prussian corps came into communication with our extreme left near Ohain.

The effective state of the several armies may be considered to be as follows :—

¹ See Muffling, p. 32, who makes the number amount to 10,000, and there is little doubt but that he is correct. A regiment of allied cavalry, whose uniform resembled the French, having fled to Brussels, an alarm spread that the enemy were at the gates. Numbers of those who had quitted the field of battle, and,—let the truth be spoken,—Englishmen too, fled from the town, and never halted until they reached Antwerp. This fact is too well attested to be doubted.

² Muffling, 29. At four o'clock, he says, "Il n'avoit pas encore paru un homme de cette armée."

³ See Soult's Letter to Grouchy, dated from the field of battle at one o'clock.

⁴ Liv. ix. 175. Buonaparte says it was seven o'clock when Lobau repulsed them.

REMARKS ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. 373

The army under the Duke of Wellington amounted, at the commencement of the campaign, to 75,000 men, including every description of force,¹ of which nearly 40,000 were English, or the King's German Legion. Our loss at Quatre-bras amounted to 4500 killed and wounded, which reduced the army to 70,500 men; of these about 54,000 were actually engaged at Waterloo, about 32,000 were composed of British troops, or the King's German Legion, including cavalry, infantry, and artillery; the remainder, under Prince Frederick, took no part in the action, but covered the approach to Brussels from Nievelles, and were stationed in the neighbourhood of Halle. The French force has been variously stated, and it is not easy to form a very accurate statement of their strength. Batty gives it at 127,000; that is the number which crossed the frontiers. Liv. ix. p. 69, it is given at 122,000. Gourgaud reduces it to 115,000; of these, 21,000 were cavalry, and they had 350 guns. Let us, however, take the statement in liv. ix., and say,

	122,000
Deduct left at Charleroi, liv. ix. 92, ²	5,300
Loss at Quatre-bras and Ligny, liv. ix. 100, and 106,	10,350
Left at Ligny (Grouchy, p. 8), liv. ix. 193; this is stated at 3000, . . .	3,200
With Grouchy (Grouchy, p. 8), . . .	32,000
	<hr/> 50,850
Engaged at Waterloo,	<hr/> 71,150

This number, however, is certainly underrated; and there is little doubt but Buonaparte had upwards of 75,000 men under his immediate command on the 18th June.³

Buonaparte, liv. ix. 162, 117, states the Prussian force concentrated at Wavre to be 75,000 men. Grouchy, p. 9, makes it 95,000. It is, however, generally understood that they had not above 70,000 with the army at Wavre.

It may be necessary here to refer to the operations of the

¹ Of these, about 12,700 were cavalry.

² Liv. ix. 193. This force is stated "4 à 5000 hommes."

³ Muffling, p. 58, mentions, that Buonaparte stated to some general officer on the morning of the 18th, that he had 75,000 men, and the English only 50,000. Liv. ix. 193, by taking Buonaparte's own account in this part of the book, upon calculation it will be seen that he there allows that he had upwards of 74,000.

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corps under Grouchy, who were detached in pursuit of the Prussians. It appears, that at 12 o'clock on the 17th, Buonaparte was ignorant of the direction the Prussian army had taken. [Grouchy, p. 13.] It was generally supposed that it was towards Namur. At that hour, Buonaparte ordered Grouchy, with 32,000 men, to follow them. As the troops were much scattered, it was three o'clock before they were in movement, and they did not arrive at Gembloux before the night of the 17th, when Grouchy informed Buonaparte of the direction the Prussian army had taken. He discovered the rear-guard of the Prussians near Wavre about 12 o'clock on the 18th, and at two o'clock he attacked Wavre, which was obstinately defended by General Thielmann, and succeeded in obtaining possession of a part of the village. By the gallant defence of this post by General Thielmann, Grouchy was induced to believe that the whole Prussian army was before him. Blucher, however, had detached Bulow's corps (4th) at an early hour upon Chapelle-Lambert, to act on the rear of the French army. The movement of this corps was, however, much delayed by a fire which happened at Wavre, and by the bad state of the roads; so that they had great difficulty in bringing up the numerous artillery they carried with this corps, which prevented them from attacking the enemy before half-past four o'clock.¹

The 2d Prussian corps marched upon Chapelle-Lambert and Lasne; and at a later period of the day² the 1st corps moved in the direction of Ohain. The 3d corps was also to have supported the 4th and 2d corps. Blucher was not aware of the large force under Grouchy, who attacked the 3d corps as it was preparing to leave Wavre, and obliged it to take up a position on the Dyle, between Limale and Wavre, where he afterwards ordered it to maintain itself as well as it could.

The British army, at this eventful period of the day, amounted to about 34,000 men (allowing 10,000 killed and wounded, and 10,000 more who had left the field), 18,000 of whom were English [Muffling, p. 32]. The enemy may have had about 45,000 immediately opposed to us, allowing 20,000 killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; and 10,000 men detached to act against the Prussians.

The assistance of the Prussians had been expected at an early

¹ See Muffling, pp. 22, 31, 62. Gourgaud, pp. 98 and 99, says it was half-past four when General Dumont informed Buonaparte of their arrival.

² Liv. ix. 163, 169, Buonaparte makes Bulow's attack after sunset.

hour,¹ which had induced Lord Wellington to accept a battle; so that the British army had to bear the whole brunt of the action for a much longer period than was calculated. Lord Wellington, however, showed no anxiety as to the result. The corps of Lord Hill, several Belgian battalions, and a considerable portion of the cavalry, had been little engaged. He knew the troops he had under his command, and seemed confident of being able to maintain his position, even if the Prussians did not arrive before night. The army was not aware of their approach, nor did he think it necessary to animate their exertions by this intelligence. Buonaparte, on the contrary, thought proper to revive the drooping spirits of his troops, even of his guards, who had not yet been engaged, by sending his aide-de-camp Labédoyère to inform them, as they were about to advance,² that Grouchy had joined their right flank, and even deceived Ney himself by this false intelligence.

The above detail has been entered into for the purpose of showing the state of the armies towards the close of the day. Buonaparte was now aware of the powerful diversion the Prussians were about to make, but at the same time seems to have imagined that Grouchy would be able to paralyse their movements. He therefore resolved to make a last desperate effort to break the centre of the British army, and carry their position before the attack of the Prussians could take effect.

The imperial guard had been kept in reserve, and had been for some time formed on the heights extending from La Belle Alliance, towards Hougomont, which supported their left flank. They had not yet been engaged.

About seven o'clock they advanced in two columns,³ leaving four battalions in reserve. They were commanded by Ney, who led them on. At the same time, they pushed on some light troops in the direction of La Haye. The advance of these columns of the guards was supported by a heavy fire of artillery. Our infantry, who had been posted on the reverse of the hill, to be sheltered from the fire of the guns, were instantly moved forward by Lord Wellington. General Maitland's brigade of guards, and General Adam's brigade (52d and 71st regiments, and 95th rifles), met this formidable attack. They were flanked by two brigades of artillery, who kept up a destructive fire on the advan-

¹ Muffling, p. 62, says, it was hoped the Prussian army could have attacked at two o'clock, but that it was half-past four before a cannon was fired by them.

² Liv. ix. 167, Ney's letter. ³ See Lord Wellington's despatches

cing columns. Our troops waited for their approach with their characteristic coolness, until they were within a short distance of our line, when they opened a well-directed fire upon them. The line was formed four deep. The men fired independently, retiring a few paces to load, and then advanced and fired, so that their fire never ceased for a moment. The French, headed by their gallant leader, still advanced, notwithstanding the severe loss they sustained by this fire, which apparently seemed to check their movement. They were now within about fifty yards of our line, when they attempted to deploy, in order to return the fire. Our line appeared to be closing round them. They could not, however, deploy under such a fire; and from the moment they ceased to advance, their chance of success was over. They now formed a confused mass, and at last gave way, retiring in the utmost confusion. They were immediately pursued by the light troops of General Adam's brigade. This decided the battle. The enemy had now exhausted his means of attack. He had still, however, the four battalions of the old guard in reserve. Lord Wellington immediately ordered the whole line to advance to attack their position. The enemy were already attempting a retreat. These battalions formed a square to cover the retreat of the flying columns, flanked by a few guns, and supported by some light cavalry (red lancers).

The first Prussian corps had now joined our extreme left. They had obtained possession of the village of La Haye, driving out the French light troops who occupied it. Bulow, with the fourth corps, had some time previous to this made an unsuccessful attack upon the village of Planchenot, in the rear of the enemy's right wing, and being joined by the second corps, (Pirch's) was again advancing to attack it.¹ In the mean time, the square of the Old Guard maintained itself, the guns on its flank firing upon our light cavalry, who now advanced, and threatened to turn their flank. Our light troops were close on their front, and our whole line advancing, when this body, the "élite," and now the only hope of the enemy to cover their retreat, and save their army, gave way, and mixed in the general confusion and rout, abandoning their cannon and all their materiel. It was now nearly dark. Bulow, upon being joined by Pirch's corps, again attacked Planchenot, which he turned; and then the enemy abandoned it. He immediately advanced towards the Genappe chaussée, and closed round the right of the French,

¹ Gneisnau says, it was half-past seven o'clock before Pirch's corps arrived.—See Blucher's despatches.

—[liv. ix. p. 169]—driving the enemy before him, and augmenting their confusion. His troops came into the high-road, or chaussée, near Maison du Roi, and Blücher and Wellington having met about the same time near La Belle Alliance, it was resolved to pursue the enemy, and give him no time to rally. The loss of the Prussians on the 18th did not exceed 800 men. The brunt of the action was chiefly sustained by the troops of the British and King's German Legion, as their loss will show. In stating this, it must be allowed, that much support was afforded by the other contingents; but they were chiefly raw levies, newly raised, who could not be depended upon in a situation of importance. Some behaved ill, as is publicly known. None were in the first line, except the Nassau troops at Hougomont, and some on our extreme left. They were placed in the second line, and in the valley behind the first line, and on the right, at Braine la Leude. They had generally been formed with the British brigades of the different divisions (in the manner Lord Wellington found so advantageous with the Portuguese troops), but these arrangements had just been made. The different brigades in a division had not any knowledge of, or confidence in, each other. Many battalions, particularly some Belgian troops, in the rear of the first line, stood with firmness against the French cavalry, and drove them back. They suffered more severely, perhaps, than the first line, from the fire of the enemy's artillery, and at the close of the action, advanced in support of the first line with great steadiness and regularity.

The Prussians, who had made only a short march during the day, pursued the enemy with such vigour, that they were unable to rally a single battalion. The British army halted on the field of battle. They once attempted to make a show of resistance at Genappe, where, perhaps, if they had had a chief to direct them, they might have maintained themselves until daylight, the situation of the village being strong; this might have given them the means of saving at least the semblance of an army. The second Prussian corps was afterwards detached to intercept Grouchy, who was not aware of the result of the battle until twelve o'clock next day. He had succeeded in obtaining some advantage over General Thielmann, and got possession of Wavre. He immediately retreated towards Namur, where his rear-guard maintained themselves against all the efforts of the Prussians, who suffered severely in their attempt to take the place. This served to cover his retreat, which he executed with great ability, keeping in a parallel line to Blücher, and having rallied many of the fugitives, he

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brought his army without loss to Paris. He had been considered as lost, and his army made prisoners; this belief was a great cause of the resignation of Buonaparte; otherwise, with this army he could have mustered 70,000 or 80,000 men; with the fortifications and resources of Paris, which was sufficiently secure against a coup-de-main, it is not likely he would have so easily submitted without another struggle, after the brilliant defensive campaign he had made the preceding year. The great central depots of Paris and Lyons gave him great advantages, as is well shown in the introductory chapter, liv. ix. and p. 181. There are always some turns of fortune in the events of war; he might at least have made terms. The southern and eastern parts of France were certainly in his favour; he and his army had been well received there only a few weeks before. That army, and a great part of the population, would still have been glad to make sacrifices to endeavour to re-establish the sullied lustre of his arms. At least the honour of falling sword in hand was in his power.

The time of the arrival and co-operation of the Prussians has been variously stated.¹ The above account is perhaps as near the truth as can be. The French writers make it at an early hour, to account more satisfactorily for their defeat. The Prussians also make it somewhat earlier than was actually the case, in order to participate more largely in the honours of the day. Their powerful assistance has been acknowledged to its full extent. They completed the destruction of the French army, after they had failed in all their attacks against the British, which continued upwards of seven hours, after their cavalry had been destroyed, their Imperial Guards driven back, and eagles and prisoners taken, and when their means of further attack may be considered as exhausted. The British army had suffered severely, and was not in a state to have taken great advantage of the retreat of the French. But its safety was never for a moment compromised, and no calculation could justify the idea, that we would have been so easily defeated and driven from our position, but that the enemy would have been so much crippled, that he could not have taken much advantage of our reverses. Even in such a case, the arrival of the Prussians must have obliged him to have retired.

¹ Liv. ix. says it was eleven o'clock when the Prussians joined. Gourgaud and Montholon copy this. The letter from Soult to Grouchy, dated half-past one o'clock, stating that they were informed by a prisoner of Bulow's march, and that they thought they discovered his advanced posts at that hour, completely contradicts this. Liv. ix.

Muffling has observed, that the bold movement of Blucher on the 18th has not been sufficiently appreciated.¹ It was bold and masterly. Even when he was told that Grouchy was in his rear with a large force, his plans were not shaken, though this might have somewhat retarded his movements. The skilful veteran knew that it was on the field of Waterloo where the fate of the day was to be decided, and if even Grouchy had attacked Bulow's corps, there was nothing to prevent the first and second corps from joining the British army by Ohain. Grouchy could only, at farthest, have checked the third and fourth corps. There cannot be a moment's doubt of the anxiety and exertions of the Prussians to assist on the 18th. The cordiality and friendship of the Prussians have been felt and acknowledged by every officer who has had occasion to visit Prussia subsequently ;—this has been particularly the case with the military.

This short campaign of “ Hours ” was a joint operation. The honours must be shared. On the 16th, the Prussians fought at Ligny under the promise of our co-operation, which could not, however, be given to the extent it was wished or hoped. On the 18th, Lord Wellington fought at Waterloo, on the promise of the early assistance of the Prussians, which, though unavoidably delayed, was at last given with an effect, which perhaps had never before been witnessed. The finest army France ever saw, commanded by the greatest and ablest of her chiefs, ceased to exist, and in a moment the destiny of Europe was changed.

¹ Muffling, p. 61. “ Il ne s'agit pas de savoir ce qu'un général ordinaire auroit fait ; mais une nouvelle de cette nature auroit pu entraîner le général le plus distingué à prendre des precautions, ou la resolution de changer l'offensive vigoureuse en simple demonstration.”

No. II.

BUONAPARTE'S PROTEST.

[*See p. 129.*]

" I HEREBY solemnly protest, in the face of Heaven and of men, against the violence done me, and against the violation of my most sacred rights, in forcibly disposing of my person and my liberty.

" I came voluntarily on board of the *Bellerophon*; I am not a prisoner—I am the guest of England. I came on board even at the instigation of the captain, who told me he had orders from the Government to receive me and my suite, and conduct me to England, if agreeable to me. I presented myself with good faith, to put myself under the protection of the English laws. As soon as I was on board the *Bellerophon*, I was under shelter of the British people. If the Government, in giving orders to the captain of the *Bellerophon* to receive me as well as my suite, only intended to lay a snare for me, it has forfeited its honour, and disgraced its flag. If this act be consummated, the English will in vain boast to Europe, their integrity, their laws, and their liberty. British good faith will be lost in the hospitality of the *Bellerophon*. I appeal to history; it will say that an enemy, who for twenty years waged war against the English people, came voluntarily, in his misfortunes, to seek an asylum under their laws. What more brilliant proof could he give of his esteem and his confidence? But what return did England make for so much magnanimity?—They feigned to stretch forth a friendly hand to that enemy; and when he delivered himself up in good faith, they sacrificed him.

(Signed) " NAPOLEON.

" *On board the Bellerophon, 4th August, 1815.*"

We have already, in the text, completely refuted the pretence, that Buonaparte was ensnared on board the *Bellerophon*. Every expression of Captain Maitland went to disown any authority to treat with Napoleon, or grant him conditions of any kind; nor could he say more when his private opinion was demanded, than that he had no reason to suppose that Napoleon would be ill received in England. This was in presence of Captain Sartorius and Captain Gambier, both of whom Captain Maitland appealed to in support

of his statement. We do not, however, feel it too much, on the present occasion, to copy the letters which passed betwixt Lord Keith, on the one hand, and Captain Maitland, Captain Sartorius, and Captain Gambier, on the other.

“ *Tonnant, at anchor under Berryhead,*
7th August, 1815.

“ SIR,—Count Las Cases having this morning stated to me, that he understood from you, when he was on board the *Bellerophon* in Basque roads, on a mission from General Buonaparte, that you were authorized to receive the General and his suite on board the ship you command, for conveyance to England; and that you assured him, at the same time, that both the General and his suite would be well received there; you are to report, for my information, such observations as you may consider it necessary to make upon these assertions. I am, Sir, &c.

“ KEITH, Admiral.

“ Captain Maitland, *Bellerophon*.”

“ *H. M. S. Bellerophon,*
Plymouth Sound, 8th August, 1815.

“ MY LORD,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of yesterday's date, informing me that Count Las Cases had stated to you, that he had understood from me, when he was on board the *Bellerophon* in Basque roads, on a mission from General Buonaparte, that I was authorized to receive the General and his suite on board the ship I command, for a conveyance to England; and that I assured him, at the same time, that both the General and his suite would be well received there; and directing me to report, for your lordship's information, such observations as I may consider it necessary to make upon these assertions. I shall, in consequence, state, to the best of my recollection, the whole of the transaction that took place between Count Las Cases and me, on the 14th of July, respecting the embarkation of Napoleon Buonaparte, for the veracity of which I beg to refer your Lordship to Captain Sartorius as to what was said in the morning, and to that officer and Captain Gambier (the *Myrmidon* having joined me in the afternoon) as to what passed in the evening.

“ Your lordship being informed already of the flag of truce that came out to me on the 10th of July, as well as of every thing that occurred on that occasion, I shall confine myself to the transactions of the 14th of the same month.

“ Early in the morning of that day, the officer of the watch informed me, a schooner, bearing a flag of truce, was approaching.

On her joining the ship, about seven A. M., the Count Las Cases and General Lallemand came on board; when, on being shown into the cabin, Las Cases asked me if any answer had been returned to the letter sent by me to Sir Henry Hotbam, respecting Napoleon Buonaparte being allowed to pass for America, either in the frigates or in a neutral vessel. I informed him no answer had been returned, though I hourly expected, in consequence of those despatches, Sir Henry Hotham would arrive; and, as I had told Monsieur Las Cases, when last on board, that I should send my boat in when the answer came, it was quite unnecessary to have sent out a flag of truce on that account;—there, for the time, the conversation terminated. On their coming on board, I had made the signal for the captain of the *Slaney*, being desirous of having a witness to all that might pass.

“After breakfast (during which Captain Sartorius came on board) we retired to the after-cabin, when M. Las Cases began on the same subject, and said, ‘The Emperor was so anxious to stop the farther effusion of blood, that he would go to America in any way the English Government would sanction, either in a neutral, a disarmed frigate, or an English ship of war.’ To which I replied, ‘I have no authority to permit any of those measures; but if he chooses to come on board the ship I command, I think, under the orders I am acting with, I may venture to receive him, and carry him to England; but if I do so, I can in no way be answerable for the reception he may meet with’—(this I repeated several times)—when Las Cases said, ‘I have little doubt, under those circumstances, that you will see the Emperor on board the *Bellerophon*.’ After some more general conversation, and the above being frequently repeated, M. Las Cases and General Lallemand took their leave; and I assure your lordship, that I never in any way entered into conditions with respect to the reception General Buonaparte was to meet with; nor was it at that time finally arranged that he was to come on board the *Bellerophon*. In the course of conversation, Las Cases asked me, whether I thought Buonaparte would be well received in England? to which I gave the only answer I could do in my situation—‘That I did not at all know what was the intention of the British Government; but I had no reason to suppose he would not be well received.’ It is here worthy of remark, that when Las Cases came on board, he assured me that Buonaparte was then at Rochefort, and that it would be necessary for him to go there to report the conversation that had passed between us (this I can prove by the testimony of Captain Sartorius, and the first Lieutenant of this ship, to whom I spoke of it at the time), which

statement was not fact; Buonaparte never having quitted isle d'Aix, or the frigates, after the 3d.

“ I was therefore much surprised at seeing M. Las Cases on board again before seven o'clock the same evening; and one of the first questions I put to him was, whether he had been at Rochefort? He answered, that, on returning to isle d'Aix, he found that Napoleon had arrived there.

“ M. Las Cases then presented to me the letter Count Bertrand wrote concerning Buonaparte's intention to come on board the ship (a copy of which has been transmitted to your lordship by Sir Henry Hotham), and it was not till then agreed upon that I should receive him; when either M. Las Cases or General Gourgaud (I am not positive which, as I was employed writing my own despatches) wrote to Bertrand to inform him of it. While paper was preparing to write the letter, I said again to M. Las Cases, ‘ You will recollect I have no authority for making conditions of any sort.’ Nor has M. Las Cases ever started such an idea till the day before yesterday. That it was not the feeling of Buonaparte, or the rest of his people, I will give strong proof, drawn from the conversations they have held with me.

“ As I never heard the subject mentioned till two days ago, I shall not detail every conversation that has passed, but confine myself to that period. The night that the squadron anchored at the back of Berry-head, Buonaparte sent for me about 10 P.M., and said he was informed by Bertrand that I had received orders to remove him to the Northumberland, and wished to know if that was the case; on being told that it was, he requested that I would write a letter to Bertrand, stating I had such orders, that it might not appear he went of his own accord, but that he had been forced to do so. I told him I could have no objection, and wrote a letter to that effect, which your lordship afterwards sanctioned, and desired me, if he required it, to give him a copy of the order.

“ After having arranged that matter, I was going to withdraw, when he requested me to remain, as he had something more to say. He then began complaining of his treatment in being forced to go to St Helena; among other things he observed, ‘ They say I made no conditions—certainly I made no conditions; how could a private man (*un particulier*) make conditions with a nation? I wanted nothing from them but hospitality, or (as the ancients would express it) air and water. I threw myself on the generosity of the English nation: I claimed a place *sur leurs foyers*, and my only wish was to purchase a small estate, and end my life in

tranquillity.' After more of the same sort of conversation, I left him for the night.

"On the morning he removed from the *Bellerophon* to the *Northumberland*, he sent for me again, and said, 'I have sent for you to express my gratitude for your conduct to me, while I have been on board the ship you command. My reception in England has been very different from what I expected; but you throughout have behaved like a man of honour; and I request you will accept my thanks, as well as convey them to the officers and ship's company of the *Bellerophon*.' Soon afterwards, Montholon came to me from Buonaparte; but, to understand what passed between him and me, I must revert to a conversation that I had with Madame Bertrand on the passage from Rochefort.

"It is not necessary to state how the conversation commenced, as it does not apply to the present transaction; but she informed me that it was Buonaparte's intention to present me with a box containing his picture set with diamonds. I answered, 'I hope not, for I cannot receive it.'—'Then you will offend him very much,' she said.—'If that is the case,' I replied, 'I request you will take measures to prevent its being offered, as it is absolutely impossible I can accept of it; and I wish to spare him the mortification, and myself the pain, of a refusal.' There the matter dropped, and I heard no more of it, till about half an hour before Buonaparte quitted the *Bellerophon*, when Montholon came to me, and said he was desired by Buonaparte to express the high sense he entertained of my conduct throughout the whole of the transaction;—that it had been his intention to present me with a box containing his portrait, but that he understood I was determined not to accept it. I said, 'Placed as I was, I felt it impossible to receive a present from him, though I was highly flattered at the testimony he had borne to the uprightness of my conduct throughout.' Montholon added, 'One of the greatest causes of chagrin he feels in not being admitted to an interview with the Prince Regent is, that he had determined to ask as a favour, your being promoted to the rank of rear-admiral.' To which I replied, 'That would have been quite impossible, but I do not the less feel the kindness of the intention.' I then said, 'I am hurt that Las Cases should say I held forth any assurances as to the reception Buonaparte was to meet with in England.'—'Oh!' said he, 'Las Cases is disappointed in his expectations; and as he negotiated the affair, he attributes the Emperor's situation to himself: but I can assure you that he (Buonaparte) feels convinced you have acted like a man of honour throughout.'

“As your lordship overheard part of a conversation which took place between Las Cases and me on the quarterdeck of the *Bellerophon*, I shall not detail it; but on that occasion, I positively denied having promised any thing as to the reception of Buonaparte and his suite; and I believe your lordship was of opinion he could not make out the statement to you. It is extremely unpleasant for me to be under the necessity of entering into a detail of this sort; but the unhandsome representation Las Cases has made to your lordship of my conduct, has obliged me to produce proofs of the light in which the transaction was viewed by Buonaparte as well as his attendants.

“I again repeat that Captain Gambier and Sartorius can verify the principal part of what I have stated, as far as concerns the charge made against me by Count Las Cases.—I have the honour to be your lordship's, &c.

“FREDERICK L. MAITLAND.

“To the Right Hon.
Viscount Keith, G.C.B. &c. &c.”

“*Slaney, in Plymouth Sound,*
15th August, 1815.

“MY LORD,—I have read Captain Maitland's letter to your lordship, of the 8th instant, containing his observations upon the assertions made on the preceding day by Count Las Cases; and I most fully attest the correctness of the statement he has made, so far as relates to the conversations that took place in my presence.—I have the honour to be your lordship's, &c.

“G. R. SARTORIUS,
“Capt. of H. M. S. *Slaney*.

“To the Right Hon.
Viscount Keith, G.C.B. &c. &c.”

It happened that Captain Gambier's attestation to the above statement was not in Captain Maitland's possession; but having obtained a copy of it from the kindness of Mr Meike, secretary to Lord Keith, we can supply this additional piece of evidence to a proof already so distinct in itself.

“I have read the preceding Letter” [that of Captain Maitland], “and most fully attest the correctness of what Captain Maitland has said, so far as relates to what occurred in my presence on the evening of the 14th of July.

(Sigoed) “ROBERT GAMBIER,
“Captain of H. M. Ship *Myrmidon*.”

No. III.

[See p. 145.]

STATES of THERMOMETER, as taken at *Deadwood*, island of St Helena, during 12 calendar months, viz. from 1st Sept. 1820, to 31st Aug. 1821, inclusive.—This condensed view of the different states of the Thermometer was kept at Deadwood, which is just one short mile from Longwood, and therefore expresses the exact temperature of the climate in which he lived,—milder, and more equable, certainly, than most in the known world. In point of moisture, Dr Shortt is not of opinion that St Helena differs materially from any other tropical island of the same extent. His account of the general state of health among the troops has been already referred to.

Months.	Thermometer.			Remarks.
	Maximum.	Medium.	Minimum.	
Sept. 1820,	66	64	62	Wind blowing from S.E.
Oct. do.	68	65	62	Do. Do.
Nov. do.	72	66	61	Generally S.E. 6 days from N.W.
Dec. do.	72	66	61	Wind from S.E.
Jan. 1821,	76	70	68	Do. Do.
Feb. do.	76	70	67	Do. Do.
March do.	76	71	67	Do. Do.
April do.	74	70	66	Do. Do.
May do.	72	68	64	Do. Do.
June do.	70	65	57	Generally S.E. 1 day westerly.
July do.	71	66	57	Do. Do.
Aug. do.	68	64	62	Wind from S.E.

(Certified) by THOMAS SHORTT,
Physician to H. M. Forces, and
Principal Medical Officer at St Helena.

No. IV.

INTERVIEW BETWIXT NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE
AND HENRY ELLIS, ESQ. THIRD COMMISSIONER
OF LORD AMHERST'S EMBASSY TO CHINA.

[See p. 263.]

ALTHOUGH, like others, I was familiar with the details of Buonaparte's present situation, and might, therefore, be supposed to have become saturated with those sentiments of surprise, which such an extraordinary reverse of fortune was calculated to excite, —I must confess that I could boast but little self-possession on entering the presence of a man, who had been at once the terror and wonder of the civilized world. The absence of attendants, and the other circumstances of high station, did not seem to me to have affected his individual greatness; however elevated his rank had been, his actions had been still beyond it. Even the mighty weapons which he had wielded were light to his gigantic strength; the splendour of a court, the pomp, discipline, and number of his armies, sufficient to have constituted the personal greatness of an hereditary monarch, scarcely added to the effect produced by the tremendous, but fortunately ill-directed, energies of his mind. Their absence, therefore, did not diminish the influence of his individuality. I do not know that I ever before felt myself in the presence of a mind differing from mine, not in degree, but in nature; and could have had but little disposition to gratify curiosity by enquiries into the motives which had guided his conduct in the eventful transactions of his life. I came prepared to listen and recollect, not to question or speculate. Lord Amherst having presented me, Napoleon began by saying, that my name was not unknown to him; that he understood I had been at Constantinople, and had a faint recollection of some person of my name having been employed in Russia. I, in reply, said that I had been at Constantinople in my way to Persia. "Yes," says he, "it was I who showed you the way to that country? *Eh bien, comment se porte mon ami le Shah?* What have the Russians been doing lately in that quarter?" On my

informing him that the result of the last war had been the cession of all the territory in the military occupation of their troops,—he said, “ Yes, Russia is the power now most to be dreaded ; Alexander may have whatever army he pleases. Unlike the French and English, the subjects of the Russian empire improve their condition by becoming soldiers. If I called on a Frenchman to quit his country, I required him to abandon his happiness. The Russian, on the contrary, is a slave while a peasant, and becomes free and respectable when a soldier. A Frenchman, leaving his country, always changes for the worse, while Germany, France, and Italy, are all superior to the native country of the Russians. Their immense bodies of Cossacks are also formidable ; their mode of travelling resembles the Bedouins of the desert. They advance with confidence into the most unknown regions.” He then related the following instance of the extraordinary powers of vision possessed by the Arabs. When in Egypt, he took up his glass to examine an Arab, who was still at some distance. Before Buonaparte had, with the assistance of the instrument, ascertained his appearance, a Bedouin standing near him, had so completely made him out, as to distinguish the dress of the tribe to which he belonged.

“ Russia,” continued he, “ has still her designs upon Constantinople. To obtain my consent to his projects upon Turkey, was the great wish of the Emperor Alexander, but in vain ; I told him I never would allow the Greek cross to be added to the crown of the Czars. Austria would unite with Russia against Turkey, on condition of being allowed to retain the provinces contiguous to her frontier. France and England are the only powers interested in opposing their schemes ; I always felt this, and always supported the Turks, although I hated them as barbarians. If Russia,” he added, “ organises Poland, she will be irresistible.” Napoleon here took a rapid view of the military character of the nations of Europe, and, without reference to what he had just said respecting the Russians, declared the French and English were the only troops deserving notice for their discipline and moral qualities. “ The Austrian and Prussian,” he said, “ were much inferior : in fact, real strength and efficiency were confined to the English and French.” The remainder of his harangue (for his habit of not waiting for, or indeed listening to replies, renders conversation an inapplicable term) was employed upon the present state of England, which he considered was most calamitous, and as produced by the impolicy of mixing with continental affairs. The dominion of the seas, and the maintenance of a monopoly of

commerce, he considered as the only true foundation of our national prosperity. "Whatever might be the bravery of our troops, their limited number would for ever prevent us from becoming a great military power. *Vous avez toujours votre bravoure des siècles, mais, avec quarante cinq mille, vous ne serez jamais puissance militaire*—In sacrificing maritime affairs, we were acting like Francis I. at the battle of Pavia, whose general had made an excellent disposition of his army, and had placed forty-five pieces of cannon (an unheard-of battery at that time) in a situation that must have secured the victory : Francis, however, his grand sabre à la main, placed himself at the head of his gendarmerie and household troops, between the battery and the enemy, and thereby lost the advantage his superiority of artillery gave him ; thus," said he, " seduced by a temporary success, you are masking the only battery you possess, your naval pre-eminence. While that remains, you may blockade all Europe. I well know the effect of blockade. With two small wooden machines, you distress a line of coast, and place a country in the situation of a body rubbed over with oil, and thus deprived of the natural perspiration. I," says he, " am now suffering in my face from this obstruction to perspiration, and blockade has the same effect upon a nation. What have you gained by the war ? You have gained possession of my person, and had an opportunity of exhibiting an example of ungenerousness. By placing the Bourbons on the throne, you have disturbed the legitimacy of kings, for I am the natural sovereign of France. You conceived that none but Napoleon could shut the ports of Europe against you, but now every petty sovereign insults you with prohibitory regulations upon your commerce.—*L'Angleterre est déchue depuis qu'elle s'est mêlée des affaires du continent*.—You should have been aware of the advance I had made towards the improvement of manufacture throughout my empire, and secured the repayment of your expenses during the war, by a forced extension of your trade. Who placed the King of Portugal on his throne ? Was it not England ? Had you not, therefore, a right to be reimbursed, and that reimbursement might have been found in the exclusive trade to the Brazils for five years. This demand was reasonable, and could not, therefore, have been refused." I observed, that such a proceeding would not have been consonant with our political system, and that the King of Portugal, aware of this, would have resisted, the more especially as, when placed on the throne, he no longer wanted our assistance. " The demand should have been made in the first instance," said he, " when you might have asked any thing ; but it is now too late ;

and you have only to blame your ministers, who have totally neglected the interests of England. Russia, Austria, Prussia, have all been gainers; England alone has been a loser. You have even neglected that poor kingdom of Hanover, Why not have added three or four millions to its population? Lord Castle-reagh got among the monarchs, became a courtier, and thought more of their aggrandisement, than of the claims of his country. Your good fortunes, *et mes fautes, mes imprudences*, have brought about a state of things which even Pitt never dared to dream of; and what is the result? your people are starving, and your country is convulsed with riots. The situation of England is most curious. She has gained all, and yet she is ruined. Believe the opinion of a man accustomed to consider political subjects; England should look wholly to commerce and naval affairs; she never can be a continental power, and in the attempt must be ruined. Maintain the empire of the seas, and you may send your ambassadors to the courts of Europe, and ask what you please. The sovereigns are aware of your present distressed situation, and insult you." He repeated, "Forty-five thousand men will never make you a military power; it is not in the genius of your nation. None but the very dregs of the nation enlist in your army; the profession is not liked." He would not listen to an observation respecting the great channel of supply from the militia to the line, which he seemed to confound with the volunteers.

Napoleon continued his observations by saying, "The suspension of the Habeas Corpus would not prove a remedy for the riots; people must have food; the stagnation of commerce diminishes your exports, and your manufacturers are starving. It is absurd to describe the evils as temporary. Wellesley is right in that, the distress is general, and must be lasting. Stopping the evils by suspending the Habeas Corpus, is applying topical remedies when the disease is in the system; topical remedies will only remove topical eruption; the complaint extends over the whole body.—There is not a man of ability in the cabinet. Lord Chatham understood the true interests of England when he said, 'If we are just for twenty-four hours, we must be ruined.' Immense extension of commerce, combined with reductions and reforms, could alone have prevented the present crisis in England. For his part, he wished that all was tranquil and settled, as that was his only chance of being released. A large army," he remarked, "was moreover inconsistent with our free constitution, to which we were, with reason, so much attached." I remarked, that the superior importance to England of maritime concerns was fully

acknowledged by our ministers, and that they would heartily rejoice in being enabled to withdraw the British contingent in France (to which he seemed to have alluded); that the actual distress in England arose from the system of public credit, by which the war had been supported, and the consequences of which were in their nature lasting; that these consequences had been anticipated, and were not, it was to be hoped, irremediable. "Yes," said Napoleon, "your resources are great: but your ruin, from persisting in your present policy, is certain. Your ministers have affected generosity, and have ruined the country. In this generosity you have departed from the system of your ancestors, who never concluded a peace without gaining, or attempting to gain, some advantage; they were steady merchants, who filled their purses, but you have set up for gentlemen, and are ruined. Although the peace, on the termination of the American war, was honourable to France, for she compelled England to acknowledge the independence of America, the treaty in 1783 was fatal to French commerce; and how do you suppose that came to be concluded? The French ministers were fully aware of its injurious consequences, but England threatened war, and they had no money to defray the expenses." I understood Buonaparte to say that this account was supported by Memoirs in the Bureau des Affaires Etrangères.

During the conversation, which, notwithstanding the variety of topics started, if not discussed, did not occupy more than half an hour, there were frequent repetitions of particular expressions, such as "*L'Angleterre est déchue; avec 45,000 hommes vous ne serez jamais puissance continentale.*" Buonaparte never listened to any reply naturally arising from his observations, but continued his own view of the subject he was discussing; he seemed little studious in arrangement, but poured out his ideas with a rapidity of language almost equal to the rapidity of their succession in the mind. His style upon political subjects is so epigrammatic and tranchant, that in a man whose actions had not been correspondent, it would look like charlatanerie. Buonaparte must be allowed to be eloquent, and possesses that species of oratory well adapted for a popular assembly, or for influencing persons already prepared to look up to him. Upon the former, his point would produce impression; and a sort of oracular confidence, in which he abounds, would command the conviction of the latter. His manner, on the whole, was pleasing, and had a mixture of simplicity and conscious superiority which I never before witnessed. The expression of his countenance is more intellectual than commanding; and his person, so far from being

overgrown with corpulency, seems fully equal to the endurance of the greatest exertion. I should say that he was as fit as ever to go through a campaign, and that, considering his age, he was not unusually corpulent. I have omitted to mention an illustration made use of by Buonaparte, in speaking of the conduct of the English ministers at the Congress. "You were," said he, "like the dog in the fable, who dropt the piece of meat in the water, while looking at his own image. You had the commerce of the world, and you took no precautions to retain it. Nothing but a great extension of commerce could have enabled you to bear your immense taxes, and you made no effort to obtain it." Buonaparte miscalls English names and words more than any foreigner I ever before heard, who had pretensions to a knowledge of the language; and notwithstanding his reading, and the attention he has probably paid to the subject, he seems little acquainted with the nature of our domestic policy. His plans, like his practice, are all despotic, and are formed without adverting to constitutional restrictions.

In his conversation with Lord Amherst, he dwelt much upon his present situation, and expressed himself with great and unjustifiable bitterness respecting Sir H. Lowe. Lord Bathurst's speech had evidently annoyed him, and he expressed disappointment at the countenance such language and treatment received from Lords Sidmouth and Liverpool, with whom he affected to consider himself as having been formerly on terms of amicable intercourse. He said such a man as Lord Cornwallis ought to have been placed in Sir H. Lowe's situation. It is difficult to conceive any complaints more unreasonable, than those made by Buonaparte of Sir H. Lowe's conduct. There perhaps never was a prisoner so much requiring to be watched and guarded, to whom so much liberty and range for exercise was allowed. With an officer he may go over any part of the island; wholly unobserved, his limits extend four miles—partially observed, eight—and overlooked, twelve. At night, the sentinels certainly close round Longwood itself. The house is small, but well furnished; and altogether as commodious as the circumstances under which it was procured would admit. I can only account for his petulance and unfounded complaints, from one of two motives,—either he wishes by their means to keep alive interest in Europe, and more especially in England, where he flatters himself he has a party; or his troubled mind finds an occupation in the tracasseries which his present conduct gives to the governor. If the latter be the case, it is in vain for any governor to unite being on good terms

with him, to the performance of his duty. Buonaparte, in concluding the observations which he thought proper to address to me, made a motion with his hand to Lord Amherst for the introduction of Captain Maxwell and the gentlemen of the embassy. They entered, accompanied by Generals Bertrand, Montholon, and Gourgaud. A circle under the direction of the grand marshal was formed, and Lord Amherst having presented Captain Maxwell, Buonaparte said, "I have heard of you before—you took one of my frigates, the *Pauline*; *vous êtes un méchant*; well, your Government can say nothing about your losing the ship, for you have taken one for them before." He observed of Lord Amherst's son, that he must resemble his mother, and good-humouredly asked him what he had brought from China, whether a bonnet or a mandarin. He enquired of Mr M'Leod, the surgeon of the *Alceste*, how long he had served, and if he had been wounded; repeating the question in English. On Mr Abel being introduced as naturalist, he enquired if he knew Sir Joseph Banks, saying that his name had always been a passport, and that, even during the war, his requests had always been attended to. He wished to know if Mr Abel was a member of the Royal Society, or was a candidate for that honour. Buonaparte appeared to be under some erroneous impression respecting a son of Sir J. Banks having gone on an expedition to the coast of Africa. Mr Cook's name led him naturally to enquire whether he was a descendant of the celebrated Cook, the navigator, adding, "he was indeed a great man." Dr Lynn having been presented as a physician, was asked at what university he had studied. "At Edinburgh," being the reply—"Ah! you are a Brunonian in practice; and do you bleed and give as much mercury as our St Helena doctors?" To Mr Griffiths, the chaplain (whom he called *Aumonier*), he put some questions respecting the state of religion in China; he was answered, a kind of Polytheism. Not seeming to understand this word spoken in English, Bertrand explained, *Pluralité de Dieux*. "Ah, *Pluralité de Dieux*! Do they believe," he resumed, "in the immortality of the soul?" "They seem to have some idea of a future state," was the reply. He then asked to what university he belonged; and jokingly said to Lord Amherst, "you must get him a good living when you go home;" adding, "I wish you may be a prebendary." He then enquired of Mr Hayne, how and where he had been educated? On being told that he had been educated at home by his father, he immediately turned away; and having now said something to each, he dismissed us.

No. V.

MEMORANDUM OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AT
LONGWOOD.

[See p. 270.]

GENERAL BUONAPARTE, 1

Followers.

General and Madame Bertrand, 2

Children of ditto, 3

General and Madame Montholon, 2

Children of ditto, 2

General Gourgaud, 1

Count Las Cases, 1

Monsieur Las Cases, his son, 1

Captain Prowtowski, 1

Foreign Servants to General Buonaparte, 12

Marchand,	Noverraz,
Santini,	Pierron.
Lepage,	Archambaud, 1,
Aby,	Archambaud, 2,
Cipriani,	Gentilini,
Rosseau,	1 female cook,

Bernard, wife, and son, foreign servants to Gen.

Bertrand, 3

1 French female servant to General Montholon, 1

English Attendants.

1 English gardener, 1

English soldiers (servants), 12

1 boy, a soldier's son, 1

1 English maid-servant to General Bertrand, . 1

Carry forward, 45

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	Brought forward,	45
2 English female servants to Gen. Montholon,		2
Black servants,	3
		<hr/>
		50

British Officers attached to the Establishment.

Captain Poppleton, captain of the guard,	.	1
Dr O'Meara, surgeon,	1
Servants,	3
		<hr/>
	Total,	55

29th August, 1816.

Of these persons, General Gourgaud, Madame Montholon and her children, Count Las Cases and his son, Prowtowski and Santini, returned to Europe at different periods.

Cipriani, the maître d'hôtel, died on the island.

The Abbé Bonavita, surgeon Antommarchi, the priest, Vignali, and two cooks, were sent out to St Helena in 1819.

The abbé returned to Europe in 1821, having left St Helena in the month of March of that year.

Something happened to three of the servants, Pierron, Aby, and Archambaud, which cannot be now precisely ascertained. It is thought, however, that Pierron was sent away in consequence of some quarrel about a female servant; Aby (probably) died, and one of the Archambauds went to America.

General Bertrand's family in France, and the relations of his wife in England (the Jerninghams), were employed to send them out several servants, whose names cannot be ascertained.

EXTRAIT DU JOURNAL MANUSCRIT DE M. DE LAS CASES.

Dec. 1815.—Depuis notre départ de Plymouth, depuis notre débarquement dans l'île, jusqu'à notre translation à Longwood, la maison de l'Empereur, bien que composée de onze personnes, avait cessée d'exister.

Personnes composant le Service de l'Empereur :—

Marchand	} Chambre	Prem. valet de chambre.
St Denis		Valet de chambre.
Noyerraz		Id.
Santini		Huissier.

Cipriani	}	Bouche	Maitre d'hôtel.
Pierron			Officier.
Lepage			Cusiner.
Rosseau			Argentier.
Archambault, aîné	}	Livrée	Piqueur.
Archambault, cadet			Id.
Gentilini			Valet de pied.

Dès que nous fumes tous réunis à Longwood, l'Empereur voulut régulariser tout ce qui étoit autour de lui, et chercha à employer chacun de nous suivant la pente de son esprit, conservant au grand maréchal le commandement et la surveillance de tout en grand. Il confia à M. de Montholon tous les détails domestiques. Il donna à Monsieur Gourgaud la direction de l'écurie, et me reserva le détail des meubles, avec la régularisation des objets qui nous seroient fournis. Cette dernière partie me sembloit tellement en contraste avec les détails domestiques, et je trouvois que l'unité sur ce point devoit être si avantageux au bien commun, que je me prêtai le plus que je pus à m'en faire dépouiller ; ce qui ne fut pas difficile.

No. VI.

INTERVIEW BETWEEN BUONAPARTE AND THE WIDOW OF THEOBALD WOLFE TONE.

[See p. 322.]

IN vindication of what we have said in the text respecting the ready access afforded by Napoleon, when Emperor, we may refer to the following interesting extract from the Memoirs of Theobald Wolfe Tone, already quoted. It is the account given by his widow of an interview with the Emperor ; and it is only necessary to add, by way of introduction, that Mrs Tone, having received a pension from the French Government after her husband's catastrophe, became desirous, in addition, to have her son admitted into the military school at St Cyr. Being discountenanced in her pretensions by the minister at war, she was advised to present her memorial to the Emperor himself. The following is a very pleasing account of the scene that took place betwixt them, in which we give Napoleon full credit for acting from his feelings of

generosity towards the widow and orphan of a man who had died in his service :—

“ Very soon the carriage with the Emperor and Empress drove into the circle; the horses were changed as quick as thought, but I stepped up and presented the book and memorial. He took them, and handing the book to his *écuyer*, opened the paper. I have said it commenced by recalling Tone to his memory. When he began, he said ‘Tone!’ with an expressive accent—‘I remember well,’ (*Je m’en souviens bien*). He read it all through, and two or three times stopped, looked at me, and bowed in reading it. When he had finished, he said to me, ‘Now, speak to me of yourself,’ (*Maintenant, parlez moi de vous*). I hesitated, for I was not prepared for that question, and took small interest in the subject. He proceeded. ‘Have you a pension?’ I said I had. ‘Is it sufficient? Do you want any extraordinary succour?’ By this time I had recovered myself, and said, ‘That his Majesty’s goodness left me no personal want; that all my cares, all my interest in life, were centered in my child, whom I now gave up to his Majesty’s service.’ He answered, ‘Be tranquil then on his account—he perfectly tranquil concerning him’ (*Soyez donc tranquille sur son compte—soyez parfaitement tranquille sur lui*). I perceived a little half smile when I said, ‘my child’ (*mon enfant*), I should have said ‘my son.’ I knew it, but forgot.—He had stopped so long, that a crowd had gathered, and were crushing on, crying *Vive l’Empereur!* They drove in the guard, and there came a horse very close to me. I was frightened, and retiring; but he called to stay where I was—‘*Restez, restez là.*’ Whether it was for my safety, or that he wanted to say more, I cannot tell; but more it was impossible to say, for the noise. I was close to the carriage door, and the guards on horseback close behind me, and indeed I was trembling. He saluted the people, and directed that two Napoleons a-piece should be given to the old women, and women with little children, who were holding out their hands. He then drove on, and, in going, nodded to me two or three times with affectionate familiarity, saying, ‘Your child shall be well naturalized’ (*Vôtre enfant sera bien naturalisé*), with a playful emphasis on the words *vôtre enfant*.”

The youth was admitted to the cavalry school of St Cyr, and the following is an account of Napoleon visiting that seminary :—

“ The Emperor frequently visited the school of infantry at St Cyr, reviewed the cadets, and gave them cold collations in the

park. But he had never visited the school of cavalry since its establishment, of which we were very jealous, and did all in our power to attract him. Whenever he hunted, the cadets were in grand parade on the parterre, crying, '*Vive l'Empereur*,' with all their young energies; he held his hat raised as he passed them; but that was all we could gain. Wise people whispered that he never would go whilst they were so evidently expecting him; that he liked to keep them always on the alert; it was good for discipline. The general took another plan, and once allowed no sign of life about the castle when the Emperor passed—it was like a deserted place. But it did not take neither; he passed, as if there was no castle there. It was *désesperant*. When, lo! the next day but one after I had spoken to him, he suddenly galloped into the court of the castle, and the cry of the sentinel, '*L'Empereur!*' was the first notice they had of it. He examined into every thing. All were in undress, all at work, and this was what he wanted. In the military schools, the cadets got ammunition-bread, and lived like well-fed soldiers; but there was great outcry in the circles of Paris against the bread of the school of St Germain's. Ladies complained that their sons were poisoned by it; the Emperor thought it was all nicety, and said no man was fit to be an officer who could not eat ammunition-bread. However, being there, he asked for a loaf, which was brought, and he saw it was villanous trash, composed of pease, beans, rye, potatoes, and every thing that would make flour or meal, instead of good brown wheaten flour. He tore the loaf in two in a rage, and dasbed it against the wall, and there it stuck like a piece of mortar, to the great annoyance of those whose duty it was to have attended to this. He ordered the baker to be called, and made him look at it *sticking*. The man was in great terror first at the Emperor's anger, but, taking heart, he begged his majesty not to take his contract from him, and he would give good bread in future; at which the Emperor broke into a royal and imperial passion, and threatened to send him to the galleys; but, suddenly turning round, he said, 'Yes, he would allow him to keep his contract, on condition that, as long as it lasted, he should furnish the school with good white household bread (*pain de ménage*), such as was sold in the baker's shops in Paris;—that he might choose that, or lose his contract;' and the baker thankfully promised to furnish good white bread in future, at the same price."

No. VII.

BUONAPARTE'S LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT.

[See p. 336-7.]

NAPOLEON,

*This 15th April, 1821, at Longwood, Island of St Helena.**This is my Testament, or Act of my last Will.*

I.

1. I die in the apostolical Roman religion, in the bosom of which I was born, more than fifty years since. 2. It is my wish that my ashes may repose on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the French people, whom I have loved so well. 3. I have always had reason to be pleased with my dearest wife, Marie Louise. I retain for her, to my last moment, the most tender sentiments—I beseech her to watch, in order to preserve my son from the snares which yet environ his infancy. 4. I recommend to my son never to forget that he was born a French prince, and never to allow himself to become an instrument in the hands of the triumvirs who oppress the nations of Europe; he ought never to fight against France, or to injure her in any manner; he ought to adopt my motto—“*Every thing for the French people.*” 5. I die prematurely, assassinated by the English oligarchy and its * * *. The English nation will not be slow in avenging me. 6. The two unfortunate results of the invasions of France, when she had still so many resources, are to be attributed to the treason of Marmont, Augereau, Talleyrand, and La Fayette. I forgive them—may the posterity of France forgive them like me! 7. I thank my good and most excellent mother, the Cardinal, my brothers Joseph, Lucien, Jerome, Pauline, Caroline, Julie, Hortense, Catherine, Eugène, for the interest which they have continued to feel for me. I pardon Louis for the libel which he published in 1820: It is replete with false assertions and falsified documents. 8. I disavow the “*Manuscript of St Helena,*” and other works, under the title of *Maxims, Sayings, &c.*, which persons have been pleased to publish for the last six years. These are not the rules which have guided my life. I caused the Duc d’Enghien to be arrested and tried, because that step was essential to the safety,

interest, and honour of the French people, when the Count d'Artois was maintaining, by his confession, sixty assassins at Paris. Under similar circumstances, I would act in the same way.

II.

1. I bequeath to my son, the boxes, orders, and other articles ; such as my plate, field-bed, saddles, spurs, chapel plate, books, linen, which I have been accustomed to wear and use, according to the list annexed (A). It is my wish that this slight bequest may be dear to him, as recalling the memory of a father, of whom the universe will discourse to him. 2. I bequeath to Lady Holland the antique cameo which Pope Pius VI. gave me at Tolentino. 3. I bequeath to Count Montholon two millions of francs, as a proof of my satisfaction with the filial attentions which he has paid to me during six years, and as an indemnity for the losses which his residence at St Helena has occasioned. 4. I bequeath to Count Bertrand five hundred thousand francs. 5. I bequeath to Marchand, my first valet de chambre, four hundred thousand francs. The services which he has rendered to me are those of a friend ; it is my wish that he should marry the widow, sister, or daughter of an officer of my old guard. 6. Item, To St Denis, one hundred thousand francs. 7. Item, To Novarre, one hundred thousand francs. 8. Item, To Pieron, one hundred thousand francs. 9. Item, To Archambaud fifty thousand francs. 10. Item, To Cursor, twenty-five thousand francs. 11. Item, To Chandellier, item. 12. Item, To the Abbé Vignali, one hundred thousand francs. It is my wish that he should build his house near the Ponte nuovo di Costino. 13. Item, To Count Las Cases, one hundred thousand francs. 14. Item, To Count Lavalette, one hundred thousand francs. 15. Item, To Larrey, surgeon in chief, one hundred thousand francs. —He is the most virtuous man I have known. 16. Item, To General Brayher, one hundred thousand francs. 17. Item, To General Le Fevre Desnouettes, one hundred thousand francs. 18. Item, To General Drouot, one hundred thousand francs. 19. Item, To General Cambrone, one hundred thousand francs. 20. Item, To the children of General Mouton Duvernet, one hundred thousand francs. 21. Item, To the children of the brave Labédoyère, one hundred thousand francs. 22. Item, To the children of General Girard, killed at Ligny, one hundred thousand francs. 23. Item, To the children of General Marchand, one hundred thousand francs. 24. Item, To the children of the virtuous General Travost, one hundred thousand francs.

25. Item, To General Lallemand the elder, one hundred thousand francs. 26. Item, To Count Real, one hundred thousand francs. 27. Item, To Costa de Basilica, in Corsica, one hundred thousand francs. 28. Item, To General Clausel, one hundred thousand francs. 29. Item, To Baron de Menevalle, one hundred thousand francs. 30. Item, To Arnault, the author of *Marius*, one hundred thousand francs. 31. Item, To Colonel Marbot, one hundred thousand francs. I engage him to continue to write in defence of the glory of the French armies, and to confound their calumniators and apostates. 32. Item, to Baron Bignon, one hundred thousand francs. I engage him to write the history of French diplomacy, from 1792 to 1815. 33. Item, To Poggi di Talavo, one hundred thousand francs. 34. Item, To surgeon Emmery, one hundred thousand francs. 35. These sums will be raised from the six millions which I deposited on leaving Paris in 1815; and from the interest, at the rate of five per cent, since July 1815. The account will be settled with the banker by Counts Montholon, Bertrand, and Marchand. 36. Whatever that deposit may produce beyond the sum of five million six hundred thousand francs, which have been above disposed of, shall be distributed as a gratuity amongst the wounded at the battle of Waterloo, and amongst the officers and soldiers of the battalion of the isle of Elba, according to a scale to be determined upon by Montholon, Bertrand, Drouot, Cambrone, and the surgeon Larrey. 37. These legacies, in case of death, shall be paid to the widows and children, and in default of such, shall revert to the bulk of my property.

III.

1. My private domain being my property, of which no French law deprives me, that I am aware of, an account of it will be required from the Baron de la Bouillerie, the treasurer thereof; it ought to amount to more than 200,000,000 of francs; namely, 1. The portfolio containing the savings which I made during fourteen years out of my civil list, which amounted to more than 12,000,000 per annum, if my memory be good. 2. The produce of this portfolio. 3. The furniture of my palaces, such as it was in 1814, including the palaces of Rome, Florence, and Turin. All this furniture was purchased with moneys accruing from the civil list. 4. The proceeds of my houses in the kingdom of Italy, such as money, plate, jewels, furniture, equipages; the accounts will be rendered by Prince Eugene, and the steward of the crown, Campagnoni.

NAPOLÉON.

2. I bequeath my private domain, one half to the surviving officers and soldiers of the French army who have fought since 1792 to 1815, for the glory and the independence of the nation. The distribution shall be made in proportion to their appointments upon active service. One half to the towns and districts of Alsace, of Lorraine, of Franche Comté, of Burgundy, of the isle of France, of Champagne Forest, Dauphiné, which may have suffered by either of the invasions. There shall be previously deducted from this sum, one million for the town of Brienne, and one million for that of Meri. I appoint Counts Montholon, Bertrand, and Marchand, the executors of my will.

This present will, wholly written with my own hand, is signed, and sealed with my own arms.

(L. S.)

NAPOLEON.

LIST (A.)

AFFIXED TO MY WILL.

Longwood, Island of St Helena, this 15th April, 1821.

I.

1. The consecrated vessels which have been in use at my chapel at Longwood. 2. I enjoin the Abbé Vignali to preserve them, and to deliver them to my son, when he shall reach the age of sixteen years.

II.

1. My arms, that is to say, my sword, that which I wore at Austerlitz, the sabre of Sobieski, my dagger, my broad sword, my hanger, my two pair of Versailles pistols. 2. My gold travelling box, that of which I made use on the morning of Ulm and of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Eylau, of Friedland, of the island of Lobau, of Moscow, of Monmirail. In this point of view, it is my wish that it may be precious in the eyes of my son. (It has been deposited with Count Bertrand since 1814.) 3. I charge Count Bertrand with the care of preserving these objects, and of conveying them to my son, when he shall attain the age of sixteen years.

III.

1. Three small mahogany boxes, containing, the first, thirty-three snuff-boxes, or comfit-boxes; the second, twelve boxes with the Imperial arms, two small eye-glasses, and four boxes

found on the table of Louis XVIII. in the Tuileries, on the 20th of March, 1815 ; the third, three snuff-boxes, ornamented with silver medals, according to the custom of the Emperor ; and sundry articles for the use of the toilet, according to the lists numbered I., II., III. 2. My field-beds, which I used in all my campaigns. 3. My field telescope. 4. My dressing box, one of each of my uniforms, a dozen of shirts, and a complete set of each of my dresses, and generally of every thing used in my toilet. 5. My wash-hand stand. 6. A small clock which is in my chamber at Longwood. 7. My two watches, and the chain of the Empress's hair. 8. I charge Marchand, my principal valet-de-chambre, to take care of these articles, and to convey them to my son, when he shall attain the age of sixteen years.

IV.

1. My cabinet of medals. 2. My plate, and my Sevres china, which I used at St Helena. (List B and C.) 3. I charge Count Montholon to take care of these articles, and to convey them to my son, when he shall attain the age of sixteen years.

V.

1. My three saddles and bridles, my spurs, which I used at St Helena. 2. My fowling-pieces, to the number of five. 3. I charge my huntsman, Novarre, to take care of these articles, and to convey them to my son, when he shall attain the age of sixteen years.

VI.

1. Four hundred volumes, selected from those in my library, which I have been accustomed to use the most. 2. I charge St Denis to take care of them, and to convey them to my son, when he shall attain the age of sixteen years.

LIST (A.)

1. None of the articles which have been used by me shall be sold : the residue shall be divided amongst the executors of my will and my brothers. 2. Marchand shall preserve my hair, and cause a bracelet to be made of it, with a gold clasp, to be sent to the Empress Marie Louise, to my mother, and to each of my brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, the cardinal, and one of larger size for my son. 3. Marchand will send one pair of my gold shoe-buckles to Prince Joseph. 4. A small pair of gold knee-buckles to Prince Lucien. 5. A gold collar-clasp to Prince Jerome.

LIST (A.)

Inventory of my Effects, which Marchand will take care of, and convey to my Son.

1. My silver dressing-box, that which is on my table, furnished with all its utensils, razors, &c. 2. My alarm-clock : it is the alarm-clock of Frederick II. which I took at Potsdam (in box No. III.) 3. My two watches with the chain of the Empress's hair, and a chain of my own hair for the other watch : Marchand will get it made at Paris. 4. My two seals (one French), contained in box No. III. 5. The small gold clock which is now in my bed-chamber. 6. My wash-stand, its water-jug and foot-bath, &c. 7. My night-table, that which I used in France, and my silver-gilt bidet. 8. My two iron bedsteads, my mattresses, and my coverlets if they can be preserved. 9. My three silver decanters, which held my eau de vie, which my chasseurs carried in the field. 10. My French telescope. 11. My spurs, two pair. 12. Three mahogany boxes, No. I., II., III., containing my snuff-boxes and other articles. 13. A silver-gilt perfuming pan.

Body Linen.

6 shirts, 6 handkerchiefs, 6 cravats, 6 napkins, 6 pair of silk stockings. 6 black stocks, 6 pair of under stockings, 2 pair of cambric sheets, 2 pillow cases, 2 dressing gowns, 2 pair of night drawers, 1 pair of braces, 4 pair of white kerseymere breeches and vests, 6 madras, 6 flannel waistcoats, 6 pair of drawers, 6 pair of gaiters, 1 small box filled with my snuff, [1 gold neck-buckle, 1 pair gold knee-buckles, 1 pair gold shoe-buckles, contained in the little box, No. III.]

Clothes.

1 Uniform of the chasseurs, 1 ditto grenadiers, 1 ditto national guards, 2 hats, 1 green-and-grey great coat, 1 blue cloak (that which I had at Marengo), 1 sable green pelisse, 2 pair of shoes, 2 pair of boots, 2 pair of slippers, 6 belts.

NAPOLEON.

LIST (B.)

Inventory of the Effects which I left in possession of Monsieur the Count de Turenne.

1 Sabre of Sobieski. It is by mistake inserted in List A. It is the sabre which the Emperor wore at Aboukir, which is in the hands of the Count Bertrand. 1 grand collar of the legion of honour, 1 sword, of silver gilt, 1 consular sword, 1 sword, of steel, 1 velvet belt, 1 collar of the golden fleece, 1 small travelling box of steel, 1 ditto of silver, 1 handle of an antique sabre, 1 hat of Henry IV. and a cap, the lace of the Emperor, 1 small cabinet of medals, 2 turkey carpets, 2 mantles, of crimson velvet, embroidered, with vests and small-clothes.

I give to my son the sabre of Sobieski.

Do. the collar of the legion of honour.

Do. the sword, silver gilt.

Do. the consular sword.

Do. the steel sword.

Do. the collar of the golden fleece.

Do. the hat of Henry IV. and the cap.

Do. the golden dressing-box for the teeth, which is in the hands of the dentist.

To the Empress Marie Louise, my lace.

To Madame, the silver night-lamp.

To the Cardinal, the small steel travelling-box.

To Prince Eugene, the wax-candlestick, silver gilt.

To the Princess Pauline, the small travelling-box.

To the Queen of Naples, a small Turkey carpet.

To the Queen Hortense, a small Turkey carpet.

To Prince Jerome, the handle of the antique sabre.

To Prince Joseph, an embroidered mantle, vest, and small-clothes.

To Prince Lucien, an embroidered mantle, vest, and small-clothes.

April 16th, 1821. Longwood.

This is a Codicil to my Will.

1. It is my wish that my ashes may repose on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the French people, whom I loved so well. 2. I bequeath to Counts Bertrand, Montholon, and to Marchand, the money, jewels, plate, china, furniture, books, arms, and generally every thing that belongs to me in the island

of St Helena. This codicil, entirely written with my own hand, is signed, and sealed with my own arms.

(L. s.)

NAPOLEON.

This 24th April, 1821. Longwood.

This is my Codicil, or Note of my last Will.

Out of the settlement of my civil list of Italy, such as money, jewels, plate, linen, equipages, of which the Viceroy is the depositary, and which belonged to me, I dispose of two millions, which I bequeath to my most faithful servants. I hope that, without acting upon the credit of any account, my son, Eugene Napoleon, will pay them faithfully. He cannot forget the forty millions which I gave him in Italy, and in the distribution of the inheritance of his mother.

1. Out of these two millions, I bequeath to Count Bertrand, 300,000 francs, of which he will deposit 100,000 in the treasurer's chest, to be disposed of according to my dispositions, in payment of legacies of conscience. 2. To Count Montholon, 200,000 francs, of which he will deposit 100,000 in the chest, for the same purpose as above mentioned. 3. To Count Las Cases, 200,000, of which he will deposit 100,000 in the chest, for the same purpose as above mentioned. 4. To Marchand, 100,000, of which he will deposit 50,000 in the chest, for the same purpose as above mentioned. 5. To Count Lavalette, 100,000. 6. To General Hogendorf, of Holland, my aide-de-camp, who has retired to the Brazils, 100,000. 7. To my aide-de-camp, Corbineau, 50,000. 8. To my aide-de-camp, General Caffarelli, 50,000 francs. 9. To my aide-de-camp, Dejean, 50,000. 10. To Percy, surgeon-in-chief at Waterloo, 50,000. 11. 50,000, that is to say, 10,000 to Pieron, my maître d'hôtel; 10 000 to St Denis, my head chasseur; 10,000 to Novarre; 10,000 to Cursor, my clerk of the kitchen; 10,000 to Archambaud, my overseer. 12. To Barou Mainevalle, 50,000. 13. To the Duke d'Istria, son of Bessières, 50,000 francs. 14. To the daughter of Dnroc, 50,000 francs. 15. To the children of Labédoyère, 50,000. 16. To the children of Mouton Duvernet, 50,000. 17. To the children of the brave and virtuous General Travost, 50,000. 18. To the children of Chartrand, 50,000. 19. To General Camhrone, 50,000. 20. To General Lefevre Desnouettes, 50,000. 21. To be distributed amongst such proscribed persons as wander in foreign countries, whether they may be French, or Italian, or Belgians, or Dutch, or Spanish, or inha-

bitants of the departments of the Rhine, at the disposal of my executors, 100,000. 22. To be distributed amongst those who suffered amputation, or were severely wounded at Ligny, or Waterloo, who may be still living, according to lists drawn up by my executors, to whom shall be added, Cambrone, Larrey, Percy, and Emmery. The guard shall be paid double; those of the island of Elba quadruple; 200,000 francs.

This codicil is written entirely with my own hand, signed, and sealed with my arms.
NAPOLÉON.

This 24th of April, 1821, at Longwood.

This is a Third Codicil to my Will of the 16th of April.

1. Amongst the diamonds of the crown which were delivered up in 1814, there were some to the value of five or six hundred thousand francs, not belonging to it, but which formed part of my private property; repossession shall be obtained of them, in order to discharge my legacies. 2. I had in the hands of the banker Torlonia, at Rome, bills of exchange to the amount of two or three hundred thousand francs, the produce of my revenues of the island of Elba, since 1815. The Sieur De La Perouse, although no longer my treasurer, and not invested with any character, possessed himself of this sum. He shall be compelled to restore it. 3. I bequeath to the Duke of Istria three hundred thousand francs, of which only one hundred thousand francs shall be reversible to his widow, should the duke be dead at the payment of the legacy. It is my wish, should there be no inconvenience in it, that the duke may marry Duroc's daughter. 4. I bequeath to the Duchess of Frioul, the daughter of Duroc, two hundred thousand francs: should she be dead at the payment of this legacy, none of it shall be given to the mother. 5. I bequeath to General Rigaud (to him who was proscribed), one hundred thousand francs. 6. I bequeath to Boisnod, the intendant commissary, one hundred thousand francs. 7. I bequeath to the children of General Letort, who was killed in the campaign of 1815, one hundred thousand francs. 8. These eight hundred thousand francs of legacies shall be considered as if inserted at the end of Article xxxvi of my testament, which will make the legacies which I have disposed of, by my will, amount to the sum of six million four hundred thousand francs, without comprising the donations which I have made by my second codicil.

This is written with my own hand, signed, and sealed with my arms.
(L. s.)
NAPOLÉON.

[On the outside, nearly at the centre, is written :]

This is my third codicil to my will, entirely written with my own hand, signed, and sealed with my arms.

[The words are intermixed with the signatures of Bertrand, Montholon, Marchand, Vignali, with their respective seals, and a piece of green silk runs through the centre. On the upper left corner are the following directions :]

To be opened the same day, and immediately after the opening of my will.

NAPOLEON.

[With some fragments of the signatures of the above-named witnesses.]

This 24th April, 1821. Longwood.

This is a fourth Codicil to my Testament.

By the dispositions which we have heretofore made, we have not fulfilled all our obligations; which has decided us to make this fourth codicil.

1. We bequeath to the son or grandson of Baron Dutheil, lieutenant-general of artillery, and formerly lord of St André, who commanded the school of Auxonne before the Revolution, the sum of one hundred thousand francs, as a memento of gratitude for the care which that brave general took of us when we were lieutenant and captain under his orders.

2. Item. To the son or grandson of General Dugomier, who commanded in chief the army of Toulon, the sum of one hundred thousand francs. We under his orders directed that siege, and commanded the artillery; it is a testimonial of remembrance for the marks of esteem, of affection, and of friendship, which that brave and intrepid general gave us.

3. Item. We bequeath one hundred thousand francs to the son or grandson of the deputy of the Convention Gasparin, representative of the people at the army of Toulon, for having protected and sanctioned with his authority, the plan which we had given, which procured the capture of that city, and which was contrary to that sent by the Committee of Public Safety. Gasparin placed us, by his protection, under shelter from the persecution and ignorance of the general officers who commanded the army before the arrival of my friend Dugomier.

4. Item. We bequeath one hundred thousand francs to the widow, son, or grandson, of our aide-de-camp, Muiron, killed at our side at Arcola, covering us with his body.

5. Item. Ten thousand francs to the subaltern officer Cantillon, who has undergone a trial, upon the charge of having endeavoured to assassinate Lord Wellington, of which he was pronounced innocent. Cantillon had as much right to assassinate that *oligarchist*, as the latter had to send me to perish upon the rock of St Helena. Wellington, who proposed this outrage, attempted to justify himself by pleading the interest of Great Britain. Cantillon, if he had really assassinated that lord, would have excused himself, and have been justified by the same motives, the interest of France, to get rid of a general, who, moreover, had violated the capitulation of Paris, and by that had rendered himself responsible for the blood of the martyrs Ney, Lahédoyère, &c. ; and for the crime of having pillaged the museums, contrary to the text of the treaties.

6. These four hundred thousand francs shall be added to the six million four hundred thousand of which we have disposed, and will make our legacies amount to six million eight hundred and ten thousand francs ; these four hundred and ten thousand are to be considered as forming part of our testament, article 36 ; and to follow in every thing the same course as the other legacies.

7. The nine thousand pounds sterling which we gave to Count and Countess Montholon, should, if they have been paid, be deducted and carried to the account of the legacies which we have given to him by our testament. If they have not been paid, our notes of hand shall be annulled.

8. In consideration of the legacy given by our will to Count Montholon, the pension of twenty thousand francs granted to his wife, is annulled. Count Montholon is charged to pay it to her.

9. The administration of such an inheritance, until its final liquidation, requiring expenses of offices, of journeys, of missions, of consultations, and of lawsuits, we expect that our testamentary executors shall retain three per cent upon all the legacies, as well upon the six million eight hundred thousand francs, as upon the sums contained in the codicils, and upon the two millions of the private domain.

10. The amount of the same thus retained, shall be deposited in the hands of a treasurer, and disbursed by drafts from our testamentary executors.

11. If the sums arising from the aforesaid deductions be not sufficient to defray the expenses, provision shall be made to that effect, at the expense of the three testamentary executors and the

treasurer, each in proportion to the legacy which we have bequeathed to them in our will and codicils.

12. Should the sums arising from the before-mentioned subtractions be more than necessary, the surplus shall be divided amongst our three testamentary executors and the treasurer, in the proportion of their respective legacies.

13. We nominate Count Las Cases, and in default of him, his son, and in default of the latter, General Drouot, to be treasurer.

This present codicil is entirely written with our hand, signed, and sealed with our arms. NAPOLEON.

This 24th of April, 1821. Longwood.

This is my Codicil or act of my last Will.

Upon the funds remitted in gold to the Empress Maria Louise, my very dear and well-beloved spouse, at Orleans, in 1814. she remains in my debt two millions, of which I dispose by the present codicil, for the purpose of recompensing my most faithful servants, whom moreover I recommend to the protection of my dear Marie Louise.

1. I recommend to the empress to cause the income of thirty thousand francs, which Count Bertrand possessed in the duchy of Parma, and upon the Mont Napoleon at Milan, to be restored to him, as well as the arrears due.

2. I make the same recommendation to her with regard to the Duke of Istria, Duroc's daughter, and others of my servants who have continued faithful to me, and who are always dear to me. She knows them.

3. Out of the above-mentioned two millions, I bequeath three hundred thousand francs to Count Bertrand, of which he will lodge one hundred thousand in the treasurer's chest, to be employed in legacies of conscience, according to my dispositions.

4. I bequeath two hundred thousand to Count Montholon, of which he will lodge one hundred thousand in the treasurer's chest, for the same purpose as above mentioned.

5. Item, Two hundred thousand to Count Las Cases, of which he will lodge one hundred thousand in the treasurer's chest, for the same purpose as above mentioned.

6. Item, To Marchand, one hundred thousand, of which he will place fifty thousand in the treasurer's chest, for the same purpose as above mentioned.

7. To Jean Jerome Levie, the mayor of Ajaccio at the commencement of the Revolution, or to his widow, children, or grandchildren, one hundred thousand francs.

8. To Duroc's daughter, one hundred thousand.

9. To the son of Bessières, Duke of Istria, one hundred thousand.

10. To General Drouot, one hundred thousand.

11. To Count Lavalette, one hundred thousand.

12. Item, One hundred thousand ; that is to say, twenty-five thousand to Piéron, my maître d'hôtel ; twenty-five thousand to Novarre, my huntsman ; twenty-five thousand to St Denis, the keeper of my books ; twenty-five thousand to Santini, my former door-keeper.

13. Item, One hundred thousand ; that is to say, forty thousand to Planta, my orderly officer ; twenty thousand to Hebert, lately housekeeper of Rambouillet, and who belonged to my chamber in Egypt ; twenty thousand to Lavigné, who was lately keeper of one of my stables, and who was my jockey in Egypt ; twenty thousand to Jeanet Dervieux, who was overseer of the stables, and served in Egypt with me.

14. Two hundred thousand francs shall be distributed in alms to the inhabitants of Brienne-le-Chateau, who have suffered most.

15. The three hundred thousand francs remaining, shall be distributed to the officers and soldiers of my guard at the island of Elba, who may be now alive, or to their widows or children, in proportion to their appointments ; and according to an estimate which shall be fixed by my testamentary executors. Those who have suffered amputation, or have been severely wounded, shall receive double : The estimate of it to be fixed by Larrey and Emmerly.

This codicil is written entirely with my own hand, signed, and sealed with my arms.

NAPOLEON.

[On the back of the codicil is written :]

This is my codicil, or act of my last will—the execution of which I recommend to my dearest wife, the Empress Marie Louise. (L. s.)

NAPOLEON.

[Attested by the following witnesses, whose seals are respectively affixed :]

MONTHOLON,	}	A piece of green silk.
BERTRAND,		
MARCHAND,		
VIGNALI.		

6th Codicil.

Monsieur Lafitte, I remitted to you, in 1815, at the moment of my departure from Paris, a sum of near six millions, for which you have given me a receipt and duplicate. I have cancelled one of the receipts, and I charge Count Montholon to present you with the other receipt, in order that you may pay to him, after my death, the said sum, with interest at the rate of five per cent, from the 1st of July, 1815, deducting the payments which you have been instructed to make by virtue of my orders.

It is my wish that the settlement of your account may be agreed upon between you, Count Montholon, Count Bertrand, and the Sieur Marchand ; and this settlement being made, I give you, by these presents, a complete and absolute discharge from the said sum.

I also, at that time, placed in your hands a box, containing my cabinet of medals. I beg you will give it to Count Montholon.

This letter having no other object, I pray God, Monsieur Lafitte, to have you in his holy and good keeping.

NAPOLEON.

*Longwood, Island of St Helena,
the 25th April, 1821.*

7th Codicil.

Monsieur le Baron Laboullerie, treasurer of my private domain, I beg you to deliver the account and the balance, after my death, to Count Montholon, whom I have charged with the execution of my will.

This letter having no other object, I pray God, Monsieur le Baron Laboullerie, to have you in his holy and good keeping.

NAPOLEON.

*Longwood, Island of St Helena,
the 25th April, 1821.*

END OF VOLUME SIXTEENTH.





